Why in news?

A recent Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs report, "India's Role and Presence in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions," has highlighted a widening gap between India's Arctic ambitions and its actual capabilities — coming close on the heels of India's Arctic Policy, 2022.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India's Arctic Credentials
• Why India Needs an Arctic Narrative: Climate Security?
• Geopolitical Stakes
• Institutional and Capability Gaps

India's Arctic Credentials

• India's Arctic engagement dates back over a century: as part of the British Dominion, it was among the original 14 signatories of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which entitles Indians to visit the Svalbard archipelago without a visa and undertake commercial activities there.
• Today, India remains one of only two developing countries with a permanent scientific presence in the Arctic, through its Himadri research station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard.
• However, engagement has largely stayed confined to scientific research, even as the Arctic evolves into a convergence point for climate change and geopolitics.

Why India Needs an Arctic Narrative: Climate Security

• Monsoon linkage: Agriculture contributes about 18% of India's GDP and supports over half its population, with nearly 70% of annual rainfall coming from the southwest monsoon.
  • Emerging research points to an Arctic-Indian monsoon teleconnection, where Arctic warming and shrinking sea ice alter atmospheric circulation patterns affecting South Asian rainfall.
• Sea-level rise: The Arctic is a major driver of global sea-level rise, threatening low-lying nations like the Maldives and large parts of Bangladesh and India's coastline.
  • Estimates suggest over 250 million people in vulnerable South Asian coastal regions could be affected by mid-century — a challenge with direct implications for migration, humanitarian response, and national security.

Geopolitical Stakes

• Two of India's closest strategic partners, the US and Russia, are Arctic nations, while China — despite being a non-Arctic state — has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research, and shipping.
• The Arctic is emerging as a zone of great-power competition over maritime access, energy security, and critical mineral supply chains.
• India enjoys goodwill with all eight Arctic states, reinforced by the recent India-Nordic Summit (covering Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland) and improving ties with Canada — a diplomatic advantage few other countries possess.

Institutional and Capability Gaps

• No Dedicated Polar Ambassador
  • Arctic affairs responsibility is fragmented across four different divisions within the Ministry of External Affairs, hampering coherent policy-making.
  • All Arctic states, and even non-Arctic states like Singapore, have dedicated Arctic envoys — India does not, despite having a formal Arctic Policy.
• Absence of a Polar Research Vessel (PRV)
  • Without an ice-class research vessel, India's Arctic research remains confined largely to Svalbard, dependent on foreign collaboration or chartered vessels — limiting research continuity and scheduling flexibility.
  • Though a PRV was sanctioned by the Union Cabinet in 2014, it remains undelivered, with current plans pushing completion to the end of this decade.
  • In contrast, China acquired a second-hand Ukrainian icebreaker (Xuelong/"Snow Dragon") as an interim measure and now operates multiple polar vessels, including a nuclear icebreaker under construction — a model India could emulate.
• Inadequate Funding
  • India spent just Rs 17.53 crore on Arctic activities in 2024-25 — less than one-tenth of its Antarctic spending, and less than the cost of building a single kilometre of flyover.
  • This is seen as disproportionately low for a region influencing sea-level rise along India's 11,098-km coastline and holding major climate and geopolitical significance.

Conclusion

India possesses historic legitimacy, scientific presence, and diplomatic goodwill in the Arctic, but its institutional structures and budgetary commitments do not match its strategic interests.

With the 2022 Arctic Policy providing the framework and the Parliamentary Committee identifying the gaps, the urgent task now is to convert policy intent into concrete capability — through a Polar Ambassador, a dedicated research vessel, and adequate funding — to secure India's long-term climate and geopolitical interests in the region.

Why in news?

Recently, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of hanging as a mode of executing a death sentence, dismissing a PIL that argued the method violates the right to a dignified death under Article 21.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Ruling
• How Hanging Is Designed to Work
• Grounds of the Challenge
• Constitutional and Legal Framework
• The Law Commission's Recommendation
• Why the Court Upheld Hanging
• Modern Execution Methods: A Global Snapshot

The Ruling

• A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta dismissed the petition challenging hanging.
• The Court held the challenge faced two key hurdles:
  • the 1983 precedent in Deena vs UOI (where a three-judge bench upheld hanging), and
  • Parliament's decision to retain hanging while enacting the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).
• The Court affirmed that constitutional protections continue for prisoners on death row, stating: "this constitutional protection does not cease to exist at the gallows."

