Why in news?

US President Donald Trump’s second term has triggered sweeping geopolitical and economic disruptions, with his aggressive trade and foreign policies paradoxically strengthening China’s global economic position.

In his first year back in office, President Trump signed hundreds of executive orders, launched a renewed trade war, withdrew the US from key international institutions, ordered mass deportations, and undertook military actions in Yemen, Iran, and Nigeria, reshaping global stability.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Trump’s Upheaval and its Unintended Impact
• Canada–China Reset After Years of Strain
• Global Supply Chains Are Stretching, Not Shrinking
• China’s Rising Influence in Global Perceptions
• India’s Cautious Rebalancing Toward China

Trump’s Upheaval and its Unintended Impact

• From Ally to Threat: Europe’s Shock - Where Russia once dominated Europe’s threat perception, the US has now emerged as a major source of uncertainty, unsettling transatlantic relations and altering Europe’s strategic calculations.
• Markets Signal Global Anxiety - Rising geopolitical and economic instability under Trump has driven investors toward safe-haven assets, pushing gold and silver prices to record highs amid fears linked to US policy unpredictability.
• The China Paradox - Despite Trump’s intent to isolate China through trade curbs and technology restrictions, China has emerged economically stronger, benefiting from a record trade surplus that surged to historic highs by December 2025.
  • China achieved 5% economic growth in 2025, meeting official targets. A booming trade surplus offset domestic challenges such as weak consumption and a prolonged property crisis, even amid tariff pressures.
  • Rather than retreating, China responded to US pressure by deepening integration with global markets, reinforcing its position in international trade and reshaping global trade relationships.

Canada–China Reset After Years of Strain

• Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to Beijing marked a pivotal reset in bilateral ties after nearly a decade of diplomatic chill.
• Canada and China agreed on tariff reductions for Canadian canola and seafood, and limited access for Chinese EVs to the Canadian market.
• During the visit, Carney and Chinese President Xi Jinping signalled the start of a “new strategic partnership”, reflecting a pragmatic turn driven by shifting global trade dynamics and shared economic interests.
• Beijing Draws Global Leaders
  • Carney’s trip fits into a broader pattern of world leaders re-engaging with China.
  • South Korean President Lee Jae Myung visited Beijing earlier this month, the first such visit since 2019.
  • UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are also expected to visit soon.
  • As the US retreats from its traditional role as the anchor of global trade under President Trump, countries are increasingly bypassing Washington to deepen partnerships with China and among themselves, reshaping the global economic order.

Global Supply Chains Are Stretching, Not Shrinking

• Recent analysis by the analysts shows that global trade is reconfiguring rather than retreating.
• Average trade distances are at record highs, with expanding flows across Asia, West Asia and Africa more than offsetting reduced US trade.
• As per their analysis, trade surged in early 2025 as firms front-loaded shipments ahead of expected tariff changes.

China’s Rising Influence in Global Perceptions

• A January 2026 paper by Timothy Garton Ash and colleagues highlights a growing global expectation that China’s influence will expand over the next decade.
• More countries now view Beijing as an ally or necessary partner, even as confidence in US leadership declines.
• Another study points out that the expectations of US leadership under Donald Trump have fallen sharply over the past year, including in countries like India and South Africa.
• Many now believe Trump’s actions have inadvertently strengthened China’s global standing.
• Many Europeans no longer see the US as a reliable ally and are keen to rearm. Russians now view the EU as a greater adversary than the US, while Ukrainians increasingly look to Brussels rather than Washington for support.

India’s Cautious Rebalancing Toward China

• New Delhi has begun a calibrated opening in its engagement with China, reflecting a pragmatic reassessment of foreign policy options amid a sharply deteriorating economic relationship with the United States under the Trump administration.
• Even as border disputes and strategic differences persist, India and China have addressed some “low-hanging fruit” in bilateral ties.
• However, New Delhi now expects reciprocity from Beijing, particularly in easing curbs on Indian businesses and sensitive sectors such as rare earth magnets, before further liberalisation on its part.
• India’s trade data signals this pivot. In December, exports to China surged nearly 70% to $2 billion, while shipments to the United States fell by almost 2% to $6.8 billion, as steep US tariffs reshaped export priorities.
• The US has imposed tariffs of up to 50% on Indian goods — among the highest levied on any country, even exceeding those on China.
• These measures have disrupted trade flows and strained diplomatic ties, pushing India to diversify markets and recalibrate external economic partnerships.

