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Three Cyclones in Three Weeks: Why the Bay of Bengal's Season Peaks in November
Why in news?
Within just 23 days, three cyclones formed over the Bay of Bengal in 2026: Cyclone Arnab made landfall near Yanam, Andhra Pradesh on October 28; Cyclone Murasu struck near Ongole on November 3; and Cyclone Akvan made landfall near Gopalpur, Odisha on November 20-21 as a cyclonic storm with winds of 70-90 kmph.
While unusual, this clustering is not unprecedented — and understanding why cyclones peak around this time reveals important insights into monsoon dynamics, ocean behaviour, and global climate patterns like El Niño.
What’s in Today’s Article?
- How Cyclones Form: The Six Necessary Conditions?
- Why the Bay of Bengal Has Two Peaks (Unlike Most Regions)?
- Storms Shift Southward as the Season Progresses
- Why the Bay of Bengal Sees More Cyclones Than the Arabian Sea?
- Why Cyclones Cluster: The Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO)?
- The El Niño Factor: A Complicated Relationship
- Historical Context: Not Entirely Unprecedented
How Cyclones Form: The Six Necessary Conditions?
- Sea surface temperature of at least 26.5°C, extending ~50 metres deep — cyclones draw energy from ocean heat.
- Unstable, moist air at ~5 km height, enabling thundercloud formation.
- Formation at least 500 km from the equator, where Earth's rotation is strong enough to make systems spin.
- A weak low-pressure system to grow from.
- Low vertical wind shear — wind speed difference between ~1.5 km and ~12 km altitude must not exceed ~10 m/s; strong shear tilts and disrupts developing storms.
- These conditions are necessary but not sufficient — many qualifying systems still don't develop into cyclones.
Why the Bay of Bengal Has Two Peaks (Unlike Most Regions)?
- Most global cyclone basins (North Atlantic, Western Pacific) have a single late-summer peak. The north Indian Ocean has two: a larger peak in November, and a smaller one in May.
- The Bay of Bengal produces ~4 cyclones for every 1 in the Arabian Sea.
- Why the monsoon splits the season: From June-September, strong opposing winds at different altitudes create high wind shear, breaking up storms before they organise. The cyclone-formation zone also shifts north, where storms cross the coast too quickly to intensify.
- A 2013 study found shear alone doesn't suppress summer cyclones — it's the combination of shear, weaker lower-atmosphere spin, and slightly less favourable ocean conditions.
- Different causes for each peak: The April-May peak is driven mainly by rising mid-atmosphere moisture (87% of the improvement) as monsoon approaches; the October-November peak is driven mainly by the drop in monsoon wind shear (91% of the improvement).
- Though October-November produces more cyclones, the 1981-2009 data shows spring produced more Category 4+ super-intense storms, linked to greater stored upper-ocean heat and stronger pre-monsoon rainfall swings.
Storms Shift Southward as the Season Progresses
- IMD records show a clear geographic pattern: Odisha-West Bengal coast is hit most in October, Andhra Pradesh in November, and Tamil Nadu in December.
- Arnab, Murasu, and Akvan all struck Andhra Pradesh/south Odisha — consistent with the typical late-October/November pattern.
Why the Bay of Bengal Sees More Cyclones Than the Arabian Sea
- Some Bay cyclones originate as typhoons in the northwest Pacific (world's most active cyclone region) and cross into Indian waters via the South China Sea.
- The Arabian Sea's equivalent supply comes from Bay storms crossing the peninsula — but most weaken over land first.
- The Arabian Sea is cooler overall.
- Post-monsoon freshwater layering: River and monsoon runoff creates a lighter freshwater layer over the Bay's saltier water.
- Cyclone winds normally stir up colder water from below, cutting off storm fuel — but a 2008 IISc study found this stirring doesn't reach deep enough in the Bay due to a warm layer trapped beneath the freshwater.
- A 2012 study found surface cooling under cyclones is ~3x greater before the monsoon than after — meaning post-monsoon cyclones retain more fuel.
Why Cyclones Cluster: The Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO)?
- A University of Hawaii (2010) study found ~60% of north Indian Ocean cyclones form during large-scale tropical rainfall swings over several weeks.