How Hanging Is Designed to Work?

• Hanging uses a calculated "drop" based on the convict's height and weight, intended to cause a fracture-dislocation at the C2-C3 vertebrae, producing near-instant unconsciousness.
• In Deena vs UOI, the Court had earlier examined medical evidence, expert opinion, and comparative execution methods, concluding that properly administered hanging is quick, causes no greater pain than other methods, and avoids barbarity, torture and degradation.

Grounds of the Challenge

• The petitioners argued that scientific understanding and constitutional doctrine have evolved since 1983.
• They sought a declaration that hanging is unconstitutional, arguing Article 21 includes a right to a dignified death procedure.
• They cited a 1992 study of 34 people hanged in England (1882–1945): while C2-C3 fractures were common, the "hangman's fracture" causing near-instant death occurred in only 3 of 34 cases, while 6 died of asphyxiation.
• Based on this, they argued hanging is unpredictable — too short a drop causes death by strangulation, too long a drop can cause decapitation — making it neither quick nor controllable.
• Government's Counter: Since 2003, India has conducted only eight executions, with no botched hanging on record — unlike lethal injection in the US, which has a well-documented history of failures.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

• The right to die with dignity flows from Article 21 (Right to Life). In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), the Supreme Court held that the right to life includes the right to live and die with dignity.
• Section 393(5) of the BNSS mandates that a person sentenced to death "shall be hanged by the neck till he is dead" — a provision largely unchanged since it first appeared in the CrPC in 1861.

The Law Commission's Recommendation

• The 187th Law Commission Report (2003), chaired by Justice M. Jagannadha Rao, had recommended amending the law to provide lethal injection as an alternative method of execution.
• It also noted that military courts-martial permit execution by shooting, which petitioners cited to argue hanging need not be the sole legal method.
• The Supreme Court, however, noted that Law Commission reports are only recommendatory, and Parliament's choice to retain hanging while enacting the BNSS amounted to a legislative reaffirmation of the existing framework.

Why the Court Upheld Hanging?

• The bench found no reason to revisit Deena, holding that the new scientific material did not displace its original basis, nor did it show that lethal injection, electrocution, lethal gas, or shooting offered any advantage over hanging.
• It reaffirmed that the long-drop hanging method satisfies the State's obligation to execute death sentences with "decency and decorum," without "degradation or brutality."
• Importantly, the Court did not close the issue permanently — it noted that constitutional law evolves, and future challenges could succeed if new scientific or empirical material fundamentally alters the assumptions behind Deena.
• It also left it open for the Union government to examine alternative execution methods if it wishes.

Modern Execution Methods: A Global Snapshot

• Global Trend: Over two-thirds of nations (113) have ended the death penalty in law or practice, though executions rose 12% in 2025 (Amnesty International).
• Prevalent Methods
  • Hanging: Widely used in Common Law countries (India, Singapore, Japan); authorised in 60 nations per a 2012 Cornell study.
  • Lethal Injection: Primary method in several US states and China; uses anaesthetic, paralytic, and potassium chloride, but prone to botched venous access.
  • Shooting: Used in China, North Korea, Somalia, and parts of West Asia; visually violent despite claims of near-instant death.
  • Beheading: Practised in Saudi Arabia, dependent on executioner precision.
  • Nitrogen Hypoxia: A new US method causing asphyxiation without panic response, though criticised as unvetted and experimental.

Conclusion

The verdict reaffirms judicial continuity by upholding a nearly century-old precedent, while balancing it against Article 21's evolving dignity jurisprudence.

By keeping the door open for future scientific evidence and legislative reform, the Court has struck a careful balance between constitutional stability and the possibility of humane progress in India's execution methods.

Why in the News?