Why in news?

Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister has urged the Centre to raise import duty on foreign apples from 50% to 100% and impose a seasonal ban on imports from July to November to protect about 2.5 lakh apple farmers. Apples account for nearly 80% of the state’s fruit output.

The demand follows the Centre’s decision to cut import duty on New Zealand apples to 25% for April–August under the India–New Zealand FTA.

Jammu and Kashmir has echoed similar concerns, warning that rising imports add to existing challenges faced by domestic apple growers.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India Cuts Import Duty on New Zealand Apples Under FTA
• Apple Production in India: J&K and Himachal at the Core
• Farmers’ Concerns Over Cheaper Imports
• Farmers’ Demands for Protection

India Cuts Import Duty on New Zealand Apples Under FTA

• Under the India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, India has reduced import duty on New Zealand apples from 50% to 25% under a quota system.
• The quota starts at 32,500 tonnes in the first year and rises to 45,000 MT by the sixth year.
• Imports must meet a minimum import price of $1.25 (₹113.6) per kg, while shipments beyond the quota will continue to attract the higher 50% duty.

Apple Production in India: J&K and Himachal at the Core

• India produces around 28 lakh metric tonnes (LMT) of apples annually.
• Jammu & Kashmir dominates output with about 20 LMT, followed by Himachal Pradesh at 5–6 LMT.
• The remaining production comes from Uttarakhand and a few north-eastern states, where cultivation is still nascent.
• The apple economy is valued at roughly ₹12,000 crore in J&K and ₹4,500 crore in Himachal Pradesh, making growers in these two states the most vulnerable to increased imports and tariff concessions.

Farmers’ Concerns Over Cheaper Imports

• Apple growers are worried about the overlap between New Zealand’s export window and India’s off-season market.
• In India, apples are harvested between July and November, while off-season sales depend on cold storage and Controlled Atmosphere (CA) facilities.
• New Zealand, however, harvests apples between January/February and May, allowing it to supply fresh apples when Indian farmers sell stored produce.
• Impact on Domestic Prices and Sales
  • Farmers warn that lower import duties will make foreign apples cheaper than domestic produce, directly affecting sales.
  • In Jammu & Kashmir, high-density varieties like Gala arrive in June, while Royal Delicious reaches markets by September.
  • Since the duty cut applies from April to August, growers fear significant losses during peak marketing periods.
• Threat to Market Share
  • Orchardists from Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir argue that cheaper imports will depress domestic prices, reduce market share.
  • It will hit farmers hardest during the off-season, undermining incomes in India’s key apple-producing regions.

Challenges Beyond Import Competition

• Climate Stress and Falling Yields - Apple production in HP and J&K has been hit hard by climate change, erratic weather, reduced snowfall, prolonged dry spells, floods, cloudbursts and landslides.
  • These factors have weakened orchards and lowered productivity.
• Rising Disease Burden - Changing climatic conditions have led to a surge in plant diseases such as fire blight, apple scab, powdery mildew, sooty blotch and bitter rot.
  • Reduced snowfall and higher temperatures have worsened water scarcity, increasing disease vulnerability during dry seasons.
• Production Losses and Quality Decline - In 2023, Himachal’s apple output fell to 4.84 LMT, nearly 28% lower than 2022, following devastating floods.
  • Although production recovered to 6.87 LMT in 2025, excessive rainfall and disasters caused quality deterioration, with nearly 1 LMT rejected for poor size and quality.
• Infrastructure and Transport Bottlenecks - Logistical disruptions have compounded farmers’ problems.
  • The prolonged closure of the Jammu–Srinagar National Highway (NH-44) due to landslides last year stranded hundreds of trucks during peak harvest, delaying market access and causing losses.

Farmers’ Demands for Protection

• Given these cumulative pressures, farmers’ groups have demanded 100% import duty on foreign apples, a July–November import ban, special category protection, and higher subsidies.
• They argue that unlike countries such as New Zealand, where apple farming is heavily subsidised and insured, Indian growers receive limited direct support.
• Farmer leaders stress that instead of increasing exposure to foreign competition, the government should focus on targeted support, productivity enhancement, and resilience-building for domestic apple growers.

