As defence experts are considering coercive diplomacy after the Pulwama terror attack in Kashmir, let’s have a look at the various measures India has tried in the past, and what their impact has been.
About:
- Last week’s suicide vehicle-borne IED attack on the CRPF convoy in Kashmir that killed 40 jawans has had an impact on the national psyche almost identical to that of the Mumbai attacks.
Military options:
- Arguments in Favour:
- With the BJP in power under a leader who banks on an image of being “strong”, and with elections just weeks away, there are compulsive internal arguments for the government to choose military retaliation.
- Additionally, India no longer feels obliged not to undermine Pakistan’s civilian government — Prime Minister Imran Khan and his ministers repeatedly declare that the government and Pakistan Army are on the same page.
- Arguments against:
- It is not clear that that military retaliation will achieve anything of demonstrable benefit for India, even if it does not end up in a full-blown conflict.
- The much-publicised surgical strike across the Line of Control, yielded no change in the Pakistan Army’s behaviour.
- Success or failure in a military operation can be gauged only by the strategic objective it sets and meets. Revenge is not a strategic objective.
- Even the drone attacks by U.S. on Taliban leaders could hardly end to the terror infrastructure inside Pakistan. In fact, it made Pakistan’s support for such groups stronger. Worse, such strikes are sure to cause civilian casualties.
- Why India Didn’t went for war after 26/11? According to former National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, it was due to following reasons –
- An Indian military attack on Pakistan would have forced the world to focus on the spectre of war between two nuclear-armed nations.
- It would have united civilian Pakistan behind the Army, whose national image was tarnished over Benazir Bhutto’s assassination.
- India managed to bring international attention to the India-focused terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan — before 26/11, the US was worried only about getting Osama bin Laden and Pakistan-based Taliban groups that were targeting it.
Non-engagement tactic:
- In 2006, after the Lashkar-e-Toiba struck Mumbai with seven coordinated train bombs killing 209 people, India said it would “pause” the then ongoing composite dialogue with Pakistan for the time being.
- For Pakistan, diplomatic victory is to bring India to the talks table, and India sensed that to keep Pakistan guessing on this front would be punishment enough.
- After the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, India pushed the pause button once again on the composite dialogue, and after that, efforts by the two sides to restart talks have failed repeatedly on what the talks should be about.
- India’s position is that talks can be held only to discuss cross-border terror; Pakistan says talks should include Kashmir as well.
- India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan at the time bore some fruit — the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hafiz Saeed were designated under UNSC 1267. But beyond this, the world did not stop doing business with Pakistan, seen as crucial to the West’s war in Afghanistan.
Other options:
- Revoking Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status: According to former High Commissioner to Pakistan Sharat Sabharwal, revoking the MFN status has symbolic value only. It will hardly hurt the Pakistan state as the country’s exports to India are 2% of its global exports.
- Cancelling the Indus Waters Treaty: In the long run it would be bad for India’s interests as this could become precedent-setters and used against India internationally.
- Cancelling Kartarpur Corridor: Calling off the Kartarpur Corridor talks, scheduled in March, could be another option. But India has not even talked about this yet, underlining the difficulties on this front.
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-punishing-pak-the-options-5588475/
