Why in the News?

• With India recording 4,87,707 road accidents in 2024 that claimed 1,77,175 lives, understanding how compensation claims are adjudicated under the Motor Vehicles Act has become essential for claimants navigating the system.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Road Accidents (Scale of the Problem, Legal Framework, Liability, How Claim is Calculated, etc.)

The Scale of the Problem

• India has the world's largest road network at about 6.7 million kilometres, larger than the US (6.59 million km) and China (5.49 million km). It also records the world's highest road fatalities.
• According to the Road Accidents in India 2024 report by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, road crashes in 2024 injured 4,71,441 people, about 485 deaths a day or 20 an hour.
• The economic cost is estimated at around 3.14% of India's GDP, falling most heavily on dependants of those killed or permanently disabled.

The Legal Framework

• The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is the principal law governing motor accident compensation. It covers the entire chain from regulation and driver duties to insurance, liability and compensation.
• Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals
  • Section 165 empowers State governments to constitute Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (MACTs) for specified areas to determine accident claims.
• Evidence Considered
  • The Tribunal typically examines the FIR and chargesheet, site plan, Mechanical Inspection Report, post-mortem or medical records, insurance policy, and depositions of eyewitnesses and the investigating officer.
• Appeals
  • Appeals under Section 173 lie before the High Court within 90 days, subject to depositing Rs. 25,000 or 50% of the awarded amount, whichever is less.

Criminal and Civil Proceedings Are Separate

• The same accident may generate two distinct proceedings, a criminal case for rash or negligent driving, and a separate MACT claim for compensation.
• As held in Reena v. Managing Director, KSRTC (2026), an acquittal in the criminal case does not affect MACT proceedings, since the two apply different standards of proof.

Who Is Liable to Pay?

• Liability initially attaches to the negligent driver and, vicariously, to the owner of the offending vehicle. Where the vehicle is insured, the insurer generally satisfies the award.
• Section 146 mandates compulsory third-party insurance, while Section 150 requires insurers to satisfy third-party awards.

Limited Defences for Insurers

• Under Section 150(2), insurers may raise limited defences including specified policy breaches, unauthorised use, driving without a valid licence, and non-disclosure or misrepresentation in obtaining the policy.
• Pay and Recover
  • Even where a defence is established, courts may apply the "pay and recover" principle, directing the insurer to pay the victim or legal representatives first, and recover the amount from the owner or driver afterwards.
  • This ensures victims are not left without compensation due to a dispute between insurer and insured.
• No-Fault Liability
  • A separate no-fault liability route dispenses with proof of negligence and provides:
    • 5 lakh for death
    • 2.5 lakh for grievous hurt
  • These amounts, revised in the 2019 amendment, are payable by the owner or authorised insurer without proof of negligence.

Calculating Compensation in Death Cases

• Section 168 requires an award of “just” compensation. Through Sarla Verma (2009) and Pranay Sethi (2017), the Supreme Court established standardised formulas.
• Once rash and negligent driving is proved, compensation is calculated in three stages:
• Foundational Facts
  • Age: Determined from the date of birth in the school-leaving certificate, not Aadhaar (Saroj, 2024).
  • Income: Actual income after tax. For salaried persons, the immediately preceding year’s ITR is ordinarily considered; for self-employed persons, the preceding three years’ average applies (Rashmirekha Tripathy, 2026). If income is unproven, the applicable State-notified minimum wage is used.
  • Dependants: Legal representatives, including married and earning children, can claim compensation regardless of financial dependency (Jitender Kumar, 2025).
• Four Heads of Compensation
  • Loss of income: Annual income + future prospects − personal expenses, multiplied by the applicable age-based multiplier.
  • Future prospects: For permanent salaried/government employees: 50% (<40 age), 30% (40-50), 15% (50-60); none above 60. For self-employed/fixed-salary persons: 40%, 25% and 10%, respectively.
  • Personal expenses: Usually 1/3 for 2-3 dependants, 1/4 for 4-6, 1/5 for 7+, and generally 1/2 for an unmarried deceased.
  • Multiplier: Based solely on age, ranging from 18 for ages 15-25, progressively declining to 5 for ages 66-70.
  • The remaining conventional heads are loss of estate (Rs. 15,000), funeral expenses (Rs. 15,000), and loss of consortium (Rs. 40,000 per eligible family member).
  • Consortium includes spousal, parental and filial relationships. These amounts increase by 10% every three years.
• Aggregation
  • The amounts under all four heads are aggregated to determine the compensation payable.
  • Courts may additionally award interest under Section 171, generally around 6-9%.

