Context:

• A debate has emerged over the allocation of India's ₹1 lakh crore Deep-Tech Fund, following reports that 62% of the first funding round went to companies linked to members of the selection committee.
• While transparency and accountability are essential, an excessive focus on perceived conflicts of interest without understanding the structure of India's deep-tech ecosystem may undermine the country's technological ambitions.

Deep-Tech and Initiatives:

• Deep-Tech: If innovation is the match between problems (customer needs or opportunities) and solutions (technologies, business models etc), then deep tech is that part of the solution space based on breakthrough science and engineering (such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, robotics, and semiconductors).
• Fund:
  • India’s primary national initiative for deep-tech is the Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Fund, approved by the Union Cabinet on July 1, 2025.
  • The RDI Scheme is a ₹1-lakh crore multi-year outlay administered under the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) to catalyze private-sector research and scale deep-tech capabilities.
  • Financial instruments utilized by the framework involve long-term low-interest or zero-interest loans, direct equity support, and contributions to a dedicated Deep-Tech Fund of Funds.

Why the Controversy Arose?

• A media investigation highlighted that a majority of the first batch of selected ventures had associations with committee members, raising concerns about conflict of interest in the use of public funds.
• Though this raises the legitimate need to scrutinise public expenditure, the controversy overlooks the design and operational realities of the Deep-Tech Fund.

Understanding the Fund's Structure:

• A multi-year, multi-manager fund:
  • The ₹1 lakh crore Deep-Tech Fund is designed to be deployed over five years, not through a single funding cycle.
  • Multiple fund managers are expected to allocate resources; but only two have been appointed so far.
  • The Technology Development Board's first batch of fund disbursements represents only a small fraction of the overall programme.
• Why the first cohort appeared concentrated?
  • Applications were processed on a first-come, first-served
  • Early applicants were naturally drawn from India's existing deep-tech ecosystem, whose members were already familiar with the programme.
  • According to the Board, only 1 of 13 companies in the second cohort has links with committee members, indicating that the initial pattern was a result of sequencing rather than systematic favouritism.

Conflict of Interest - The Central Issue and Why Overlap Exists:

• India's deep-tech ecosystem remains relatively small.
• The limited number of experienced investors, scientists, mentors and entrepreneurs means that leading experts have inevitably interacted with many promising ventures through mentoring, funding or board participation.
• Consequently, complete separation between experts and applicants is difficult without sacrificing domain expertise.

Institutional Safeguards in Place:

• The system manages rather than ignores potential conflicts through several safeguards -
  • Companies founded, owned or operated by committee members are ineligible.
  • Firms in which a member holds more than 10% ownership are automatically disqualified.
  • Members must disclose interests not only in applicant firms but also in competing firms.
  • Members with conflicts are required to recuse themselves, with recusals formally recorded.
  • Funding decisions require a super-majority, reducing the influence of individual members.
  • Government support is capped at 50% of project cost, ensuring private participation.
  • Final approvals undergo an additional review by the Board of Secretaries.
• These mechanisms aim to preserve integrity while retaining specialised expertise.

Outcome-Based vs Process-Based Evaluation:

• The effectiveness of the fund should ultimately be judged by outcomes rather than perceptions.
• The more relevant questions are -
  • Were genuinely deserving deep-tech ventures financed?
  • Were capable firms unfairly excluded?
  • Did the investments strengthen India's technological capabilities?
• The governance should evaluate decision quality based on information available at the time rather than retrospective assumptions.

Potential Risks of Excessive Suspicion:

• The sensational reporting focused solely on conflict of interest may produce unintended consequences.
• For example,
  • Discouraging talented scientists and entrepreneurs from participating in government initiatives.
  • Reducing the willingness of globally reputed experts to serve on public committees.
  • Weakening investor confidence in India's emerging deep-tech ecosystem.
  • Slowing innovation through excessive procedural caution, thereby affecting India's technological competitiveness.

The Larger Policy Questions:

• Instead of focusing exclusively on governance controversies, the greater attention should be paid to structural challenges such as -
  • Availability of follow-on capital for scaling deep-tech ventures.
  • Development of larger venture funds for strategic technologies.
  • Creation of sovereign or strategic innovation funds through monetisation of public assets.
  • Strengthening India's long-term financing ecosystem for emerging technologies.
• These issues will determine whether India can build globally competitive deep-tech industries.

