Why in News?

Ahead of the RBI’s monetary policy review on April 9 and US tariff policy changes, India’s 10-year bond yields fell by nine basis points to 6.49% after the central bank announced a ₹80,000 crore bond purchase for April.

A drop in bond yields raises bond prices and signals market expectations of lower future interest rates, though it doesn’t guarantee an immediate rate cut.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Indian Bond Market: An Overview
• Impact of US Bond Yields on Indian Markets
• Improved Liquidity in Indian Banking Sector

Indian Bond Market: An Overview

• The Indian bond market is a key segment of the financial system where entities (government, corporations, and financial institutions) raise funds by issuing bonds.
• Investors lend money to issuers in exchange for periodic interest payments and principal repayment at maturity.
• Structure of the Indian Bond market
  • Primary Bond Market - In the primary market, bonds are issued for the first time by the government, corporations, or financial institutions to raise funds.
    • Government Securities (G-Secs): Issued by the central and state governments, including Treasury Bills (short-term) and Government Bonds (long-term).
    • Corporate Bonds: Issued by companies to raise capital; rated based on creditworthiness.
    • Municipal Bonds: Issued by local governments for public infrastructure projects.
    • Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) Bonds: Issued by government-owned companies.
    • Green Bonds: Used to finance environmentally sustainable projects.
    • Masala Bonds: Rupee-denominated bonds issued in foreign markets.
  • Secondary Bond Market (Trading Market) - In the secondary market, previously issued bonds are bought and sold among investors.
    • E.g., T-Bills; Commercial Papers (CPs); Certificates of Deposit (CDs) etc.
• Size of Indian Bond Market
• The Indian bond market is valued at US$2.69 trillion as of December 2024. 
• G-Secs dominate the domestic bond market, constituting over 60% of the market capitalization, while corporate bonds hold a significant share of the remaining segment.
• Challenges in the Indian Bond Market
  • Limited Retail Participation: Retail investors prefer bank deposits over bonds due to lack of awareness and accessibility.
  • Liquidity Constraints: Corporate bonds have lower trading volumes, making it difficult for investors to buy/sell easily.
  • Credit Risk Concerns: Defaults by some issuers reduce investor confidence.
  • Regulatory Hurdles: Multiple regulators (RBI, SEBI) create complexity in market operations.
  • Interest Rate Volatility: Changes in RBI’s monetary policy impact bond yields and prices.

Impact of US Bond Yields on Indian Markets

• Indian bond yields have closely tracked US bond yields, falling 24 bps since March following the RBI’s 25 bps repo rate cut in February.
• In FY 2024-25, the 10-year yield has dropped 62 bps—the steepest decline in five years.
• US Treasury Yields Decline
  • Driven by investors shifting to safer assets ahead of Trump’s expected tariff announcement, the yield on 10-year US Treasury notes also fell to the lowest since December 6, 2024.

Improved Liquidity in Indian Banking Sector

• The comfortable liquidity situation as seen by a slight deficit last week has ensured that India’s bond yields have come down.
  • There was only a small shortage of money in the banking system last week, which helped bring down bond yields (or the interest rate on government bonds).
  • When liquidity is good (meaning there is enough money flowing in the system), borrowing costs tend to stay low, making it easier for the government and businesses to raise funds.
• Key Liquidity Factors and RBI’s Measures
  • Upcoming Repayments (VRRs Maturing):
    • Banks had borrowed about ₹1.81 lakh crore from the RBI through Variable Rate Repo (VRR), and this money needs to be repaid by April 7.
      • VRR is a monetary policy tool used by the RBI to manage liquidity in the banking system.
      • Unlike the fixed repo rate, which is predetermined by the RBI, the VRR is decided through market-based auctions.
      • This means banks bid for funds, and the rate is determined based on demand and supply.
    • This repayment could reduce liquidity (the amount of money available in the banking system).
  • Counterbalance Through SDF:
    • However, a lot of money is already parked in the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF)—a tool where banks keep excess funds with the RBI.
    • This means the impact of VRR repayments on liquidity will be limited.
  • RBI’s Preparedness:
    • The RBI has planned four Open Market Operations (OMOs) of ₹20,000 crore each, meaning it will buy government bonds to inject liquidity.
    • The VRR auction recently saw fewer bids than expected, meaning banks may not need as much liquidity support.
  • The RBI is managing liquidity carefully by balancing money going out (VRR repayments) and money coming in (OMOs and SDF balances). This should prevent any major disruption in the financial system.

