Why in news?

• The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 marks a shift in the trajectory of transgender rights in India.
• Since the 2014 NALSA judgment, courts have expanded transgender rights by emphasising personal autonomy.
• However, legislative and executive actions have often introduced bureaucratic hurdles, limiting the full realisation of these rights.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Core Conflict: Self-Identification vs Medical Certification
• Legislative Reluctance and ‘Omissive Discrimination’

Core Conflict: Self-Identification vs Medical Certification

• The Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as the “third gender” and affirmed the right to self-identification.
• Gender identity was held to be part of personal liberty (Article 21) and freedom of expression (Article 19).
• Courts consistently upheld that gender identity is based on an individual’s internal experience, not biological tests.
• Self-determination was treated as central to dignity, privacy, and identity.
• Expansion of Rights by Courts
  • High Courts protected:
    • Self-identification without medical proof in official documents
    • Employment rights, rejecting forced medical examinations
    • Access to institutions (e.g., NCC inclusion)
    • Political rights, including contesting elections
    • Marriage and relationships, recognising trans persons’ rights
  • Courts repeatedly ruled that no authority can question self-identified gender.
  • Courts across India reaffirmed that gender choice lies solely with the individual, and state or institutional interference is impermissible.
• Shift in 2026 Amendment Act
  • The 2026 Amendment removes self-perceived identity as the basis for recognition.
  • It introduces:
    • Medical board certification for gender identity
    • Mandatory approval by district authorities
    • Removal of categories like trans-man, trans-woman, genderqueer
    • Surgery requirement for legal gender change
  • The amendment marks a shift from self-identification to medical certification, contrasting with the long-standing judicial emphasis on autonomy.

Legislative Reluctance and ‘Omissive Discrimination’

• Delay and Disagreement in Lawmaking
  • After the NALSA judgment, a Private Member’s Bill (2015) was passed in Rajya Sabha.
  • The government introduced revised versions in 2016 and 2018, which faced criticism from the transgender community.
• Concerns with the 2019 Act
  • The Transgender Persons Act, 2019 removed screening committees but still:
    • Required proof of surgery for gender change
  • Several provisions were challenged in the Supreme Court (2020) and remain pending.
• Implementation Failures
  • The law’s implementation was weak, leading to repeated judicial interventions.
  • In Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (2025), the Supreme Court criticised:
    • Administrative inaction
    • Termed it “omissive discrimination” (failure of the State to act)
  • The Court noted that the law had become a “dead letter” due to government apathy.
  • It directed the government to:
    • Form an advisory committee
    • Implement the law effectively
• 2026 Amendment and Lack of Consultation
• The 2026 Amendment Act reintroduced:
  • Medical certification
  • Removal of self-identification
• This was done without consulting the advisory committee.
• Judicial Response to the Amendment
  • The Rajasthan High Court highlighted that the amendment:
    • Departs from constitutional principles
    • Makes gender identity subject to State approval
  • The Court warned that legal recognition of gender identity risks becoming a State-controlled entitlement, undermining earlier constitutional guarantees of autonomy.

Why in news?

• In the 1970s and early 1980s, many Western countries faced stagflation, meaning low or negative economic growth along with high inflation.
• For example, the US and UK had negative or very low GDP growth in 1974–75, while inflation remained very high during the same period.
• A similar pattern was seen again between 1979 and 1982, especially in the US, with fluctuating growth and high inflation rates.
• The main cause of stagflation was oil shocks:
  • First: After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Arab countries imposed an oil embargo.
  • Second: After the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq conflict.
• Later oil shocks (2008, 2022, 2026) also affected economies, but:
  • 2008 caused slow growth without high inflation.
  • 2022 led to inflation but not a major recession.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Understanding Stagflation: Causes and Mechanism
• Is Stagflation a Real Risk Today
• Dealing with Stagflation: Limits and Challenges

