Why in news?

The National Statistical Office (NSO) recently released new National Accounts Statistics (NAS), showing manufacturing sector's Gross Value Added (GVA) at ₹38.6 lakh crore for 2023-24 — 14.7% of GDP.

But when researchers cross-checked, this figure using other official data sources, they found a much lower number, raising questions about the reliability of the official estimate.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Understanding Manufacturing's Two Parts
• The Gap: A 41% Difference
• Where Does the Official Data Come From?
• Checking the Numbers Using Employment Data
• Possible Explanations — And Why They Fall Short

Understanding Manufacturing's Two Parts

• India's manufacturing sector is made up of two segments:
  • The organised sector — registered factories and companies, tracked by the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).
  • The unorganised sector — small, informal workshops and household units, tracked by the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (ASUSE).
• Together, these two surveys should capture almost all of India's manufacturing output.
• So, researchers added up the GVA from both surveys to create an "Alternative Estimate" and compared it with the official figure.

The Gap: A 41% Difference

• The Alternative Estimate, based on ASI and ASUSE data, works out to just ₹27.4 lakh crore — significantly lower than the official ₹38.6 lakh crore.
• That's a difference of nearly 41%, far too large to be explained by minor definitional or methodological differences between surveys.
• Since the unincorporated sector uses the same ASUSE data in both calculations, it cannot explain this gap.
• The unorganised sector, in any case, contributes only about 14% of total manufacturing GVA.
• This means the real mismatch lies somewhere in how the organised (company) sector's output is being calculated.

Where Does the Official Data Come From?

• For the organised sector, the NAS doesn't rely only on ASI data.
• Instead, since the last major revision (base year 2011-12), it has increasingly used company balance-sheet data from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs' database, known as MCA-21.
• This database is built from annual statutory filings that registered companies are legally required to submit — and this practice continues in the latest revision too.

Checking the Numbers Using Employment Data

• One way to sanity-check GVA figures is to look at how many workers are actually employed and estimate what they could realistically produce.
• This is where an interesting discrepancy shows up:
  • The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) estimates 697.5 lakh workers in manufacturing for 2023-24.
  • But ASI and ASUSE data together account for only 532.9 lakh workers.
  • This leaves 164.6 lakh "residual workers" unaccounted for — likely employed in smaller non-factory companies or informal units too small to be captured by ASUSE
• Using standard production ratios, researchers estimated that these residual workers could plausibly add about ₹3.6 lakh crore in GVA.
• Adding this to the earlier Alternative Estimate of ₹27.4 lakh crore brings the potential total to ₹31.0 lakh crore.
• The Unexplained Gap Still Remains
  • Even after this adjustment, the potential estimate of ₹31.0 lakh crore is still 24.5% short of the official ₹38.6 lakh crore figure.
  • In other words, all identifiable workers — in both companies and informal units — can only account for about 80% of the official GVA estimate.
  • That leaves roughly ₹7.6 lakh crore worth of manufacturing output that remains genuinely unexplained.

Possible Explanations — And Why This Matters?

• The NSO has suggested that ASI, being a factory-based survey, may miss value addition happening outside the factory floor — such as at head offices, in marketing, distribution, or R&D activities.
• However, researchers point out that available evidence does not really support this explanation.
• An alternative possibility is that the NSO's method of scaling up sample data — extrapolating from a sample of companies to represent the entire universe of registered companies — may be inflating the estimate, especially since the true size and composition of India's vast company universe remains unclear and largely unverified.
• Manufacturing GVA is a key input for calculating India's overall GDP.
• Inflated or unreliable estimates can distort our understanding of the economy's real structure and health — affecting policy decisions on industrial growth, employment planning, and sectoral targeting.

Conclusion

The significant, unexplained gap between the official manufacturing GVA and independently verified estimates raises serious questions about India's statistical methodology, especially the use of scaled-up corporate filings.

Resolving this puzzle requires the NSO to make its MCA data and estimation methods public for independent scrutiny — essential for maintaining confidence in India's economic statistics.

Why in news?

India's Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has launched an unusual and significant experiment — assigning a monetary value to the country's marine fish stocks.

