Why in news?

BRICS leaders gathered at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 12, 2026, with India holding the chair.

Against this backdrop, analysts argue that India should focus on the New Development Bank (NDB) as the most practical avenue for BRICS cooperation. Strengthening the NDB through greater capital, wider membership and local-currency lending can make the grouping relevant without advancing Beijing's strategic position.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Representation Grievance
• Why BRICS Lacks a Coherent Identity?
• The NDB: BRICS' Most Tangible Tool
• The NDB's Underperformance
• Breaking the Asset Bottleneck
• What the NDB Has Done for India?
• The Local-Currency Advantage
• Pushing the Rupee Bond

The Representation Grievance

• BRICS' economic and demographic weight has not translated into institutional influence:
  • In 2011, the five original members contributed 20 per cent of global GDP but held only 11 per cent of voting share at the IMF.
  • Today, the expanded grouping accounts for nearly 40 per cent of global GDP and 55 per cent of the world's population, yet its IMF voting share has barely grown.

Why BRICS Lacks a Coherent Identity?

• The grouping is divided over its purpose. Russia, China and Iran want it to be anti-West. India, Brazil and South Africa see it as non-West.
• Given these divergences and the importance of India-US ties, Delhi cannot join the Beijing-Moscow de-dollarisation campaign. Doing so would worsen already strained relations with Washington and would be unsustainable in the medium term.
• India's approach must therefore work within the constraints of membership: maximising the grouping's potential without strengthening Beijing.
• Within these limits, the NDB offers real possibilities.

The NDB: BRICS' Most Tangible Tool

• The NDB was established by BRICS countries in 2015 to mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging markets and developing countries.
• It is the grouping's most concrete instrument, and one that can contribute to the global financial order without directly challenging American predominance.

The NDB's Underperformance

• Despite a decade in operation, the NDB has lagged well behind its peer, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established around the same time:
  • Projects approved – 139 (NDB); 350 (AIIB)
  • Commitments ~$43 billion (NDB); ~$69 billion (AIIB)
  • Members - Mostly core members (NDB); 111 approved members (AIIB)
  • Credit rating - AA/AA+ (NDB); AAA (AIIB)
• Additional weaknesses:
  • Stagnant asset growth restricts lending capacity.
  • Disbursement is exceptionally slow. Only about $20 billion of approved loans has actually been disbursed.
  • China and India together account for 51 per cent of the active portfolio.
  • Transport infrastructure takes the largest share (38 per cent), followed by COVID-19 emergency assistance (25 per cent).

Breaking the Asset Bottleneck

• One solution is for the five founders to raise their paid-up capital. But this faces obstacles:
  • Russia, heavily sanctioned, cannot match higher commitments.
  • Sanctions have strained the bank's credit standing and raised its dollar funding costs.
  • Ironically, though Moscow and Beijing champion de-dollarisation, the NDB has extended no new credit to Russia since March 2022 to protect its AA/AA+ rating.
  • The bank's rules mandate equal voting shares among founders, so capital expansion is effectively held hostage by its financially weakest member.
  • New members can bring fresh capital, but the founders' collective voting share cannot fall below 55 per cent.

What the NDB Has Done for India?

• The bank has served India well. It has committed nearly $10 billion across 32 projects, including metro rail systems and the Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System (RRTS) corridor.
• Expanding the NDB to match other multilateral lenders would require extending such benefits to many more emerging markets and developing countries.

The Local-Currency Advantage

• A notable strength of the NDB is its preference for local-currency lending. This appeals to emerging economies facing sustained foreign-exchange volatility due to global military and economic wars.
• It offers a way to reduce reliance on the dollar without replacing it as the currency for trade invoicing.
• The bank's 2022-26 General Strategy commits to 30 per cent of lending and borrowing in members' local currencies, though most remains in dollars.
• However, existing local-currency activity is heavily skewed towards the Renminbi. The NDB recently priced a ¥7 billion (about $1.04 billion) three-year Panda bond in the China Interbank bond market.

Pushing the Rupee Bond

• Analysts urge India to push the long-delayed rupee bond over the line.
• A rupee bond programme was floated in March 2026 to mobilise around Rs 25,000 crore over five years
• Since the 2026 New Delhi Declaration did not include a meaningful agreement on mobilising the NDB, India's BRICS focus next year should be on simpler fixes to local-currency challenges.