Context:

• The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has faced criticism over its de novo approach, documentary requirements, treatment of EPIC, emphasis on deletions and large-scale exclusion from draft rolls.
• Recent disclosures (by The Indian Express), however, raise a deeper institutional question - whether some major decisions relating to electoral rolls were taken without the knowledge or approval of two of the three Election Commissioners.

From SIR Controversy to Institutional Authority:

• According to the reported disclosures, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections at least 14 times over 10 months regarding decisions concerning -
  • Registration and deletion of voters
  • Restoration of deleted names
  • Form 6
  • Appeals relating to electoral rolls
  • Control over the digital architecture of electoral rolls
• If these reports are accurate, the issue extends beyond whether SIR is administratively sound or fair.
• It raises a fundamental constitutional question: Were these decisions actually taken by the Election Commission as a collective body?

Collective Decision-Making is the Statutory Norm:

• The Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, under Section 18, provides that -
  • Business of the Commission should, as far as possible, be conducted unanimously.
  • Where the Commissioners disagree, the matter is decided by majority opinion.
  • Even the procedure for transaction and allocation of business is to be regulated through a unanimous decision.
• Thus, unilateral decision-making has no statutory basis where a matter falls within the Commission's collective domain.
• Constitutional precedent:
  • In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court emphasised that Article 324 vests electoral authority in the Election Commission, not in an individual Commissioner.
  • The Court cautioned against allowing an individual to eclipse the institution.

Bypassing the Majority:

• The reported situation is unusual because it was allegedly not a case of one Commissioner being outvoted by two others.
• Instead, two Commissioners reportedly stated that certain decisions were taken without their knowledge.
• If substantive decisions legally belonging to the Commission were taken without being placed before it or without a valid allocation of business, their legality could be questioned as ultra vires—beyond the authority granted by law.
• Institutional authority cannot be created merely by issuing an order in the Commission's name.

Form 6 and ECINet - Technology Cannot Override Law:

• The controversy over Form 6, used for inclusion of names in electoral rolls, illustrates the concern.
• Commissioner Vivek Joshi reportedly recorded that the prescribed form could not be altered through an SIR direction without amending the relevant Rules.
• Commissioner Sandhu reportedly concurred, yet an altered version subsequently appeared on ECINet.
• Concerns were also raised about centralisation of access to the electoral-roll database. Commissioners reportedly sought safeguards, including an independent technical audit.
• In Goa, software reportedly prevented restoration of 97 voters whom Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) had found eligible.
• This raises an important governance principle: technology must facilitate statutory authority, not replace or override it.

West Bengal Appeals:

• The West Bengal case further highlights questions of institutional authorisation.
• Of 38.31 lakh appeals reportedly filed before tribunals, 22.21 lakh were deleted voters seeking restoration, and 16.10 lakh were reportedly filed by the Election Commission seeking deletion of voters.
• Questions were raised about who had authorised appeals filed in the name of the Election Commission when two Commissioners reportedly had not been informed.
• This makes accountability, authorisation and institutional transparency central to the controversy.

