Why in news?

Oil has emerged as the central driver behind the US action against Nicolás Maduro. After Maduro’s capture recently, US President Donald Trump announced that Washington would take control of Venezuela’s oil sector, with American oil majors investing to revive the country’s dilapidated infrastructure.

However, experts caution that reviving Venezuela’s oil industry will take years, given prolonged damage from sanctions and economic collapse.

Despite holding the world’s largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela contributes less than 1% of global oil production. With global markets currently well supplied and demand subdued, analysts do not expect immediate price shocks. Past US actions, including tanker seizures, had little effect on global oil prices.

If the US eventually succeeds in restoring and controlling Venezuelan oil output, increased supply could exert downward pressure on prices, but only over the long term.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Venezuela’s Oil Wealth: Huge Reserves, Limited Output
• US Intervention and Trump’s Plan
• India Watches Venezuela Closely Amid Shifting US Policy

Venezuela’s Oil Wealth: Huge Reserves, Limited Output

• Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at over 300 billion barrels, roughly one-fifth of global reserves.
  • Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, ranks second in reserves.
• Yet Venezuela produces only around 1 million barrels per day (bpd), compared to over 100 million bpd globally.
• Venezuela is a member of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) but currently contributes only about 3.5% of OPEC’s exports and around 1% of global oil supplies.
• Why Production Lags Despite Massive Potential?
  • Venezuela’s low output stems from:
    • US sanctions constraining oil and gas exports
    • A prolonged economic crisis
    • Severe underinvestment and deteriorated oil infrastructure
  • Together, these factors have sharply limited realisation of its resource potential.

US Intervention and Trump’s Plan

• US President Donald Trump has said Washington aims to bring American oil majors into Venezuela to invest billions of dollars to repair broken infrastructure and ramp up production—benefiting both Venezuela and US companies, and supplying oil to global markets, including the US.
• If implemented, the plan could:
  • Make Venezuela a significantly larger oil supplier
  • Reopen the sector to foreign investment beyond US firms
  • Add supply to global markets, creating downward pressure on oil prices over the long term
• However, experts caution that tangible effects would take several years, given the scale of investment required to revive ageing infrastructure.

India Watches Venezuela Closely Amid Shifting US Policy

• How US–Venezuela relations evolve in the coming months is critical for India.
• Any easing or suspension of US sanctions could allow Venezuelan oil to re-enter global markets—including India—and reopen stalled investment and dividend flows.
• Potential Gains for India’s Oil Companies
  • A sanctions thaw could enable ONGC Videsh, the overseas arm of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, to recover over $500 million in pending dividends from two Venezuelan projects:
    • San Cristobal (40% stake)
    • Carabobo 1 (11% stake)
  • ONGC Videsh has sought US approvals since 2024, but permissions are still pending.
• India’s Crude Import History with Venezuela
  • An analysis of recent trade data indicates that the US attack on Venezuela is unlikely to directly affect India’s energy security.
  • India imported $255.3 million worth of oil from Venezuela up to November 2025, accounting for just 0.3% of total oil imports in the current financial year.
  • Before US sanctions in 2019, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) was a regular buyer of Venezuelan crude.
    • 2019: Venezuela was India’s 5th-largest oil supplier, exporting ~16 million tonnes to Indian refiners.
    • Post-2019 sanctions: Imports stopped within months.
  • In October 2023, the US briefly eased sanctions, allowing exports for six months—prompting RIL and others to restart imports.
  • These stopped again when the waiver lapsed amid disputes over Venezuela’s elections.
  • RIL later resumed imports under a specific US waiver, but halted them again in summer 2025 after the Trump administration threatened higher tariffs on buyers of Venezuelan crude.
• The ‘Chevron Model’ and US Licensing
  • ONGC Videsh aims to operate under the “Chevron model”, which allows sanctioned-country operations via specific US licenses.
  • Such licenses are issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under the US Department of the Treasury and typically:
    • Permit use of US banking channels and the US dollar;
    • Grant foreign companies significant control over finances, operations, production, and marketing, even when the host country’s NOC is the majority shareholder
  • In Venezuela’s case, that NOC is Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA).

Why in news?

The capture of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro by US forces on January 3 has reignited debate over a return of overt US interventionism, raising concerns about doctrine-driven military action and its global implications.