Conclusion

• Unlike the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose recent summit produced bare-minimum outcomes, BRICS has tangible economic tools and its widest membership ever.
• In a world drifting towards "subscription multilateralism," exemplified by Washington's pay-to-shape-the-rules Board of Peace, these concrete arrangements are what will set BRICS apart.

Why in news?

Copper prices recently rose to an all-time high of $14,708 per tonne, even though the global economic outlook is uncertain because of trade disputes, the conflict in West Asia and general instability.

Three-month copper futures on the London Metal Exchange (LME) stayed above $14,000 per tonne for most of August before climbing further in September. As per the experts, this rally is driven less by economic optimism and more by anticipation of US tariffs on refined copper.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• A Rally After Volatility
• Why Copper Prices Matter?
• The Real Driver: Anticipation of US Tariffs
• Stockpiling and the Inventory Shift
• The Arbitrage Factor
• Supply Constraints and the Outlook
• Other Factors
• Conclusion

A Rally After Volatility

• The rise follows a turbulent period:
  • Copper crossed $12,000 per tonne in December 2025, recording its biggest annual gain since 2009.
  • Prices cooled to $11,929.5 per tonne in March 2026 amid fears that higher energy costs from the West Asia conflict would slow global growth and weaken demand for industrial commodities.
• The current surge has reversed that decline sharply.

Why Copper Prices Matter?

• Copper, often called the "red metal", is essential to the modern economy. Its uses span:
  • Housing and manufacturing
  • Power grids and clean energy
  • Artificial intelligence infrastructure
  • Defence
• Because of this wide industrial use, copper prices are treated as a barometer of economic health.
• Rising prices normally signal robust growth, while falling prices raise fears of a slowdown.
• Copper is sometimes nicknamed "Dr Copper" for this reason. However, the present rally tells a different story.

The Real Driver: Anticipation of US Tariffs

• Industry insiders say the surge stems mainly from concerns over potential US tariffs that could take effect from January 2027. These expected duties are already reshaping trade flows and inventories.
• The tariff picture so far:
  • In August 2025, President Donald Trump imposed a 50 per cent tariff on semi-finished and derivative copper imports.
  • Refined copper has so far been exempt.
  • A proposal now exists to impose a 15 per cent tariff on refined copper imports from January 2027, rising to 30 per cent in 2028.

Stockpiling and the Inventory Shift

• In anticipation of tariffs, traders are moving copper out of LME warehouses into US COMEX (Commodity Exchange) warehouses.
• This has created a shortage of tradeable copper stocks on the LME and pushed futures prices up.
• The current inventory distribution highlights the imbalance:
  • LME: about 2,65,000 tonnes
  • Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE): about 63,000 tonnes
  • US COMEX: about 7,00,000 tonnes
• Refined copper has been "front-loaded" into the US market amid tariff uncertainty, while low inventories in London and Shanghai indicate tighter availability outside the US.

The Arbitrage Factor

• The price gap between exchanges has created arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage arises when the same commodity is priced differently in two markets.
• Traders buy copper in the cheaper market and sell it simultaneously in the costlier one, profiting from the difference.
  • The current LME-COMEX gap is estimated at $400–500 per tonne.
• However, industry sources stress that arbitrage is only a secondary factor. The primary driver is stockpiling ahead of the expected tariff.

Supply Constraints and the Outlook

• Analysts identified two additional reasons for elevated prices: constrained mine supply and the ongoing geographical rebalancing of inventories.
  • Chile’s copper shipments fell to their lowest level in more than a year in August despite the sharp increase in prices.
• But they also flagged a downside risk. If the US tariff is delayed significantly or set lower than expected, the inventory flows could reverse.
• Accumulated US stocks would then flood global markets, pushing prices down and squeezing the profitability of upstream producers.

Other Factors

• AI and data centres: The rapid expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure is creating additional demand for copper.
  • Data centres use the metal in power systems, cooling infrastructure and network equipment.
• Power grids and renewable energy: Global investments in electricity transmission and distribution networks, renewable energy projects and battery storage are also supporting copper demand as economies expand electrification.
• Electric vehicles: EVs require significantly more copper than conventional internal combustion engine vehicles, with industry estimates suggesting they use roughly six times as much copper.

Conclusion

The record copper price is a product of tariff anticipation, cross-border stockpiling and supply constraints rather than strong economic fundamentals.

This shows how trade policy can distort commodity markets independent of demand. For India, which is racing alongside China and the US to secure copper supplies, sustained high prices raise input costs for power, infrastructure and clean energy sectors.