This move, aimed at measuring the wealth hidden in India's oceans, could reshape how the country accounts for its natural resources and manages its blue economy.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What Is MoSPI Trying to Do?
• Why Fisheries Matter to India?
• Joining a Select Global Club
• The Bigger Push Behind Blue Economy
• How Will the Valuation Actually Work?

What Is MoSPI Trying to Do?

• MoSPI has released a concept paper titled 'Methodological Approach for Compilation of Experimental Monetary Asset Accounts of Marine Fish Resources'.
• It is based on the UN System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) — a global framework that links environmental data with economic accounts.
• The basic idea is simple: fish in the sea are a natural capital asset. When fish are caught, this represents a flow of economic benefit drawn from that asset — much like income generated from any other resource.
• By valuing this properly, India can track whether its fish wealth is growing, shrinking, or staying stable over time.

Why Fisheries Matter to India?

• Fishing is a cornerstone of India's blue economy:
  • India is the second-largest fish producer in the world, accounting for 8% of global production.
  • Total fish production in FY25 was 19.77 million metric tonnes (MMT) — 77% from inland sources and 23% from marine sources.
  • The sector contributed an estimated ₹1.76 lakh crore, or 1.09% of national GVA, in 2023-24.
  • Marine fish production rose from 34.43 lakh tonnes (2013-14) to 46.15 lakh tonnes (2024-25).
  • Fisheries support nearly 30 million livelihoods.
  • Over 350 varieties of marine products reach 130 countries; FY25 exports stood at 1.7 MMT worth ₹62,408.45 crore, growing 3.11% annually in volume.
• Despite these impressive numbers, raw production data has a blind spot: it doesn't reveal whether individual fish species or regional stocks can sustain similar output in the future, or how fishing pressure and climate change are affecting them.

Joining a Select Global Club

• If successful, India would join a small group of countries — Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, the UK, France, the US, and New Zealand — that have attempted to bring ocean wealth into their national accounts.
• The OECD notes that only a handful of countries currently compile monetary accounts for aquatic resources, unlike more mature accounting fields like forests or minerals.
• Even the global guidance framework (SEEA-Fisheries) is considered somewhat outdated.
• India has been building environmental accounts since 2018 through its EnviStats India programme, covering land, water, forests, minerals and pollination.
• However, it still lacks a regular, comprehensive "blue economy GDP" series — though current estimates suggest the blue economy contributes around 4% of India's GDP.

The Bigger Push Behind Blue Economy

• The government's commitment is reflected in budget allocations: the latest Union Budget earmarked a record ₹2,761.8 crore for the sector, with the Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) receiving ₹2,500 crore for 2026-27 as its central pillar.
• India's strengths in this space are considerable:
  • A coastline of about 11,100 km;
  • An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spanning over 2 million sq km;
  • Rich marine biodiversity, supporting India's ambition of a $100-billion blue economy by 2030.
• However, ocean space isn't used by fisheries alone — it's shared with ports, tourism, offshore energy, and coastal development.
• Proper accounting can make trade-offs between these competing uses more transparent, and help decide whether India should invest in more fishing capacity, stock restoration, or deep-sea fisheries.
• Notably, NITI Aayog estimates India's EEZ resource potential at around 7.16 MMT, while cautioning that some deep-sea resources remain vulnerable to overexploitation.

How Will the Valuation Actually Work?

• The accounting process involves a few clear steps:
  • Identify important species — selecting commercially, economically, or ecologically significant marine fish stocks.
  • Assess stock health — using ten years of species-wise landing data as a proxy to check whether a stock is regenerating, stable, or depleting, by comparing current landings to historical peaks.
  • Estimate "asset life" — how long a resource can keep generating value, linking fisheries science with economics.
  • Calculate resource rent — the income attributable purely to the natural resource, after deducting labour costs, operating expenses, depreciation, and normal returns on fishing vessels.
  • Project future value — expected future resource rents are projected over the stock's asset life and discounted at a proposed 2% real rate to estimate present value.
• The final output is a marine fish asset account — a record combining both physical condition and economic value of fish stocks.
• Unlike simple annual catch figures, this account shows whether the resource base supporting future fishing income is being maintained, depleted, or regenerated.
• It's worth noting this remains an experimental estimate, built largely on proxy methods due to existing data limitations in the marine fisheries sector.

Conclusion

India's blue economy stands at an important crossroads — balancing genuine opportunities for growth against the responsibility of sustainable resource use.