The episode recalls former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s famous caution — “If you break it, you own it” — coined during the 2003 Iraq War. The audacious operation underscores the risks of ownership that follow forceful regime interventions.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Trump’s Policy U-Turn
• Why Venezuela: The Oil Factor?
• The Monroe Doctrine: From Anti-Colonial Principle to Interventionist Tool
• MAGA Pushback: Disquiet Over Renewed US Interventionism
• Venezuela’s Uncertain Endgame

Trump’s Policy U-Turn

• US President Donald Trump, once a critic of the Iraq invasion and a self-proclaimed peacemaker upon taking office a year ago, has reversed course.
• He justified the operation as being in line with an over 200-year-old foreign policy agenda set under the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which warned European powers not to interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.
• Trump has reasserted this doctrine—recently rebranded by him—as a guiding principle, marking a sharp departure from decades of US administrations that kept it largely dormant.
• The shift was signalled in the new US security strategy released last month.
• Pattern of Escalating Military Action
  • The Maduro operation fits a broader trend over the past year of expanded US military assertiveness:
    • Airstrikes ordered in Syria and Nigeria
    • Threats of intervention amid protests in Iran
    • Earlier 2025 actions targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean, Houthi forces in Yemen, militants in Somalia, and Islamic groups in Iraq
  • Together, these moves point to a worrying reassertion of unilateral military power, with Venezuela’s intervention serving as the clearest signal yet that US interventionism is back—this time with oil and hemispheric dominance at its core.

Why Venezuela: The Oil Factor?

• Venezuela holds the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world—over 300 billion barrels, roughly one-fifth of global reserves, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
• Despite this, Venezuela produces only ~1 million barrels per day, about 0.8% of global output, highlighting a stark gap between potential and realisation.
• Chevron is the only foreign oil major with exposure to Venezuelan crude, positioning US interests uniquely within the country’s energy sector.
• Trump’s Oil-Centric Agenda
  • US President Donald Trump has made oil central to his rationale.
  • He stated that the US would take control of Venezuela’s reserves and deploy American companies to invest “billions of dollars” to refurbish broken oil infrastructure and ramp up production.
• Criticism and Allegations
  • Critics say the intervention is mainly about taking control of Venezuela’s oil resources.
  • They have described the move as “straight up theft,” arguing that ignoring Venezuela’s massive oil reserves hides the real reason behind the action.
  • Some analysts also believe the move may help shift attention away from domestic political problems in the US, while allowing Washington to assert control over a valuable energy asset.

The Monroe Doctrine: From Anti-Colonial Principle to Interventionist Tool

• Named after former US President James Monroe, the Monroe Doctrine began as a symbolic 19th-century declaration opposing new or expanded European involvement in the Americas after colonial rule.
• Over time, the United States broadened its interpretation, treating Latin America as a strategic sphere of influence.
• This shift turned the doctrine into a key justification for US political and military interventions across South and Central America for decades—often criticised by scholars as an alibi for meddling in the region’s internal affairs.
• While recent US administrations had largely distanced themselves from this approach, President Donald Trump has revived and reinforced it, aligning with right-leaning governments such as Argentina’s and opposing left-wing leadership in countries like Brazil.
• Historically, the doctrine’s legacy is stark: between 1898 and 1994, the US intervened to change governments in Latin America at least 41 times, ostensibly to protect American interests and counter communism.

MAGA Pushback: Disquiet Over Renewed US Interventionism

• US President Donald Trump’s move against Venezuela has triggered unease within his Make America Great Again (MAGA) base, which supported him on the promise of ending “never-ending wars” and avoiding new overseas entanglements.
• Trump’s assertion that a US team would work with Venezuelans to effectively “run the country” until a transition is achieved has raised fears of prolonged American involvement, contradicting core MAGA expectations.

Venezuela’s Uncertain Endgame

• It remains unclear whether the US will occupy Venezuela or back a US-approved leadership in Caracas.
• While President Donald Trump hinted at cooperation from interim President Delcy Rodríguez, she quickly denounced the US action.
• The survival of the post-Maduro government, the absence of US troops on the ground, and deep political divisions complicate any transition—especially with oil at stake.
• The disputed 2024 election, claims of victory by Edmundo González, and the sidelining of María Corina Machado add to uncertainty. The coming weeks will be decisive.

Why in the News?

• India’s seafood exports recorded strong growth in FY 2025-26 despite higher tariffs in the U.S., reflecting a shift towards diversified global markets.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Seafood Sector (Background, Production, Exports, Institutional Support)
• News Summary

India’s Seafood Sector - Scale, Structure and Export Profile

• India has one of the largest and most diverse seafood sectors in the world, supported by a long coastline of over 7,500 km, extensive inland water resources, and a strong aquaculture base.
• The sector plays a critical role in employment generation, rural livelihoods, foreign exchange earnings, and food security.

