Why in the News?

• Recent analysis of digital political advertisements during Assembly elections has highlighted major gaps in India’s election rules in regulating third-party and surrogate campaigners.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Election Campaign Ecosystem (Background, Legal & Regulatory Framework, Shadow Campaigns, Demographic Reach, Accountability Gaps, Implications, etc.)

India’s Election Campaign Ecosystem: A Structural Shift

• India’s election regulations were designed for a campaign environment dominated by political parties and individual candidates.
• However, the contemporary electoral ecosystem has undergone a structural transformation.
• Political messaging and voter persuasion are increasingly mediated through digital platforms, social media, campaign consultancies, influencers, and interest groups that operate outside formal party structures.
• This shift has weakened the effectiveness of existing election rules, which continue to focus primarily on parties and candidates, even as the real drivers of electoral influence have diversified.

Existing Legal and Regulatory Framework

• The Election Commission of India (ECI) regulates election expenditure and political advertising mainly through the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and a set of model codes and guidelines.
• Key regulatory mechanisms include:

• Mandatory disclosure of election expenditure by candidates and political parties under Section 77 of the Act.
• Pre-certification of political advertisements by the Media Certification and Monitoring Committee (MCMC).
• Restrictions on political advertisements during the final stages of polling.

• However, these provisions largely assume that political messaging originates from formally recognised actors, leaving limited oversight over indirect or third-party campaigning.

Emergence of Shadow Campaigns

• Shadow campaigns refer to political communication efforts carried out by third-party actors such as digital marketing firms, ideological groups, influencers, or surrogate pages that are not officially linked to political parties or candidates.
• An analysis of digital political advertisements during Assembly elections revealed that third-party actors often outspend official parties and candidates and achieve significantly higher visibility online.
• Despite spending similar amounts, third-party advertisers generated far more impressions, demonstrating greater cost efficiency and reach.
• This indicates that influence in digital elections depends not just on spending but also on who controls message dissemination.

Demographic Reach and Influence Patterns

• Digital advertising data shows that both official and third-party political advertisements are primarily consumed by younger voters, particularly those aged 13-34.
• However, third-party campaigns display a more evenly spread reach across age groups, including older demographics.
• This broader reach allows third-party actors to shape narratives across voter segments that traditional party messaging may not effectively penetrate, increasing their strategic importance in elections.

Financial Entanglements and Accountability Gaps

• A major concern highlighted by the analysis is the financial relationship between political parties and third-party campaigners.
• In some cases, advertisements appearing on official party social media pages were funded by external entities.
• Such expenditure may not be fully reflected in official election expenditure statements submitted to the ECI. As a result:

• The true financial footprint of digital campaigning may be understated.
• Electoral influence can be exercised without clear attribution or accountability.

• This creates a bi-directional relationship where third-party actors not only amplify political messaging but also directly finance it, blurring the line between authorised and unauthorised expenditure.

Legal Contradictions and Enforcement Challenges

• Judicial precedents, including Supreme Court rulings, have emphasised that no individual or entity should publish political advertisements for the benefit of a party or candidate.
• Despite this, enforcement remains weak in the digital domain.
• Current ECI guidelines apply restrictions mainly during the immediate pre-poll period and are often limited to print media, while digital campaigns build influence over months.
• Third-party actors have continued campaigning even on polling day, exposing the limitations of time-bound regulatory approaches.

Implications for Electoral Transparency and Fairness

• The persistence of shadow campaigns poses serious challenges to electoral integrity:

• Opaque funding channels undermine transparency.
• Unequal digital reach distorts the level playing field.
• Voters are influenced by actors beyond the scope of electoral accountability.

• Unless regulatory obligations are extended to include all significant stakeholders in digital campaigning, these gaps will continue to erode trust in democratic processes.

Context

• Relations between Iran and India extend beyond conventional diplomacy, drawing strength from millennia of civilisational continuity.
• Long before modern political borders, both societies emerged from a shared Indo-Iranian civilisation, rooted in common linguistic, cultural, and spiritual traditions.
• This historical affinity has endured political change and now intersects with contemporary strategic, economic, and security interests.
• In a shifting global order marked by multipolarity, Iran and India are well positioned to transform their ancient bond into a forward-looking partnership.