Context:

• Cash transfers have become a regular feature of Indian politics, in the form of free electricity, free bus travel, monthly payments to women, subsidised food and utility subsidies.
• Experts argue that governments attach lofty purposes such as dignity and empowerment to these schemes but rarely publish the evidence linking payments to outcomes. They call for rigorous accountability before and after rollout.
• This article highlights the growing role of cash transfers in Indian politics, their expanding fiscal footprint, the evidence gap surrounding their outcomes, and the need for stronger accountability.

The Speenhamland Lesson

• In May 1795, English magistrates met at the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland, Berkshire.
• With food prices rising and the French Revolution unsettling the establishment, they decided to top up agricultural wages from parish funds, linking payouts to bread prices and family size.
• Hungarian economic historian Karl Polanyi later saw this as an early assertion of a human "right to live" against the harshness of the market. Critics disagreed.
• Once wage support, poor relief and public finance were merged into one instrument, it became unclear what the system was protecting: poor families, the wage structure, employers or social peace.
• Subsidising wages from public funds blurred price signals and weakened incentives.
• Analysts draw a clear lesson: relief may be justified, but the instrument must still be judged by its effects. India's dole politics must face the same test.

Why Cash Support Matters in India?

• Cash transfers can be essential in a poor, informal economy. The Economic Survey 2025-26 notes that transfers to women amount to:
  • 11–24 per cent of the monthly income of women daily-wage workers;
  • 11–87 per cent of the income of self-employed women.
• However, a transfer that begins as relief can become a permanent fiscal commitment unless there is a clear account of who receives it, what it changes and what it displaces.

The Growing Fiscal Footprint

• Dole politics now stakes major claims on State finances. According to PRS Legislative Research:
  • Unconditional cash transfers to women expanded from two States in 2022-23 to 12 States in 2025-26.
  • The estimated annual cost is Rs 1.68 lakh crore, about 0.5 per cent of GDP.
• State-level examples:
  • West Bengal has moved from Lakshmir Bhandar to Annapurna Yojana, budgeting Rs 36,000 crore for a Rs 3,000 monthly transfer to about 1.3 crore women.
  • Tamil Nadu allocated Rs 14,412 crore for the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai in its 2026-27 interim budget.
  • Assam set aside Rs 5,000 crore for Orunodoi.

Cash Cannot Replace Public Goods

• Cash may improve welfare, but it should not substitute for the public goods that make welfare durable.
• The same woman who values Rs 1,500–3,000 a month also needs a functioning health centre, childcare, a good government school and access to better work.
• A cash transfer may soften the strain caused by weak institutions, but it cannot fix them.

The Missing Evidence

• Governments rarely publish the model that connects payments to outcomes. Key unanswered questions include:
  • Who exactly is being targeted?
  • What baseline data justifies the scheme?
  • What effect is expected on consumption, debt, nutrition, schooling, health spending, labour supply or women's bargaining power?
• Without such answers, dole politics is defended by the moral language of welfare rather than evidence.
• An ADB study prepared for the 16th Finance Commission found that India lacks a systematic dataset of government expenditure on cash-transfer schemes.

Learning from Other Democracies

• Other democracies also redistribute and face welfare politics. But benefits such as unemployment insurance, food support and healthcare subsidies are usually tied to eligibility rules, contribution records, job-search obligations or periodic reassessment.
• India need not copy these mechanically. Some transfers, especially to women in poor households, may be better left unconditional.

A Framework for Accountability

• Experts propose a two-stage evidence framework for any large recurring transfer:
  • Before rollout: a welfare impact statement covering
    • Objective and eligibility rule
    • Expected coverage
    • Five-year fiscal cost
    • Alternatives considered
    • Likely leakage and exclusion errors
    • Measurable outcomes
  • After rollout: household surveys recording not just receipt of the transfer but its effects on
    • Consumption and debt
    • Health spending and schooling
    • Mobility and work incentives
    • Control over household expenditure
    • Subjective well-being
• Anonymised microdata should then be released for independent research. Schemes spending public money at this scale must survive severe scrutiny.

Conclusion

• Cash transfers have real value in India's informal economy, but they are fast becoming permanent fiscal commitments without evidence of impact.
• Welfare impact statements, post-rollout surveys and open data would not remove politics from welfare, but would make it more honest. Evidence is ultimately a matter of democratic fairness.