Why in the News?

After a marathon debate of 12 hours, the Lok Sabha has passed the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Introduction (Context of the Article)
• About Waqf Bill 2025 (Key Provisions, Controversies, etc.)

Introduction:

• The Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2025, tabled in the Lok Sabha by Union Minister Kiren Rijiju, has reignited debate over the regulation of Waqf properties in India.
• The Bill seeks to amend the Waqf Act, 1995, with sweeping changes aimed at increasing transparency, addressing title disputes, and incorporating judicial oversight.
• However, the proposed provisions have drawn strong criticism from opposition parties and Muslim bodies who claim it threatens the community's constitutional autonomy in managing religious endowments.

Key Provisions of the Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2025:

• Judicial Oversight on Waqf Tribunal Orders
  • The amended Bill introduces a provision allowing High Court appeals against Waqf Tribunal orders.
  • This rectifies a long-standing gap in judicial review under the 1995 Act, which previously made Tribunal decisions final and unchallengeable.
  • The new mechanism strengthens legal accountability and provides a higher forum for redressal.
• Clarification on ‘Waqf by User’
  • The controversial proposal to eliminate the Islamic legal concept of “waqf by user” has been revised.
  • The updated Bill now retains the status of such properties, like mosques and graveyards, if they were registered before the new law’s enactment, unless contested.
  • However, future recognition of waqf status requires documentary proof or declaration from a practicing Muslim of at least five years, raising concerns over the exclusion of recent converts or informal practices.
• Empowering Government Officials in Property Disputes
  • One of the most significant changes is the shift in adjudication power.
  • The Bill empowers senior government officers (above District Collector rank) to settle disputes over whether a property is waqf or government land, replacing the Waqf Tribunal’s exclusive authority under the 1995 Act.
  • Until the officer submits a report, disputed properties will be treated as government property.
• Centralised Digital Registration of Waqf Properties
  • The Bill mandates the creation of a digital portal for registering and updating waqf properties.
  • All information must be uploaded within six months of the law’s commencement, streamlining data management and curbing misappropriation.
  • The Tribunal, however, may allow an extension in justified cases.
• Application of Limitation Act to Waqf Properties
  • Another critical change is the removal of Section 107 of the Waqf Act, which had excluded waqf properties from the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • With this deletion, the standard 12-year limitation for reclaiming encroached property will now apply to waqf land.
  • This opens the possibility for encroachers to claim ownership via adverse possession.
• Altered Composition of Waqf Boards and Tribunals
  • The amended Bill allows the inclusion of non-Muslim members, including Chief Executive Officers, in State Waqf Boards and the Central Waqf Council.
  • Additionally, Waqf Tribunals will now have three members instead of two, a district judge, a joint secretary-level state officer, and an expert in Muslim law.
  • This restructuring is intended to promote expertise and inclusivity without undermining community representation.

Controversies and Criticisms:

• Allegations of Government Overreach
  • Opposition argues that empowering government officials to decide the status of waqf properties significantly curtails community autonomy.
  • The new framework grants the government de facto control over disputed land, undermining the Waqf Board’s authority and traditional Islamic jurisprudence.
• Marginalisation of Muslim Community in Governance
  • While the government asserts that the inclusion of non-Muslims in Waqf bodies fosters transparency, opposition parties and Muslim organisations see this as a violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to manage religious affairs.
  • The representation is perceived as tokenistic and politically motivated.
• Retrospective Implementation Concerns
  • Though the revised Bill protects already registered “waqf by user” properties, it introduces ambiguity for those not formally documented.
  • This may endanger numerous religious and charitable assets informally managed by local communities for decades.
• Politicisation and Suppression of Dissent
  • Opposition leaders have accused the government of bulldozing the Bill through parliamentary processes.
  • Dissent notes submitted by opposition MPs were reportedly removed from the Joint Committee's final report, raising concerns about legislative transparency.
• Legal and Social Ramifications
  • The combined impact of repealing Section 107 and centralising authority may lead to increased litigation, displacement, and unrest within the community.
  • Many view these changes as targeting Muslim institutions at a time when communal sensitivities are high.

