Why in the News?

• Recent reports of differing views among Election Commissioners have renewed attention on the decision-making process, voting mechanism and role of dissent within the Election Commission of India (ECI).

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About ECI (Constitutional Framework, How EC Takes Decisions, Equality of Commissioners, Dissent, etc.)

Election Commission of India: Constitutional Framework

• The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a constitutional body established under Article 324 of the Constitution.
• Article 324 vests the ECI with the “superintendence, direction and control” of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President.
• The Constitution provides for a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such number of other Election Commissioners (ECs) as the President may determine, subject to legislation.
• The ECI was permanently expanded from a single-member body to a three-member commission in 1993, comprising the CEC and two Election Commissioners.

How Does the Election Commission Take Decisions?

• The decision-making process is currently governed by the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023.
• Under Section 17, the business of the Commission is conducted according to the provisions of the Act.
• Section 18 provides that:
  • The Commission should, as far as possible, conduct its business unanimously.
  • If the members differ in their opinions, the matter is decided by majority.
  • Since the Commission has three members, two members can decide a matter when unanimity is not achieved.
  • The CEC chairs the Commission, but all three members have one vote each.
• Thus, the CEC does not possess a casting vote that can override the other Commissioners.

Judicial Clarification on Equality of Commissioners

• The principle of equality among the three members was clarified by the Supreme Court in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995).
• Then CEC T.N. Seshan had challenged the appointment of two Election Commissioners, M.S. Gill and G.V. Krishnamurthy.
• The Supreme Court upheld the appointments and established that the three members of the Commission have equal status in decision-making.
• This is important for understanding the institutional structure of the ECI: although the CEC is the chairperson, the Commission functions as a multi-member body rather than a hierarchy in which the CEC has greater voting power.

Dissent Within the Election Commission

• Differences of opinion within the ECI are not unprecedented.
• T.N. Seshan and Other Commissioners
  • The period following the expansion of the Commission saw disagreements between T.N. Seshan and Commissioners M.S. Gill and G.V. Krishnamurthy, eventually leading to litigation before the Supreme Court.
• N. Gopalaswami and Navin Chawla
  • In 2009, CEC N. Gopalaswami wrote to the President seeking the removal of Election Commissioner Navin Chawla, citing concerns over his political neutrality.
  • The request was not acted upon, and Chawla subsequently became Chief Election Commissioner.
• Ashok Lavasa's Dissent
  • In 2019, Election Commissioner Ashok Lavasa disagreed with the majority view concerning complaints against Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP president Amit Shah relating to alleged Model Code of Conduct violations.
  • Lavasa recorded dissent notes and also objected that his views were not being reflected in the Commission's final orders. He resigned from the ECI in 2020.

Dissent Notes and Observations

• A distinction exists between an observation recorded during deliberations and a final dissent against a Commission decision.
• Election Commission officials have stated that differing views on electoral or administrative matters are a normal part of internal deliberation. Commissioners can record their disagreement on files, while the final decision can still be unanimous or based on majority opinion.
• For instance, before the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in 2025, Election Commissioner Sukhbir Singh Sandhu recorded an observation emphasising that vulnerable groups such as elderly persons, persons with disabilities and poor citizens should not face harassment.
• According to the ECI, such observations formed part of the internal deliberative process, while the final SIR decision was unanimous.

Why Institutional Dissent Matters?

• Dissent within a constitutional body can function as an internal check and balance.
• Recording alternative views creates an institutional record of deliberation and can help identify administrative, legal or operational concerns before a final decision is taken.
• At the same time, the statutory framework gives the Commission a clear mechanism for resolving disagreements through majority decision-making.
• This balances two requirements: collective decision-making and individual institutional accountability.

Why in news?

During Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States, issues ranging from tariffs to AI regulation were on the agenda, carrying global implications. But for China, the most significant concern is likely US policy on Taiwan.

China has called Taiwan a "red line" that cannot be challenged. In Washington, Xi said China hopes the US will oppose "Taiwan independence" and handle the issue with caution "to lay a solid foundation for China-US strategic cooperation."