Balancing Accountability with Innovation:

• The media scrutiny should not be rejected, rather, informed oversight must distinguish between genuine malpractice and unavoidable ecosystem characteristics.
• In a democracy, accountability remains indispensable, but excessive suspicion can create policy paralysis, discourage expert participation and weaken strategic national initiatives.
• The challenge is to maintain robust governance without undermining innovation, particularly in sectors critical to technological self-reliance, economic security and global competitiveness.

Conclusion:

• India's deep-tech ambitions require both institutional integrity and risk-tolerant innovation financing.
• The challenge for policymakers is to design governance frameworks that ensure transparency while enabling experts to accelerate technological advancement rather than deterring them through excessive procedural caution.

Context

• The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA), signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, marks a significant shift in West Asian security.
• Emerging amid the U.S.-Iran conflict, regional instability and uncertainty over American security guarantees, it reflects Saudi Arabia’s effort to diversify its strategic partnerships.
• Though its collective-defence provision resembles NATO’s Article 5, the MJDA is better viewed as an experiment in regional security diversification than a prospective Muslim NATO.

A Shifting and Uncertain Regional Order

• West Asia is experiencing growing instability due to Israeli assertiveness, Iranian tensions, non-state actors and disruptions around strategic maritime chokepoints.
• Saudi Arabia has responded through multiple arrangements, including its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan and a Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance.
• The MJDA remains strategically ambiguous. It does not identify a specific adversary or establish its relationship with the GCC, Arab League or OIC.
• Riyadh has also denied that it represents a military axis or sectarian bloc. This ambiguity offers flexibility but raises questions about its deterrent credibility.

Historical and Strategic Contradictions

• The three partners possess significant strategic differences.
• Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have historical mistrust rooted in Ottoman rule, while Ankara’s earlier support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other regional groups has unsettled Gulf monarchies.
• Pakistan presents different challenges. Its previous military deployments to Saudi Arabia generated disagreements over command structures and Islamabad’s reluctance to confront Iran or Yemen.
• Its 900-kilometre border with Iran, domestic security pressures and rivalry with India further constrain its strategic choices.
• Thus, although the partners share broad interests, their divergent priorities could limit the emergence of a cohesive military bloc. 

Saudi Arabia’s Security Imperatives

• The MJDA is primarily driven by Saudi security requirements.
• Riyadh faces asymmetric threats to oil facilities, civilian infrastructure and maritime routes, alongside risks involving the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.
• Yet Türkiye and Pakistan may not possess the capabilities required to counter such threats effectively.
• Even the U.S., with its advanced military presence, has struggled to eliminate these vulnerabilities.
• Hence, the MJDA is unlikely to replace American protection; instead, it represents strategic hedging and additional security insurance.

Complementarity and Defence Cooperation

• Despite its limitations, the partnership offers substantial complementarities.
• Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and defence spending, Türkiye possesses a growing defence-industrial complex, and Pakistan provides a large and experienced military force.
• Cooperation in joint military exercises, weapons interoperability, defence technology, intelligence-sharing and co-production of military equipment could strengthen all three partners.
• The arrangement could also enhance Türkiye’s and Pakistan’s political and economic influence in Saudi Arabia.

The Iran Question and the Limits of the Alliance

• Iran remains the central strategic complication. Türkiye and Pakistan share borders and significant interests with Tehran and are unlikely to welcome automatic involvement in a war against Iran.
• Consequently, the MJDA may prove most effective as a mechanism of deterrence and strategic coordination rather than as an instrument for major warfare.
• Continued low-intensity conflict could increase its relevance, while a full-scale war could expose divisions among the partners. Conversely, regional peace could make the agreement less necessary.

The Declining Certainty of Pax Americana

• The MJDA reflects growing doubts about the reliability of an exclusively U.S.-led security system.
• Saudi Arabia appears to be pursuing multipolar security arrangements rather than abandoning Washington altogether.
• This represents a broader transition from dependence on a single external guarantor towards greater regional strategic autonomy.
• Riyadh’s objective appears to be diversification of security partnerships and reduction of vulnerability to sudden shifts in American policy.