Conclusion:

The Waqf (Amendment) Bill 2025 introduces pivotal changes to the management and regulation of waqf properties in India. While the government emphasizes transparency, accountability, and judicial oversight, oppositions sees the Bill as an encroachment on religious freedoms and community rights.

Context:

• Democracy is not just about elections but also about addressing the needs of vulnerable sections.
• The article evaluates poverty reduction in India under the current government.
• The focus is on poverty alleviation across social and religious groups between 2011-12 and 2023-24.

Measuring Poverty - The Rangarajan Poverty Line:

• The study uses the 2011-12 poverty line recommended by the C Rangarajan Committee.
• Key features:
  • Based on the Modified Mixed Recall Period (MMRP) for accurate household expenditure data.
  • Calibrated to Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) norms for calorie-based food requirements.
  • Assigns higher weightage to non-food essentials in urban areas.
  • Poverty estimates for 2023-24 are updated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Data Sources and Methodology:

• Based on unit-level data from Household Consumption Expenditure Surveys (HCES):
  • 2011-12 survey: Over 1 lakh households.
  • 2023-24 survey: Over 2.5 lakh households.
• Conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), Government of India.

Findings of the Study:

• Overall decline in poverty (2011-12 to 2023-24):
  • Rural poverty fell from 30.4% to 3.9%.
  • Urban poverty declined from 26.4% to 3.9%.
• Poverty reduction among religious groups:
  • Muslims:
    • Rural areas: 31.7% (2011-12) → 2.4% (2023-24).
    • Urban areas: 39.4% (2011-12) → 5.7% (2023-24).
  • Hindus:
    • Rural areas:30.9% (2011-12) → 4% (2023-24).
    • Urban areas:24.4% (2011-12) → 3.7% (2023-24).
  • Convergence: The Muslim-Hindu gap in urban poverty reduced from 15 percentage points to 2 percentage points.
• Poverty reduction across social groups:
  • Scheduled Tribes (STs):
    • Rural:49.5% → 12.2%.
    • Urban:38.2% → 9.9%.
    • Poverty gap with the General category narrowed from 29.5 to 10.6 percentage points (rural) and from 21.5 to 7.4 percentage points (urban).
  • Scheduled Castes (SCs):
    • Rural: Gap with General category reduced from 17.4 to 2.6 percentage points.
    • Urban: Poverty fell from 39.6% to 6.6%, and the gap narrowed from 20 to 4.1 percentage points.
  • Other Backward Classes (OBCs): Poverty rate dropped from 30.4% to 3.6%.

Poverty Alleviation Schemes/Programmes:

• In rural India:
  • Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS)
  • Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana-Gramin (PMAY-G)
  • Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana - National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY NRLM)
  • Deendayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (DDU-GKY)
  • National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP)
  • Watershed Development Component (WDC) of the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana (WDC-PMKSY)
• In urban India:
  • Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana (National Urban Livelihoods Mission)
  • Jal Jeevan Mission (Urban)
  • Scheme to Augment City Buses & Urban Green Mobility
  • Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Housing for All - Urban)
  • Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT)

Conclusion - Inclusive Growth and Democratic Governance:

• The above study shows that poverty has come down among all communities.
• India’s economic growth as well as government welfare programmes (including direct benefit transfers, rural employment programs, and food security initiatives) have been widely inclusive, and their impact on minorities and vulnerable groups has been substantial.
• The Modi government’s initiatives have reinforced democratic governance through social upliftment.

Context

• The Trump administration’s ‘Fair and Reciprocal Plan’ is designed to counter what it perceives as unfair trade practices by imposing tariffs that equalise trade relationships between the United States and its foreign partners.
• This policy aims to address trade imbalances arising from non-reciprocal trading arrangements, which are determined by tariffs, discriminatory taxes, non-tariff barriers, exchange rate manipulations, and other restrictive practices that hinder U.S. market access.
• However, a closer examination of global trade patterns and tariff structures suggests that such an approach may be counterproductive, potentially harming U.S. commercial interests rather than strengthening them. 