The exercise should not become mere "statistical spectacle." Its real value will be judged by whether it leads to better catch limits, more sustainable harvesting practices, stronger coastal livelihoods, and a clearer national picture of how ocean wealth is changing over time.

Why in the News?

• India and Belgium have agreed to strengthen cooperation in defence, intelligence-sharing, trade, semiconductors, fintech and renewable energy during Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever's visit to India, the first by a Belgian Prime Minister in two decades.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Bilateral Relations (Background, Bilateral Trade, etc.)
• News Summary (Key Outcomes of the Meet)

India-Belgium Bilateral Relations

• India and Belgium share close economic and diplomatic relations, with trade and investment traditionally forming the core of bilateral engagement.
• The India-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Joint Commission, established in 1997, is an important institutional mechanism for economic cooperation.
• Belgium is particularly important to India because of its role as a major global centre for diamond trading, with Antwerp serving as a key hub.
• Bilateral cooperation has also expanded into science and technology, healthcare, renewable energy and other sectors.
• India's engagement with Belgium also has a wider European dimension. Belgium's position within the European Union makes bilateral cooperation relevant to India's broader relationship with the EU.

Economic Relations

• Bilateral trade reached US$13.01 billion in 2025-26, while Belgian FDI inflows into India amounted to approximately US$4.2 billion between April 2000 and December 2025.
• Diamond trade remains a significant component of bilateral commerce.
• The two countries are seeking to diversify this economic relationship through fintech, semiconductors, manufacturing, renewable energy and technology.

News Summary

• Defence and security emerged as a major area of cooperation during the recent meeting.
• India and Belgium exchanged a Letter of Intent establishing a framework for structured defence cooperation. It covers:
  • Military training and exchanges
  • Research and development
  • Joint exercises and seminars
  • Maritime security
  • Defence industrial cooperation
• The two sides also agreed to strengthen intelligence-sharing and cooperation between security agencies to combat crime.
• Around 15 Belgian defence companies participated in discussions with Indian defence industry representatives.

Defence Industrial Cooperation

• The discussions identified opportunities in drones, rockets, ammunition, mine-countermeasure systems, tanks, radar, electro-optical sensors and counter-drone systems.
• Several industrial collaborations were highlighted. New Lachaussée and Tembo Classic Engineering will establish an ammunition production line with an annual capacity of about 100 million rounds, under a project valued at €50 million.
• Exail Belgium and Larsen & Toubro are cooperating on autonomous systems for mine-countermeasure vessels, initially covering 12 vessels with potential expansion to 59.
• Other collaborations involve 70 mm rocket assembly, weapons and counter-drone systems, electro-optical systems for Arjun tanks, the Zorawar light tank, air-defence software and marine engines.

Trade, Investment and Fintech

• India has established an Investment Fast-Track Mechanism for Belgian companies and agreed to make the India-Belgium Business Forum a regular platform.
• Both countries also intend to strengthen coordination among their financial, fintech and regulatory institutions. They have set an objective of doubling bilateral trade over the next five years.

Semiconductors and Renewable Energy

• The two sides agreed to deepen cooperation in semiconductors, an area of growing importance for resilient global supply chains.
• They also agreed to work towards a renewable energy pact, expanding bilateral cooperation into clean-energy technologies and the energy transition.

Maritime Security

• Maritime security is another emerging area of cooperation. India is seeking stronger capabilities in mine countermeasures, autonomous maritime systems, underwater robotics and advanced sensors, along with protection of critical infrastructure such as ports, pipelines and subsea data cables.
• The cooperation is significant for both countries because secure maritime routes are important for international trade and supply chains.

Global and Regional Issues

• India and Belgium also discussed international developments, including Ukraine and West Asia. Both sides emphasised dialogue, diplomacy and respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.
• They also stressed the importance of maintaining safe and unimpeded maritime shipping.

Significance

• The recent developments indicate a broadening of India-Belgium relations beyond traditional trade and investment.
• Defence manufacturing, maritime security, semiconductors, fintech and renewable energy are emerging as important areas of cooperation.
• For India, Belgium can provide access to specialised European technologies and industrial capabilities, while Indian manufacturing capacity and market opportunities can support Belgian companies.
• The partnership also contributes to India's wider engagement with Europe and the European Union.