- The Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO) — a band of cloud/rain travelling eastward around the tropics — mainly influences November-December cyclone formation.
- IMD's November 5 and 12 outlooks confirmed the MJO was in a favourable phase for Bay/Arabian Sea cyclone formation, persisting through late November 2026 — directly relevant to this year's cluster.
- Additionally, equatorial Rossby waves and Kelvin waves interacted with the MJO, encouraging air to rise and gather moisture over the southern/central Bay.
The El Niño Factor: A Complicated Relationship
- 2026's cyclone cluster occurred during a strong El Niño, which NOAA said could become the strongest since 1950 (60% likelihood), persisting through January-March 2027.
- General pattern: El Niño tends to reduce Bay of Bengal cyclone formation (less lower-atmosphere spin, fewer thunderstorms, less stored ocean heat) — the opposite (La Niña) favours more/intense cyclones, as per a 2012 study.
- However, El Niño's effects vary over time, depending on the slower Pacific Decadal Oscillation cycle (2015 follow-up study).
- Crucially: El Niño and the Indian Ocean Dipole (currently neutral, not typically cyclone-favourable) don't fully explain this year's three cyclones — though El Niño still influences the steering winds that guide cyclone paths.
- A 1991 MAUSAM study found 87% of Bay cyclones in El Niño years (1901-1987) crossed India south of 17°N (southern AP/Tamil Nadu) — yet Cyclone Akvan moved mostly northward, attributed by IMD to an anticyclonic circulation over Myanmar and an approaching westerly wind disturbance.
Historical Context: Not Entirely Unprecedented
- A May 2026 study found an average of 1.8 post-monsoon cyclones/year (1982-2022), with frequency increasing after 2001.
- Similar clustering occurred before: three cyclones within 32 days affecting Andhra Pradesh in 1976 and 1987; Cyclones Helen and Lehar made landfall within a week in November 2013.
Comparison: Why the Atlantic Has Just One Season?
- NOAA's Atlantic hurricane season (June 1-November 30) lacks an equivalent of the southwest monsoon to disrupt summer activity — wind shear and humidity rise and fall together there, unlike the Bay of Bengal.
- The 2026 Atlantic season produced only 10 named storms and 1 hurricane (against an average of 14 and 7) — potentially the first single-hurricane season since 1925 — partly due to El Niño strengthening Atlantic wind shear.
Conclusion
The clustering of Arnab, Murasu, and Akvan reflects the Bay of Bengal's unique post-monsoon window — when weakening wind shear, warm retained ocean heat, and a favourable MJO phase align to favour cyclone formation.
While El Niño typically suppresses Bay cyclones, its interaction with steering winds and other atmospheric oscillations shows that no single factor alone explains this season's activity, underscoring the complex, multi-layered nature of tropical cyclone climatology.
Manila Summits: India's Push to Broad-Base Its Act East and Indo-Pacific Policy
Why in news?
PM Narendra Modi took part in three back-to-back multilateral meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila: the ASEAN-India Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Quad Summit — the latter attended by US President Donald Trump, Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi, and Australian PM Anthony Albanese.
These engagements produced several concrete announcements and sent a deeper signal: India is actively broad-basing its "Act East" and Indo-Pacific policies, even as global attention shifted to the Trump-Xi-Putin trilateral later that week.
What’s in Today’s Article?
- Why These Summits Mattered Especially This Year?
- Key Outcomes from the ASEAN-India Summit
- East Asia Summit: First Since the US-Iran Conflict
- Quad Summit: Defying "Life Support" Predictions
- The Bigger Strategic Picture: India's Broad-Basing Strategy
- Other Parallel Diplomatic Moves
Why These Summits Mattered Especially This Year?
- In 2025, Modi had skipped the ASEAN summits in Kuala Lumpur, reportedly due to domestic commitments around Deepavali and trade friction with the US.
- India-Philippines ties have improved sharply since President Bongbong Marcos's Delhi visit in August 2025, making it important for Modi to attend conferences hosted by Marcos this year.
- Summit Composition
- ASEAN-India Summit: includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
- East Asia Summit: brings in US, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea.