Global Trade Dynamics and the U.S. Role

• Over the past decade, the U.S. has remained a significant global trading power, but its share of world exports has shown only marginal growth.
  • In 2010, the U.S. accounted for 12% of total global merchandise exports, rising to just 13.4% by 2022.
  • This means that approximately 87% of world exports occur between countries that do not include the U.S.
• While some nations, such as Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands, rely heavily on the U.S. as their primary export destination, many others have minimal trade engagement with America.
  • In fact, 81 out of 160 surveyed countries sent less than 5% of their total exports to the U.S., with 26 of them exporting less than 1%.
  • This data highlights the limited extent of America’s influence in global trade flows.
• Moreover, major economic players such as China, India, and the European Union (EU) direct only a small percentage of their exports to the U.S., ranging between 16% and 19%.
• This suggests that a large portion of global trade is already well-diversified and not overly dependent on the American market.
• Therefore, the ability of the U.S. to exert leverage over its trade partners through reciprocal tariffs may be weaker than assumed under the Fair and Reciprocal Plan.

The Disparity in Tariff Structures

• The effectiveness of reciprocal tariffs depends on whether U.S. tariffs on imports are lower than the tariffs imposed on American goods by its trade partners.
• However, data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reveals that in 27 major trading partners, including Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, U.S. exports face lower tariffs than what the U.S. imposes on their goods.
• These nations collectively account for half of America’s total merchandise exports, making them crucial to U.S. trade interests.
• If these countries were to implement reciprocal tariffs under the Fair and Reciprocal Plan, it could harm American exporters, as their goods would become less competitive in these key markets.
• Thus, rather than benefiting the U.S., the policy could backfire by triggering retaliatory actions that restrict American exports.

Potential Consequences of US’ Reciprocal Tarriff

• Trade Disruptions and Self-Inflicted Harm
  • Among the remaining 130 countries where the U.S. perceives a tariff disadvantage, the extent of necessary tariff adjustments varies significantly.
  • In 57 of these nations, including China and India, the required tariff increases to reach parity is below 5%, and in 15 cases, it is less than 1%.
  • However, for the remaining 73 countries, the required tariff hike exceeds 5%, making the policy’s economic impact far more severe.
  • Notably, there is a direct correlation between the magnitude of tariff hikes and the U.S. export share in partner countries, meaning that higher tariffs are more likely to be imposed on nations where the U.S. is already a significant export destination.
  • This suggests that instead of protecting American interests, the Fair and Reciprocal Plan could inflict self-harm by provoking retaliatory measures, reducing U.S. export competitiveness, and potentially forcing businesses to seek alternative markets.
• The Risks of Trade Diversion
  • A crucial question arises: could affected countries simply redirect their exports to other markets instead of accepting higher U.S. tariffs?
  • Given that 87% of global exports do not involve the U.S., such a shift is plausible. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that firms can adapt to external shocks quickly by finding alternative trading partners.
  • While switching export destinations may involve short-term costs, businesses and governments have shown a strong capacity for adjusting to shifting trade policies.
  • Thus, instead of enforcing reciprocal tariffs, which could lead to global trade realignment away from the U.S., policymakers should consider alternative approaches that enhance competitiveness without triggering trade conflicts.

Alternative Strategies to Counter US Reciprocal Tariff Policy

• Eliminating Trade Barriers
  • Rather than engaging in a tit-for-tat tariff battle, countries facing potential reciprocal tariffs should focus on eliminating trade barriers both domestically and internationally.
  • This includes reducing non-tariff restrictions, improving regulatory cooperation, and streamlining cross-border trade processes.
  • In particular, the rise of digital services presents a new frontier for trade expansion. Reports from the World Bank and the World Trade Organization indicate that digitally delivered services have been growing at a faster rate than goods and traditional services over the past decade.
  • Research further suggests that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that include regulatory provisions can significantly boost digital trade.
• Developing Open Markets
  • Instead of expending political and economic capital on reciprocal tariffs, countries would benefit more from developing open markets, strengthening trade agreements, and investing in areas that offer long-term competitiveness.
  • This approach would not only mitigate the adverse effects of the Fair and Reciprocal Plan but also position economies for sustained growth in the evolving global trade landscape.