Historical and Civilisational Foundations

• The earliest connections between Iran and India originated in the Indo-Iranian world, whose legacy is evident in the parallels between the Avesta and the Rigveda.
• These texts reflect shared mythologies, ethical values, and cosmological views that shaped early social organisation.
• Despite later migrations and political divergence, this common heritage sustained a sense of cultural kinship.
• One of the most enduring manifestations of this relationship was the prominence of the Persian language in India.
• For centuries, Persian functioned as a medium of administration, diplomacy, and intellectual life across the subcontinent.
• This interaction fostered the development of the Indian Style (Sabk-e Hendi) in Persian poetry, blending Persian literary form with Indian philosophical depth.
• The work of Mirza Abdul-Qadir Bedil Dehlavi epitomised this synthesis, leaving a lasting imprint on Persian literary tradition and Indo-Iranian cultural exchange.

Transition to Modern Strategic Realities

• While historical memory provides depth and legitimacy, contemporary relations are shaped by pragmatic considerations.
• As global power structures evolve and Asia gains prominence, Iran and India increasingly share strategic objectives, including regional stability and foreign policy autonomy.
• A central pillar of this engagement is energy security cooperation.
• India’s rapidly growing economy requires sustained access to hydrocarbons, while Iran’s vast oil and gas reserves position it as a natural partner.
• This complementarity reflects a mutually beneficial relationship grounded in economic necessity rather than sentiment alone.

Key Aspects of India-Iran Relations

• Connectivity, Trade, and Geoeconomic Cooperation
  • Transport and connectivity initiatives represent one of the most consequential dimensions of bilateral cooperation.
  • India’s involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar Port highlights the strategic importance of alternative trade routes that reduce dependence on traditional maritime corridors.
  • Iran’s geographical position further enhances its role in the International North-South Transport Corridor, linking South Asia to Russia and Northern Europe through a shorter and more cost-effective route than the Suez Canal.
  • Together, Chabahar Port and INSTC elevate Iran’s role as a Eurasian transit hub while expanding India’s access to continental markets.
• Security Cooperation and External Challenges
  • Beyond economics, Iran and India face common security challenges, particularly the spread of extremism and terrorism across West and South Asia.
  • Quiet but sustained security and counterterrorism cooperation has therefore become an essential component of bilateral relations.
  • External pressures and geopolitical rivalries have at times constrained engagement.
  • Nevertheless, India has generally navigated these complexities through strategic pragmatism, balancing global partnerships while safeguarding national interests.
  • For both countries, developing alternative financial mechanisms and reducing vulnerability to external constraints remain important objectives.

Prospects for Future Cooperation

• To ensure long-term sustainability, the relationship must diversify beyond traditional energy trade. Expanding collaboration in knowledge-based sectors offers significant potential.
• India’s strengths in information technology and innovation complement Iran’s advances in nanotechnology, medical sciences, and research-intensive industries.
• Such cooperation can gradually transform the relationship into an innovation-driven future partnership, capable of generating shared growth and technological self-reliance.

Conclusion

• Iran and India represent two historical expressions of a deeply interconnected civilisation.
• Their relationship, shaped by ancient cultural bonds and reinforced by modern strategic needs, possesses exceptional resilience.
• As the two nations commemorate seventy-five years of diplomatic relations, they face a critical opportunity to translate historical goodwill into concrete cooperation.
• By aligning cultural affinity with economic, security, and technological collaboration, Iran and India can forge a partnership that strengthens regional stability, enhances prosperity, and reflects both their shared past and collective future.

Context

• India stands at a defining juncture in its economic and technological journey; with a large population, expanding economy, and global aspirations, it appears poised for leadership.
• Yet, this promise is constrained by a chronic and structural deficit in research and development.
• Without correcting this weakness, the vision of a Viksit Bharat risks remaining rhetorical rather than real. 