Conclusion

• India-Belgium relations are evolving into a broader partnership combining economic engagement with defence, technology and strategic cooperation.
• The recent agreements and proposed industrial collaborations provide a framework for deeper engagement, while the emphasis on trade diversification, semiconductors, maritime security and renewable energy reflects the changing priorities of both countries.

Context:

• India’s recent growth is genuine and supported by multiple indicators, even after accounting for concerns over the GDP deflator, statistical revisions and methodology. However, strong growth should not become an excuse for complacency.
• To convert high growth into sustained, broad-based and high-income development, India must urgently address structural constraints in trade, investment, factor markets and the business environment.

GDP Growth - The Numbers Are Credible:

• Strong headline growth:
  • Real GDP growth was 7.8% in April–June 2026, compared with 7.3% in the corresponding quarter of 2025.
  • Nominal GDP grew by 10.3%, while the economy-wide price rise was only 2.3%.
  • Despite a difficult global environment marked by wars, tariffs and trade disruptions, India has continued to expand faster than many major economies.
  • The IMF’s projected world growth of around 3% in 2026 underscores India's relatively strong performance.
• Evidence beyond GDP statistics:
  • The growth cannot be dismissed merely as a statistical artefact because several independent indicators corroborate it.
  • For example,
    • Consumption, government expenditure and investment-to-GDP prices rose by about 4.4%, above consumer inflation of 2.3%.
    • Import prices increased by around 32%, while imports expanded in real terms.
    • Excise duties on petrol and diesel, fertiliser subsidies and other taxes/subsidies also influence measured GDP through the GDP deflator.
    • GST collections provide additional evidence: after the September rate reduction, GST collections in October–December rose 8.5% year-on-year in rupee terms, compared with 10.8% earlier.
    • Real consumption growth accelerated to 8.2% from 6%, while the consumption deflator fell sharply.

The GDP Deflator Debate - Why the Criticism is Overstated:

• Critics argue that India's low inflation has mechanically inflated real GDP growth. However, the issue is more complicated.
• India's national accounts have moved towards double deflation, particularly for manufacturing and agriculture, where output and input prices are separately considered.
• This is methodologically preferable to relying simply on consumer prices.
• The GDP deflator is not the same as CPI inflation. GDP measures domestically produced output, whereas CPI reflects the prices paid by consumers and includes imported goods.
• Therefore, using CPI alone to challenge real GDP estimates can be misleading.

International Comparisons Strengthen the Case:

• The use of historical GDP revisions to challenge the claim that India's growth statistics are systematically overstated.
• Since 1980, revisions to India's GDP have added only around 11%, compared with approximately 79% for Bangladesh, 51% for Pakistan, 36% for Vietnam and 25% for Myanmar.
• This suggests that India's statistical revisions have not uniquely exaggerated its economic performance.
• India's per capita income has also risen, although the country remains below several emerging-market peers.

Investment and Credit - Real Economy Indicators:

• Investment provides particularly strong evidence of underlying growth.
  • Fixed investment grew by around 12%.
  • Its share in GDP increased by nearly 3 percentage points to above 34%.
  • This indicates that growth is not merely consumption-driven.
  • Bank credit growth has nearly doubled over the year, rising from about 12% to 19%.
  • The repo rate at 5.25%, combined with inflation moving towards 4%, implies a real policy rate of roughly 1.3%, described as near ideal.
• Thus, investment, credit and consumption trends collectively reinforce the credibility of the GDP data.

The Real Challenge - Structural Reform:

• High growth is necessary, but insufficient:
  • The central argument is that India should stop treating the GDP-data controversy as the principal economic challenge. Even if the growth numbers are accepted, India still needs faster structural transformation.
  • The goal of becoming a developed economy by 2047 requires sustained high growth.
  • India's dollar-denominated per capita income has grown at roughly 5% annually between 2012 and 2025, reaching around $2,750.
  • Reaching approximately $10,000 by 2047 would require growth of nearly 10% per year for two decades.
• Reforms that matter:
  • The focus should therefore shift towards -
    • Trade liberalisation and greater global integration.
    • Reform of factor markets — land, labour and capital.
    • A more predictable investment regime.
    • Improved ease of doing business.
    • Greater availability and allocation of capital.
    • Avoiding protectionist policies that raise costs and weaken competitiveness.
  • India's experience with the 2015 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) illustrates the danger of excessive regulatory caution and investment uncertainty.