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Larger US-China Meeting: What to Expect?
• Taiwan in US Policy
• Strategic Ambiguity: Biden vs Trump
• The Arms Package Controversy
• The Economic Stakes: TSMC and Chip Supply Chains

The Larger US-China Meeting: What to Expect

• Trump's first term (from 2017) centred on strategic competition and correcting unfair trade with China.
• His approach has since evolved — he believes personal charm can persuade autocratic leaders, a playbook used with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un. It hasn't worked with Putin, given the lack of a Ukraine agreement.
• With China, the outcome is uncertain. Trump understands the cultural importance of respect and has shown deference to Xi.
• But leverage remains a concern — during the last trade war, when China restricted rare earths, the US lost its negotiating advantage.
• Realistic outcomes: Agreement on AI principles, extended trade, or better personal rapport preventing future escalation would count as positive.

Taiwan in US Policy

• Before 1979: The US officially recognised Taiwan as representing China internationally.
• Three Joint Communiqués (through 1982): The US and mainland China agreed to recognise each other diplomatically, conditional on the US revoking recognition of Taiwan. The third communiqué stated the US would gradually decrease arms sales to Taiwan.
• The Six Assurances: A classified US memo to Taiwan clarifying that the US had not agreed to any end date on arms sales and would not negotiate with China over them — reassuring Taiwan it wasn't being abandoned.
• Taiwan Relations Act, 1979: This remains the basis of unofficial US-Taiwan relations, with the US as Taiwan's primary arms supplier, committed to helping Taiwan credibly deter Chinese military action.

Strategic Ambiguity: Biden vs Trump

• Strategic ambiguity is the long-standing US policy of not explicitly committing to military support for Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack.
• Joe Biden repeatedly dispensed with this ambiguity, stating the US would intervene militarily.
• Trump has softened this stance, echoing Chinese talking points such as "no one wants to go to war" and noting "Taiwan's 9,500 miles away."
• This shift worries Taiwan while pleasing China.

The Arms Package Controversy

• In 2025: Trump approved a $10 billion arms package to Taiwan.
• Now: A proposed $14 billion package — the largest ever — awaits Trump's clearance.
• It remains unclear whether this package has become a "red line of red lines" for Xi, though China has likely signalled consequences if it's approved.
• Why China Wants It Held Off?
  • After Trump and Xi's meeting in Beijing in May 2026, Trump gave interviews echoing Beijing's talking points without reasserting long-standing US Taiwan policy, including arms sales.
  • Xi appears to view Trump as malleable on this issue and is testing how far he can be pushed toward Beijing's position.
• Current Status
  • Trump has paused the $14 billion package — possibly as a token gesture to Xi in service of securing what Trump primarily wants: trade and bilateral investment.
  • Experts predict Trump will eventually approve it, but the timing will be significant, likely well after this visit. A failure to approve it would set a worrying precedent.

The Economic Stakes: TSMC and Chip Supply Chains

• Beyond geopolitics, Taiwan's economic weight has grown sharply because TSMC, based in Taiwan, became the world's number-one chipmaker.
• Semiconductors are essential components for nearly all modern electronics.
• Theories that China might invade specifically to seize TSMC lack strong credibility.
• Nonetheless, any conflict would severely disrupt global chip supply chains — a major concern for the US and all chip-importing countries.
• Both Trump and Xi reportedly understand that a Taiwan conflict would be disastrous.
• This has driven increased US-Taiwan discussions on supply chain resiliency, and Trump has pushed Taiwan to shift chip manufacturing to the US — leading to investments in Arizona.

Conclusion

Taiwan sits at the exact intersection of geopolitics and economics — a small island whose chips power the world and whose fate could trigger a great-power confrontation. Trump's willingness to soften strategic ambiguity, even as a bargaining chip, unsettles a region already hedging its bets.

The paused $14 billion arms package is not just about weapons — it is a live signal of how much Washington is willing to trade for Beijing's cooperation elsewhere.

Why in news?

In a move to ensure uniformity and consistency in the construction of high-speed corridors — also known as access-controlled national highways or expressways — the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) has issued detailed guidelines covering design, standards and specifications for such projects.