The Scale of the Deficit: A Stark Numerical Reality

• India is home to roughly 17.5% of the world’s population but contributes only about 3% of global research output.
• This mismatch highlights the inability to convert demographic strength into knowledge leadership.
• Patent data reinforces the concern. Although India ranked sixth globally in patent filings in 2023, its share of worldwide applications remained below 2%.
• When adjusted for population, India’s ranking drops sharply, revealing limited diffusion of innovation across society.
• The most revealing indicator is R&D expenditure. India’s Gross Expenditure on R&D has stagnated around 0.6–0.7% of GDP and is declining proportionally as the economy grows.
• This contrasts sharply with China, the United States, and Israel, which treat R&D as a strategic national priority.
• The comparison with Huawei is particularly stark: the company’s R&D spending alone exceeds India’s total public and private R&D expenditure.
• This illustrates how concentrated, mission-driven investment drives technological leadership, a scale India has yet to achieve.

Structural Weaknesses in the Innovation Ecosystem

• Weak Role of the Private Sector
  • The numerical gap reflects deeper systemic problems. One of the most critical is the weak role of the private sector. In mature innovation economies, industry leads R&D spending.
  • In India, the government remains the dominant funder, while private industry contributes barely over a third.
  • Corporate investment is shaped by risk aversion, a preference for incremental improvements, and reliance on imported technologies rather than indigenous development.
• Disconnect Between Academia and Industry
  • Universities produce millions of graduates, but research often remains theoretical and detached from market needs.
  • Technology transfer mechanisms, commercialisation pathways, and collaborative projects are underdeveloped.
  • Unlike the United States, where firms routinely fund university research to create market-ready innovations, Indian companies rarely engage academia in this manner.
  • As a result, promising ideas fail to cross the valley of death between laboratory and marketplace.
• Brain Drain
  • While India trains large numbers of scientists and engineers, many of the most capable seek opportunities abroad due to better funding, infrastructure, and career prospects.
  • Domestically, researchers face bureaucratic delays, unpredictable funding flows, and limited access to world-class facilities.
  • Slow approval processes and staggered fund releases undermine ambitious, long-term research programmes.

The Path Forward

• Reimagining India’s R&D Strategy
  • Correcting these failures requires a fundamental shift in national priorities. The most urgent step is to raise R&D spending to at least 2% of GDP within the next five to seven years.
  • This must be backed by significant public investment and strong incentives to raise private sector participation to at least half of total R&D spending.
  • The recently announced Research, Development and Innovation Fund is a positive step, provided it is deployed efficiently and focused on frontier technologies.
  • India must also abandon fragmented research efforts in favour of national missions.
  • Strategic domains such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials, and green energy demand sustained funding, clear objectives, and alignment with national security and economic sovereignty.
  • These areas will determine long-term competitiveness rather than short-term gains.
• Universities and Research
  • Universities must evolve from teaching-centric institutions into research-driven centres of excellence.
  • This requires expanded funding for doctoral programmes, competitive research faculty positions, and modern infrastructure.
  • Structured industry-academia collaboration, through sponsored research chairs, joint laboratories, and incubation centres, must become the norm rather than the exception.
  • Alongside this, India must foster a stronger intellectual property culture. Simplified patent procedures, stronger enforcement, and financial incentives for commercially successful patents would encourage innovation across academia and industry.
  • Innovation must be rewarded, protected, and commercialised at scale to generate economic value.

Conclusion

• India possesses the intellectual capacity and ambition to emerge as a global innovation leader. However, ambition without sustained R&D investment is strategically hollow.
• The contrast with global innovation leaders and even single multinational corporations exposes a systemic failure to prioritise knowledge creation.
• The coming decade is decisive. With political will, structural reform, and cultural change, India can convert its demographic advantage into technological power.
• Without it, the goal of a developed and sovereign nation may drift far beyond 2047.

Context:

• Free and fair elections are a core feature of India’s constitutional democracy. However, persistent inequalities in political funding have undermined the level-playing field among political parties.
• Despite multiple reform attempts—most recently the striking down of the Electoral Bonds Scheme (2018) by the Supreme Court—India’s political finance system continues to be dominated by corporate money.
• This raises concerns of quid pro quo (between the corporates and such parties), institutionalised corruption, and unequal political participation.

Core Issue - Unequal Political Funding:

• Unequal access to private donations distorts electoral competition and political participation.
• Better-resourced parties gain disproportionate advantages in campaigning, visibility, and organisational reach.
• Weak regulation, poor enforcement, and lack of political will have allowed the money–politics nexus to persist.