Need for Institutional Correctives:

• The disclosures suggest that the response should focus on strengthening the institution rather than turning the controversy into a partisan dispute.
• Key measures include -
  • Disclosing which major SIR decisions were taken unanimously or by majority.
  • Reviewing decisions allegedly taken without lawful approval.
  • Ensuring Form 6 conforms to statutory rules.
  • Conducting an independent technical and legal audit of ECINet.
  • Protecting the statutory powers of Electoral Registration Officers.
  • Clarifying the authority under which appeals were filed on behalf of the Commission.
  • Ensuring transparent and documented allocation of business within the Commission.
• These measures reinforce the broader constitutional principles of institutional accountability, rule of law, procedural fairness, transparency and independence of constitutional bodies.

Conclusion:

• The controversy raises a question deeper than the merits of SIR itself: whether the Election Commission is functioning collectively as the constitutional institution envisaged under Article 324.
• A constitutional body entrusted with ensuring the integrity of elections must itself adhere strictly to the constitutional and statutory framework governing its functioning.
• Electoral legitimacy depends not only on accurate voter rolls but also on lawful, transparent and institutionally accountable decision-making.

Context

• India’s ambition to become a globally competitive manufacturing hub requires firms capable of achieving scale, integrating into global value chains and competing on quality and cost.
• Quality standards are essential for consumer protection and reliable production, but poorly designed regulations can increase costs, restrict inputs and weaken industrial competitiveness.
• The central challenge is to ensure that QCOs improve quality without undermining production, value addition and efficiency.

Rapid Expansion of Quality Control Orders

• The number of products covered by QCOs increased rapidly from 88 in 2019 to 765 by December 2024.
• The expansion slowed thereafter as concerns grew over intermediate goods, where mandatory certification could cause input shortages, higher procurement costs and supply-chain disruptions.
• During the WTO’s eighth Trade Policy Review of India in July 2026, concerns over QCOs and other non-tariff barriers were raised by the European Union, the United States and BRICS members such as Brazil, China and Indonesia.
• This demonstrates that India’s standards regime has implications for both domestic manufacturing and international trade.

The Government’s New Transition Mechanism

• The Transition Facilitation (Quality Control) Order, 2026, notified by Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) on June 25, 2026, seeks to reduce regulatory bottlenecks.
• BIS Scheme-I certification can temporarily source products from BIS Scheme-II-licensed suppliers in specified sectors, including toys, footwear and air conditioners.
• The mechanism introduces flexibility while maintaining quality oversight.
• However, more than 600 QCO-covered products remain to be reassessed, including critical intermediate inputs used in chemicals, steel, textiles, machinery, electronics, rubber and plastics.

Impact on Firms and Supply Chains

• QCOs affecting intermediate goods can generate consequences across entire manufacturing networks.
• Certification requirements may increase compliance costs, restrict sourcing options and raise input prices.
• These effects can ultimately influence exports, profitability, domestic value addition and competitiveness.
• The burden is particularly significant for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), which generally have fewer financial and organisational resources to absorb certification and compliance expenses.
• Therefore, QCO assessment must examine not only product quality but also downstream supply-chain effects.

Evidence from the Chemical Sector

• A CSEP study of chemical-using firms illustrates these consequences.
• The number of chemical products covered by QCOs rose to 52 by 2024, while the share of chemical-using firms exposed to input regulation increased from 11.8% in 2019 to 56.6% in 2024.
• Among larger firms, input QCOs were associated with a 9.6% increase in production but a 37% decline in gross value added (GVA).
• This suggests that firms could sustain output while experiencing lower value addition, potentially because of increased input costs and partial transmission of these costs through prices.
• For smaller firms, QCOs had no statistically significant effect on production or GVA but were associated with a 47.6% decline in profitability.
• Their limited ability to absorb additional costs makes them particularly vulnerable.
• The evidence shows that regulatory costs affect firms of different sizes differently.
• Scale provides resilience but does not eliminate efficiency and value-addition losses.

Quality Standards and Viksit Bharat 2047

• India’s Viksit Bharat 2047 ambition depends on manufacturing firms achieving greater scale, productivity and international competitiveness.
• Quality standards can support this transformation by improving reliability and encouraging firms to meet global requirements.
• However, regulation should be judged by whether it enhances quality without constraining scale, efficiency, innovation and competitiveness.
• The number of products regulated is therefore a poor measure of policy success.