Until now, consultants prepared Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) for these corridors based on varying standards and specifications, leading to inconsistency across projects.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Bigger Picture: Vision 2047
• How Traffic Will Be Assessed?
• Lane Configuration Norms
• Access Control and Design Standards
• Signage and Road Marking Standards
• Barrier-Less Tolling and Corridor Protection
• Green and Sustainable Design Elements

The Bigger Picture: Vision 2047

• The move gains significance because India targets 50,000 km of high-speed corridors by 2036–37 under Vision 2047.
• These corridors are special sections of national highways providing uninterrupted, end-to-end travel.
• The total length of high-speed corridors stood at just 3,052 km as of December 2025 — showing the scale of expansion planned ahead.

How Traffic Will Be Assessed

• NHAI has mandated a more rigorous approach to traffic assessment for these projects.
  • Assessment must include existing, generated, induced, and diverted traffic, based on proper traffic modelling.
  • Freight growth rate must be analysed considering economic development.
  • Traffic data must be validated from secondary sources such as toll transactions.
  • For freight traffic and determining the Vehicle Damage Factor (VDF), data from GST portals, mining departments and other sources must be cross-validated.

Lane Configuration Norms

• The guidelines set clear, traffic-based thresholds for how many lanes a corridor should have:
• 
• This tiered approach ensures highways are built to match actual and projected traffic volumes, rather than a one-size-fits-all design.

Access Control and Design Standards

• The core principle behind access-controlled highways is protecting the speed of long-distance through traffic from local interference.
  • Access must be planned so that through traffic can move at the speed set by the main highway flow — not slowed by local, access, or cross traffic.
  • There shall be no at-grade intersection of any road with the project highway.
  • Access to the highway must be through properly designed ramps at planned locations.
• Underpass height: In areas with frequent operation of heavy agricultural machinery — harvesters and laden tractors — underpass height may be set at 4.50 metres, accommodating farm vehicle movement.
• Service roads: These must be provided in built-up and urban sections on both sides, along with a drain-cum-footpath, ensuring local connectivity and pedestrian safety alongside the high-speed corridor.

Signage and Road Marking Standards

• NHAI has also standardised signage placement for driver clarity and safety:
  • Full overhead gantries (carrying direction signs) shall be placed 5 km and 2 km ahead of an exit.
  • Cantilever gantries (carrying advance direction signs) shall be placed 1 km and 500 metres before the exit.
  • Lane and other markings must be 150 mm wide.
  • Edge-lane markings must be 200 mm wide.

Barrier-Less Tolling and Corridor Protection

• NHAI is shifting towards a Multi-Lane Free Flow (MLFF) system — essentially a barrier-less tolling mechanism that allows vehicles to pass through toll points without stopping.
• The new guidelines require provisions for this system to be incorporated into corridor layout design from the outset.
• Preventing encroachment: To stop unauthorised access and encroachment on high-speed corridors, a 1-metre-high RCC (Reinforced Cement Concrete) boundary wall must be constructed along the extreme outer edge of the Right of Way (ROW).
  • ROW refers to the total width of land legally acquired or owned by the government or road authority for construction, operation, maintenance, and future highway expansion.

Green and Sustainable Design Elements

• The guidelines also embed environmental considerations into corridor planning:
  • Drip irrigation will be provided in the median for watering plants.
  • Tree plantation will be made an integral part of project design at the DPR stage itself — not an afterthought.

Conclusion

NHAI's new rules replace guesswork with a uniform rulebook — from lane width to tree plantation. As India races toward 50,000 km of high-speed corridors, consistency in design will matter as much as the pace of construction. Standardisation today prevents costly retrofits tomorrow.

Context

• India’s nuclear doctrine has remained broadly stable for over two decades despite major changes in its security environment.
• Operationalised in 2003, it rests on credible minimum deterrence, No First Use (NFU), second-strike capability, and civilian control. It also provides for nuclear retaliation after a major biological or chemical attack.
• However, China’s military expansion, Pakistan’s evolving nuclear posture and emerging technologies have created strategic conditions very different from those of the early 2000s.
• This raises the need to examine whether the existing framework remains adequate.

Origins and Core Principles of India’s Nuclear Doctrine

• India’s doctrine emerged after the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil War, which demonstrated that nuclear deterrence does not eliminate conventional conflict.
• The 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine and the Cabinet Committee on Security’s January 4, 2003 decision established its operational framework.
• Its principal elements include credible minimum deterrence, No First Use, massive retaliation, a survivable nuclear arsenal, second-strike capability, and firm civilian control.
• The framework sought to combine nuclear deterrence with strategic restraint and predictability.