Corporate Donations and Party-wise Skew:

• Direct corporate donations (FY 2013–14 to FY 2023–24):
  • For example, the incumbent political party (BJP) received nearly 84.65% of all declared direct corporate donations.
  • Its donations were four times more than all other national parties combined.
• Electoral trusts: For example, BJP received around 71.67% of total funds routed through electoral trusts. This indicates a clear financial asymmetry in favour of the ruling party.

Electoral Trust Scheme - Performance and Concerns:

• Introduced in 2013 to formalise corporate political donations.
• FY 2013–14 to 2023–24 data:
  • Among the top ten trusts, Prudent Electoral Trust dominates.
  • It received ₹33,330.54 crore (86.38%) of total trust contributions. 75% of its donations went to the BJP.
• FY 2024–25 data:
  • The trust received ₹2,668.49 crore.
  • Donated ₹2,180.71 crore to BJP and ₹216.34 crore to Congress.
• Inference: Political funding via trusts is highly concentrated—both in terms of donors (few trusts) and beneficiaries (incumbent party).

Transparency Deficit in Electoral Trusts:

• What is known? Names of donor companies and recipient parties (via filings to ECI and IT Department).
• What is not known?
  • Which company donated to which party.
  • Method and rationale of fund disbursal by trusts remain opaque.
• Reform suggestion:
  • Electoral trusts should reflect the name of the company or corporate group that established them.
  • Public disclosure of donors–donees mapping is essential for democratic accountability.

Quid Pro Quo and Supreme Court Observations:

• Political funding in India is heavily dependent on corporates donating to ruling parties at Centre or states.
• This creates a quid pro quo (“something for something”) relationship.
• SC (Electoral Bonds Case, 2024):
  • “The reason for political contributions by companies is as open as daylight.”
  • “Contributions made by companies are purely business transactions made with the intent of securing benefits in return.”
  • Thus, the apex court called quid pro quo an instance of “institutionalised corruption”.

Campaign Finance and Rising Cost of Elections:

• No legal cap on political party expenditure (only on candidates).
• Unlimited party spending has led to:
  • Highly professionalised campaigns.
  • Escalating election costs.
  • India becoming one of the most expensive electoral democracies, surpassing even the US.

Public Funding of Elections - Historical Debate:

• Constituent Assembly (1948) deliberations: Elections are a state affair, not a private one. Public funding was seen as a way to prevent unfair advantage to wealthy candidates. Several committees and experts have supported state funding of elections.
• Preconditions suggested:
  • Internal democracy within political parties
  • Transparency in party functioning
  • Bringing parties under RTI
  • Regulation or ban on private donations

Lessons from the Past:

• Corporate donations were banned (1969–1985).
• The absence of alternative lawful funding:
  • Led to opaque, illegal practices
  • Rise of “briefcase politics”
• Indicates that bans without systemic reform can worsen corruption.

Challenges and Way Forward:

• Disparity in access to funds among political parties: Design a comprehensive political finance framework that
  • Ensures equitable access to funding
  • Diversifies sources of political finance
  • Strengthens transparency and disclosure norms
• Concentration of economic and political power: Strengthen institutional oversight by ECI and judiciary.
• Opaque funding channels: Introduce calibrated public funding alongside reforms.
• Lack of expenditure limits for parties: Cap political party expenditure.
• High entry barriers: Reduce financial entry barriers ( for new or less-resourced candidates) to political contestation.

Conclusion:

• India’s democracy bears the cost of distorted political funding through weakened electoral competition and compromised public interest.
• Without urgent reforms to address inequality, elections risk becoming contests of money rather than mandates of the people.
• Ultimately, when political finance remains skewed and opaque, it is the citizens who pay the price for their democracy.

Why in news?

As the world enters 2026 after a turbulent 2025, India faces a critical diplomatic moment. Global geopolitics was reshaped by wars, elections, sanctions, and leadership shifts.