Understanding Stagflation: Causes and Mechanism

• Stagflation refers to a situation where high inflation and low or negative economic growth occur together, described as “the worst of both worlds”.
• A combination of "stagnation" and "inflation," famously coined in the 1960s to describe a period of rising prices alongside a sluggish economy.
• Basic Demand–Supply Framework
  • Prices and output are determined by the interaction of demand and supply curves.
  • The equilibrium point is where quantity demanded equals quantity supplied (P0, Q0).
  • Normally, changes in supply occur due to price changes, leading to movement along the same supply curve. In contrast, a supply shock shifts the entire supply curve.
  • Stagflation arises from negative supply shocks, which reduce production.
  • Causes include wars, pandemics, natural disasters, and disruptions in trade or shipping routes. These factors increase input costs and reduce supply.
  • 
• Impact on Economy
  • The supply curve shifts left (from S0 to S1).
  • This leads to:
    • Higher prices (P1)
    • Lower output (Q1)

Is Stagflation a Real Risk Today

• The possibility of stagflation depends on the magnitude and duration of the supply shock.
• The ongoing US-Israel vs Iran conflict has created a severe shock.
• Unlike 2022 (mainly a price shock), the current crisis is both a price and supply shock, making it more serious.
• The issue is not just high prices but also availability of energy (oil, gas, LPG).
• Shortages can lead to sudden stoppage of industrial activity and long-term economic disruptions.
• Increased Economic Vulnerability
  • Compared to the 1970s, India is now more dependent on energy and petrochemical products.
  • Fertilisers, LPG, synthetic fibres, and plastics are widely used, increasing vulnerability to energy disruptions.
  • Energy disruptions affect multiple industries through supply chains.
  • These create complex, non-linear economic impacts, where small disruptions can lead to large economic consequences.

Dealing with Stagflation: Limits and Challenges

• Role of Supply Shock Duration
  • The impact of stagflation depends on how long the supply shock lasts.
  • If disruptions end quickly, the supply curve can return to normal, avoiding prolonged stagflation.
• Limits of Conventional Policy Tools
  • Fiscal and monetary policies can address either:
    • Low growth (through spending and lower interest rates), or
    • Inflation (through tighter money and higher rates).
• Policy Trade-offs in Stagflation
• Raising interest rates to control inflation can worsen growth and unemployment.
• Stimulating demand through spending or lower rates can increase inflation further when supply is constrained.
• Nature of the Problem
  • Stagflation is mainly a supply-side issue, while traditional policies target demand management.
  • This makes standard tools less effective.
• Way to Address Stagflation
  • The solution lies in restoring disrupted supply chains.
  • However, achieving this is difficult and complex.

Context:

• India plans a massive expansion of nuclear power capacity—from 8,180 MW to 100 GW by 2047—backed by major policy reforms.
• The SHANTI Act (2025) marks a structural shift by ending the monopoly of the Department of Atomic Energy, allowing private (and potentially foreign) participation in building, owning, and operating nuclear plants.
• It also strengthens regulation by giving statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and revises liability laws to attract investment, replacing earlier laws like the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and CLNDA (2010).
• However, achieving the 100 GW target will depend on effective implementation—especially timely framing of rules, regulatory clarity, and alignment with the reform-oriented vision of the Act.