• The Registrar General of India has decided to use an open-ended question rather than a predetermined list of castes for the ongoing census, raising concerns that the exercise could produce unwieldy and unusable data.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Caste Enumeration in India
• News Summary (Caste Census, Challenges, Lessons from 1931 Census, Bihar Case Study, Solutions)

Caste Enumeration in India

• Caste enumeration has a long and complicated history in India.
• The 1931 Census was the last comprehensive exercise that counted and published caste data. It recorded 4,147 castes.
• In the 1941 Census, caste details were collected but dropped from final tabulation due to wartime financial constraints.
• The then Census Commissioner wrote that with a constricted financial position and many other priorities, there was no justification for spending lakhs on that detail.
• After Independence, the 1951 Census under the Nehru government decided against caste enumeration altogether, shaped by the ideals of equality and secularism.
• Since then, the Census has continued to enumerate Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) using comprehensive official lists.
• The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment currently lists 1,208 SCs, with different castes categorised differently across states, while official records list 730 STs.

News Summary: How Caste Will Be Counted This Time?

• The ongoing census will have no pre-given list of castes. It will be up to the respondent to state their caste, which the enumerator will record as given.
• This is expected to generate a large number of entries for what may effectively be a single caste.
• As one senior official explained, if a person identifies their caste by surname, the enumerator is duty-bound to record it as their caste.
• If the surname is misspelt, that misspelling too becomes an entry in the caste column.

The Problem of Multiple Names

• A single caste may be known by many different names, and the same name may mean different castes in different regions.
• Rajput, Thakur, Singh, and Kshatriya may be used interchangeably by respondents.
• However, "Rajput" in the Bundelkhand region, cutting across Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, may also refer to the Other Backwards Class Lodh community. "Singh" is a surname that cuts across castes and categories entirely.
• Similarly, the surname Verma can indicate a Kayasth, a Kurmi, a Jat, or even a Sonar, depending on the region and family.
• Without a standardised list, all these variations enter the dataset as separate categories.

Lessons from the 1931 Census

• The colonial state used a similar open-ended method until 1931, and the census report from that year documents the difficulties that arose when caste became a highly subjective category.
• Assertion of New Identities
  • Sections of the leather-working caste among Dalits in Punjab adopted a new religious identity as Aad Dharmis, meaning people belonging to the "original" or "pre-Aryan" religion of India.
  • As many as 418,789 people enumerated themselves as Aad Dharmis, a category that did not exist in 1921. This was roughly the same number as Christians in Punjab at that time.
  • Aad Dharmis constituted about 1.5% of Punjab's population and about a tenth of the population of the so-called low castes in the province.
  • Notably, literacy among Aad Dharmis was more than twice that among other members of the low castes, suggesting the shift was driven primarily by educated Dalits.
  • Similar trends appeared elsewhere, with identities such as Adi Dravida, Adi Andhras, and Adi Karnatakas emerging.
• Consolidation for Status and Numbers
  • The 1931 report also documented multiple castes merging into single categories to strengthen their numbers or claim higher social status.
  • The report described the grazier castes as the clearest example, noting an effort to combine the Ahirs, Goalas, Gopis, Idaiyans and other milkmen castes under the term "Yadava", a movement already effective by 1921.
  • It also recorded that carpenters, smiths, goldsmiths, and others in similar occupations sought to be returned under a common name such as Vishwakarma or Jangida, usually adding a descriptor implying they belonged to one of the highest Varnas, either Brahman or Rajput.
  • The report further noted that a caste which had applied in one province to be recorded as Brahman sometimes asked in another province to be called Rajput, and several castes claiming Brahman status in 1931 had claimed Rajput status a decade earlier.

The 2011 SECC Failure

• The most recent cautionary example comes from the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) of 2011.
• That exercise failed to produce usable caste data precisely because of open-ended enumeration.
• The final dataset contained nearly 46.7 lakh distinct caste names, compared with the 4,147 castes recorded in 1931.
• The Union government eventually withheld the raw caste data, rendering the entire exercise ineffective for policy purposes.

The Bihar Caste Survey Experience

• The 2023 Bihar caste survey, ordered by the then Chief Minister, took a different approach. State officials compiled a list of castes for the purpose, even though it was a pen-and-paper survey.
• Experts noted that not having a list would create an administrative nightmare. If some respondents say they are Bhumihar and others say Bhumihar Brahmin, two distinct categories emerge in the absence of a standard list.
• However, the Bihar exercise also faced criticism over how the lists were prepared. Objections raised included that no methodology was discussed with political parties or made public.
• In the case of Yadavs, a dozen sub-castes were consolidated under one header, while in the case of Kushwahas, the Dangi sub-caste was enumerated separately. Among the Mallah fishermen community, 10 to 11 sub-castes were split and shown separately.
• This illustrates that even with a list, the choices made in constructing it carry significant political consequences.