Production and Resource Base

• India is the 3^rd largest fish producer globally and the 2^nd largest producer of aquaculture products.
• Marine fisheries are concentrated along the eastern and western coasts, while inland fisheries rely on rivers, reservoirs, ponds, and wetlands.
• Aquaculture, particularly shrimp farming, has emerged as the dominant contributor to export volumes and value.

Export Composition

• Shrimp accounts for the largest share of India’s seafood exports, especially frozen shrimp varieties such as Vannamei.
• Other exported products include frozen fish, cuttlefish, squid, crabs, and value-added marine products.
• Export orientation has increased steadily over the last decade, driven by improved cold-chain infrastructure and compliance with international food safety standards.

Major Export Markets

• Traditionally, the United States has been India’s largest seafood export destination, followed by China, Japan, the European Union, and Southeast Asian countries.
• However, recent years have seen a strategic push towards market diversification to reduce over-dependence on a single region.

Institutional Support

• The Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA), under the Ministry of Commerce, plays a key role in export promotion, quality control, traceability, and market access.
• Government initiatives such as the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) have strengthened infrastructure, processing capacity, and sustainability in fisheries.

News Summary

• Recent official data show that India’s marine product exports increased by 16% in value and 12% in volume during April-October of FY 2025-26 compared to the same period last year.
• Export earnings rose from $4.19 billion to $4.87 billion, while export volumes expanded from 9.62 lakh metric tonnes to 10.73 lakh metric tonnes.
• This growth is notable because it occurred despite higher tariffs imposed by the United States, traditionally India’s largest seafood market.
• During the same period, exports to the U.S. declined marginally in both value and quantity, reflecting the impact of tariff-related trade barriers.
• However, Indian exporters successfully compensated for this decline by expanding shipments to alternative markets. Countries such as China, Vietnam, Belgium, Malaysia, and Germany recorded sharp increases in imports of Indian seafood.
• Exports to China rose to $845.67 million, indicating China’s growing importance as a destination market.
• Vietnam emerged as a standout market, registering over 100% growth in value and over 90% growth in volume, while Belgium also saw nearly 90% growth in imports.
• This eastward and European pivot reflects a deliberate diversification strategy adopted by exporters and policymakers.

Sign of Resilience

• Government departments, including the Fisheries and Commerce Ministries, have held regular consultations with exporters and MPEDA to identify new markets, resolve non-tariff barriers, and strengthen compliance with importing countries’ standards.
• Officials have described the sector’s performance as a sign of resilience, adaptability, and improved export competitiveness.
• Despite the U.S. market contraction, it remains India’s single largest seafood destination, underlining the importance of balancing diversification with market retention.
• Overall, the data suggest that India’s seafood sector is increasingly less vulnerable to single-market shocks and better positioned to navigate global trade uncertainties.

Context:

• In recent years, several Indian states have reported fiscal deficits exceeding the conventional 3% of GSDP threshold, while simultaneously expanding social welfare schemes and capital expenditure (capex).
• This has triggered debates on fiscal discipline, state borrowing limits, and whether rising welfare commitments are crowding out growth-enhancing investments.
• The article analyses the institutional and policy factors behind these trends, especially in the post-pandemic period (FY2021–FY2025).

States Breaching the 3% Fiscal Deficit Norm:

• Enhanced borrowing flexibility (FY2021–FY2025):
  • States’ base borrowing limit was fixed at 3–4% of GSDP.
  • Additional borrowing of 0.5–1.1% of GSDP was permitted by the Union Government and 15th Finance Commission (FC).
• Centre’s loans outside normal borrowing limits:
  • The Centre disbursed GST compensation loans of Rs 2.6 trillion to states in FY2021–FY2022.
  • It also transferred Rs 3.7 trillion during FY2021-FY2025 under the 50-year interest-free capex loans.
  • The surge in states’ capital spending in recent years benefited from the expansion in capex loans to around Rs 1.5 trillion in FY2025 from Rs 0.1 trillion in FY2021.
  • These loans were over and above the states’ normal borrowing ceilings.
• Reforms-linked additional borrowings:
  • States completing specified reforms were allowed extra borrowing. For example, ₹1.1 trillion availed for reforms in FY2021.
  • The 15th FC had recommended additional borrowing flexibility of 0.5% of GSDP for power sector reforms.
  • States benefitting from power sector reforms - Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Odisha, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal - availing a total of Rs 1.3 trillion between FY2022-FY2025.
• Carry-forward of unutilised borrowings:
  • For example, the Union Government (FY2021–FY2022) allowed carry-forward of unused borrowing to support growth during the pandemic.
  • The 15th FC (FY2022–FY2026) permitted carry-forward of unutilised borrowing limits.
  • This softened fiscal deficit constraints in recent years. 