Context:

• The rapid global shift to electric vehicles is driving an unprecedented surge in copper demand, as the metal is essential for EV batteries, motors, wiring, charging networks, and power grids.
• While EV sales have grown exponentially over the past decade, copper supply has lagged due to underinvestment, declining ore quality, and long mine development timelines.
• This mismatch could trigger a structural copper deficit as early as 2026, reshaping global trade, intensifying geopolitical competition, and potentially slowing or raising the cost of the EV transition.
• This article highlights how the rapid global shift to electric vehicles is triggering an underappreciated copper crunch, as soaring EV demand collides with slow-moving supply, creating a structural risk to electrification, trade, and climate goals.

EV Sales and Copper Demand in Lockstep

• The electric vehicle transition shows a strong, near one-to-one relationship between EV sales growth and copper demand.
• From 2016 to 2024, copper demand rose faster than EV adoption, with elasticity mostly above 1.0, despite efficiency improvements.
• Rising Copper Intensity of Electrification
  • EV-related copper use jumped from about 39,000 tonnes in 2016 to over 1.1 million tonnes in 2024, alongside EV sales growth from 0.75 million to nearly 17 million units.
  • The peak elasticity in 2019 reflected larger batteries, more power electronics, and rapid charging infrastructure.
• Structural Pressure on Copper Supply
  • Even as elasticity moderates with efficiency gains, absolute copper demand will keep rising due to scale.
  • EVs use four to five times more copper than conventional vehicles, with no viable substitutes, making copper a key constraint on global electrification.

Supply–Demand Imbalance in the Copper Market

• Global copper demand is rising rapidly, while supply growth has slowed, creating a widening structural gap often described as a “jaw-opening deficit”.
• This imbalance marks the start of a prolonged copper shortage phase.
• Why Supply Is Falling Behind - Supply growth is constrained by declining ore grades at existing mines, long 10–15 year timelines for new projects, and environmental opposition in key producers such as Chile, Peru and the United States.
• From Surplus to Severe Deficit - In 2024, global copper supply is expected to exceed demand by about 0.3 million tonnes. By 2026, demand may reach 30 million tonnes, while supply lags near 28 million tonnes.
• A Rapidly Widening Gap - The deficit could widen to 4.5 million tonnes by 2028 and nearly 8 million tonnes by 2030 — equivalent to the combined output of the world’s ten largest copper mines.
• Implications for Electrification - Such shortages could raise EV costs, delay charging infrastructure, and strain decarbonisation goals. Without rapid expansion of mining, recycling and material innovation, copper scarcity may become electrification’s main bottleneck.

China at the Centre of EV-Driven Copper Demand

• The geography of EV-led copper consumption is reshaping global market dynamics, with China emerging as the dominant force.
• China’s EV-related copper demand rose from about 78,000 tonnes in 2020 to nearly 6,78,000 tonnes in 2024 and is projected to reach around 7,80,000 tonnes by 2025, accounting for almost 60% of global EV-linked copper use.
• Integrated Supply Chains and Strategic Advantage
  • China’s dominance is driven not just by EV sales but by its control of over 70% of global battery cell production and a deeply integrated supply chain.
  • This gives Beijing strong pricing power, long-term contracting leverage, and strategic influence over copper-rich regions.
• Uneven Global Consumption Patterns
  • By 2025, EV-related copper demand is expected to reach around 2,10,000 tonnes in the European Union and 1,14,000 tonnes in the United States, while India’s demand remains modest at roughly 7,200 tonnes.
  • This asymmetry reinforces China’s structural advantage.
• Copper as the Artery of the Energy Transition
  • The EV revolution is transforming not just transport but the global metals economy.
  • Copper has become the critical artery of electrification, with demand nearing levels that outpace supply in unprecedented ways.
• Resource Strategy Will Shape Electrification
  • Policymakers, investors and planners must recognise that the energy transition is inseparable from resource strategy.
  • Without decisive action on copper supply, recycling and innovation, geology—not ambition—will set the pace of electrification.

Why in the News?