Suggested Solutions

• Experts have proposed practical alternatives to open-ended enumeration.
• Former Indian Council of Social Science Research chairman S.K. Thorat, who served on the expert committee reviewing caste data in Telangana, argued that a predetermined list is necessary.
• He noted that SC, ST, and OBC lists already exist and are recognised by the government. What is needed is a similar list of castes in the general category, which would produce an exhaustive list.
• He acknowledged this may still carry a small margin of error of 2-3%, but argued this would minimise error rather than the far larger distortions of open-ended enumeration.
• Thorat also suggested including columns for "no caste" and "no religion" for people who do not identify with these categories.
• He recommended separate questionnaires for SCs and STs, since the exclusions they face differ: untouchability in the case of SCs, and physical and geographical isolation in the case of STs.
• He noted that a separate questionnaire for OBCs was not required, as social and educational backwardness would be captured by the census in any case.
• Activists working on sub-categorisation have argued for questions on hierarchies and exclusions within SCs and STs, since some castes within these categories are considerably more deprived than others, and there is currently no sub-categorisation of reservation to direct benefits to the most needy groups.

Context:

• India hosted the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi on August 18 under its BRICS chairship.
• The BRICS grouping represents nearly 49.5% of the world’s population, 40% of global GDP and 26% of international trade, giving it significant influence over global development and environmental governance.
• India’s approach seeks to reconcile economic development, climate action, ecological conservation and inclusive growth, while ensuring that the concerns of developing countries and the Global South remain central.

India’s Vision - “Humanity First”:

• India’s BRICS chairship is guided by a people-centric approach and the principle of “Humanity First”.
• This builds on India’s experience during its G20 presidency, where it emphasised inclusivity and the priorities of the Global South.
• Initiatives such as Mission LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) and Ek Ped Maa Ke Naam demonstrate India’s emphasis on behavioural change, ecological restoration, public participation and community ownership.
• They highlight how environmental protection can simultaneously strengthen livelihoods, biodiversity and climate resilience.

Four Priorities of the BRICS Environment Working Group:

• Promoting sustainable lifestyles:
  • Building on Mission LiFE, BRICS seeks to promote responsible consumption and production, behavioural change, environmental awareness and knowledge-sharing among citizens and communities.
  • The emphasis is on shifting from environmentally harmful consumption patterns towards sustainable lifestyles, making individuals and communities active participants in climate action.
• Afforestation, forest fire management and disaster resilience:
  • Increasing pressures on forests, land and natural ecosystems require an integrated approach to landscape restoration, combating land degradation and forest-fire management.
  • BRICS cooperation focuses on -
    • Forest-fire preparedness and response;
    • Early-warning systems;
    • Integrated landscape management;
    • Ecosystem restoration and resilience;
    • Use of remote sensing and Artificial Intelligence; and
    • Sharing scientific and technological best practices.
  • The objective is to strengthen both ecosystem resilience and community resilience against climate-related disasters.
• Circular economy:
  • The conventional “take-make-dispose” model is increasingly incompatible with sustainable development.
  • BRICS therefore recognises the circular economy as an important pathway for reducing resource consumption and environmental pressures.
  • Greater cooperation in research, innovation, technology transfer and capacity building can promote resource efficiency while generating green jobs and inclusive economic opportunities.
• Climate adaptation and community-based resilience:
  • With climate impacts intensifying, adaptation has become particularly important for developing countries, which often face disproportionate vulnerabilities despite having contributed less to historical emissions.
  • BRICS emphasises the integration of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge with modern science and technology.
  • Its principles for people-centric, community-based adaptation seek to develop solutions that are context-specific, evidence-based and culturally appropriate.

Equity and CBDR-RC:

• A key feature of India’s approach is the principle of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).
• Environmental cooperation must recognise differences in countries’ historical contributions, capabilities and developmental needs.
• For developing countries, climate action must therefore be compatible with poverty reduction, livelihood security, energy security and inclusive development.