- Quad Summit: hosted by the US for the first time during Trump's "turbulent presidency" — significant given lingering doubts about his commitment to the Indo-Pacific grouping.
Key Outcomes from the ASEAN-India Summit
- PM Modi's address emphasised that the world needs "peace, stability, and predictability" — a pointed message amid tensions from US, Russian, and Chinese actions affecting India and Asia economically.
- Concrete announcements:
- Free tourist visas for all ASEAN citizens visiting India.
- New agreements on disaster management and maritime cooperation.
- Unresolved concern: No progress on revising the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (FTA) — significant because ASEAN nations are increasingly drawn toward the 15-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which India exited in 2019.
- Despite this gap, ASEAN remains a key trading partner, accounting for ~11% of India's global trade, which rose to $128 billion in 2025-26.
East Asia Summit: First Since the US-Iran Conflict
- Held for the first time since the US-Iran conflict began in February 2026.
- Key outcomes:
- Seafarers' Safety Initiative — cooperation on joint training and emergency response.
- Cooperation on cybercrime prevention.
Quad Summit: Defying "Life Support" Predictions
- The grouping announced concrete 2027 plans:
- A Quad Business Summit.
- The first-ever Quad naval exercises involving P3 and P8 patrol aircraft.
- Unresolved issue: India has still not managed to host a Quad Summit in three years — largely due to US presidential unavailability. The Manila summit gave no clarity on whether India will chair next year's summit either.
- The next full Quad leaders' gathering is expected in December, when Modi, Takaichi, and Albanese travel to the US for the G-20 meeting hosted by Trump — with possible pull-aside talks among them being closely watched.
The Bigger Strategic Picture: India's Broad-Basing Strategy
- If the Trump-Xi-Putin "Declaration Towards Peace" reflects a "global power" muscle-flex, India's ASEAN outreach fits a broader pattern of diversifying its strategic partnerships this year.
- Context driving this shift:
- Intensifying US-China engagement, with four Xi-Trump meetings planned for 2026.
- The region must fend for itself against Chinese economic coercion and fallout from US strikes in West Asia, which threaten food, fuel, and fertilizer security.
- India is actively diversifying supply chains — particularly for critical minerals, technology, and artificial intelligence — while also seeking new markets in the Global South.
- This pushes India to find common cause with similarly-positioned partners: ASEAN, and East Asian nations like Japan and South Korea.
Other Parallel Diplomatic Moves
- India-EU Free Trade Agreement: Expected to be signed when Modi travels to Brussels in December.
- Strengthening ties with Canada, Australia, and other "middle power" groupings, such as the Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M), which India co-sponsored at the UN General Assembly.
- During the India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue in Tokyo (with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh), EAM S. Jaishankar articulated India's evolving approach: "trusted partnerships as solutions" to global uncertainty.
- Jaishankar's key observation: "In such uncertain times, nations, as indeed enterprises, put a much greater value on trusted partners and shorter supply chains... We are getting increasingly clear-eyed about the gaming of rules and ensuring that these are not utilised to the disadvantage of those who abide by it."
Conclusion
The Manila summits reveal a clear strategic recalibration: India is deliberately broad-basing its Indo-Pacific engagements — strengthening ASEAN ties, sustaining the Quad despite uncertainty, and building parallel partnerships with the EU and middle powers.
As global power dynamics grow more unilateral and unpredictable, India's embrace of "trusted partnerships" signals a pragmatic hedge against over-reliance on any single power bloc, safeguarding its economic and strategic interests in an increasingly fragmented world order.
India's Battery Recycling Push - Banning Export of Lithium-ion Battery Black Mass
Why in News?
- Recently, the Union Government prohibited the export of lithium-ion battery black mass to retain valuable secondary critical minerals within India.
- The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) revised the export policy for the specified category of battery waste and scrap under ITC (HS) Code 85491400, changing its status from 'Free' to 'Prohibited'.
- The move aims to strengthen domestic battery recycling, reduce import dependence and develop an integrated battery manufacturing ecosystem.
What’s in Today’s Article?
- Understanding Black Mass
- Strategic Significance
- Other Policy Measures
- The Technology Gap
- Other Challenges
- Way Forward
- Conclusion
Understanding Black Mass:
- What is Black Mass?