India’s foreign policy choices in 2026 will determine its global standing, regional stability, and strategic autonomy.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Backdrop: 2025 as a Global Reset Year
• India–U.S. Relations Under Trump 2.0
• India–Pakistan: An Uneasy Pause
• Neighbourhood Diplomacy Challenges
• West Asia: Fragile Calm, Strategic Stakes
• Ukraine War and Russia Factor
• China and Russia: Strategic Outreach
• Multilateral Diplomacy in 2026
• Key Diplomatic Tests for India in 2026
• Conclusion: Repair, Rebuild, Rebalance

Backdrop: 2025 as a Global Reset Year

• 2025 witnessed the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, reshaping global trade, security, and alliance politics.
• Wars in Ukraine and Gaza, renewed great-power rivalry, and erosion of trust in multilateral institutions marked the year.
• Global politics increasingly moved towards transactionalism, tariffs, and coercive diplomacy.
• India’s Position
  • India navigated a year of conflicting pressures:
    • Managing ties with the U.S. amid tariff threats.
    • Sustaining energy and defence links with Russia.
    • Maintaining stability in its neighbourhood.
  • Despite tensions, India avoided strategic isolation.

India–U.S. Relations Under Trump 2.0

• Initial optimism following Trump’s re-election faded quickly.
• Trump accused India of “unfair trade practices” and imposed 50% tariffs on Indian exports.
• Pressure mounted on India to reduce Russian oil imports.
• Trade talks stalled.
• While military and strategic cooperation continued, economic friction dominated.
• 2026 will test whether the relationship stabilises or deteriorates further.

India–Pakistan: An Uneasy Pause

• A terror attack in Pahalgam led India to launch Operation Sindoor.
• Military escalation was avoided, but relations remain tense.
• Pakistan faces internal consolidation of power under Asim Munir, raising concerns over military dominance.
• Key Concern for India - Fragile ceasefire; Persistent terror infrastructure; Risk of sudden escalation.

Neighbourhood Diplomacy Challenges

• Nepal: Regime Change and Instability
  • Protests and generational political churn.
  • Formation of an interim government.
  • Revival of monarchist sentiments and stronger army role.
  • India must recalibrate engagement carefully.
• Bangladesh: Political Turmoil
  • Renewed unrest after killing of youth leader.
  • Student protests and fragile interim administration under Muhammad Yunus.
  • Elections due in 2026 amid law-and-order concerns.

West Asia: Fragile Calm, Strategic Stakes

• Gaza War Pause
  • Temporary pause after intense conflict.
  • Direct Indian interests due to:
    • Energy security
    • Indian diaspora
    • IMEC corridor prospects
  • India’s Role - Advocates restraint, humanitarian aid, and regional stability; 2026 may offer limited diplomatic revival but risks remain high.

Ukraine War and Russia Factor

• War Without Resolution
  • No clear end despite peace talks.
  • Trump pushes for ceasefire, but core disputes persist.
• India’s Position - Continued engagement with Russia; Participation in Ukraine discussions while preserving strategic autonomy; Russian oil imports remain critical for inflation control.

China and Russia: Strategic Outreach

• India engaged both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin through SCO and bilateral channels.
• China remains the primary long-term challenge despite tactical engagement.
• Despite talks, 60,000+ troops remain deployed on both sides of LAC.
• Disengagement remain incomplete.
• Re-engagement with China: Cautious Reset
  • Trade links expanded but mistrust remains.
  • India balances economic pragmatism with security concerns.
  • 2026 diplomacy requires avoiding escalation without conceding core interests.

Multilateral Diplomacy in 2026

• BRICS and Quad
  • India must balance participation in BRICS with its role in the Quad.
  • Both forums reflect India’s strategic autonomy.
• G20 Under U.S. Presidency
  • Trump’s approach may dilute multilateralism.
  • India must protect G20 gains achieved during its presidency.
• Europe and Africa: Renewed Focus
  • Europe
    • India seeks stronger economic and strategic ties.
    • Hosting visits from EU leadership expected.
  • Africa
    • India’s goodwill remains strong.
    • Next India–Africa Forum Summit
    • Countering China’s growing footprint remains a challenge.

Key Diplomatic Tests for India in 2026

• Trade
  • Finalising or salvaging trade deal with the U.S.
  • Managing tariff pressures.
• Energy Security
  • Sustaining Russian oil imports amid pressure.
  • Maintaining Middle East stability.
• Technology and AI
  • Hosting global AI summit.
  • Showcasing India’s tech leadership.

Conclusion: Repair, Rebuild, Rebalance

• 2026 is not about grand resets but careful repair:
  • Repairing strained alliances.
  • Rebuilding neighbourhood trust.
  • Rebalancing relations among rival power blocs.