Conclusion

• The Fair and Reciprocal Plan, while intended to correct perceived trade imbalances, carries significant risks of economic self-harm.
• A broad examination of global trade flows suggests that U.S. leverage in imposing reciprocal tariffs is limited, and in many cases, retaliatory actions could harm American businesses.
• Furthermore, many affected countries may find it more advantageous to diversify their trade relationships rather than comply with U.S. tariff demands.
• Instead of pursuing a rigid tariff-based approach, a more effective strategy would be to focus on removing trade barriers, fostering regulatory cooperation, and enhancing digital trade.

Context

• One of the most alarming threats is the use of AI to generate, possess, and disseminate child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
• In response, the United Kingdom (U.K.) has taken a pioneering step by introducing legislation targeting AI-generated CSAM.
• This development is accompanied by growing global concern over the misuse of AI tools to create life-like child exploitation content.
• Given the increasing incidence of cybercrimes against children, India must reassess its existing legal framework and adapt it to effectively counter this emerging threat.

The UK’s Legislative Approach to AI-Generated CSAM

• The International AI Safety Report 2025, released by the British government’s Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology in collaboration with the AI Security Institute, highlights the risks posed by AI-generated CSAM.
• In response, the U.K. is set to introduce legislation that will criminalize the possession, creation, and dissemination of AI tools designed for generating CSAM.
• Additionally, possessing manuals that guide individuals on using AI for CSAM production will also be illegal.
• This proposed legislation represents a shift from an ‘accused-centric’ and ‘act-centric’ approach to a "tool-centric" one, recognizing that AI itself can facilitate child exploitation crimes.
• Existing U.K. laws, such as the Protection of Children Act 1978 and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, focus primarily on individuals and their actions.
• However, the new legislation takes a proactive stance by targeting the tools that enable such crimes, providing several advantages:
  • It allows authorities to apprehend offenders at an earlier stage, potentially preventing harm.
  • It reduces the psychological and emotional damage caused to children by limiting the spread of AI-generated CSAM.
  • It closes a crucial legal loophole, previously, laws addressed only materials involving actual children, whereas AI-generated imagery was not explicitly covered.

The Growing Threat of AI-Generated CSAM in India

• India, like many other nations, faces significant challenges in combatting CSAM.
• The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Report 2022 reveals a sharp rise in cybercrimes against children.
• Additionally, the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal recorded 1.94 lakh cases of child pornography incidents as of April 2024.
• These figures highlight the increasing threat posed by CSAM, exacerbated by the availability of advanced AI tools.
• While India has existing laws to counter child exploitation, such as Section 67B of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, and provisions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, these laws were drafted before the rise of AI-generated content.
• As a result, they fail to adequately address the unique risks posed by AI-generated CSAM.

Steps Needed to Effectively Counter AI-Generated CSAM in India

• Expanding Legal Definitions
  • The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recommended in 2023 that the term ‘child pornography ‘under the POCSO Act be replaced with "CSAM" for broader legal coverage.
  • Additionally, the phrase ‘sexually explicit’ under Section 67B of the IT Act must be clearly defined to facilitate real-time identification and blocking of AI-generated CSAM.
• Regulating Digital Intermediaries
  • The definition of "intermediary" in the IT Act should explicitly include Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Virtual Private Servers (VPS), and cloud services.
  • This will ensure that technology providers bear legal responsibility for compliance with CSAM-related laws.
• Legislative Amendments for AI Risks
  • Statutory amendments must be introduced to specifically address AI-generated CSAM, following the U.K.’s example.
  • This would empower enforcement agencies to act against individuals and platforms facilitating the creation of such material.
• International Cooperation
  • India should actively support the UN Draft Convention on ‘Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technology for Criminal Purposes.’
  • Global cooperation is essential to tackling cross-border digital crimes, including AI-generated CSAM.
• Incorporating AI-Specific Provisions in the Digital India Act
  • The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology is currently working on the Digital India Act 2023, which aims to replace the outdated IT Act.
  • This legislation should include specific provisions to combat AI-generated CSAM, drawing inspiration from the U.K.’s upcoming law.

Conclusion

• The U.K.’s legislative approach serves as an important model for India and other nations grappling with similar concerns.
• While India has existing laws to address child exploitation, they lack explicit provisions for AI-generated content.
• By amending its legal framework to include AI-specific safeguards, strengthening regulatory oversight, and developing international collaboration, India can take decisive action to protect children in the digital age.