Implications for India

• Pakistan’s participation could provide Islamabad with greater diplomatic leverage and encourage attempts to use the MJDA against India. Nevertheless, New Delhi should avoid overreaction.
• Saudi Arabia has deep and expanding economic relations with India, including strong energy and trade interests.
• Riyadh is therefore unlikely to jeopardise its relationship with India merely to support Pakistani adventurism.
• India should pursue strategic vigilance without strategic overreaction, while deepening economic, maritime, energy and diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Conclusion

• The MJDA is neither an inconsequential diplomatic gesture nor the immediate foundation of a Muslim NATO.
• It represents Saudi Arabia’s search for strategic autonomy, Türkiye’s regional ambitions and Pakistan’s quest for greater strategic relevance.
• Its future depends on overcoming historical mistrust, reconciling divergent interests and developing credible defence cooperation.
• For India, the appropriate response is careful monitoring, deeper Gulf engagement and strategic autonomy rather than alarm.
• Ultimately, the MJDA’s significance will be determined by whether it can convert political commitments into effective deterrence, interoperability and regional security coordination.

Why in the News?

• The delimitation debate has intensified as the Centre pushes for a constitutional amendment to redraw Lok Sabha constituencies, with the exercise set to be triggered once data from the 2027 Census is published.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About Delimitation (Meaning, Constitutional Provisions, etc.)
• News Summary

About Delimitation

• Delimitation is the process of fixing the number of seats and redrawing the boundaries of territorial constituencies for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, based on population data from the latest Census. It involves two distinct exercises:
  • Reallocation of seats among States and Union Territories based on their population share.
  • Redrawing of constituency boundaries within each State.
• The exercise is carried out by an independent Delimitation Commission, whose orders have the force of law and cannot be challenged in court.
• Constitutional Provisions
  • Article 81: Deals with the composition of the Lok Sabha and requires that seats be allocated among States, "so far as practicable," on the basis of a national average population per seat.
  • Article 82: Provides for readjustment of seats and constituency boundaries after every Census.
• The maximum number of Lok Sabha seats permitted by the Constitution is 550.

The Freeze on Seat Reallocation

• The last time Lok Sabha seats were reallocated among States was in 1973, based on the 1971 Census. That ratio continues to apply today.
• On two occasions, in 1976 and 2001, Parliament deliberately froze the reallocation of seats among States. The freeze was extended until the first Census after 2026.
• The last delimitation exercise, set up in July 2002 after the 2001 Census, only redrew constituencies within States without altering the seat share of individual States.
• Its recommendations were implemented in 2008, and the 2009 Lok Sabha elections were held on the newly drawn constituencies.

News Summary

• The Union government plans to initiate a fresh delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies which requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament to pass a constitutional amendment. An amendment was moved in April 2026 but could not be passed.
• The proposals placed before Parliament in the previous session were:
  • Increase the size of the Lok Sabha to a maximum of 850 seats.
  • Distribute these seats among the States based on the 2011 Census through a fresh, country-wide delimitation.
  • Reserve one-third of the total seats for women.
• Is a Constitutional Amendment Necessary?
  • A constitutional amendment is not required for a fresh delimitation to take place. The terms for the next delimitation are already written into Articles 81 and 82.
  • An amendment is needed only if the existing constitutional provisions are to be changed, for instance, to raise the ceiling of 550 seats, or to use the 2011 Census instead of the 2027 Census as the basis.
• What Happens Without an Amendment?
  • If no amendment is passed, the following sequence will unfold once the 2027 Census data is published:
    • Reallocation of the existing Lok Sabha strength among States and Union Territories based on the 2027 Census population.
    • Delimitation of individual constituencies within each State.
    • Implementation of women's reservation, which under existing provisions can be rolled out only along with delimitation.
  • Notably, reservations for women would apply to one-third of seats nationally as well as one-third of the seats within each State.