Rising Welfare Spending - Welfare Schemes Crowding Out Capital Expenditure:

• States expanded social welfare programmes, including social security pensions, cash transfers to women, and transfers to low-income households.
• The combined cash transfers to women across 11 states added up to around Rs 1.5 trillion or a sizable 0.8% of GSDP in FY2026, up from Rs 120 billion or 0.1% in FY2023.

Managing Revenue Deficits:

• Despite higher welfare spending revenue deficits widened only marginally.
• How states adjusted to this:
  • By curtailing expenditure under other heads.
  • By trimming allocations to older schemes.
• States with adequate fiscal space may avoid such compression.

Encouraging Trend in Capital Expenditure:

• The combined capital expenditure and loans and advances of 28 states reported a healthy 18.5% CAGR during FY2021–FY2025, doubling to Rs 8.4 trillion.
• This indicates that welfare expansion has not necessarily come at the cost of capex.

Key Challenges and Way Ahead:

• Sustaining high welfare spending: This should be achieved without undermining fiscal sustainability. Continued reforms-linked borrowing incentives (power sector, urban governance).
• Dependence on extraordinary borrowing relaxations: Rather than stable revenue growth. Balance between redistributive welfare and growth-oriented capex. Predictable and transparent Finance Commission transfers.
• Potential inter-sectoral compression of expenditure (health, education): Strengthening state own tax and non-tax revenues.
• Uncertainty over future borrowing space post-FY2026: Clear borrowing framework, aligned with medium-term fiscal consolidation.
• Role of the 16th Finance Commission: Crucial in determining vertical and horizontal resource sharing, base borrowing limits, scope for additional borrowing, and continuation (or otherwise) of carry-forward provisions.

Conclusion:

• The breach of the 3% fiscal deficit norm by states in recent years is largely a result of institutionally sanctioned borrowing flexibility, exceptional Centre-led loans, and Finance Commission provisions, rather than fiscal indiscipline.
• Simultaneously, states have demonstrated the capacity to expand welfare spending without significantly crowding out capital expenditure, aided by reform incentives and borrowing relaxations.
• The forthcoming recommendations of the 16th Finance Commission will be pivotal in shaping the fiscal and developmental space of states in the next phase of India’s federal fiscal architecture.

Context

• Maoism in India, once among the most serious internal security challenges, has been substantially weakened over the past decade.
• Violent incidents have declined sharply since 2010, and the geographical spread of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) has contracted dramatically.
• From over a hundred affected districts, Maoist influence is now largely restricted to a few pockets in the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh, with only three districts, Bijapur, Narayanpur and Sukma, classified as most affected.
• This transformation marks a major success for the Indian state, though the durability of peace will depend on addressing long-standing structural issues.

Historical Roots of Maoist Expansion in Dandakaranya

• The Maoist movement consolidated itself in the Dandakaranya region (DKR) during the early 1980s after facing pressure in Andhra Pradesh.
• DKR’s dense forests, rugged terrain, and location across multiple State boundaries made it an ideal rear area.
• More significantly, the region’s tribal population had experienced prolonged marginalisation and minimal state presence.
• Severe governance deficit characterised the region, shaped by administrative neglect and policies that isolated tribal areas from mainstream development.
• This vacuum enabled Maoists to build parallel systems of authority and project themselves as defenders of tribal interests.
• The state’s emphasis on mineral extraction, combined with tribal struggles over land, forests and water, created fertile ground for insurgency.
• Maoism thus expanded not only through armed strength but also through the exploitation of unresolved socio-economic grievances.

The Security-Centric Turn and Its Impact

• The decline of Maoism is closely linked to a strategic shift towards establishing security camps in remote and previously insurgent-controlled areas.
• Despite initial local resistance, these camps gradually gained acceptance as they began delivering visible benefits.
• Expansion of security camps significantly increased the state’s presence, improving the police-to-population ratio and limiting Maoist freedom of movement.
• Faster response times during emergencies placed insurgents on the defensive and enhanced the confidence and morale of security forces.
• Just as importantly, the visible dominance of state forces produced a psychological impact, reassuring local communities of the government’s ability to provide safety and stability.
• These developments generated cumulative advantages. Improved human intelligence strengthened counterinsurgency operations, while infrastructure projects such as roads and mobile towers began to transform daily life.
• Under the protection of security camps, the civil administration expanded its reach. For many villagers, this marked the first meaningful interaction with state officials beyond the police or forest department, altering long-held perceptions of the government.