From Declarations to Implementation:

• The significance of India’s BRICS chairship lies not merely in declarations but in creating practical mechanisms for cooperation.
• Outcomes include principles on sustainable lifestyles, integrated landscape management, forest-fire preparedness and community-based adaptation, alongside technical reports, platforms, dialogues and knowledge-sharing networks.
• These demonstrate the potential of multilateralism and South-South cooperation in addressing shared environmental challenges.

India’s Climate Action:

• India’s domestic experience strengthens its credibility in advocating development-compatible climate action.
• India reduced its emissions intensity of GDP by 37.38% between 2005 and 2022, while non-fossil sources accounted for 54.18% of installed electricity capacity as of June 30, 2026.
• India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2031–2035 further reflects the effort to balance climate mitigation with energy security and inclusive development.

Way Forward:

• BRICS can become an important platform for Global South-led environmental governance by translating shared principles into measurable outcomes.
• Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on implementation—restoring ecosystems, protecting livelihoods, strengthening climate resilience and expanding access to technology and finance.
• The BRICS approach also reinforces the need to -
  • Bridge the mitigation–adaptation–finance–technology gap,
  • Strengthen climate-resilient infrastructure and
  • Promote technology transfer and capacity building for developing economies.

Conclusion:

• India’s BRICS environmental agenda reflects a broader shift from environmental protection as a stand-alone objective towards integrated, people-centric and development-oriented environmental governance.
• The real test of BRICS cooperation will be whether it can convert consensus into on-ground resilience, sustainable livelihoods and equitable climate action.

Context

• The AI industry has become heavily focused on model rankings, with new systems frequently claiming leadership on benchmarks.
• Yet enterprise AI success increasingly depends not on selecting the most powerful model, but on choosing the right model and deployment strategy for each workload.
• Alongside capability, cost, governance, data residency, security, intellectual-property protection and operational complexity are now critical factors.

The Equation Has Changed

• The rise of open-weight models has significantly expanded enterprise choices.
• Unlike closed models accessed through external APIs, open-weight models allow organisations to run trained weights themselves, subject to licensing conditions.
• This enables sensitive data to remain within approved environments, facilitates proprietary fine-tuning, improves portability and reduces dependence on a single vendor. It can also lower per-token costs.
• However, open weights are not synonymous with free AI. Enterprise-scale deployment requires GPU infrastructure, inference serving, monitoring, cybersecurity, governance, upgrades and specialised expertise.
• Total cost therefore depends heavily on utilisation and scale. While large organisations may justify self-hosting, smaller enterprises can find its technical and financial demands difficult to manage.

The Security Imperative

• The July 2026 Hugging Face security incident demonstrated why model control can be crucial.
• During the investigation, frontier commercial APIs were used to analyse attacker activity, but safety restrictions prevented them from processing certain genuine exploit payloads and related evidence.
• Responders ultimately completed the forensic analysis using a self-hosted open-weight model, keeping sensitive information within their controlled environment.
• The lesson is not that closed models are inherently inferior. Rather, some workloads structurally require direct control over the model and data environment.
• Security forensics, malware analysis and highly sensitive intellectual-property applications may not tolerate external guardrails or data leaving the organisational perimeter.
• Enterprises should therefore classify workloads according to security, privacy and control requirements, alongside performance needs, and maintain vetted self-hosted capabilities for critical use cases.

One Organisation, Multiple AI Strategies

• Enterprises rarely have a single AI workload. A bank processing confidential customer information has different requirements from a marketing team generating content.
• Likewise, manufacturing customer service and cybersecurity investigations demand different priorities.
• Some applications prioritise reasoning and speed, while regulated or security-sensitive workloads require confidentiality, data residency and governance.
• Therefore, a single model or deployment strategy is unlikely to suit every use case.
• The emerging principle is workload-specific AI deployment rather than organisation-wide adoption of one model.

The Emerging Third Option

• Between closed APIs and fully self-hosted systems lies managed inference for open-weight models.
• These platforms host open-weight models on managed infrastructure and provide production-ready endpoints, combining greater model control with the convenience of a managed service.
• Sarvam's launch of Sarvam Inference illustrates this emerging category in India.
• By providing open-weight models through domestic infrastructure, managed inference can support data residency, fine-tuning flexibility and potentially lower costs without requiring enterprises to build specialised GPU clusters.
• The major benefit is operational. Downloading a model is relatively easy; making it reliable in production requires concurrency management, low latency, security, monitoring and continuous updates.
• Managed inference can make advanced open-weight AI accessible to organisations without specialised AI operations teams.