Which States Could Gain or Lose

• The core political tension arises from differential population growth across States.
• At present, the distribution of 543 Lok Sabha seats is based on 1971 Census figures. Once the benchmark shifts to the population recorded in the first Census after 2026:
  • Southern States are likely to face a reduction in their share of Lok Sabha seats.
  • Hindi-speaking States, particularly Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan, are likely to gain seats.
• This is because southern States achieved population stabilisation earlier, while several northern States continued to record higher growth rates.
• The Unequal Value of Votes
  • The freeze on seat reallocation has created significant disparities in the value of each vote.
  • In 1967, an MP across most major States represented roughly four to five lakh electors. Today:
    • An MP from Kerala represents about 14 lakh electors.
    • An MP from Uttar Pradesh or Bihar represents around 19 lakh electors.
    • The current national average would be about 18 lakh voters per constituency.

The Central Tension: Federalism vs Democracy

• Article 81 requires seats to be allocated among States "so far as practicable" on the basis of a national average. This deliberate flexibility allows for a balance between two principles that can pull in opposite directions:
  • Federalism: The representation of States as units of the Union, which argues against penalising States for successful population control.
  • Democracy: The principle of one person, one vote, one value, which argues that every vote should carry equal weight regardless of where it is cast.
• Resolving this tension is the central challenge of the delimitation debate.

The Problem of Gerrymandering

• Equal numbers of voters per constituency do not by themselves guarantee equal value for every vote.
• The way voters are grouped can dramatically affect electoral outcomes. This manipulation of boundaries is called gerrymandering.
• Consider a simple illustration. Suppose there are 50 voters, Party A has 20 supporters and Party B has 30, spread across five constituencies of 10 voters each.
  • Fair distribution: Voters are distributed evenly, and the result broadly reflects the overall vote share, with each party winning seats roughly in proportion to its support.
  • Cracking: Party A's voters are spread thinly across all constituencies. Despite holding 40% of the total vote, Party A may fail to win even a single seat, leaving 40% of voters without representation.
  • Packing: Party B's voters are heavily concentrated in a few constituencies. Party B wins those seats by huge margins but wastes votes elsewhere, allowing Party A to win more seats overall despite having fewer supporters.
• This demonstrates that the drawing of constituency boundaries can profoundly shape democratic representation, independent of population equality.

Way Forward

• Broad political consensus across parties and regions before finalising any amendment.
• Transparent criteria for both seat reallocation and boundary drawing.
• Safeguards against gerrymandering through independent oversight and public consultation.
• Consideration of compensatory mechanisms for States that stabilised populations, such as greater representation in the Rajya Sabha or fiscal devolution adjustments.
• Clear timelines so that the exercise does not create uncertainty around election cycles.
• Public awareness about what delimitation involves and how it affects representation.

Why in news?

Recently, the Lok Sabha passed the Bankers' Books Evidence Bill, 2026, aiming to overhaul the colonial-era Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891.

While legal experts have welcomed this technological update, they have flagged concerns over data privacy and the absence of robust digital safeguards.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Why the Old Law Needed Replacement?
• Key Change: Expanded Definition of "Bankers' Books"
• Standardising Digital Evidence
• Clarifying "Special Cause"
• Concern Over Police Powers
• Missed Opportunities: Data Protection Gaps

Why the Old Law Needed Replacement?

• The 135-year-old Act allowed certified copies of bank records to be used as evidence in court, sparing bank officials the burden of physically producing original ledgers each time.
• However, the law was framed when banking records were predominantly maintained in physical form.
• With the growth of digital banking, bank records today are increasingly created, stored, and maintained using modern technology — necessitating a modernised legal framework.

Key Change: Expanded Definition of "Bankers' Books"

• Old law: Defined bankers' books narrowly as records "kept in written form or stored in a micro film, magnetic tape or in any other form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval mechanism."
• 2026 Bill: Recognises records stored in electronic or digital form, whether onsite, offsite, or in virtual/cloud locations — bringing the law in line with contemporary banking practices.

Standardising Digital Evidence

• To ensure courts can trust digital records, the Bill introduces specific certificate formats and conditions for presenting such evidence.
• Experts compared this to the Section 63 certificate required for electronic evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, calling it a major improvement — it provides a defined format and undertakings so courts can be satisfied of a copy's genuineness.