Erosion of Maoist Capability and Appeal

• As governance deepened and security improved, Maoist influence weakened considerably. Declining Maoist recruitment reflected the loss of ideological appeal and organisational capacity.
• Access to weapons, ammunition and funding diminished, while numerous cadres and leaders surrendered or were neutralised through security operations.
• The shrinking support base among tribal communities underscored a critical reality: insurgencies rooted in governance failures lose relevance when those failures are systematically addressed.
• Nevertheless, military success alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. The underlying grievances that once sustained Maoism cannot be resolved solely through security measures.

The Imperative of Structural Reform and Constitutional Guarantees

• The post-insurgency phase presents a more complex challenge. As communities emerge from isolation, rights-based demands are expected to intensify.
• Some surrendered Maoist leaders have already indicated their intent to pursue tribal causes through democratic means, signalling a transition from armed struggle to political engagement.
• Implementation of PESA and FRA is therefore central to the next phase. These constitutional frameworks are essential for strengthening local self-governance, protecting forest and land rights, and empowering tribal communities.
• In many regions, civil administration must effectively begin anew, rebuilding institutions while simultaneously earning public trust.
• A long-term development vision aligned with the Viksit Bharat 2047 framework can help consolidate peace.
• Long-term inclusive development must balance economic growth with ecological sustainability and tribal autonomy, avoiding the extractive approaches that previously fuelled alienation and conflict.

Conclusion

• The containment of Maoism represents a significant achievement for the Indian state, reflecting effective coordination between security forces and civil administration.
• Yet the true measure of success lies beyond the decline of violence. Sustainable peace will depend on translating security gains into justice, inclusion and democratic participation.
• The sacrifices made by security forces have created a critical opening; its outcome will be determined by the state’s ability to address the structural inequities at the heart of the conflict.

Context

• As 2026 begins, China presents a striking paradox: Anxious yet assertive China, facing deep economic and structural stresses at home while projecting growing strategic confidence abroad.
• This duality shapes Beijing’s domestic governance, foreign policy, and military posture.
• For India, these shifts are further complicated by a recalibration of U.S. priorities, narrowing India’s strategic space and making the management of an already difficult relationship with China more complex.

China’s Strategic Mood Shift: From Anxiety to Assertiveness

• Unease Over US Pressure
  • Until late 2024, Chinese strategic thinking was marked by unease over U.S. pressure, slowing growth, and geopolitical isolation.
  • By mid-2025, this anxiety had largely given way to confidence.
  • Beijing’s strategic community increasingly believed China had stabilised its position in great-power competition, managed escalation with Washington more effectively, and gained tactical advantages in trade and tariffs.
• Closer Alignment with Russia
  • This shift was reinforced by China’s expanding influence in the Global South, closer alignment with Russia, and stabilisation of most major-power relationships, except Japan.
  • Yet this confidence remains tempered by awareness of domestic fragilities and a hostile external environment.
  • These tensions were evident at the Fourth Plenum and Central Economic Work Conference in late 2025, where President Xi Jinping reaffirmed national security, technological autonomy, and the real economy as core organising principles.

Economic Strain and the Turn Inward

• Despite official growth figures near 5% in 2025, China’s economy remains under strain.
• Domestic demand is weak, the property sector continues to depress confidence, and deflationary pressures persist, with producer prices in negative territory for over three years.
• Productivity growth and corporate profits remain sluggish, while local governments face severe fiscal stress, limiting stimulus options.
• Rather than pivot decisively toward consumption-led growth, Beijing has reinforced State-led technological self-reliance, prioritising advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, green energy, and dual-use technologies.
• The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–30) underscores supply-chain insulation and whole-chain breakthroughs to reduce exposure to external shocks.
• Paradoxically, China’s inward turn has coincided with rising export dependence.
• The trade surplus crossed $1 trillion in the first eleven months of 2025, as China deepened dominance across global value chains in electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, and industrial machinery.
• This renewed export surge, widely described as China Shock 2.0, has disrupted both developed and developing economies and intensified global trade tensions. 