Why in News?

The India Meteorological Department (IMD) forecasts an above-normal number of heatwave days this summer, aligning with the trend of increasing heat intensity and frequency.

This poses health risks, especially for vulnerable groups, and causes economic losses. While heatwaves can be managed through timely action, the implementation of heat action plans in many states and cities has been inadequate.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• IMD’s Heatwave Forecast for 2024
• Economic and Social Impact of Extreme Heat
• Heat Action Plans (HAPs) in India

IMD’s Heatwave Forecast for 2024

• The IMD predicts an “above-normal” number of heatwave days across northern, central, and eastern India from April to June.
• Only the extreme south, the northeast, Jammu & Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh might be spared from extreme heat.
• It predicted above-normal temperatures for 10-11 days in central and eastern states like Odisha, Jharkhand, and eastern Uttar Pradesh.
• Night temperatures are also expected to be higher than usual, except in the Himalayan and sub-Himalayan regions.
  • Some parts of Gujarat, Odisha, and Vidarbha have already experienced 3-5 heatwave days in March.
• Expected Heatwave Days
  • The number of heatwave days varies by region.
  • In Rajasthan, for instance, western areas could face 12–18 heatwave days, while eastern Rajasthan may experience 10–15 days, exceeding the usual count of over eight days.
• 2024: A Record-Breaking Year for Heat
  • Every Indian state, except Kerala, witnessed a heatwave in 2024, including Karnataka, which rarely experiences such conditions.
  • Kerala has also seen rising heat stress over the last 15 years.
• Heatwaves vs. Annual Temperature Trends
  • Although 2024 was India's warmest recorded year, there is no direct correlation between heatwave days and average annual temperature.
    • The World Meteorological Organization’s (WMO) State of the Global Climate 2024 report confirmed that 2024 was the hottest year in 175 years, with a global temperature rise of 1.55°C above pre-industrial levels.
  • Heatwaves are concentrated periods of extreme heat above 40°C, which may not significantly affect yearly temperature averages.
• Historical Heatwave Data
  • The highest recorded heatwave days in India were in 2010 (578 days), followed by 2024.
  • However, 2014 saw only 188 heatwave days, while the severe 2022 heatwave recorded 467 days.

Economic and Social Impact of Extreme Heat

• The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) Department of Economic and Policy Research warns that climate change could lead to a 2.8% GDP loss and 34 million of the projected 80 million global job losses.
• Urban heat island effects could warm cities by 4°C by 2100, creating severe health challenges.
• Extreme heat is linked to increased mortality, school closures, water shortages, power outages, and food insecurity.

Heat Action Plans (HAPs) in India

• HAPs have become India’s key strategy for heatwave management. India’s first city-level HAP emerged in 1999 after Odisha’s devastating 1998 heatwave.
• At least 23 states and many districts have formulated heat action plans to minimize heatwave disruptions and prevent heat-related deaths.
• These plans outline measures such as creating shaded areas, ensuring water availability, and adjusting school and office timings.
• Challenges in Implementation
  • Despite improved forecasts and well-designed plans, implementation remains weak.
  • Studies show that authorities often prioritize short-term emergency responses—like providing drinking water and cooling rooms—over long-term strategies to address extreme heat exposure.
• Other Shortcomings
  • Inadequate planning for vulnerable groups like children and elderly
  • Weak long-term planning and mitigation strategies
  • Unlike air pollution control (which has a legally mandated Graded Response Action Plan for Delhi-NCR), no automatic heat mitigation system exists.
  • IMD issues heat alerts, but delayed impacts make timely interventions challenging.
• Need for Stronger Coordination
  • A study by the Sustainable Futures Collaborative found that most local administrations lacked clear responsibilities and an empowered organization to lead the effort.
  • Effective implementation requires a well-coordinated, government-backed mechanism to adapt to climate change.
• Future Recommendations
  • Naming heatwaves (like hurricanes) to improve public awareness, as seen with "Zoe" in Seville, Spain (2022).
  • WHO recommends the health sector take a lead role in strengthening governance, preparedness, and response to protect high-risk populations.