Conclusion:

• India's growth performance is supported by consumption, investment, credit, GST collections and other real-economy indicators, making it difficult to dismiss GDP growth as merely a statistical illusion.
• The more important question is what India does with this growth. The message is therefore two-fold: defend credible statistics, but do not confuse strong growth with completed economic transformation.
• Sustaining high growth until 2047 will require deeper reforms in trade, investment, factor markets and capital allocation rather than protectionism or policy complacency.

Context

• India has made major progress in promoting institutional deliveries, yet a disturbing paradox has emerged: newborns are increasingly dying inside health facilities meant to protect them.
• The deaths of three newborns in a fire at Amravati government women’s hospital on August 24, 2026, are part of a recurring pattern of clustered newborn deaths in government hospitals.
• Though not a comprehensive national registry, such incidents indicate systemic weaknesses in neonatal care, including overcrowding, infrastructure failures, inadequate staffing and poor safety preparedness.
• India must now move beyond merely ensuring institutional delivery towards ensuring safe, appropriate and high-quality newborn care.

The Problems and Challenges

• Overcrowding: The Unintended Consequence of Progress
  • Institutional deliveries increased from 39% in 2005–06 to around 90% in 2023–24.
  • Women delivering in institutions rose from about 109 lakh in 2005 to 194 lakh in 2024–25.
  • Meanwhile, sick newborn admissions to public Special Newborn Care Units increased from 11.3 lakh in 2021–22 to 14.45 lakh in 2023–24, a 28% rise in ­­two years.
  • This expansion has placed neonatal units under severe pressure. Overcrowding can reduce individual attention, increase infection risks and overload equipment and staff.
• Changing Case Mix
  • Government hospitals are increasingly receiving premature, low-birth-weight and critically ill newborns referred from peripheral facilities.
  • These babies require specialised equipment and continuous monitoring. Without adequate staffing and infrastructure, the growing concentration of high-risk cases can overwhelm neonatal units.
• Infrastructure Failures
  • Neonatal care depends heavily on reliable oxygen, electricity and specialised equipment.
  • The oxygen-related crisis at Gorakhpur in 2017 and fires at Bhandara, Bhopal, Jhansi and Amravati demonstrate serious vulnerabilities.
  • Fire safety, electrical safety, oxygen security and emergency preparedness must become integral to neonatal healthcare.
  • Overcrowding can further increase electrical loads because incubators, warmers, ventilators and monitoring systems operate continuously.
• Infection and Staffing
  • Inadequate nurse-to-baby ratios, equipment shortages and weak infection-control practices can significantly endanger vulnerable newborns.
  • Merely adding beds without strengthening human resources, infection prevention and clinical supervision will not adequately address neonatal mortality.

The Gadchiroli Model

• India already possesses an effective alternative to hospital-centred newborn care.
• The Gadchiroli field trial demonstrated that trained community health workers could provide effective home-based neonatal care, producing a 62.2% reduction in neonatal mortality in the rural population studied.
• Community health workers supported breastfeeding and warmth, identified infections and managed appropriate low-birth-weight and premature babies.
• The principles of this model have subsequently been incorporated into India’s public-health system, with around 8,00,000 ASHAs trained in home-based newborn care.
• The key lesson is that not every newborn requiring care needs a hospital bed. Stable newborns can receive appropriate care at home, while those with serious complications can be referred immediately to specialised facilities.
• However, home-based care is not a substitute for neonatal intensive care.
• Babies with severe prematurity, respiratory distress, shock, severe sepsis or serious birth asphyxia require immediate facility-based treatment.

The Optimum Strategy

• Decongest Neonatal Units
  • Home-based neonatal care should be strengthened through better training, supervision and support for ASHAs.
  • Appropriate and stable newborns can safely receive care at home, allowing SNCUs to focus on critically ill babies.
• Strengthen Hospital-Based Care
  • Government neonatal units require adequate doctors and nurses, appropriate nurse-to-baby ratios, functioning equipment, reliable oxygen and electricity, backup systems and rigorous infection prevention.
  • The priority should be quality and resilience rather than simply increasing bed capacity.
• Make Neonatal Units Intrinsically Safe
  • Hospitals should mandatorily install fire detection and suppression systems, electrical and oxygen safety mechanisms, conduct emergency evacuation drills and undergo independent safety audits.
  • Neonatal safety must be treated as a core component of healthcare rather than an afterthought. 