Political Consolidation and Military Assertiveness

• Domestically, 2025 saw further political consolidation under Xi Jinping. Information control tightened, ideological discipline was reinforced, and the scope of national security expanded.
• At the same time, the sacking of senior military officers exposed persistent dysfunctions within the party-state system.
• Militarily, the PLA continued rapid modernisation of conventional and nuclear forces.
• Emerging doctrinal shifts toward an early-warning counter-strike posture suggest a more risk-tolerant and assertive strategic outlook, reflecting a willingness to accept higher risks in defence of core interests. 

Recalibrated Great-Power Dynamics

• Externally, the most consequential shift was the recalibration of U.S.–China relations under President Donald Trump’s second term.
• The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy reframed China primarily as an economic competitor, deprioritised the Indo-Pacific, and emphasised a more inward-looking America First approach.
• Nevertheless, rivalry persists, as demonstrated by U.S. intervention in Venezuela, which damaged Chinese interests and triggered sharp reactions from Beijing.
• The Trump–Xi meeting in Busan in October 2025 produced limited de-escalation through modest tariff adjustments and selective easing of export controls.
• These steps reflected transactional U.S.–China accommodation, not movement toward a cooperative G2.

Implications for India–China Relations

• For India, these developments are sobering. Frictions in India–U.S. ties over trade, Russia, and Pakistan have reduced Washington’s willingness to prioritise India as a strategic counterweight to China.
• Simultaneously, Beijing increasingly perceives India’s interest in stabilisation as driven by uncertainty in India–U.S. relations, reducing incentives to accommodate Indian concerns.
• India–China relations in 2025 saw cautious stabilisation without progress on core disputes. High-level exchanges arrested deterioration, but border conditions remain stable yet abnormal.
• Disengagement has not been matched by de-escalation, and buffer zones continue to limit India’s traditional patrolling rights, reflecting Grey-zone incrementalism.

Conclusion

• China is likely to persist with managed competition with the U.S., stabilisation combined with hardball diplomacy, intensified Global South outreach, and calibrated assertiveness along its borders and maritime periphery. Grey-zone tactics will remain central.
• For New Delhi, the path forward requires calibrated engagement, strengthened domestic capabilities, and Asymmetric deterrence and patience.
• External balancing remains relevant but cannot be assumed reliable in an era of selective great-power accommodation.
• India must prepare for a prolonged strategic contest with resilience and strategic clarity.

About RQ-170 Sentinel:

• It is an American high-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
• It was designed and manufactured by Skunk Works, a division of Lockheed Martin (an American defense and aerospace manufacturer), for the United States Air Force (USAF).
• It is designed to execute intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and electronic warfare missions over a target area.
• The aircraft entered service in the mid-2000s and has previously been associated with U.S. operations in the Middle East and Asia.
• Features:
  • It features a flying-wing design optimized for reduced radar visibility and long-endurance flights.
  • It features a blended fuselage, pointed nose, and tricycle-type landing gear.
  • An electro-optic camera was incorporated beneath the front fuselage section to seize real-time imagery or videos of the battlefield it is surveying.
  • It can capture real-time imagery of the battlefield and transfer the data to the ground control station (GCS) through a line of sight (LOS) communication data link.
  • It is fitted with an active electronically scanned array radar, synthetic aperture radar, and signal intelligence in its belly fairings.
  • About 90% of the aircraft is made up of composite materials to decrease its overall weight.

About Thadou Tribe:

• They are an indigenous people who live in the hill country adjacent to the Imphal Valley in Manipur.
• The Thadous are the second largest tribe in Manipur, preceded only by the Meiteis, or Manipuris.
• They are also found in smaller numbers in Nagaland, Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Delhi.
• Language: They speak Chin and Thado, which belong to the Tibeto-Burman family of the Sino-Tibetan languages.
• Thadous share a common culture with all the Chin-Kuki-Mizo community.
• Thadou settlements are located in forests. Sites on the tops of ridges or just below ridges are preferred.
  • Villages are not arranged according to an established urban plan, and there is no marking of the perimeter of a village.
  • The village chief’s house is usually the largest dwelling within the village.
  • Outside it there is a platform upon which men gather to discuss matters of importance and to mediate disputes.
• Economy:
  • They practice subsistence activities including animal domestication, cultivation, hunting, and fishing.
  • Jhum (slash-and-burn) agriculture is predominant.
• Religious Beliefs: The Thadou tribe traditionally practiced an animistic religion centered on nature spirits and a supreme god, Pathen, presently, almost all Thadou people are Christians.
• Festival: The Hun-Thadou cultural festival is an annual celebration of this community, which is celebrated at the arrival of the New Year.