A Changed Strategic Environment

• The China-Pakistan Strategic Nexus
  • China and Pakistan increasingly represent an interconnected strategic challenge.
  • China has expanded and modernised its nuclear forces, strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control, and deepened defence cooperation with Pakistan.
  • Pakistan has also diversified its nuclear capabilities.
  • India must therefore consider the possibility of simultaneous pressure from two nuclear-armed adversaries.
  • A crisis involving one country could create opportunities or incentives for the other, complicating deterrence and escalation management.
• Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture
  • Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons is intended to offset India’s conventional military advantage.
  • Such weapons potentially lower the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.
  • This creates a dilemma for India. A doctrine based on massive retaliation raises questions about the credibility and consequences of responding to a limited nuclear strike.
  • At the same time, weakening the retaliatory threat could affect deterrence. The challenge is to maintain credible deterrence while preventing uncontrolled escalation.
• Transformation of Military Technology
  • Cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, precision missiles and space capabilities are transforming nuclear deterrence.
  • Attacks on communication networks, satellites, early-warning systems or command infrastructure could affect nuclear decision-making.
  • The distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare is consequently becoming less clear.
  • Misinterpreting a conventional attack on strategic infrastructure as preparation for a nuclear strike could increase the danger of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Credible Minimum Deterrence and Strategic Stability

• Credible minimum deterrence remains important because it avoids an unlimited nuclear arms race.
• India does not formally seek numerical parity with China or Pakistan; instead, it requires sufficient capability to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary.
• However, the meaning of minimum changes as technologies and adversary capabilities evolve.
• Maintaining deterrence therefore requires continuous attention to survivability, assured retaliation and resilient command-and-control systems.

The NFU Debate

• No First Use remains a defining feature of India’s nuclear posture.
• It signals that nuclear weapons are primarily instruments of deterrence rather than weapons for initiating nuclear warfare.
• Debate continues over whether NFU remains suitable amid changing threats.
• Critics question its strategic flexibility, while supporters argue that it promotes predictability, crisis stability and responsible nuclear behaviour.
• The key issue is whether the present formulation adequately addresses contemporary security and technological conditions.

The Need for Periodic Review

• Changing strategic circumstances justify a systematic review without necessarily requiring abandonment of the existing doctrine.
• Important areas include:
  • Massive retaliation and its credibility
  • Second-strike survivability
  • Tactical nuclear weapons
  • China-Pakistan strategic coordination
  • Cyber and space vulnerabilities
  • Artificial intelligence and emerging technologies
  • Nuclear command-and-control resilience
  • Escalation risks during simultaneous crises
  • Nuclear communication and risk-reduction mechanisms
• The objective should be to preserve deterrence while reducing the possibility of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Conclusion

• India’s nuclear doctrine has delivered continuity, restraint and strategic predictability since 2003.
• Yet, China’s growing nuclear capabilities, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear posture, closer China-Pakistan cooperation and disruptive technologies have transformed the strategic environment.
• The challenge is not necessarily to discard established principles but to ensure that credible minimum deterrence, NFU, second-strike capability and civilian control remain effective under contemporary conditions.
• Regular reassessment can help India reconcile its tradition of nuclear restraint with the complexities of modern strategic competition while keeping the prevention of nuclear war at the centre of its nuclear policy.

Context

• The debate over lotteries reflects a broader policy dilemma: whether socially harmful activities should be prohibited or regulated.
• Experiences with tobacco, alcohol and gambling suggest that prohibition cannot always eliminate persistent demand.
• It may instead create black markets, increase enforcement costs and deprive governments of revenue.
• Lotteries therefore require a balance between individual choice, consumer protection, social welfare and fiscal interests.

The Limits of Prohibition

• The U.S. experience with alcohol prohibition from 1920 to 1933 demonstrates the limitations of banning activities with sustained demand.
• Although legal supply was suppressed, bootlegging and organised crime expanded, public institutions were corrupted and governments lost excise revenue.
• Repeal in 1933 reflected recognition that a regulated and taxed market could be more manageable than an unenforceable ban.
• Indian experiences with prohibition reveal similar challenges.
• When demand persists, consumers may shift towards illegal and unregulated markets, where there are fewer safeguards and greater opportunities for fraud and exploitation.