• India is likely to be invited to join the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative aimed at securing global semiconductor, AI, and critical mineral supply chains.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Pax Silica (Background, Global Context, Objectives, Key Members, India’s Perspective, Challenges, Way Forward)

Understanding Pax Silica

• Pax Silica is a multilateral initiative launched by the United States in December 2025 to secure supply chains of critical technologies such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), and rare earth elements (REEs).
• The term “Pax” denotes peace, while “Silica” refers to silicon-based semiconductor technologies, symbolising a stable and cooperative global technology order.
• The Pax Silica Declaration emphasises three core objectives:
  • Reducing coercive economic dependencies,
  • Ensuring secure global technology and AI supply chains, and
  • Building trusted digital infrastructure.
• The initiative reflects growing concerns that over-dependence on a single country for critical inputs can expose economies to geopolitical coercion.

Global Context Behind Pax Silica

• The global economy is witnessing a shift where advanced technologies such as AI, semiconductors, and digital infrastructure are becoming central to economic and strategic power.
• At the same time, supply chains for rare earths and critical minerals remain highly concentrated.
• China currently dominates the global supply of rare earth elements and processing capabilities.
• In recent years, it has used export restrictions as a strategic tool, including suspending REE exports following tariff disputes with the U.S. India too faced disruptions in rare-earth magnet supplies, affecting its automobile and electronics industries.
• The COVID-19 pandemic further exposed vulnerabilities of globally fragmented and concentrated supply chains, prompting countries to pursue diversification and resilience strategies.

Key Members of Pax Silica

• The Pax Silica grouping brings together technologically advanced and resource-rich countries.
• Key participants include the United States and Japan as technology leaders; Australia as a major lithium and rare-earth exporter; the Netherlands for advanced lithography technologies; South Korea for memory chip manufacturing; and Singapore for semiconductor fabrication.
• Israel contributes expertise in AI software, defence technologies, and cybersecurity, while the United Kingdom hosts one of the world’s largest AI markets.
• Gulf countries such as Qatar and the UAE add financial strength through sovereign investment funds.
• Canada, the European Union, OECD, and Taiwan currently participate as observers.

India’s Strategic Relevance

• India is not yet a formal member but is expected to be invited soon. India brings several strengths to Pax Silica.
• It has one of the world’s most robust digital public infrastructures, a rapidly growing AI market, and a large pool of skilled technology professionals.
• The Government of India has also launched the India Semiconductor Mission and national AI initiatives with significant financial support.
• Investments by Indian firms such as the Tata Group and foreign companies like Micron indicate growing confidence in India’s semiconductor ecosystem.
• Additionally, a steady return of skilled Indian professionals trained abroad could strengthen domestic capabilities.

Existing Supply Chain Initiatives Involving India

• India has already taken steps to enhance supply chain resilience. In 2021, it joined Australia and Japan in launching the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative.
• India is also part of the Quad’s Critical Minerals Initiative, aimed at securing emerging technology supply chains.
• Collaborations with Japan, Singapore, and Israel in semiconductor manufacturing further position India as a credible partner in Pax Silica-aligned ecosystems.

Challenges for India in Joining Pax Silica

• Despite the opportunities, India faces challenges. Pax Silica members are largely high-income U.S. allies, whereas India would be the first developing country and non-ally strategic partner in the grouping.
• This may create expectation gaps on policy alignment and strategic responses.
• India also prioritises strategic autonomy and may resist frameworks that constrain independent foreign or economic policy choices.
• Moreover, India may seek to protect its nascent semiconductor and AI industries through subsidies, procurement preferences, and calibrated import controls, policies that may not fully align with the current U.S. policy environment.

Strategic Implications and the Road Ahead

• The emergence of Pax Silica signals the likelihood of two parallel global technology supply chains, one centred around China and the other around Pax Silica countries.
• Given India’s long-standing technological collaboration with Western economies and recent supply disruptions from China, aligning with Pax Silica appears strategically advantageous.
• However, India is expected to proceed cautiously, engaging in dialogue to ensure that participation strengthens domestic capabilities without compromising strategic autonomy or development priorities.

Why in News?