Driving India’s Energy Transition: Growth, Net Zero, and the Role of Power Mix

• Twin Drivers: Viksit Bharat & Net-Zero Goals
  • India’s energy reforms are guided by two key goals: becoming a developed nation (Viksit Bharat) by 2047 and achieving net-zero emissions by 2070.
  • Economic development will increase dependence on electricity over traditional fuels like coal, firewood, and fossil fuels.
  • India’s per capita electricity consumption (1,418 kWh) is far below China, the US, and OECD averages—highlighting the need for massive expansion.
  • Currently, only one-fifth of total energy consumption is electricity, indicating a major transition ahead.
• Current Energy Mix: Capacity vs Reality
  • As of June 2025, India’s installed power capacity is 476 GW, with nearly 50% from non-fossil sources.
  • Renewable capacity stands at 227 GW (solar, wind, hydro, bioenergy), while nuclear is 8.8 GW and thermal (mainly coal) is 240 GW.
  • India aims to reach 500 GW renewable capacity by 2030.
• The Generation Gap: Renewables vs Thermal
  • Installed capacity does not equal actual power generation.
  • In 2024–25:
    • Total generation: 1,824 TWh
    • Thermal: 75% of generation
    • Renewables: 22%
    • Nuclear: 3%
  • Despite equal capacity share, renewables underperform due to dependence on sunlight, wind, and seasonal factors.
• Baseload Challenge & Storage Constraint
  • Thermal and nuclear power provide stable baseload electricity, unlike intermittent renewables.
  • Scaling renewables requires large investments in energy storage systems.
  • Due to these constraints, renewable expansion is slowing, with ~40 GW projects stuck without power-purchase agreements (PPAs).
• The Core Challenge Ahead
  • India must simultaneously:
    • Expand electricity access and consumption for development
    • Decarbonise power generation for climate goals
  • This requires balancing renewables, nuclear, and storage solutions while ensuring reliable and affordable power supply.

India’s Nuclear Power Path: Capacity Expansion, Costs, and Future Options

• Rising Power Needs & Role of Nuclear Energy
  • India may need over 2,000 GW of electricity capacity to achieve Viksit Bharat levels.
  • Renewables like solar and wind are highly land-intensive (≈10× more than thermal) and intermittent.
  • With coal incompatible with net-zero goals, nuclear power emerges as the preferred baseload solution.
• Evolution of India’s Nuclear Programme
  • India’s first reactor began operations in Tarapur (1969).
  • Currently, NPCIL operates 24 reactors with about 8,780 MW capacity.
  • Reactor mix includes:
    • Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) – oldest
    • VVER (PWR) reactors at Kudankulam (Russian design)
    • Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) – dominant and indigenised
  • PHWR designs have evolved from 220 MW to 540 MW and 700 MW, showing strong domestic capability.
• Cost Advantage & Investment Challenge
  • India’s 700 MW PHWR costs ~$2 million/MW, among the lowest globally.
  • To add 90 GW nuclear capacity, India needs over $200 billion (₹18 lakh crore).
  • Such scale is not feasible without private and foreign investment, despite steady public funding.
• Stalled Large-Scale Projects
  • Approval for 10 × 700 MW reactors (fleet mode) was granted in 2017, but progress is slow.
  • Major proposed projects:
    • Jaitapur (Maharashtra) – 6 × 1,650 MW (French EDF design)
    • Mithi Virdi (Gujarat) & Kovvada (Andhra Pradesh) – 6 × 1,000 MW each (US/Japanese designs)
  • These imported designs are costlier (~$5 million/MW) and remain under consideration for years.
• Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) & Industrial Demand
  • Government has allocated ₹20,000 crore to develop indigenous SMRs (5–200 MW) by 2033.
  • Industries with captive power plants (steel, cement, petrochemicals, data centres) show growing interest in nuclear options.
  • Existing 220 MW PHWRs can act as reliable, scalable units for faster deployment.

Three-Front Strategy for Scaling Nuclear Power in India

• Indigenisation of Large Reactor Technologies
  • Foreign designs (EdF, Westinghouse) are new and costly; indigenisation is needed to reduce costs.
  • China’s example shows that building a domestic supply chain can lower costs to below $2 million per MW.
• Advancing Indigenous R&D (SMRs and Thorium)
  • The DAE should accelerate research on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), especially molten-salt designs.
  • Focus on Thorium-based technologies using HALEU as an alternative to breeder reactors.
  • This can enable early utilisation of India’s thorium reserves.
• Scaling Indigenous PHWRs for Industrial Use
  • The 220 MW PHWR model can be modularised for captive industrial power plants.
  • Indian private sector firms already have design, fabrication, and construction capabilities.
  • Requires suitable financing models due to high upfront costs and long operational life (60 years).
  • Exclusion zone norms need modification for single-unit captive reactors.