The Case for Regulating Lotteries

• Lotteries can impose serious social costs, particularly on low-income households.
• Instant games, rapid draws, large jackpots, aggressive advertising and loss-chasing can encourage compulsive gambling and distort perceptions of risk.
• However, prohibition may drive consumers towards matka, satta, illegal lotteries and offshore platforms, where age restrictions, transparent odds, audited prize funds and grievance mechanisms are often absent.
• Legitimate vendors may also lose livelihoods, while governments lose GST and lottery revenue.
• A regulatory framework can reduce these risks through age verification, spending limits, responsible advertising, transparent odds, audited draws, restrictions on credit sales and effective grievance redressal.

Paternalism and Consistency

• The regulation of lotteries also raises questions of policy consistency.
• Adults are permitted to participate in risky activities such as day trading and derivatives.
• Financial markets remain legal because risks are disclosed, intermediaries regulated and fraud punished.
• Lotteries differ because they are games of chance rather than instruments serving functions such as capital formation or hedging.
• Nevertheless, the comparison raises a broader question: whether financial risk should automatically justify prohibition or whether informed adult choice combined with regulation can provide adequate protection.

International Experience

• International practice largely favours controlled legality rather than blanket prohibition.
• Lotteries operate in much of North America, Europe and Australia, with revenues frequently directed towards education, healthcare, welfare, sports and infrastructure.
• The public-operator model allows governments or statutory bodies to retain operational control, while private firms may provide technology and retail services.
• Under the concession model, governments regulate the activity while granting operating rights to private entities.
• Federal countries also demonstrate the value of inter-State cooperation.
• Multi-jurisdictional lotteries can pool players and prizes while allowing participating governments to retain regulatory autonomy.

India's Legal and Fiscal Framework

• Government-organised lotteries fall under Entry 40 of the Union List.
• The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 establishes conditions governing State lotteries and permits restrictions on lotteries that violate statutory requirements.
• The Supreme Court has treated gambling, including State lotteries, as res extra commercium, outside the ordinary constitutional protection of trade.
• However, B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. (1999) held that a State seeking to prohibit lotteries organised by other States must also refrain from operating its own lottery.
• This creates an all-or-nothing regulatory structure. States such as Tamil Nadu and Karnataka chose total prohibition, thereby surrendering the possibility of operating regulated public lotteries.

Reforming the Legal Framework

• Section 5 could be amended to permit a State to prohibit lotteries from other States whether or not it operates its own lottery, provided the rule is applied uniformly.
• A State could either admit all qualifying outside lotteries or exclude all of them.
• A new Section 4A could permit two or more States to establish common lotteries through formal agreements, pooling players, prizes, technology and administrative costs while retaining regulatory oversight.
• Reform should also emphasise audits, age restrictions, responsible marketing, transparent prize structures, digital monitoring, anti-money-laundering safeguards and grievance mechanisms.

Kerala as a Public-Operator Model

• Kerala demonstrates how State-operated lotteries can combine regulation with fiscal and welfare objectives.
• In FY 2023-24, its lottery system generated ₹2,883.80 crores, including ₹1,129.71 crores in net lottery revenue and ₹1,754.09 crores in State GST. Lottery surpluses support health and welfare programmes.
• The system also provides livelihoods to small vendors, persons with disabilities, women’s self-help groups and cooperatives.
• Kerala therefore offers a significant model of public operation, although different States may require different institutional arrangements.

Conclusion

• The central issue is whether prohibition produces better outcomes than effective regulation.
• Persistent demand can survive bans and migrate towards illegal markets, weakening consumer protection and increasing enforcement burdens.
• India can consider a framework combining consumer protection, fiscal responsibility, State autonomy and individual choice.
• Transparent public operation, inter-State cooperation, responsible marketing and targeted restrictions can address lottery-related harms while preserving legitimate economic and welfare benefits.
• Effective policy must account for human behaviour, institutional capacity and unintended consequences, rather than relying exclusively on prohibition.