Deployment Choice as a Strategic Decision

• The central principle is simple: match deployment to the workload, not the leaderboard.
• Closed frontier APIs remain appropriate for applications requiring advanced reasoning and rapid access to cutting-edge capabilities.
• Managed open-weight platforms can suit regulated workloads requiring domestic data residency and greater control.
• Self-hosted models are particularly relevant for security forensics, malware analysis and proprietary fine-tuning.
• A mature enterprise may therefore use several models and deployment approaches simultaneously, selecting each according to its technical, economic and governance requirements.

Conclusion

• The future of enterprise AI lies beyond the pursuit of benchmark leadership. Model performance alone does not determine business value.
• Organisations must balance capability with cost, control, security, governance, portability and operational complexity.
• Open-weight models increase choice, self-hosting maximises control, and managed inference platforms reduce the operational burden of running open models.
• The most successful organisations will ask not which model is universally best, but which model and deployment architecture best fit each specific workload.
• Ultimately, deployment choice is becoming a core architectural decision, not a procurement afterthought.

Context

• The Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs) were established to create intellectually vibrant institutions combining high-quality education with cutting-edge research and encouraging students to enter research at an early stage.
• Their success depends on institutional autonomy, visionary leadership and a strong scientific culture.
• However, multiple interim appointments, vacancies and leaders holding several positions raise concerns about whether the original vision is being adequately protected.

IISERs and the Importance of Autonomy

• Scientific progress requires intellectual freedom. Researchers should be able to decide which questions to pursue, how to investigate them and how resources should be used.
• Excessive administrative control can weaken creativity and discourage experimentation.
• At the same time, publicly funded institutions require accountability.
• The National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007 established Boards of Governors containing government officials and nominees.
• This structure seeks to balance accountability with autonomy.
• Problems arise when governance becomes overly bureaucratic, temporary or disconnected from scientific priorities.

Multiple Roles and Leadership Vacancies

• Several IISERs currently face administrative churn and leadership gaps.
• Some chairpersons simultaneously head other institutions, while certain positions remain vacant or are managed through additional charges.
• IISER Bhopal, for instance, has operated with a director-in-charge following the departure of its previous director.
• Temporary arrangements can be necessary during transitions, but their prolonged use may cause policy paralysis, administrative uncertainty and weak strategic direction.
• Research institutions need stable leadership capable of pursuing long-term academic and scientific goals.

The Question of Scientific Leadership

• The professional backgrounds of several key leaders also raise questions.
• Current chairpersons include individuals from civil administration, medicine, engineering and industry, rather than predominantly from basic scientific research.
• Administrative, financial, industrial and public-policy expertise can strengthen governance.
• Nevertheless, IISERs primarily exist for basic science, scientific education and frontier research.
• Their leadership should therefore include people who understand research ecosystems, academic freedom, scientific risk-taking and the long-term character of fundamental research.
• The issue is not the competence of current leaders but why India's pool of accomplished scientists and experienced academic administrators is not being used more extensively to lead institutions dedicated to science.

The Problem of Repeated Appointments

• Moving the same individuals between several institutions can create another governance problem.
• While experienced administrators can contribute significantly, excessive responsibilities may dilute attention, accountability and institutional engagement.
• Effective research leadership requires more than routine administration.
• Leaders must articulate a scientific vision, attract talent, encourage interdisciplinary research and create an environment where students and researchers can pursue ambitious questions.

Consequences for Research and Education

• Weak governance may not immediately reduce scientific output.
• Established institutions can remain productive because of their existing reputation, infrastructure and committed faculty.
• However, institutional decline is often gradual and cumulative.
• Persistent leadership instability can make administration less responsive to students and researchers and reduce scientists' influence over decisions affecting their work.
• Excessive intervention may encourage a risk-averse institutional culture, discouraging unconventional research.
• Over time, this can undermine IISERs' educational mission. Students require an environment that encourages curiosity, experimentation and independent thinking.
• Weak administration can prevent institutions from responding effectively to evolving academic needs.