Clarifying "Special Cause"

• Under the 1891 Act, bank officers could not be compelled to produce records or appear as witnesses in cases where the bank wasn't a party — unless a court ordered it for "special cause," a term the old Act never defined.
• The 2026 Bill defines "special cause" as situations where:
  • The accuracy of the record is doubtful;
  • Regular record-keeping has been interrupted;
  • The bank disobeys an inspection order.
• Analysts noted this will streamline commercial litigation, such as cheque bounce cases, since bank officials won't be dragged into court unnecessarily, and electronic records can be directly admitted as evidence — reducing case lifespans.

Concern Over Police Powers

• Section 11 of the Bill allows court orders compelling production of bank records for investigations to be treated as orders from an officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP).
• This is not a new power — Section 8 of the 1891 Act contained an identical provision. Experts called concerns over this a "red herring."
• However, others pointed out that since records are now electronic, they can be obtained and shared far more easily (even via phone), raising the risk of data leaks and privacy breaches — unlike physical books, which were harder to copy or share.
• They suggested such access should require court authorisation.

Missed Opportunities: Data Protection Gaps

• No safeguards like hash values: The Bill should have incorporated hash values — a unique digital fingerprint verifying that an electronic file hasn't been tampered with — to preserve evidence integrity, since lawyers and judges currently struggle to prove or disprove digital documents.
• No data protection framework: Experts questioned whether Indian banks are prepared for data leaks and manipulation, noting the Bill doesn't address data protection at all.
• Unrealistic certification burden: Analsts criticised the Bill's requirement that a branch head certify that the bank's network and devices are secure from cyber threats.
  • In a centralised banking environment, branch managers typically lack knowledge of the data centre or cloud provider's cybersecurity status.
  • Hence, experts suggested a modular certification system with designated technical officers instead.
• Section 4 concerns: This provision lets the Union government extend the law's provisions to any financial entity via notification. Critics warned that loosely regulated digital lenders or fintech platforms shouldn't automatically receive the same reliability presumption as scheduled commercial banks without Parliamentary approval.
• Litigation risk from wholesale replacement: Replacing the Act entirely could cause interpretation issues, as parties dispute whether new definitions apply to ongoing trials — with pending cases likely to be the "first casualty."

Conclusion

The Bill rightly modernises a 135-year-old law to reflect India's digital banking reality, easing litigation and standardising electronic evidence.

Yet, without robust safeguards like tamper-proof verification and clear data protection provisions, this legal upgrade risks creating new vulnerabilities even as it resolves old ones.

Why in news?

Gujarat's first generation of privately developed ports — Pipavav and Mundra — are approaching the end of their original 30-year concession periods.

Despite the approaching deadlines, the state government has not yet announced a formal policy framework for extending operating rights, putting Gujarat's next phase of port policy under scrutiny.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• BOOT Model
• Background: Gujarat's Port Privatisation Model
• The Two Ports in Focus
• Why the Delay Matters: An Investment Concern?
• How Other States Compare?
• A Signal from Gujarat's New Shipbuilding Policy

BOOT Model

• BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) is a public-private partnership (PPP) model used for developing infrastructure projects. Under this model:
  • A private developer builds the infrastructure (like a port, highway, or power plant) using its own capital.
  • The developer owns and operates the asset for a fixed concession period (typically 20-30 years), earning revenue through user charges, tariffs, or tolls.
  • At the end of the concession period, ownership of the asset transfers back to the government, usually free of cost or at a nominal value.
• It is a variant of the broader BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) family of models, distinguished by the explicit "ownership" phase held by the private developer during the concession period.
• How It Works: The Logic?
  • The government lacks the capital or technical capacity to build large infrastructure alone.
  • Under BOOT, it invites private players to fund, construct, and run the project, allowing them to recover costs and earn profit over the concession period.
  • Since the asset eventually reverts to the state, public ownership of strategic infrastructure is preserved in the long run.

Background: Gujarat's Port Privatisation Model

• In the late 1990s, Gujarat opened its coastline to private investors under a 1997 Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)
• Private developers were given rights to build and operate ports for an initial concession period of 30 years, after which assets would revert to the government unless agreements were extended.
• This model helped Gujarat emerge as India's largest maritime State, attracting billions of dollars in investment and handling a substantial share of the country's cargo traffic.