• India is witnessing a sharp rise in digital frauds, particularly the phenomenon of “digital arrest” scams, leading to massive financial losses and erosion of trust in digital payments.
• In response, a high-level inter-departmental committee (IDC) constituted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is examining systemic solutions, including a transaction “kill switch” and a fraud insurance mechanism.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• ‘Digital Arrest’ Scams
• Key Proposals Under Consideration
• Institutional Framework Involved
• Role of RBI and Insurance Sector
• Key Challenges and Way Ahead
• Conclusion

‘Digital Arrest’ Scams:

• Meaning:
  • Cyber-enabled fraud: Fraudsters impersonate law enforcement officials via video calls. Victims are shown fake IDs, arrest warrants, and threatened with arrest. Leaked personal data is used to build credibility.
  • Social engineering: Victims are kept under psychological pressure for hours and coerced into transferring money to mule accounts.
• Estimated losses: Victims across India are believed to have collectively lost nearly Rs 3,000 crore to digital arrest scams, prompting the Supreme Court to take suo motu cognizance of the issue.

Key Proposals Under Consideration:

• Transaction ‘Kill Switch’:
  • An emergency button embedded in UPI apps, and banking/payment applications.
  • Once activated all banking and financial transactions are instantly frozen, preventing further outflow of funds during suspected fraud.
  • It aims to create last-mile consumer protection, and real-time intervention in fraud scenarios.
• Tracking and blocking fraudulent transactions: Exploring systems to identify suspicious transactions, prevent instant splitting of funds into multiple mule accounts, and address rapid laundering techniques used by fraud networks.
• Fraud insurance mechanism:
  • Proposal to introduce insurance coverage for fraud-related losses in banking.
  • Driven by increasing scale and sophistication of digital frauds, and recognition that traditional audits and compliance are insufficient.
  • RBI’s evolving stance - Shift from viewing fraud as merely a compliance issue to a systemic and balance-sheet risk.

Institutional Framework Involved:

• The IDC is chaired by Special Secretary (Internal Security), MHA, with representatives from:
  • Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY),
  • Department of Telecommunications (DoT),
  • Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
  • Department of Financial Services (DFS),
  • Ministry of Law & Justice (MoLJ),
  • Ministry of Consumer Affairs (MoCA),
  • Reserve Bank of India (RBI),
  • CBI, NIA, Delhi Police, and
  • The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) (with the CEO, I4C acting as Member-Secretary).
• Additionally: MeitY met major IT intermediaries (Google, WhatsApp, Telegram, Microsoft) earlier.

Role of RBI and Insurance Sector:

• RBI observations:
  • There were 23,879 fraud cases involving an amount of Rs 34,771 crore as of 2024-25.
  • The RBI’s Payment Vision 2025 report has proposed studying the feasibility of setting up a Digital Payment Protection Fund (DPPF) to provide security cover to defrauded customers and payment instrument issuers.
• Expert view: Existing cyber insurance does not cover first-party fraud losses, especially those caused by customer manipulation.
• Preferred option - Insurance pool model:
  • Backed by contributions from banks, insurers and potentially supported by regulatory frameworks – that could spread fraud risk across the system.
  • This will be similar to terrorism insurance pools in several countries.
  • Such a structure would help manage tail risks while keeping premiums affordable.

Key Challenges and Way Ahead:

• Operational complexity: Avoiding misuse or accidental triggering of the kill switch.
  • Technology-based safeguards - AI-driven fraud detection and transaction velocity checks.
• Interoperability: Uniform adoption across banks, UPI platforms, and fintech apps.
  • Strengthened coordination - Banks–Insurers–Regulators–Tech platforms partnership.
• Moral hazard: Risk of reduced consumer vigilance if insurance is guaranteed.
  • Consumer awareness - Nationwide campaigns on digital arrest scams.
• Regulatory coordination: RBI, IRDAI, MeitY, and banks must act in sync.
  • Regulatory clarity - Clear SOPs for kill switch activation and reversal.
  • Legal backing - Amendments to IT and banking regulations for rapid response.
• Coverage gaps: Current cyber insurance inadequate for social engineering frauds.
  • Insurance innovation - Creation of a fraud insurance pool under IRDAI leadership.

Conclusion:

• India’s rapid digitalisation has outpaced traditional risk-control mechanisms, making digital fraud a systemic threat rather than a mere compliance issue.
• The proposed initiatives represent a paradigm shift towards proactive, consumer-centric and system-wide protection.
• If implemented with robust safeguards, regulatory coordination and public awareness, these measures can significantly enhance the resilience and credibility of India’s digital financial ecosystem.