The Way Forward: Towards Smarter Regulation

• India needs a risk-based and supply-chain-sensitive approach to QCOs.
• Regulations covering intermediate goods should be evaluated according to their effects on input availability, costs, competitiveness and domestic value addition.
• This does not require abandoning quality standards. Effective standards can prevent substandard products, promote technological upgrading and strengthen India’s participation in global markets.
• The objective should instead be regulatory quality rather than regulatory quantity.
• MSMEs may require technical assistance, simplified compliance procedures, transition periods and targeted exemptions where immediate certification imposes disproportionate burdens.

Conclusion

• India must balance quality assurance with industrial competitiveness.
• QCOs can strengthen manufacturing when appropriately designed, but excessive or poorly sequenced requirements for intermediate goods can disrupt supply chains and weaken firms.
• The ongoing reassessment provides an opportunity to develop a framework combining strong standards, regulatory flexibility, supply-chain assessment and MSME support.
• Such an approach can help Indian firms achieve scale, generate greater value and compete effectively in global markets.

Why in news?

A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred petitions challenging the 2023 law on appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) to the Chief Justice of India (CJI).

Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma disagreed on the merits of the case, but agreed the matter should go before the CJI to constitute an appropriately sized bench, so proceedings are not delayed further.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Background: Where the 2023 Law Came From?
• What the 2023 Act Changed?
• Why the Bench Referred the Matter Further?
• Justice Datta's Key Observations
• A Shared Concern: Delays in Constitutional Adjudication

Background: Where the 2023 Law Came From?

• The challenge traces back to the Supreme Court's judgment in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India in March 2023.
  • The Court noted that Parliament had never enacted a law governing EC appointments, despite Article 324 of the Constitution contemplating one.
  • It laid down an interim mechanism: appointments would be made by a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in Lok Sabha, and the CJI.
  • The Bench stressed that those conducting elections must be insulated from executive influence, underlining the importance of an independent Election Commission.
• Parliament subsequently enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023.
• 

What the 2023 Act Changed?

• The law altered the composition laid down by the Court in a crucial way.
• It replaced the CJI on the selection committee with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.
• As a result, the government effectively gained two representatives — the PM and the nominated minister — on the three-member panel, alongside the LoP.
• This shifted the committee's balance away from the judiciary-involved model the Court had temporarily designed.

Why the Bench Referred the Matter Further?

• A genuine split on the core question.
  • The two judges disagreed on whether the present Bench could decide the case itself, or whether it needed a Constitution Bench.
  • Justice Datta held that the relevant constitutional principles are already settled; the Court only needs to test the 2023 law against them.
  • Justice Sharma held that the case raises an important constitutional question not previously decided.
• Avoiding further delay.
  • Rather than referring their disagreement to a three-judge bench — which would trigger another round of litigation — both judges agreed to place the matter directly before the CJI, to consider constituting a five-judge Constitution Bench.

Justice Datta's Key Observations

• Though the case moves to a larger bench, Justice Datta's observations (part of the split reasoning) carry significant substantive weight.
• Independence Must Be Visible, Not Just Real - Using a cricket analogy, he noted that even correct decisions can be viewed with suspicion if the process of choosing the umpire appears unfair.
  • The issue, he said, is as much about public confidence as about actual independence.
• The LoP's Role Risks Becoming Ornamental - Because a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM is bound by collective responsibility, such a minister is unlikely to disagree with the PM within the committee.
  • This effectively neutralises any check the LoP's presence might otherwise provide.
  • Justice Datta observed that the petitioners' argument — that the law gives the executive overwhelming influence over EC appointments — does appear to have substance.
• On The Collegium Comparison - The government's defenders often argue that if judges can appoint judges via the collegium without outside checks, a similar executive-heavy model for EC appointments should also be acceptable.
  • Justice Datta pushed back on this comparison, pointing out that judicial appointments already involve the executive at the confirmation stage, and flagging concerns over the executive selectively clearing collegium recommendations.
  • He also questioned whether the presence of a "neutral member" would even be meaningful in the EC selection process, given that the collegium itself functions without an outsider.

