Why in news?

Recently, the UN General Assembly adopted its first-ever declaration on rising sea levels, which pose an existential threat to populations worldwide.

The declaration addresses both the loss of territory faced by vulnerable island nations and the need for countries to build sea-level rise projections into coastal infrastructure planning — the latter being an area where India has significant work to do.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Scale of the Problem
• Can a Country Survive Losing Its Territory?
• What India Gains?
• Is India's Own Coast Ready?
• The Regulatory Gap
• Who the Declaration Leaves Out?
• What India Should Do Before 2030

The Scale of the Problem

• Sea-level rise has been "accelerating," in the declaration's own words.
  • The global rate of rise more than doubled: from 2.1 mm/year (1993–2002) to 4.7 mm/year (2015–2024), as per the World Meteorological Organization.
  • In 2024 alone, the sea rose 6 mm — the largest annual increase on record.
• Future projections (from 'Surging Seas in a Warming World', a 2024 UN Secretary-General's Climate Action Team brief):
  • Lowest-emissions path: Global sea level rises ~38 cm by 2100 above early-2000s levels.
  • High-emissions path: Rise could reach ~77 cm.
  • Crucially, seas will keep rising for centuries to millennia, even if the world reaches net zero.

Can a Country Survive Losing Its Territory?

• This is the central legal question the declaration attempts to settle.
• Under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, a state is defined by four criteria:
  • a permanent population,
  • a defined territory,
  • a government, and
  • the capacity to enter relations with other states.
• If rising seas swallow a state's territory or make it uninhabitable, does statehood survive? The declaration's answer: Yes
• It affirms a "presumption in favour of continued statehood" — such a country keeps its sovereignty, rights, and UN seat.
• Crucially, it also keeps its nautical boundaries, even as the coastline physically retreats. These include:
  • The Territorial Sea — extending 12 nautical miles (~22.2 km) from the coast.
  • The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) — extending up to ~370 km, within which a country holds exclusive rights over natural resources.
• On Emissions and Adaptation: The declaration calls adaptation and mitigation "essential" but leaves actual emission-cut negotiations to the UN climate convention and the Paris Agreement.
• On Displaced People: It asks countries to respect the human rights of those who lose homes, encourages strengthened international cooperation, and supports voluntary choices and "mobility with dignity."
• A Real Example Already Underway: By December 2025, more than a third of Tuvalu's 11,000-strong population had applied for climate visas to migrate to Australia under a bilateral treaty.

What India Gains?

• India welcomed the declaration and backed stable maritime zones and continuity of statehood.
• It also reaffirmed "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" — the principle that all countries must act on climate change, but those who caused more pollution and can afford more should contribute more.
• India's Direct Stake
  • A 2023–24 remeasurement counts 1,298 offshore islands/islets and a coastline of 11,098 km.
  • Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands extend India's maritime boundaries deep into the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.
  • A pledge to keep nautical boundaries fixed therefore protects India's own waters, not just Pacific nations'.
• Diplomatic Continuity
  • The vote extends India's ongoing engagement with island nations — via the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation (set up with 14 Pacific countries in 2014) and the Infrastructure for Resilient Island States initiative (launched at the 2021 Glasgow climate summit).

Is India's Own Coast Ready?

• The National Centre for Coastal Research tracked India's mainland shoreline from 1990 to 2016 and found about a third of it eroding.
  • Nationally, losses and gains are roughly balanced: 234 sq km lost, 231 sq km gained elsewhere.
  • But losses are concentrated: nearly 400 km of coast is retreating by more than 5 metres/year, and another 225 km by 3–5 metres/year.
  • West Bengal alone has over 170 km in the fastest-eroding category — about a third of its entire coast.

The Regulatory Gap

• Under the 2019 Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) notification, the "no-build" strip is:
  • 50 metres wide in densely populated rural areas (once a state's coastal plan is approved).
  • 200 metres elsewhere.
• Both are measured from the high-tide line — defined as where the highest spring tide reaches today.
• The problem: On a stretch losing 5 metres/year, a house built 50 metres from today's high-tide line would reach the water's edge in about 10 years. Even the 200-metre strip would last only about 40 years.
• A Better Tool Exists But isn't Fully Used
  • The Survey of India has mapped a "hazard line" incorporating sea-level rise and shoreline change, shared with coastal states.
  • The 2019 rules use it only as a disaster management planning tool, while the actual no-build strip is still measured from today's tide line — not the projected future one.

Who the Declaration Leaves Out?