Why in the News?

• India has secured country-specific tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) of about 1.64 million tonnes of steel products annually under its proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU).

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About Tariff-Rate Quota (Concept, India’s Steel Quota, EU’s New Steel Import Policy, Products, Covered)
• News Summary (Details of the Agreement)

About Tariff-Rate Quota

• A Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) is a trade policy instrument that allows a specified quantity of a product to enter a market at a preferential or lower tariff rate. Imports beyond the specified quota are subject to a higher tariff.
• In the India–EU arrangement, country-specific quotas provide Indian steel exporters with defined access to the EU market.
• Steel exported outside the applicable quota will face the duties prescribed under the EU's new steel regime.
• TRQs therefore combine market access with domestic industry protection.

India's Steel Quota under the FTA

• India has secured a total country-specific quota of 1,641,470 tonnes annually. This comprises:
  • 946,616 tonnes under the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) component
  • 694,853 tonnes under the FTA component
• India currently exports approximately 4 million tonnes of steel annually to the EU, making the quota an important consideration for the country's steel industry.
• The negotiated access is particularly significant because steel imports entering the EU outside the applicable quotas will attract a 50% tariff under the new regime.

EU's New Steel Import Regime

• The EU's new Steel Regulation came into force on July 1, 2026.
• It replaced the temporary safeguard measures introduced in 2018, which expired in June 2026, after reaching the maximum eight-year period permitted for temporary safeguards under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.
• The new regime seeks to protect the European steel industry from the effects of global overcapacity and potentially low-priced imports. It provides:
  • Duty-free tariff quotas of 18.3 million tonnes
  • A 50% duty on imports outside the applicable quotas
  • A melt-and-pour requirement aimed at improving transparency regarding the origin and production of steel
• Under the new system, MFN quotas are allocated based on each exporting country's average share of EU imports in individual product categories during 2022-24.

Steel Products Covered

• The country-specific quotas cover a broad range of steel products, including:
• Non-alloy and alloy hot-rolled sheets and strips.
  • Cold-rolled sheets
  • Metallic-coated sheets
  • Organic-coated sheets
  • Tin mill products
  • Quarto plates
  • Stainless steel products
  • Merchant bars and light sections
  • Reinforcing bars
  • Wire rods
  • Pipes and tubes
• The largest Indian country-specific quota is for non-alloy and other alloy hot-rolled sheets and strips, at 509,605 tonnes.
• This consists of 299,197 tonnes under the MFN component and 210,408 tonnes under the FTA component.
• Other significant quotas include 218,658 tonnes for cold-rolled sheets, 197,860 tonnes for metallic-coated sheets, and 186,038 tonnes for organic-coated sheets.

News Summary

• The negotiated steel access is significant because the EU is simultaneously strengthening protection for its domestic steel industry.
• The 1.64-million-tonne country-specific quota gives Indian exporters predictable access to the EU market despite the new 50% out-of-quota tariff.
• Of the total quota, nearly 6.95 lakh tonnes will receive access under the FTA component, while around 9.47 lakh tonnes will fall under the MFN component.
• The agreement also contains mechanisms to prevent India from being disadvantaged if the EU subsequently provides more favourable quota access to another FTA partner.
• India will have access to additional quota volumes in product categories where it already has a country-specific quota.
• These additional volumes will be allocated through competition among eligible EU FTA partners having country-specific quotas.
• For categories without an Indian country-specific quota, Indian exporters can access residual quotas, including general residual quotas and preferential quotas reserved for EU FTA partners.
• The EU has committed to administering the TRQs in a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory manner and making relevant information regarding their administration publicly available.

Review Mechanism

• The agreement provides for periodic review of the negotiated quotas.
• The first review will begin one year after the FTA enters into force, followed by subsequent reviews every five years.
• These reviews will consider market developments, quota utilisation and changes in the EU's steel regime.
• The agreement also provides for consultation with India if the EU proposes amendments to Product Specific Rules (PSRs) for products covered under its Steel Regulation.

Significance for India

• The arrangement provides Indian steel exporters with greater certainty and predictability in a major export market.
• At the same time, the benefits will depend on effective utilisation of the quotas. Since India currently exports around 4 million tonnes of steel annually to the EU, the negotiated access does not cover the entirety of existing exports.
• For Indian steel producers, therefore, the FTA provides an opportunity to preserve and expand market access while encouraging greater competitiveness, product diversification and compliance with evolving European trade regulations.