A Shared Concern: Delays in Constitutional Adjudication

• Both judges, despite their disagreement on the merits, jointly flagged a systemic problem: the long time taken to decide Constitution Bench matters.
• They noted that several constitutional references have remained pending for years, and urged the CJI to consider setting up a Constitution Bench to resolve such matters more expeditiously.

Conclusion

The verdict resolves nothing yet — it only decides how the question will be decided. But its real weight lies in Justice Datta's diagnosis: an opposition seat that cannot dissent is a safeguard in name only. Whether India's election watchdog stays independent in appearance, not just in law, now awaits a Constitution Bench.

Why in news?

Calls to declare a drought are rising in Maharashtra, as an El Niño-driven rainfall deficit hits the state's agriculture-dependent economy hard. Water scarcity has compounded the crisis, setting back the kharif season and clouding prospects for rabi.

Opposition leaders have demanded an official drought declaration. Maharashtra Chief Minister says the government is taking "all steps necessary" to address the "alarming" situation.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Why No Official Declaration Yet?
• The Declaration Process
• The NDRF Criteria for Drought
• How the Kharif Season Was Hit?
• The Water Situation
• The Rainfall Picture

Why No Official Declaration Yet?

• The timing constraint comes from national disaster-relief rules, not political reluctance.
  • Under National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) rules, drought declaration for the kharif season (June–October) requires an assessment that can begin only from October 5, once the monsoon starts withdrawing.
  • For the rabi season (October–April), assessment can be held only in March 2027.
  • There is no single, nationally accepted definition of drought. States have the authority to declare drought based on local conditions, but their report must conform to NDRF-specified parameters before the Centre releases disaster relief funds.
• Maharashtra has decided to submit its proposal to the Centre after October 5.

The Declaration Process

• The process runs through several defined steps:
  • State-level surveys and panchanamas (on-ground crop-loss assessments) are already underway, to quantify losses in terms of food production and finances.
  • Once the state submits its report, a central team visits the affected regions to conduct its own independent assessment.
  • Only after this verification can relief funds be unlocked by the Centre.

The NDRF Criteria for Drought

• Drought declaration under NDRF norms rests on multiple indicators, not rainfall alone:
  • Crop loss
  • Moisture Adequacy Index (used to assess soil health)
  • Rainfall deficit
  • Decline in food production
  • Labour migration in search of work
• Specific thresholds also apply:
  • Sowing must fall below 50% of total cultivable kharif/rabi area.
  • Drinking water shortage must be severe.
  • Groundwater tables must be shrinking.
  • There must be a fodder shortage.
  • Rainfall deficit must reach up to 70%.

How the Kharif Season Was Hit?

• Sowing this season was delayed due to erratic rainfall — instead of the usual June 10 start, sowing began only on July 15. Rain failure after sowing then stunted flowering and fruiting.
• The worst-hit crops are soybean and cotton — the mainstay of small and marginal farmers in Marathwada and Vidarbha.
• The dry spell has also stunted sugarcane growth in Marathwada and parts of western Maharashtra.
• Government response: During the July monsoon session, the CM announced a Rs 40,385-crore farm loan waiver, with an additional Rs 50,000 incentive for farmers who had been repaying loans regularly.

The Water Situation

• Drinking water scarcity is a major concern, with dam levels well below last year's figures (data as of September 20):
• 
• Region-wise water levels show sharp disparities:
  • Marathwada (highest dam count at 929): just 46%, down from 81% last year.
  • Amravati division: 64%
  • Nagpur division: 72%
  • Pune: 88%
  • Nashik: 83%
  • Konkan: 76%
• Marathwada stands out as the most severely affected region.