Conclusion

• The SHANTI Act seeks to clearly separate strategic and defence-related nuclear activities from civilian power generation.
• Its success depends on transparent rules addressing key issues such as tariffs, fuel ownership, waste management, liability, dispute resolution, and establishing an independent regulator.

Why in the News?

• Prime Minister Narendra Modi has become the longest-serving elected head of government in India, reigniting debate on executive term limits.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Executive Tenure (Constitutional Position, Rationale, Impact of Anti-Defection Law, Convention, Reforms, etc.)

Constitutional Position on Executive Tenure

• India’s Constitution does not prescribe any term limit for the office of the Prime Minister.
• The Prime Minister continues in office as long as they enjoy the confidence of the Lok Sabha. This principle is rooted in the parliamentary system adopted from the British model.
• The framers of the Constitution believed that democratic accountability through Parliament would act as an effective check on executive power.

Constituent Assembly’s Rationale

• The reasoning behind the absence of term limits was clearly articulated during the Constituent Assembly debates.
• Dr B.R. Ambedkar emphasised the concept of “daily accountability” through parliamentary mechanisms such as question hour, no-confidence motions, and adjournment motions.
• He argued that these mechanisms were more effective than periodic elections in ensuring executive responsibility.
• Thus, the Constitution relied on continuous legislative oversight rather than fixed tenure restrictions.

Comparative Perspective on Term Limits

• India stands out among major democracies for not having executive term limits.
• Countries such as the United States, Brazil, and Indonesia impose limits on the tenure of their executive heads.
• In parliamentary systems, term limits are generally absent because leaders can be removed through legislative processes.
• However, this assumption depends on the effectiveness of institutional checks within the system.

Impact of Anti-Defection Law

• The introduction of the Tenth Schedule through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985 significantly altered the balance between the legislature and executive.
• The anti-defection law mandates the disqualification of legislators who vote against the party whip.
• This has weakened the effectiveness of no-confidence motions, as ruling party members are unlikely to vote against their own government.
• As a result, the primary mechanism envisioned by the framers to check executive power has been diluted.

Weakening of Parliamentary Accountability

• In addition to the anti-defection law, the absence of strong intra-party democracy further reduces accountability.
• Unlike in the United Kingdom, where party members can challenge leadership, Indian political parties lack structured mechanisms for internal leadership change.
• This creates a situation where both legislative and intra-party checks on executive authority are weakened.

The Presidential Convention Paradox

• Interestingly, India has developed an informal convention limiting the President to two terms, despite the Constitution not mandating such a restriction.
• No President has served more than two terms, even though the office is largely ceremonial.
• In contrast, the Prime Minister, who exercises real executive power, faces no such formal or informal limitation.
• This creates an institutional asymmetry in the constitutional framework.

Debate on Democratic Legitimacy

• One argument against imposing term limits is that repeated electoral victories reflect the will of the people.
• However, prolonged incumbency may provide structural advantages such as control over institutions, influence over policy, and shaping of the political narrative.
• This raises concerns about whether electoral processes alone can ensure adequate checks on executive power.

Possible Reforms

• Experts suggest that there are two potential reform pathways.
  • First, restoring parliamentary accountability by exempting confidence motions from the anti-defection law.
  • Second, introducing a constitutional amendment to limit consecutive terms for Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers, while allowing a return after a gap.
• These reforms aim to balance democratic choice with institutional safeguards.

Context:

• The blocking of a comedian’s (Pulkit Mani) video under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act highlights growing concerns over arbitrary online censorship in India.
• The episode reflects broader systemic issues arising from the Information Technology (IT) Rules, 2021, and their subsequent amendments.