Conclusion

• India’s success in promoting institutional deliveries through programmes such as Janani Suraksha Yojana has brought mothers closer to professional healthcare.
• However, institutional delivery is only the first step in protecting newborn lives.
• The next phase must focus on capacity, quality, safety and appropriate distribution of neonatal care.
• Hospitals should be strengthened without making hospitalisation the default response to every newborn requiring care.
• India needs a continuum in which community-based home care and specialised hospital care complement each other.
• The future of newborn healthcare should therefore not be hospital versus home but hospital plus home.

Context

• India is witnessing an unprecedented political and social focus on its youth. Political parties, governments, think tanks, educational institutions and media organisations are increasingly engaging with Generation Z and Generation Alpha.
• This attention reflects concerns over education, employment, skills, examinations, political participation and accountability.
• With nearly two-thirds of Indians below 35, young people represent both a major demographic advantage and a potentially powerful political constituency.
• Yet their numerical strength has not translated into a distinct youth vote. The key question is whether the current youth awakening will develop into sustained political participation.

Growing Political Attention to Youth

• Governments have long introduced programmes for youth development covering employment, entrepreneurship, skill development, education, internships, sports and volunteering.
• The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 seeks to promote quality learning, innovation and empowerment, while the proposed National Youth Policy 2026 aims to prepare young people for the digital age.
• However, policies alone cannot resolve the deeper challenges confronting young Indians. A major concern is the large population classified as not in education, employment or training (NEET).
• The reported figure of 8.7 crore people aged 15–29 indicates a substantial amount of youthful potential without a productive anchor.

Youth as an Elusive Electoral Constituency

• India has the world’s largest youth population, with around 65% of its population below 35 and approximately 23% of its electorate aged 18–29. Nevertheless, young voters have not emerged as a clearly identifiable electoral bloc.
• Indian elections have traditionally been influenced by caste, community, class, occupation, religion and gender.
• Dalits, minorities, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and specific caste groups have often functioned as recognisable electoral constituencies.
• The women’s vote has also become increasingly significant.
• By contrast, youth remain a heterogeneous constituency. A young farmer, unemployed graduate, student and technology worker can have very different priorities.
• Therefore, age alone does not create a unified political identity. Employment and education, though crucial, have not yet displaced established social and regional loyalties.

Digital Youth and Political Communication

• Political parties are adapting their communication strategies to reach young citizens through social media, digital platforms and informal political language.
• Leaders are increasingly attempting to communicate in a direct and conversational manner, while educational campuses have become important political spaces.
• However, digital engagement does not automatically translate into electoral participation.
• Young people may consume political content without voting or becoming politically organised.
• Genuine youth mobilisation therefore requires more than online visibility; it requires credible policies addressing their employment, education, skills and aspirations.

The Election Commission and Youth Participation

• The Election Commission of India (ECI) has strengthened electoral literacy programmes in schools and colleges to familiarise students with the electoral system and democratic processes.
• Such initiatives can help transform young people from passive recipients of political messaging into informed and active democratic participants.
• Electoral literacy is particularly important for strengthening long-term civic engagement.

The Upcoming Electoral Test

• The forthcoming Assembly elections in Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Manipur and Goa could indicate whether recent youth activism translates into electoral preferences.
• In closely contested constituencies, changes in youth turnout could potentially influence results.
• However, India’s youth are not politically homogeneous. Young people in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab face different social and economic conditions, just as those in Goa and Manipur have distinct concerns.
• Political parties therefore need region-specific youth policies rather than a single national formula.

Old Equations Still Matter

• Despite growing attention to youth, established electoral calculations remain powerful.
• Political parties possess longstanding caste equations, community networks, local organisations and booth-level mobilisation systems.
• The youth constituency remains unpredictable. Young citizens may be highly expressive online but may not vote collectively.
• Consequently, parties are unlikely to abandon traditional voting blocs for an uncertain youth constituency.
• Their present strategy is more likely to combine youth-oriented messaging with established electoral structures.