Context:

• The Election Commission of India (ECI) is a constitutional institution under Article 324, entrusted with ensuring free and fair elections.
• Its credibility depends not only on actual independence but also on the perception of institutional neutrality.
• The Supreme Court’s recent disagreement over the constitutional validity of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 has revived this question.

Constitutional Basis of ECI Independence:

• During the Constituent Assembly debates, concerns were raised that an Election Commissioner could become vulnerable to executive influence.
• B.R. Ambedkar, therefore, envisaged appointments under Article 324(2) being regulated by a law made by Parliament. However, Parliament did not enact such a law for nearly seven decades.
• In Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court filled this legislative vacuum by prescribing an interim selection committee comprising -
  • Prime Minister (PM)
  • Leader of Opposition (LoP)
  • Chief Justice of India (CJI)
• Parliament subsequently enacted the 2023 Act, replacing the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.

The Supreme Court’s Current Disagreement:

• A two-judge Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma differed on petitions challenging the 2023 law and referred the matter for consideration by a Constitution Bench.
• Justice Datta argued that the case essentially involves application of an already settled constitutional principle, rather than a new question of constitutional interpretation.
• His opinion rests on the distinction that interpretation of law is not application of law.
• A question of interpretation arises when competing meanings of a legal provision are possible.
• If the SC has already established the governing constitutional principle, a subsequent court ordinarily has to determine whether the challenged law complies with that principle.

What Did Anoop Baranwal Establish?

• The 2023 judgment emphasised that an Election Commissioner must not be beholden to the authority that appoints him.
• The Court stressed that the appointment process should not create even a perception of executive control.
• Justice Datta therefore identified the binding constitutional principle as the ECI's appointments must be insulated from exclusive executive control.
• According to him, the specific mechanism devised in Anoop Baranwal—including the CJI—was an interim prescription, not the permanent constitutional requirement.
• Thus, Parliament could modify the composition of the selection committee, without undermining the underlying principle of institutional independence and neutrality.

The Problem of Executive Dominance:

• Under the 2023 Act, the selection committee consists of the PM, Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, and the LoP.
• This gives the government two members against one from the Opposition.
• During proceedings, when asked whether the PM’s nominee would oppose the PM in a disagreement with the LoP, the Attorney General reportedly answered “probably no”, while petitioners argued “certainly no”.
• This raises the constitutional concern that the selection process may permit executive dominance over the appointment of the electoral umpire.

Justice Sharma’s Reasoning:

• He accepted that free and fair elections are part of the Basic Structure, constitutional principles declared by the SC under Article 141 are binding, and the Anoop Baranwal committee was an ad hoc arrangement.
• However, he considered the question of whether Parliament was justified in excluding a neutral selector to be a new issue requiring independent examination.
• Thus, his reasoning (examining whether a new law meets an already established constitutional test) is simply applying the existing law, not interpreting it.

NJAC Analogy and Institutional Independence:

• The government relied on the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) judgment, 2015, arguing that executive participation does not automatically violate institutional independence.
• However, the NJAC judgment sought to protect judicial independence from excessive executive influence.
• Applying the same logic to protect executive control over the ECI reverses the underlying constitutional concern.
• The ECI is the electoral umpire, while the executive is itself a participant in the electoral process.
• Therefore, institutional independence requires safeguards against exclusive executive influence.

Way Forward - Strengthening Credibility:

• Instead of allowing executive dominance, the selection committee could have been required to take decisions unanimously.
• Such a requirement would ensure that both the government and Opposition agree on an appointee, strengthening public confidence in the ECI.

Conclusion:

• The independence of an electoral institution requires not merely freedom from actual interference but also a selection process that does not create a reasonable perception of executive control.
• A democracy can tolerate an occasional erroneous decision by its electoral umpire, but sustained public suspicion about the umpire’s neutrality can undermine electoral legitimacy and democratic trust.