Why in news?

India’s approach to energy security has steadily evolved from dependence on a few traditional suppliers to a more diversified and opportunistic sourcing strategy. Once heavily reliant on Saudi Arabia and West Asia for nearly two-thirds of its crude imports, India has progressively broadened its oil basket to balance geopolitical risks with cost advantages.

In recent years, Russia has emerged as a major supplier, reflecting New Delhi’s pragmatic diplomacy—leveraging global disruptions to secure discounted crude while maintaining ties across rival blocs.

Overall, India’s oil policy now prioritises flexibility, diversification, and economic prudence over fixed geopolitical alignments.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• West Asia as the Backbone of India’s Oil Imports
• Iran Sanctions and the Reshaping of India’s Crude Basket
• Iran Sanctions, Temporary Revival, and India’s Diversification Push
• Russia Emerges as India’s Largest Crude Supplier

West Asia as the Backbone of India’s Oil Imports

• Before 2005, India’s energy security rested overwhelmingly on West Asia, which supplied over 70% of its crude oil, led by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and the UAE.
• Although India gradually diversified its sources between 2005 and 2015—adding African suppliers like Nigeria and Angola and limited volumes from South America—West Asia remained dominant.
• Despite this gradual broadening, more than 60% of the crude oil imported in 2011-12 came from seven West Asian nations:
  • Saudi Arabia (About 17% of the overall basket),
  • Iran (11.3%), Iraq (10.5%),
  • Kuwait (7%),
  • United Arab Emirates (9%),
  • Oman (3.4%) and
  • Qatar (3.3%).
• African oil, mainly from Nigeria and Angola, formed a distant second, accounting for about one-fifth of total imports.

Iran Sanctions and the Reshaping of India’s Crude Basket

• India’s long-standing oil ties with Iran faced a major disruption after international sanctions tightened around Tehran.
• In June 2010, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran over concerns about its expanding nuclear programme.
• This was followed in 2011 by unilateral sanctions from the United States, including restrictions on Iran’s Central Bank and threats to penalise foreign banks purchasing Iranian crude.
• Under mounting external pressure, India began scaling down imports from Iran. As a result, Iran’s share in India’s crude oil basket declined sharply—from a double-digit level earlier to 7.1% in 2012–13, 5.8% in 2013–14, 5.7% in 2014–15, before a marginal rise to 6.2% in 2015–16.
• This phase marked a crucial turning point in India’s energy diplomacy, highlighting how geopolitical sanctions directly constrained sourcing choices despite economic considerations.

Iran Sanctions, Temporary Revival, and India’s Diversification Push

• The easing of sanctions on Iran in 2016, after compliance with the United Nations Security Council–approved nuclear agreement, briefly revived India–Iran energy ties.
• India increased crude imports from Iran to 12.7% in 2016–17, restoring Tehran’s position as a major supplier.
• However, this recovery was short-lived. After Donald Trump assumed office and reimposed US sanctions in 2017, Iran’s share in India’s oil basket declined again to just over 10% in 2017–18 and 2018–19.
• By 2019–20, India drastically reduced Iranian crude purchases by 91.8%, reflecting both sanctions pressure and a conscious diversification strategy.
• New Delhi increasingly sourced oil from the United Arab Emirates and the United States, reducing vulnerability to single-source shocks.
• At present, India’s oil import profile is far more diversified: 40–45% from the Middle East, 8–10% from Africa, and 10–12% from the Americas.