Context

• The turn of 2026 underscores the erosion of the post–Second World War international order.
• Structures once rooted in multilateral norms and collective security are giving way to a fragmented environment driven by unilateral coercion, regional power assertions, and opportunistic diplomacy.
• The year reveals a world transitioning from rules-based order to competitive multipolarity, where norms often yield to force and influence.

The New ‘Donroe Doctrine’ and the Return of Hemispheric Hegemony

• The year begins with a dramatic U.S. operation: the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, justified as a security imperative and framed as an updated incarnation of the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine.
• This new ‘Donroe Doctrine’ reflects President Donald Trump’s instinct to restore hemispheric primacy and assert the United States as the dominant guarantor of security in the Western Hemisphere.
• Trump’s November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) articulates ambitions to deny non-Hemispheric competitors’ strategic access to the region.
• The Venezuelan action fits a broader pattern of hemispheric reassertion, combined with veiled signals toward Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, and even Greenland.
• The muted international response reinforces the perception that sovereignty norms have weakened and that the post-1945 security architecture is no longer constraining major powers.
• This environment invites emulation: China and Russia now appear more confident about advancing their own spheres of influence, with Taiwan representing China’s most salient potential flashpoint.
• Global politics edges toward a world of regional doctrines rather than global consensus.

The Trouble in Asia: A Region of Uneven Fires

• The Trouble in West Asia
  • West Asia enters 2026 in a fractured state. Israel’s military offensives in Gaza have paused, yet durable peace remains elusive.
  • Violence persists as a background condition, especially in densely populated and contested zones.
  • Instability deepens with unrest in Iran, where the regime identifies itself as fighting four simultaneous wars: economic, psychological, military, and counterterrorism.
  • The U.S. and Israel perceive an opportunity to undermine the Khamenei regime, reviving unfinished objectives from 2025.
  • Additional sanctions and covert manoeuvres heighten regional tension, making escalation more likely than reconciliation.
• Afghanistan and Bangladesh
  • The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and allied militant groups gain renewed momentum, threatening the fragile Afghanistan–Pakistan frontier.
  • Pakistan experiences intensified military dominance under Field Marshal Asim Munir, with democratic processes further eroded.
  • Yet Islamabad paradoxically enjoys revived status as a preferred U.S. partner and recipient of advanced weapons systems, reshaping regional balances.
  • Bangladesh confronts democratic uncertainty as elections promise procedural renewal without guaranteeing stability.
  • Together, these trends render West and Northwest Asia a mosaic of local crises without regional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

China’s Strategic Poise and the Pacific Reshuffle

• Amid this volatility, China finishes 2025 with strengthened geopolitical posture.
• The tariff confrontation with the U.S. fails to cripple Chinese industry; instead, Beijing consolidates its position in global supply chains and uses rare earth export restrictions as strategic leverage.
• These actions underscore China’s capacity for economic statecraft.
• China’s influence expands across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, eroding traditional U.S. dominance in the Eastern Pacific.
• Power shifts occur quietly through investments, infrastructure, and maritime logistics rather than direct confrontation.
• The U.S. finds itself stretched between reasserting hemispheric control and countering Chinese expansion across the Indo-Pacific.

India at the Crossroads: Strategic Uncertainty and Diplomatic Constraints

• India enters 2026 in an ambiguous strategic position. Despite alignment with U.S. interests on several fronts, Trump criticizes India’s continued imports of Russian oil and cultivates closer ties with Pakistan, producing a subtle diplomatic chill.
• This reduces India’s leverage in West Asian crises and narrows its mediation space.
• Mini-lateral initiatives such as I2U2 and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor progress, yet economic vulnerabilities remain.
• China holds a tactical advantage in tariff and trade disputes, limiting India’s ability to hedge.
• The improvement in India-China relations after the 2025 Tianjin meeting stabilizes tensions but does not generate momentum for deeper rapprochement.
• Terrorism persists as an ambient threat in 2026. While India may avoid major attacks, Islamic State and al-Qaeda activity in Africa and West Asia ensures that militant networks remain dispersed, resilient, and transnational. 

Conclusion

• The emerging world of 2026 is defined not by institution-building but by geopolitical disorder.
• The Donroe Doctrine symbolises a shift from multilateral restraint to unilateral assertion, encouraging similar ambitions among rival powers.
• Middle states such as India must adapt to an environment where power increasingly substitutes for legitimacy and where regionalism replaces global security consensus.