About Etruscan Civilization:

• It was a pre-Roman Mediterranean civilization that flourished between the 8th and 3rd centuries BCE.
• The Etruscans, also known as the Tyrrhenians, inhabited the area that is now Italy.
• Their country was called Tuscia, or Etruria, which was located in the central part of the Italian peninsula.
• They played a significant role in the cultural and political development of early Rome.
• They established a confederation of twelve city-states.
• One of the key features of Etruscan society was their system of government.
  • The Etruscans were ruled by a series of kings, who were elected by the members of the aristocratic families.
  • This system of government was highly decentralised, with each city-state having its own king and its own system of laws and governance.
• Etruscan society was marked by a high degree of leisure and luxury, evident in their art, elaborate burial practices, and the status of women, who experienced more equality compared to many contemporary cultures.
• The Etruscans were skilled traders and builders, known for their wealth derived from local metal deposits and fertile agricultural land.
• The Etruscans possessed the biggest iron reserves in the whole of the western Mediterranean.
• They had a strong navy and dominated the seas on the western coast of Italy.
• They developed advanced architectural techniques, including the use of the arch and vault.
• Etruscans were the first in the Mediterranean region to construct a city on the basis of a grid plan.
  • In this plan, most of the streets were laid in a north-south direction with a few streets crossing them from the east-west direction.
• Despite their many accomplishments, the Etruscan civilization began to decline in the 5th c. BC, as they were gradually absorbed into the expanding Roman Republic.
• The Romans were heavily influenced by Etruscan culture and adopted many of their traditions and practices, such as their system of government, their religious beliefs, and urban planning.

About mBridge Project:

• mBridge is a cross-border payments platform designed to allow central banks to transact directly using central bank digital currencies (CBDCs).
• It is a joint project launched in 2021 between the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) innovation hub and the Bank of Thailand, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, the Digital Currency Institute of the People’s Bank of China, and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
• The project aimed to explore a multi-CBDC platform shared among participating central banks and commercial banks, built on distributed ledger technology (DLT) to enable instant cross-border payments and settlement.
• Need for mBridge:
  • The project aimed to tackle key inefficiencies in cross-border payments, including high costs, low speed, and operational complexities.
  • It also aims to address financial inclusion concerns, particularly in jurisdictions where correspondent banking (which connects countries to the global financial system) has been in retreat, causing additional costs and delays.
  • The system is designed to potentially reduce the need for the US dollar to act as an intermediary currency.
• How does mBridge work?
  • The platform uses blockchain technology, which makes all the participating banks connect to the same network, which is shared among them.
  • The blockchain is a shared digital record which helps keep in tracking the transactions, including maintaining who has paid whom and how much.
  • Participating central banks as well as monetary organisations use their own computers on the mBridge network, which are called as validating nodes.
  • They play a role in maintaining the transactions that have taken place as well as also help in maintaining the shared digital record to maintain clarity on the transactions that have taken place.
  • This means that international payments no longer pass through several banks, rather they are settled directly through one shared platform, mBridge in this case.
• Why is it seen as China-led?
  • The mBridge platform is often said to be a China-led cross-border digital currency project.
  • China has been involved in this project since the very beginning in 2021, as the Digital Currency Institute of the People’s Bank of China was one of the founding partners.

About Basic Customs Duty (BCD):

• BCD is a type of tax imposed on goods imported into India.
• It is the principal custom duty levied on imported goods.
• It is levied under the Customs Act, 1962.
• It is calculated as a percentage of the assessed value of the goods, i.e., it is fixed based on the ad-valorem, with rates set out in the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
• There is no specific rate of BCD, and it can vary on the basis of the country of origin and the types of goods being imported.
• The Central Government holds the power to exempt specific goods from BCD.
• Purpose:
  • It protects domestic manufacturers from underpriced foreign competition by raising the landed cost of comparable imports.
  • It generates revenue for the central government, since customs duty remains a significant indirect tax stream.
  • It also functions as a policy lever. The government raises or removes BCD on specific inputs to support sectors such as electronics, renewable energy, and defence manufacturing.
  • Because BCD applies before Integrated GST (IGST) on imports, it directly affects the final landed cost that a business builds into its pricing.
• The calculation of BCD involves several steps:
  • Classification of Goods: Imported goods are classified under specific Harmonized System (HS) codes, which determine the applicable duty rate.
  • Assessment of Value: The value of the goods is assessed based on the transaction value, including the cost of goods, insurance, and freight (CIF).
  • Application of Duty Rate: The BCD rate for that HS code is applied to the assessed CIF value to arrive at the duty payable.