The Rainfall Picture

• According to the India Meteorological Department (IMD):
  • 31 of 36 districts in Maharashtra are rain-deficient.
  • 20 of these face a deficit of 25% to 58%.
  • In more than 100 of the state's 355 drought-hit talukas, gaps between rain spells have stretched to 40–60 days.
  • As a result, the main kharif crop, sown across 147 lakh hectares, has withered.
• An unusual pattern has worsened the damage: where rain did fall, it came short and intense, damaging soil health and causing erosion in some areas, rather than providing steady, absorbable moisture.
• Structural vulnerability: Maharashtra's agriculture is largely rain-fed. Its irrigation potential stands at under 20%, far lower than states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, leaving it especially exposed to monsoon variability.

Conclusion

Maharashtra's crisis is real on the ground but procedurally premature on paper. The NDRF's rule-bound calendar, not denial, explains the delay.

What the state needs now is not just an October declaration, but a longer-term shift — greater irrigation coverage — to reduce dependence on a monsoon that keeps growing less reliable.

Context:

• BRICS gatherings always trigger heated debate in India. Optimists see BRICS as an institution capable of multipolarising the global order. Sceptics highlight internal divisions and fear domination by Russia and China.
• A third group dismisses it entirely as strategic noise, arguing India should instead focus on deepening ties with the United States.
• The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, drew special attention because of its timing and location.
• It was the first BRICS summit since the US and Israel launched war against Iran on February 28, 2026, in India's extended neighbourhood. India — a close strategic partner of both the US and Israel — hosted the Presidents of Iran, Russia and China at the same table.
• This article highlights how BRICS enables India to manage strategic differences with China, Russia, Iran and the United States while preserving its policy of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy.

A Difficult Consensus in Delhi

• Building agreement among 11 member countries — including the UAE and Iran, who remain locked in an undeclared conflict — was itself an achievement.
• The Delhi Declaration shows that despite disputes, members continue to find value in a BRICS worldview built around a more representative global order.
• This consensus required compromise from every side, including India.

India's Balancing Act on West Asia

• India's position had grown awkward in the run-up to the summit.
  • PM Modi visited Israel just two days before the Israel-US bombing of Iran began.
  • India initially avoided condemning the attacks or the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — creating an impression of tilting towards Washington and Tel Aviv.
  • India also watched from the sidelines as Pakistan stepped in as a mediator between the US and Iran, seizing the diplomatic opening.
• India then repositioned itself as West Asia's traditional balancer, using multilateral platforms to do so without damaging bilateral ties:
  • India endorsed the Bishkek resolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in September, condemning the strikes on Iran and expressing condolences over Khamenei's killing.
  • India hosted Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian at the Delhi summit even as the West Asia war continued.
  • The image of Modi walking hand in hand with Pezeshkian is unlikely to fade quickly in Washington or Tel Aviv.

Managing the China Relationship

• The India-China border dispute remains unresolved and continues to simmer. But there is momentum toward resetting ties, and multilateral forums like BRICS let India and China stay engaged even without high-level bilateral visits.
• The underlying logic: a lack of engagement between competing major powers deepens mistrust, and mistrust combined with a security dilemma can turn dangerous.
• Staying engaged — bilaterally and multilaterally — creates guardrails for competitive coexistence.

Convergence Despite Divergence

• On major global issues — AI regulation, global trade and finance rules, climate change, border conflicts, and the status of multilateral bodies — BRICS members hold different approaches and priorities.
• Yet they converge on one point: unilateralism by any bloc or power harms their interests and the planet.

The "Washington Predictability"

• Analysts frame US behaviour not as unpredictable, but as totally predictable in one sense — a consistent focus on its own dominance above all else.
• Several BRICS members have had difficult direct experiences with this:
  • India was recently hit with varying US tariffs.
  • India was among the countries most economically affected by the US-Israel war on Iran.
  • On September 16, 2026, the US House passed the Russia sanctions Bill, threatening tariffs of up to 100% on countries including India.
• India's foreign policy under PM Modi has sometimes been read as a tilt toward the US camp, reinforced by his early remark that India had overcome its "hesitation of history" with Washington.
• But this coexists with the official framing of "sabke saath" — multi-alignment.
• Experts contend that India has not abandoned the hesitations of strategic realism, even if it shed historical hesitancy.