- It is a powder obtained by shredding discarded lithium-ion batteries and battery manufacturing scrap.
- It contains recoverable metals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese, along with graphite and other residues.
- It is an intermediate raw material, not a finished battery component. Further processing is required to extract and purify individual metals.
- Why does its composition matter?
- The commercial value of black mass depends on battery chemistry, metal concentration, recovery efficiency and market prices.
- For example, NMC (Nickel-Manganese-Cobalt) batteries contain lithium, nickel and cobalt, generally offering greater recovery value.
- Domestic resource potential: India generates approximately 50,000 tonnes of end-of-life lithium-ion batteries annually, potentially yielding around 25,000 tonnes of black mass.
- Classification: MoEFCC's Technical Review Committee recognised black mass as hazardous waste unless processed on the same premises for critical mineral recovery.
- Regulatory framework: Import and export are governed by the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016, requiring MoEFCC permission and compliance with prescribed conditions.
Strategic Significance:
- Global trend: India's black-mass export ban aligns with a global shift towards retaining critical minerals within domestic supply chains. For example, the US and EU recently announced export restrictions.
- China's dominance: China controls approximately 90% of global critical mineral processing capacity, giving it significant leverage over international supply chains.
- Critical mineral security: India is almost entirely import-dependent for certain critical minerals, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements (REEs) and silicon.
- Circular economy: Converts discarded batteries into secondary resources, reducing waste and dependence on fresh mining.
- Industry-level impact: The export ban may adversely affect standalone battery shredders and dismantlers dependent on overseas buyers while benefiting domestic refiners and integrated recycling companies.
- Supply chain resilience: Reduces exposure to international mineral supply disruptions and geopolitical uncertainties.
- Value addition: Retains downstream processing opportunities, employment and technological capabilities within India.
Other Policy Measures:
- Incentive Scheme for Critical Mineral Recycling:
- Approved (in September 2025) under the National Critical Mineral Mission, with an outlay of ₹1,500 crore, and for an implementation period of 2025-26 to 2030-31.
- It seeks to develop domestic capacity for recovering critical minerals from secondary sources, including battery and electronic waste.
- Battery Waste Management Rules, 2022:
- Establish an Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework, making battery producers responsible for collection, recycling and refurbishment obligations.
- Prescribe minimum material recovery targets for recyclers.
- For EV batteries, the minimum material recovery target reaches 90% from 2026-27 onwards.
- Require producers to incorporate domestically recycled materials into new batteries (5% from 2027-28, gradually increasing to 20% by 2030-31).
- Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) Recommendations:
- Its report highlighted black-mass exports as a loss of valuable domestic feedstock.
- It also flagged undervalued EPR certificates, which weaken incentives for investment in environmentally sound recycling and advanced recovery technologies.
The Technology Gap:
- Retaining black mass does not automatically make India self-reliant in battery manufacturing. The recovery process involves several stages.
- Recovering metals is not equivalent to producing battery-grade materials. Cell manufacturers require high purity, consistent chemical composition and stringent quality standards.
Other Challenges:
- Fragmented collection networks: Inadequate and unpredictable battery feedstock.
- Informal recycling: Material losses, unsafe handling and environmental pollution.
- High capital costs: Investment required in dismantling, chemical recovery and effluent treatment.
- Recycling economics: Lower recovery value can discourage commercial investment.
- Weak EPR enforcement: Risk of certificates reflecting reported waste rather than actual recovery.
- Limited downstream manufacturing: Recovered minerals may still lack domestic buyers.
- Quality and traceability gaps: Difficulty ensuring material purity and regulatory compliance.
Way Forward:
- Strengthen collection infrastructure: Develop organised battery take-back, aggregation and safe transportation networks.
- Improve EPR accountability: Ensure transparent, verifiable recycling certificates and strict monitoring of recovery targets.
- Promote advanced technologies: Invest in high-recovery hydrometallurgical processes, environmentally sound recycling and indigenous R&D.
- Develop domestic value chains: Link recyclers with mineral refiners, precursor manufacturers and battery-cell producers.
- Establish quality standards: Standardise black-mass composition, recovered materials and traceability mechanisms.