Background - The IT Rules 2021:

• Notified (on February 25, 2021) through executive action, the repeated amendments of the rules have -
  • Expanded executive control over digital platforms.
  • Reduced procedural safeguards for users.
• Legal challenges:
  • Various High Courts (HCs) have issued interim orders (partial stays, selective validation).
  • Final constitutional validity remains pending, allowing continued enforcement.

Key Provisions and Recent Amendments:

• Arbitrary content takedown mechanism: Section 79(3)(b) allows content removal without clear reasoning, opportunity for hearing, and transparent procedure, violating the principles of natural justice.
• Shrinking timeframes for compliance:
  • The most recent (February 2026) amendment of the rules reduced the takedown timeline to 3 hours.
  • No exemptions for parody, satire, or artistic expression. This may have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)) due to over-compliance by intermediaries.
• Expansion of State surveillance infrastructure:
  • The earlier (October 2025) changes strengthened Sahyog Portal, enabling over 35 State police officers and 8 Central agencies to order takedowns.
  • Parallel powers under Section 69A of IT Act provides some procedural safeguards, but rarely followed in practice.
• Overlapping and opaque legal framework:
  • In addition, there is also the power for the Union government to block websites under the IT Rules, Section 69A, executive advisories, and SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures).
  • Issues are lack of transparency, no clarity on authority responsible, and users unaware of grounds for censorship.
• Proposed amendments:
  • The proposed amendments highlight the need for expansion of regulation to Digital news media, and even on individual social media users commenting on current affairs.
  • Seen as indirect implementation of the Broadcasting Bill, 2024.
  • Other changes are giving legal force to unpublished advisories/SOPs, and removal of a 3-month cap on data retention for intermediaries.

Major Concerns/ Challenges:

• Violation of fundamental rights: Impacts Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – restrictions may fail the tests of reasonableness and proportionality.
• Erosion of due process: No prior notice, hearing, and reasoned orders, undermining rule of law.
• Chilling effect on free speech: Fear of arbitrary action discourages satire, political commentary, and dissent.
• Executive overreach: Expansion via executive notifications, not parliamentary scrutiny, weakens separation of powers.
• Surveillance and privacy risks: Unlimited data retention - threat to Right to Privacy (recognized in Puttaswamy judgment), and potential misuse by state agencies.
• Regulatory uncertainty: Pending judicial review creates legal ambiguity, and uneven enforcement.
• Critically analysing government’s justification:
  • Government’s justification:
    • According to the MeitY, these measures are needed to combat Deepfakes, and AI-generated misinformation.
    • These projects India’s framework as a “global benchmark”.
  • Critical analysis: While misinformation is a genuine concern, measures appear disproportionate, lack institutional accountability, and risk of transforming regulation into censorship architecture.

Way Forward:

• Strengthening procedural safeguards: Mandatory notice, hearing, and reasoned orders, ensuring compliance with natural justice principles.
• Parliamentary oversight: Limit executive rule-making, and major changes should pass through legislative scrutiny.
• Clear and transparent framework: Single, streamlined mechanism for content regulation. Public disclosure of takedown orders, and responsible authorities.
• Judicial clarity: Fast-track constitutional adjudication of IT Rules. Establish clear jurisprudence on digital free speech.
• Safeguards for creative expression: Explicit exemptions for satire, parody, and artistic content.
• Data protection alignment: Harmonize with Digital Personal Data Protection framework, and reinstate limits on data retention.

Conclusion:

• India stands at a critical juncture where the need to regulate digital platforms must be balanced against constitutional freedoms.
• The expanding scope of the IT Rules, 2021 risks tilting this balance towards unchecked executive power and systemic censorship.
• A transparent, accountable, and rights-based framework is essential to ensure that the digital public sphere remains a space for free expression, dissent, and democratic engagement—not control.