The Lesson of Frontline States

• History and current events both warn against becoming a frontline in great-power rivalry.
• Pakistan's experience is one instructive example.
• UAE and Iran — better off dealing with each other directly — found a partial corrective through their bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Delhi BRICS summit, using a multilateral platform to address a bilateral problem.
• Ukraine, by contrast, backed by NATO and fighting Russia for over four years, has no direct platform to engage Moscow, leaving its diplomatic options entirely dependent on Brussels and Washington.

What India Should Learn?

• The argument is not that India should downgrade ties with the US. The US partnership remains vital for India's development.
• But India must avoid becoming a frontline in the US-China competition. BRICS lets India pursue this path without championing an anti-US agenda or undermining cooperation with Washington.
• Washington, having previously accepted India's adherence to strategic autonomy, has reportedly been pushing to draw India into a more subordinate relationship.
• India's answer should be to pursue multiple pathways to its rise, rather than accept unequal great-power alliances.

Why BRICS's Divisions Are Not a Weakness?

• BRICS is unlike the G-7, where American primacy and the Western order are broadly accepted by all members.
• Its internal divisions actually prevent any single country from dominating the grouping.
• Meanwhile, an external convergence — a shared belief that the post-war international system is unfair and needs a more representative replacement — holds the group together.
• The dialectic between internal contradiction and external convergence is producing a synthesis. The contradictions are not a reason to question BRICS's existence — they are part of the reason it should exist and grow.

Conclusion

• BRICS works for India not by resolving disagreement, but by managing it. The Delhi summit showed India balancing Tehran, Washington, and Beijing simultaneously — without abandoning any relationship.
• Strategic autonomy is not neutrality; it is the deliberate refusal to become anyone's frontline.

About Koel River:

• It is an important river flowing through the states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
• Course:
  • It originates from the Palamau Tiger Reserve, Jharkhand, and flows in the western part of Palamu District.
  • The river is believed to be fed by three streams of Jharkhand, namely South Karo, North Karo and Koina.
  • The river divides into two:
    • North Koel River: It is tapped near Kutku for irrigation reasons and finally joins with the Son River (a principal southern tributary of the Ganges).
    • South Koel River: It joins the Sankh River near Rourkela in Odisha to form the Brahmani River.
  • Flowing through the hilly terrain of Jharkhand and Odisha, the Koel River is part of the larger Damodar Valley region, known for its mineral-rich landscape.
  • It is prone to seasonal flooding, particularly during the monsoon months.
  • Hydropower Potential: The North Koel Dam, also known as the Mandal Dam, was constructed on the North Koel River in Jharkhand, intended to generate hydroelectric power and supply irrigation water.

About Garamantes Civilization:

• They were an ancient civilization that thrived in the Sahara Desert from approximately 500 BCE to 200 CE, primarily centered in the Fazzan region of southwest Libya.
• They established significant urban centers, including their capital, Germa, as well as Zinchera and Saniat Gebril, alongside numerous other settlements.
• Contrary to historical depictions of them as nomadic, archaeological findings suggest that the Garamantes were an advanced society skilled in constructing extensive underground irrigation systems known as foggara, which allowed them to access groundwater for agriculture in an arid environment.
• The origins of the Garamantes remain debated among scholars, with theories ranging from Berber ancestry to connections with Neolithic peoples.
• Their civilization engaged in trade with nearby Mediterranean regions, exchanging goods like salt, gold, ivory, and slaves, and transitioned from military conflict to becoming important trading partners with the Roman Empire.
• However, environmental changes, particularly falling water levels, led to the decline of the Garamantes by the sixth century CE, resulting in the eventual abandonment of their urban centers.
• The legacy of the Garamantes is marked by their innovative adaptation to a challenging landscape and their role in shaping the cultural and historical landscape of ancient North Africa.