The Two Ports in Focus

• Pipavav Port: Operated by APM Terminals Pipavav (part of Netherlands-based APM Terminals group). Its 30-year BOOT concession, signed in 1998, is scheduled to end on September 29, 2028 — making it the first of Gujarat's original private ports to reach the end of its term.
• Mundra Port: Operated by Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone (APSEZ). Its concession expires on February 16, 2031.

Why the Delay Matters: An Investment Concern

• The lack of clarity is increasingly seen as an investment issue, not just a contractual one.
• Port infrastructure requires continuous investment in dredging, mechanisation, deeper berths, rail connectivity, and cargo-handling facilities.
• Without certainty on post-concession operations, developers may hesitate to commit fresh capital with long payback periods.
• This concern has already surfaced publicly:
  • In October 2025, APM Terminals Pipavav signed a non-binding ₹17,000-crore investment memorandum with the Gujarat government, but indicated major investments would follow only after concession clarity.
  • APSEZ's Whole-time Director and CEO said the company expects the Pipavav decision to precede Mundra's, given Pipavav's earlier 2028 deadline, and that discussions are underway.

How Other States Compare

• Newer port projects across India have adopted longer concession horizons than Gujarat's original 30-year model:
  • Andhra Pradesh (Gangavaram, Krishnapatnam) - 30 years + 20-year extension = up to 50 years
  • Kerala (Vizhinjam) - 40 years + 20-year extension = up to 60 years
  • Odisha (Dhamra) - 34-year initial period (including construction), extendable
• Notably, both Gangavaram and Krishnapatnam are now part of APSEZ's own portfolio, following Adani Group's acquisition of controlling stakes.

A Signal from Gujarat's New Shipbuilding Policy

• Gujarat's newly unveiled shipbuilding policy offers the clearest hint yet of the state's direction.
• Developers setting up new shipyards can now secure waterfront concessions of up to 50 years, replacing the earlier 30-year tenure.
• Industry executives interpret this as recognition that large maritime infrastructure needs long-term policy certainty to justify multi-billion-rupee investments.
• This longer-concession approach is also shaping Gujarat's upcoming greenfield port projects.
• For six new ports planned along the coastline — Nana Layja (Kutch), Vadhera (Amreli), Vadodra Jhala (Gir Somnath), Damka (Surat), Lakhanka (Bhavnagar), and Bhogat (Devbhumi Dwarka) — the GMB has indicated concession periods could range between 30 and 50 years, with the final tenure decided during bidding.
• These will also follow the BOOT model.

Conclusion

As Gujarat's pioneering port concessions approach expiry, its policy response will test whether the state can match the longer-term certainty now offered by rivals like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.

The outcome will shape not just coastal investment in Gujarat, but the broader template for India's maritime infrastructure growth.

About Mount Bromo:

• It is a small but active volcanic cinder cone located on the Indonesian island of Java.
• It is located in the center of the Sandsea Caldera, itself only a portion of the larger Tengger Caldera.
• The historical record indicates eruptions of Bromo every few years since 1804, and geologic evidence indicates eruptions at least several hundred years earlier.
• The most recent eruption occured in 2004 and tragically killed two tourists.

About Exercise Pitch Black 2026:

• It is a biennial and multinational exercise hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
• It is the RAAF’s flagship international flying exercise.
• The name ‘Pitch Black’ was derived from the emphasis on nighttime flying over large unpopulated areas.
• 2026 Edition:
  • It was based out of RAAF Bases Darwin and Tindal in the Northern Territory, as well as RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland.
  • It featured a massive assembly of global air forces, providing an unparalleled platform for interoperability.  
  • The exercise focused on highly complex aerial manoeuvres, including offensive counter-air operations, air defence tracking, and tactical coordination between completely different styles of aircraft and communication systems.
  • The IAF contingent consisted of 145 air warriors including the IAF Commandos team, Garuds, four Su-30 MKI, one C-130, and one C-17 for logistic support for induction and de-induction.
  • For the IAF, training alongside advanced air assets from nations like the US, UK, Australia, France, and regional partners offers crucial exposure to contemporary air warfare tactics, electronic warfare defence, and modern network-centric operations.
  • Previous participation of India: The IAF has previously participated in the 2018, 2022, and 2024 editions of this exercise.