Context

• The global system of trade multilateralism is facing one of its most severe challenges since the Second World War.
• Increasing unilateral actions, particularly by the United States, have raised concerns about the erosion of foundational principles such as most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment.
• In this context, the fourteenth Ministerial Conference (MC14) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), held in Yaoundé (Cameroon) in March 2026, was expected to reaffirm the importance of a rules-based global trading order.
• However, instead of strengthening the system, the conference revealed deep divisions and structural weaknesses.

Failure to Achieve Consensus

• A major disappointment of MC14 was the inability of its 166 member countries to agree on a ministerial declaration outlining future priorities.
• Such declarations are essential for providing direction and coherence to global trade governance.
• The absence of consensus reflects widening differences among member states and highlights the WTO’s declining effectiveness as a negotiating platform.
• The so-called Yaoundé package, consisting only of draft decisions, further underscores the organisation’s inability to deliver concrete outcomes at a critical juncture.

Breakdown of Key Moratoriums

• E-commerce Moratorium
  • One of the most significant developments at MC14 was the lapse of the long-standing moratorium on customs duties on electronic commerce.
  • Since 1998, WTO members had agreed not to impose tariffs on digital transactions to facilitate global digital trade.
  • Its expiration now allows countries to impose such duties, potentially benefiting developing nations through increased revenue but also raising costs for businesses and consumers.
  • Additionally, 66 WTO members signed a separate e-commerce agreement prohibiting such tariffs.
  • This creates a fragmented system with parallel legal frameworks, one within the WTO allowing tariffs and another outside it prohibiting them, thereby weakening the uniformity of global trade rules.
• TRIPS Non-Violation Complaints
  • The second moratorium that lapsed concerned non-violation complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.
  • These complaints allow countries to challenge measures that may not violate trade rules but undermine expected benefits.
  • The removal of this safeguard raises concerns for developing countries, particularly regarding public health policies that could be contested by developed nations.
  • Although past cases suggest such complaints are unlikely to succeed, their possibility introduces uncertainty into policymaking.

Challenges of Plurilateral Agreements

• Another key issue at MC14 was the failure to incorporate the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) agreement into the WTO framework.
• Despite support from 129 countries, opposition from India prevented its inclusion. India raised concerns about the absence of clear legal safeguards for integrating plurilateral agreements into the WTO system.
• This highlights a broader dilemma: while plurilateral agreements can help advance negotiations among willing members, they may undermine inclusivity and create divisions within the multilateral system.

Lack of a Reform Roadmap and Implications for the Future of Global Trade

• Lack of a Reform Roadmap
  • Critical issues, such as restoring the appellate mechanism of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, remain unresolved.
  • This institutional paralysis weakens the organisation’s credibility and effectiveness.
  • Historical experience, particularly during the stagnation of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1970s, shows that such periods often lead to increased unilateral actions by the United States.
  • Measures like Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 exemplify how unilateralism can rise when multilateral systems falter.
• Implications for the Future of Global Trade
  • The failure of MC14 is likely to accelerate the shift toward alternative trade arrangements outside the WTO.
  • As countries increasingly negotiate separate agreements, the central role of the WTO in global trade governance may diminish.
  • This fragmentation risks creating a less predictable and more unequal global trading system.
  • To remain relevant, the WTO must adopt innovative approaches, such as developing a coherent framework for plurilateral agreements.
  • In this regard, India can play a constructive role by advocating for legal safeguards that ensure inclusivity while enabling progress.

Conclusion

• The WTO’s MC14 represents a missed opportunity to reinforce and revitalise the global trading system.
• The inability to reach consensus, the breakdown of key moratoriums, and the absence of a reform agenda highlight a deepening crisis in trade multilateralism.
• Without decisive action and strong political commitment, the system risks further fragmentation, with unilateralism replacing cooperation.
• Strengthening the WTO and preserving a rules-based order is therefore essential for ensuring stability and fairness in global trade.