Why in News?

• At the concluding session of the BRICS Summit hosted by India, the Indian Prime Minister warned that the weaponisation of technology and critical minerals could undermine collective progress.
• Without naming any country, the remarks come amid concerns over China’s dominant position in critical-mineral processing and restrictions affecting the supply of rare earths and advanced technologies.
• India’s BRICS chairship centred on four pillars—Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability—with an emphasis on making BRICS a platform for inclusive global growth, particularly for the Global South.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Critical Minerals and Technology
• BRICS as a Platform for the Global South
• Four Pillars of India’s BRICS Chairship
• Way Forward
• Conclusion

Critical Minerals and Technology:

• Critical minerals are increasingly central to clean energy, electronics, defence, semiconductors and advanced manufacturing.
• Excessive concentration of their processing and supply chains creates strategic vulnerabilities.
• Modi stressed that weaponising technology and critical minerals can hinder shared development.
• The New Delhi Declaration consequently called for -
  • Reliable, diversified, resilient and just critical-mineral supply chains.
  • Greater value addition and benefit sharing.
  • Economic diversification in resource-rich countries.
  • Respect for countries’ sovereign rights over their mineral resources.
• India’s position reflects a broader push for supply-chain diversification, strategic autonomy and technology inclusivity.

BRICS as a Platform for the Global South:

• The Indian PM highlighted the growing confidence of developing countries in BRICS because their voices are heard, experiences respected and solutions developed jointly rather than imposed upon them.
• This reflects India’s effort to position BRICS as a mechanism for reformed and more representative global governance.
• The grouping’s diversity is presented as a strength that can facilitate cooperation among countries with different developmental realities.
• The emphasis is therefore shifting from merely articulating grievances of the Global South towards creating practical, scalable and accessible

Four Pillars of India’s BRICS Chairship:

• Resilience:
  • The increasing frequency of conflicts, pandemics, climate disasters and supply-chain disruptions demonstrates the vulnerability of an interconnected world.
  • Crises originating in one region can rapidly produce global consequences.
  • India highlighted -
    • BRICS Integrated Early Warning System for prevention and response to infectious diseases.
    • Early Warning Data Integration Guidelines for disaster management.
    • BRICS Logistics Supply Chain Cooperation Framework to strengthen reliability and resilience of supply chains.
  • The broader objective is to move from crisis response to anticipatory governance, through early identification, preparedness and prompt action.
• Innovation:
  • India sought to use innovation for inclusive development through -
    • BRICS Incubator Network to connect start-ups and incubators.
    • BRICS Startup Innovation Fund to promote innovative and scalable solutions.
    • BRICS Network on Digital Agriculture, linking AI, geospatial technology and Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) with farmers’ needs.
  • This approach seeks to ensure that emerging technologies are not confined to technologically advanced economies but contribute directly to agricultural productivity and livelihoods.
• Cooperation and wider participation:
  • India stressed that BRICS cooperation should extend beyond governments to entrepreneurs, farmers, researchers, women, youth and ordinary citizens.
  • Key initiatives include -
    • BRICS CONNECT for skills, employability, women’s workforce participation, social security and capacity building.
    • BRICS MSME Cooperation Portal to connect small enterprises with knowledge, finance and markets.
    • BRICS Urban Mobility Hub for sharing urban best practices.
  • This represents a shift towards people-centric and multi-stakeholder cooperation.
• Sustainability:
  • India emphasised the need to balance human development with environmental protection, keeping intergenerational equity at the centre of sustainable development.
  • Initiatives include -
    • BRICS Digital Centre of Excellence for smart grids and energy storage.
    • Centres of Excellence for Agro-Ecology and Regenerative Agriculture, connecting traditional knowledge with modern science.
  • These initiatives seek to make clean-energy systems more reliable, efficient and accessible.

Way Forward:

• As BRICS enters its third decade, its credibility will increasingly depend on translating declarations into concrete, measurable outcomes.
• Priorities should include diversified critical-mineral supply chains, responsible technology governance, resilient logistics, inclusive digitalisation and stronger participation of developing countries.

Conclusion:

• India’s BRICS chairship seeks to transform the grouping from a forum for political coordination into an “ecosystem of solutions”.
• Its central challenge is to ensure that technology, critical minerals and economic integration become instruments of shared prosperity rather than geopolitical leverage.
• For the Global South, BRICS can contribute most effectively when cooperation remains inclusive, sovereign, sustainable and development-oriented.