Russia Emerges as India’s Largest Crude Supplier

• A major shift in India’s oil import basket occurred in 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February that year.
• The conflict triggered sweeping sanctions on Moscow by the European Union and the United States, forcing Russia to redirect its crude exports at discounted prices.
• India and China—among the world’s largest oil consumers—continued buying Russian oil, guided by economic considerations rather than sanction regimes.
• Sharp Rise in Russian Oil Share
  • According to India’s Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCIS), Russia became the largest contributor to India’s crude basket starting FY 2022–23.
  • Russia’s share jumped from less than 2% in 2021–22 to 21.6% in 2022–23, rising further to 35.9% in 2023–24 and 35.8% in 2024–25.
  • Currently, around one-third of India’s total crude imports come from Russia.
  • Importantly, Indian refineries were technically “well-suited” to process Russian crude, easing the transition.
• Economics of Discounted Russian Crude
  • The surge was supported by favourable pricing.
  • The price of Russian Urals crude fell from $79.41 per barrel in April 2022 to $66.49 per barrel in March 2025, improving refinery margins.
  • During this period, the shares of traditional suppliers such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE declined only marginally, indicating diversification rather than displacement.
• Why Russian Oil Is Hard to Replace?
  • As per analysts, cutting Russian oil imports would be “difficult, costly, and risky” for India.
  • Replacing Russian crude would require rapid sourcing from multiple suppliers at higher costs due to increased freight charges and weaker discounts.
  • Such substitution could compress refinery margins, raise retail fuel prices, fuel inflation, trigger political backlash, and strain refinery balance sheets and credit lines.

About Buccal Mucosa Cancer (BMC):

• It refers to a type of oral cancer that originates in the inner lining of the cheeks, called the buccal mucosa.
• It usually occurs in the thin, flat cells called squamous cells that line the buccal mucosa and other parts of the mouth. Hence, most BMC cases are Squamous Cell Carcinoma (SCC).
• It is the predominant form of oral cancer in the Indian subcontinent.
• It primarily affects individuals with risk factors such as tobacco use and alcohol use, which causes cellular changes in the cheek lining.
• Symptoms commonly include persistent sores, lumps, pain, and difficulty chewing or moving the cheek.
• Treatment options include surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy, depending on the cancer stage.
• Early detection is essential for improving prognosis and the buccal mucosa cancer survival rate.

About Ho Tribe:

• The Ho, or Kolha, people are an Austroasiatic Munda ethnic group of India.
• They call themselves the Ho, Hodoko, and Horo, which mean ‘human’ in their own language.
• Distribution:
  • They are mostly concentrated in the Kolhan region of Jharkhand and Odisha.
  • Ho also inhabit adjacent areas in the neighboring states of Odisha, West Bengal, and Bihar.
  • They also live in Bangladesh and Nepal.
• Language: Ho people speak the Ho language, an Austroasiatic language closely related to Mundari.
• Occupation: The majority of the Ho tribe is involved in agriculture, either as landowners or labourers, while others are engaged in mining.
• The men and women of this community wear very minimal dress. The women prefer to wear tribal jewelleries.
• Women have higher status among the Ho than they do in most tribes.
• Dance is very important in Ho culture. Most villages have a dedicated dancing ground, called akhra, usually consisting of a cleared space of hard ground under a spreading tree.
• Traditional Ho music incorporates native instruments, including a dama (drum), dholak, dumeng (mandar), and the rutu (flute).
• Religion:
  • The majority of the Ho have their own nature-based religion (Sarnaism) that doesn't fit in with Hinduism.
  • They have a village priest called a deuri.

About Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme (RDSS):

• It was launched by the Ministry of Power, Government of India to transform the electricity distribution sector.
• It is a Reforms-based and Results-linked Scheme.
• It seeks to modernise India’s power distribution sector through smart metering, network strengthening, and financial reforms, with the goal of creating financially sustainable and operationally efficient DISCOMs.
• The scheme aims to reduce the Aggregate Technical and Commercial (AT&C) losses to pan-India levels of 12-15% and Gap between Average Cost of Supply (ACS) and Average Revenue Realised (ARR) to zero by 2024-25.
• The Scheme has two major components:
  • Part A: Financial support for Prepaid Smart Metering & System Metering and upgradation of the Distribution Infrastructure.
  • Part B: Training & Capacity Building and other Enabling & Supporting Activities.
• Financial assistance to DISCOMs is provided for upgradation of the Distribution Infrastructure and for Prepaid Smart Consumer Metering & System Metering based on meeting pre-qualifying criteria and achieving basic minimum benchmark in reforms.

About Dhasan River:

• It is a right bank tributary of the Betwa River, which itself is a tributary of the Yamuna.
• It flows in the Bundelkhand region of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
• Course:
  • The river originates in Madhya Pradesh and forms the southeastern boundary of the Lalitpur District of Uttar Pradesh.
• The river was known as the Dasharna in the ancient period.
• Lehchura Dam is built on this river. It is primarily an irrigation dam providing water for agricultural use via the Dhasan Canal System (DCS).