Weakening Institutional Autonomy

• The deeper concern is the gradual erosion of institutional autonomy. Autonomy does not imply freedom from accountability.
• Public institutions must remain transparent, financially responsible and answerable to society.
• However, accountability should not become excessive centralisation.
• Scientists need meaningful participation in decisions concerning research priorities, academic programmes and institutional development.
• A healthy governance model should combine scientific leadership, professional administration and public accountability.
• Otherwise, excessive external control may gradually produce centralisation, conformity and caution instead of creativity and intellectual independence.

The Way Forward

• India should reconsider how its premier scientific institutions are governed.
• Leadership vacancies should be filled through transparent, timely and merit-based selection rather than prolonged temporary arrangements.
• Governing boards should include more distinguished scientists with proven research and academic leadership records, complemented by expertise in administration, finance, industry and public policy.
• Individuals should not routinely hold multiple leadership responsibilities if this compromises effective oversight.
• The government should also protect academic and research autonomy while ensuring accountability.
• Institutional performance should be judged not merely by administrative efficiency but by its ability to promote frontier research, quality teaching, interdisciplinary collaboration and student development.

Conclusion

• IISERs are crucial to India's scientific future because they seek to cultivate scientific curiosity, independent thought and globally competitive research.
• Their reputation may withstand weak governance temporarily, but long-term excellence requires stable and capable leadership.
• India possesses a substantial pool of accomplished scientists who can guide its premier research institutions.
• The priority should therefore be scientifically informed governance, where accountability strengthens rather than restricts autonomy.
• Only by combining merit-based leadership, institutional independence and public accountability can IISERs continue to serve as engines of basic science, innovation and intellectual excellence.

About Regional Rural Banks (RRBs):

• RRBs are financial institutions established to provide financial services to rural areas.
• They are formed in collaboration by the Central Government, State Governments, and Sponsoring Commercial Banks to give loans to rural areas.
• The main objectives of setting up the RRB is to provide credit and other facilities, especially to the small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers, artisans, and small entrepreneurs in rural areas.
• Origin:
  • RRBs were set up on the basis of the recommendations of the Narasimham Working Group (1975) and after the legislation of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976.
• Ownership: The equity of an RRB is held by the Central Government, concerned State Government and the Sponsor Bank in the proportion of 50:15:35.
• The RRBs combine the characteristics of a cooperative in terms of the familiarity of the rural problems and a commercial bank in terms of its professionalism and ability to mobilise financial resources.
• The area of operation of RRBs is limited to the area as notified by the Government of India, covering one or more districts in the State.
• The RBI has set a Priority Sector Lending (PSL) target of 75% of total outstanding advances for RRBs as against 40% for Scheduled Commercial Banks.
• Sources of Funds: It comprises owned funds, deposits, borrowings from NABARD, sponsor banks and other sources, including SIDBI and the National Housing Bank.
• Regulation: RRBs are regulated by the RBI and supervised by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD).
• Management: The Board of Directors manages these banks, overall affairs, which consists of one Chairman, three Directors as nominated by the Central Government, a maximum of two Directors as nominated by the concerned State Government, and a maximum of three Directors as nominated by the sponsor bank.

About Giloy:

• It is a climbing shrub that grows on other trees, from the botanical family Menispermaceae.
• Scientific Name: Tinospora cordifolia
• Giloy is also called giloe, guduchi, and amrita, among other names.
• Habitat and Distribution:
  • It is native to India but also found in China and tropical areas of Australia and Africa.
  • It grows well in almost all types of soils and under varying climatic conditions.
  • The plant is cultivated by stem cutting in the months of May-June.
• It’s considered an essential herbal plant in Ayurvedic and folk medicine, where people use it as a treatment for a wide range of health conditions.
• All parts of the plant are used in Ayurvedic medicine. However, the stem is thought to have the most beneficial compounds.
• Nutritional Value:
  • Giloy contains several essential nutrients such as copper, iron, manganese, zinc, calcium, and phosphorus.
  • It also has alkaloids, steroids, glycosides, sesquiterpenoids, essential oils, fatty acids, and aliphatic compounds.
• Traditionally, giloy is used to treat
  • fever
  • urinary problems
  • asthma
  • dysentery
  • diarrhea
  • skin infections
  • Hansen’s disease (formerly called leprosy)
  • diabetes
  • gout
  • jaundice
  • anorexia
  • eye conditions