Youth and India@2047

• The vision of a developed India by 2047 places young Indians at the centre of national development and describes them as the Amrit Peedhi.
• India’s demographic advantage, however, can become an economic and social asset only when young people receive quality education, productive employment, social mobility and political representation.
• Swami Vivekananda's emphasis on the power of youth remains relevant. The contemporary challenge is to transform youthful potential into institutional, economic and democratic power.

Conclusion

• The growing focus on employment, education, skills, digital participation and accountability reflects changing expectations among younger citizens.
• Yet political attention does not necessarily signify the emergence of a consolidated youth vote. Caste, community, gender, region and traditional political networks continue to shape electoral behaviour.
• India's demographic advantage will ultimately depend on how effectively it educates, employs, empowers and politically integrates its young citizens.
• If this generation becomes an organised democratic force, it can move from being merely an electoral target to becoming a principal architect of India@2047.

About Purse Seine Fishing:

• Purse seines are used in the open ocean to target dense schools of single-species pelagic (midwater) fish species of various sizes.
  • Pelagic fish are those that swim in the water column of the open ocean, up to approximately 600 feet deep.
• A purse seine is a huge wall of netting that is set in a circle around a school of fish.
• Once the fish school is encircled, the net is closed underneath the school by hauling the purse line at the bottom of the net, which is called “pursing”.
• As the volume of the net becomes smaller, the fish become more concentrated, and the catch is harvested by either hauling the net aboard or bringing it alongside the vessel.
• The size can vary depending on the vessel they are deployed from, the size of the mesh, and the target species.
• Advantages:
  • Purse-seine fishing in open water is generally considered to be an efficient form of fishing.
  • It has no contact with the seabed and can have low levels of bycatch (accidental catch of unwanted species).
  • It can also be used to catch fish congregating around fish aggregating devices.
• Why is it banned in some states?
  • In some States, it is linked to concerns about the decreasing stock of small, pelagic shoaling fish such as sardines, mackerel, anchovies, and trevally on the western coasts.
  • Because this fishing method uses a wide net to draw in not only the targeted fish but also at-risk varieties, including turtles.
  • Fishing is a State subject, and the management plan for marine fisheries in territorial waters is the job of the states (Under the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution).
  • Currently, bans on purse seine fishing are implemented in the territorial waters of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry, Odisha, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands up to 12 nautical miles.

About Uparkot Fort:

• It is an ancient fort located in the city of Junagadh in Gujarat.
• It is strategically perched at the foothills of Girnar Hill.
• History:
  • This ancient fort is believed to have been built in 319 BC by the Mauryan emperor Chandragupta, though it has been extended many times.
  • The fort was known previously as the Revath Nagri.
• Architecture:
  • One of the most famous attractions of Uparkot Fort is the Buddhist caves, which were carved out of the rock by Buddhist monks around the 2nd century BCE.
  • These caves are adorned with beautiful carvings and inscriptions and are considered to be some of the oldest surviving Buddhist caves in India.
  • There is also an ancient mosque, a 15th-century Jama Masjid, which also houses the tomb of Nuri Shah in proximity.
  • The fort also encloses a couple of temples and even two stepwells called Adi Chadi, or the Adi Kavi Wav, and the Navghan Kuvo.
  • A huge cannon of more than fifteen feet is located on the grounds. This is said to have been made in Egypt in 1531.
  • The Fort also has a square lake in its premises, called the Nawabi Lake.

About Sepsis:

• Sepsis is a life-threatening condition that happens when the body’s immune system has an extreme response to an infection, causing organ dysfunction.
• The body’s reaction causes damage to its own tissues and organs, and it can lead to shock, multiple organ failure, and sometimes death.
• Cause:
  • Sepsis happens when an infection one already has triggers a chain reaction throughout body.
  • Sepsis is usually caused by bacterial infections but may be the result of other infections such as viruses, parasites, or fungi.
  • The infections are often in the lungs, stomach, kidneys, or bladder.
• Treatment:
  • It usually includes:
    • Antibiotics.
  • In serious cases, one might need kidney dialysis or a breathing tube.
  • Some may need surgery to remove tissue damaged by the infection.