Context

• The September 11, 2001 attacks transformed global counter-terrorism.
• Over the past 25 years, terrorism has evolved from large, centrally controlled organisations into decentralised networks and lone-wolf attacks.
• Drones, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence have created new security challenges.
• India’s response has similarly shifted from diplomatic restraint to active deterrence against cross-border terrorism.

The Changing Nature of Global Terrorism

• The rise of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State demonstrated the destructive potential of international terrorist organisations.
• However, their decline as centralised structures has given rise to smaller, autonomous groups and individual attackers.
• Modern terrorists exploit encrypted communications, digital propaganda, cyber operations, and emerging technologies.
• These developments make it difficult to identify threats before attacks occur.
• Counter-terrorism therefore requires not only military action but also intelligence-sharing, technological preparedness, and efforts to prevent radicalisation.

India’s Early Struggle with Cross-Border Terrorism

• India’s experience with terrorism predates 9/11. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the Mumbai serial blasts of 1993, and the Coimbatore blasts of 1998 exposed weaknesses in national security.
• The IC-814 hijacking in 1999 forced India to release Pakistan-based terrorists, including Masood Azhar, demonstrating the limitations of its response mechanisms.
• The Parliament attack in December 2001 led to Operation Parakram, but nuclear deterrence and international pressure prevented direct military action against Pakistan.

The Passive Response and Its Consequences

• India suffered several attacks, including those at Akshardham, Varanasi, Pune, and Delhi.
• The 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008 became a defining moment in India’s fight against terrorism.
• Despite evidence of Pakistan-based involvement, India avoided military retaliation.
• This approach reduced the immediate risk of escalation but also created the perception that terrorist attacks could occur without proportionate consequences.
• The need for a stronger deterrent became increasingly evident.

The Shift Towards Active Deterrence

• After the change of government in 2014, India adopted a more assertive counter-terrorism policy.
• The Uri attack in September 2016 led to surgical strikes across the Line of Control, marking a significant departure from earlier restraint.
• Following the Pulwama attack in February 2019, the Indian Air Force conducted strikes on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp in Balakot.
• This demonstrated India’s willingness to cross Pakistani airspace to target terrorist infrastructure.
• The Pahalgam attack in April 2025 led to Operation Sindoor, launched on May 6–7.
• The operation targeted Pakistan-based terror infrastructure and reinforced India’s policy of imposing direct costs on those responsible for cross-border terrorism.

India’s Contemporary Counter-Terrorism Framework

• The launch of PRAHAAR, India’s National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, in February 2026 reflects the development of a comprehensive national framework.
• Its emphasis on whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches recognises that terrorism cannot be defeated through military force alone.
• Four priorities are essential:
  • Eliminating Terrorist Networks: Security agencies must continue dismantling terrorist networks, particularly in Kashmir.
  • Preventive Military Action: India must maintain the capability to respond to emerging threats across the Line of Control.
  • De-radicalisation and Social Integration: Education, employment, community engagement, and rehabilitation can reduce the appeal of extremist ideologies.
  • Disrupting Terror Financing: International cooperation is necessary to trace and block financial networks supporting terrorist organisations.

The Importance of International Cooperation

• Terrorism is a transnational threat requiring coordinated international action.
• India has used platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS to oppose countries that support or shelter terrorists.
• The inclusion of a paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the BRICS Delhi Declaration reflects growing international recognition of India’s security concerns.
• India’s consistent opposition to double standards on terrorism is essential for building an effective global response.

Conclusion

• Twenty-five years after 9/11, terrorism remains a serious global threat despite changes in its organisational structure and methods.
• India has moved from a reactive policy to active deterrence and comprehensive counter-terrorism.
• Military action must be combined with intelligence coordination, technological preparedness, de-radicalisation, financial disruption, and diplomacy.
• India’s long-term success will depend on preventing terrorism before attacks occur while ensuring that terrorism never becomes a strategic asset for any state.

About Mayun Island:

• Mayun Island, also known as Perim Island, is a small volcanic island belonging to Yemen, located in the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
• Perim Island actually splits the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into two smaller channels.
• The importance of the small island grew with the advent of the Suez Canal, which connected the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea through the Red Sea and allowed global shipping routes to bypass the lengthy route around Africa.
• Perim Island became part of independent Yemen (Aden) in 1967.