- Strengthen institutional coordination: Improve coordination among customs, environmental regulators and industry to ensure effective implementation of export restrictions.
Conclusion:
- India's battery black-mass export prohibition represents a shift from treating discarded batteries as waste towards recognising them as a strategic source of secondary critical minerals.
- However, its success will depend on building an integrated ecosystem that converts collected battery waste into high-purity, battery-grade materials.
- The ultimate objective should be to move from a 'Linear Battery Economy' (Extract–Manufacture–Discard) to a 'Circular Battery Economy' (Manufacture–Use–Recover–Reuse).
IMO Net Zero Framework - India as a Swing Vote on Shipping Decarbonisation
Why in the News?
- India is seen as a swing state at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) meetings in London, scheduled from November 23, with a vote on the global shipping decarbonisation framework expected on December 4.
What’s in Today’s Article?
- IMO Net Zero Framework (Background, Why Vote Was Delayed, Position of Key Players, Significance for India, etc.)
About the IMO Net Zero Framework
- The IMO is the global body regulating international shipping.
- In July 2023, the IMO committed international shipping to net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by or around 2050, with reduction targets for 2030 and 2040 against a 2008 baseline.
- Net zero means zero GHG emissions from “well to wake”, i.e. covering the entire chain from fuel production (well) to the ship’s movement (wake).
- In April 2025, the relevant IMO committee proposed a framework that would:
- Cut the GHG intensity of each ship in a time-bound manner, with a 43% reduction per ship targeted by 2035.
- Collect a carbon tax from non-compliant ships and reward performers.
- Administer an IMO fund to support alternatives, with compliance deficits partly paid into it.
Background: Why the Vote Was Delayed?
- A simple majority at the IMO committee had formulated the framework in April 2025.
- In October 2025, the U.S. disrupted the meeting convened to vote on it, threatening retaliation and sanctions such as blocking vessels from U.S. ports.
- Leveraging reservations among fossil fuel producers such as Saudi Arabia, the U.S. forced the vote to be postponed by a year.
- India voted in favour of the adjournment last year.
- The 2023 net-zero commitment had been enthusiastically supported by the then Biden administration.
Positions of Key Players
- United States:
- Says it is ready to work within IMO structures but stays firm on key issues.
- Opposes an IMO-administered fund, any carbon price and unilateral regional mechanisms such as the EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime.
- Describes alternative fuels such as green ammonia and green methanol (without naming them) as unproven and expensive.
- Seeks to protect traditional bunker fuels and backs LNG and biofuels, in which it has a market interest as a supplier.
- European Union: Has softened its stance on fuel intensity and indicated easier targets, but remains firm on the ultimate goal of net zero.
- Canada, Australia, the U.K. and South Africa: Made a joint submission updating the April 2025 framework.
- Japan and Brazil: Have advocated a softer start.
India’s Likely Stance
- Climate justice:
- India’s position is expected to follow the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) and a just transition.
- Key questions for India are who pays for the transition and who gets supported.
- Carbon tax:
- India would likely oppose a blanket, equal carbon tax on every ship.
- Any financial levy should reflect who is principally responsible for climate change.
- Feasibility concerns:
- India is concerned about the availability, affordability and scalability of green fuels globally.
- It is likely to prefer a preparatory phase to ensure the arrangements are commercially feasible.
- National interest:
- As an importer of fossil fuels, India would benefit from a shift away from them if alternatives were available and affordable.
- Complication:
- Ship ownership is often opaque, with flags of convenience such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Marshall Islands accounting for much tonnage. Developed/developing classifications do not always apply in such cases.
Significance for India
- Green fuel supplier: India has an active green fuel programme, with several green ammonia projects planned with assured offtake agreements, though much work remains before investments flow in.
- Strategic location: India’s closeness to Singapore, a major bunkering point, could help it become a supplier of green fuels to global shipping.
- Biofuels opportunity: India’s ethanol push in road transport, driven by foreign exchange savings and domestic investment, shows the potential of biofuels.
- Diplomatic balance: India must balance climate justice, developing-country interests and its green fuel ambitions while handling pressure from the U.S. and the expectations of other stakeholders.