• In the Sundarbans, the loss has already happened.
  • Ghoramara island shrank from ~7.2 sq km (1972) to 3.6 sq km (2022).
  • Families who had earlier moved there from neighbouring Lohachara (which disappeared in the early 2000s) were displaced again within a decade — relocated to marginal land without secure tenure or livelihood support.
• The Legal Gap: Indian law has no clear category for people who gradually lose land to erosion; each relocation is handled case by case.
  • A 2025 review in Frontiers in Marine Science estimates 45 million Indians will be at risk from sea-level rise by 2050, and notes India "still lacks comprehensive legislation" on this.
• A Model Worth Following: Fiji wrote planned relocation into its Climate Change Act (2021), backed by a trust fund.

What India Should Do Before 2030?

• Measure the no-build strip from the hazard line, or widen it by the local erosion rate, starting with fastest-retreating stretches.
• Enact a law for slow-onset displacement, ensuring relocated families receive land title and livelihood support.
• Keep pressing on climate finance. UNEP estimates developing countries need over $310 billion/year by 2035 for adaptation, against just $26 billion in international public adaptation finance (2023).
  • At Baku (2024), India called the new $300 billion/year goal "too little and too distant" — a position it should press again at COP31 in Antalya.
• The declaration schedules the next high-level meeting on sea-level rise by September 2030 — giving India four years to act.

Why in news?

The Calcutta High Court has held that casteist slurs on social media can attract provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, ruling that "public view" under the law is not confined to physical spaces.

A single bench of Justice Uday Kumar held that the requirement of "public view" under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act "transcends physical space into the digital domain."

This ruling comes weeks after the Supreme Court reiterated that not every caste-related remark amounts to an offence under the Act, and that courts must closely examine whether its statutory requirements are met — making this an important, evolving area of law.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What the Law Says?
• How Courts Have Interpreted Public View So Far?
• What the Calcutta High Court Held?
• The Emerging Judicial Pattern

What the Law Says?

• Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act criminalise intentionally insulting, intimidating or abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by caste name, "in any place within public view."
• To establish these offences, three elements must be satisfied:
  • The accused must not be a member of an SC/ST community.
  • The act must be intended to humiliate the victim on the basis of caste.
  • The incident must occur in a place within public view.
    • Digital cases typically hinge on this third requirement.

How Courts Have Interpreted Public View So Far

• Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) — Supreme Court. The SC held that public view means a place where members of the public can witness or hear the alleged utterance.
  • It clarified: "If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view."
• Ramkrishna Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026) — Supreme Court. Apex Court quashed proceedings against a school manager under both clauses. The bench held the requirement depends on whether the alleged utterance was made in circumstances where members of the public could witness or hear it.
  • Crucially, it added: "the mere fact that the occurrence took place within the premises of a school does not, by itself, satisfy this requirement."
• This shows the Supreme Court has been applying the test cautiously and narrowly in physical-space cases.

What the Calcutta High Court Held?

• The petitioner, a member of a Scheduled Caste, alleged that two men from general caste communities had "hurled foul, unparliamentary, and casteist expletives targeting his caste identity, religion, God, and family" on Facebook.
• Police approached Facebook through the Cyber Police Station, Kolkata, but did not receive user details.
• Police then filed a "Final Report True, No Clue" — effectively closing the case.
• The complainant challenged this closure, but the Special Court at Alipore rejected his petition.
• The HC's Intervention
  • The High Court set aside the Special Court's order.
  • The court held it "transcends physical space into the digital domain."
  • It noted that police had seized screenshots and recorded statements during investigation, and therefore the investigating agency "cannot throw up its hands reporting 'no clue'" after a mere local cyber inquiry failed — without exhausting specialised State CID cyber-forensic or IP-log tracking protocols.
  • This is a significant procedural direction: investigators must pursue advanced technical methods before declaring a dead end.

The Emerging Judicial Pattern

• 
• The pattern shows courts applying a stricter, circumstance-based test for physical spaces, while extending the concept more liberally to digital spaces — recognising that online content, by its nature, has unlimited potential viewership.

Conclusion

The law was written for a world without screenshots and social media feeds, yet courts are now stretching "public view" to cover exactly that. The Calcutta High Court's ruling, read alongside Kerala's 2022 judgment, signals that caste-based abuse online cannot hide behind the excuse of a closed investigation.

Context

• Household borrowing is becoming an integral part of everyday consumption in India.
• Credit cards, personal loans, digital lending and buy-now-pay-later arrangements allow households to bring future income into the present.
• According to the RBI, household debt increased from 39.2% of GDP in March 2021 to 45.5% in September 2025.
• Although this remains moderate compared with several emerging economies, the pace and composition of household borrowing require careful attention.

The Household Savings Transition

• From Savings to Credit
  • India's traditional household financial model was centred on savings, but this pattern is changing.
  • Household net financial savings declined from pandemic-era highs, although recent recovery is visible.
  • Government data indicate that savings increased to around 6% of GDP in 2024-25 from 5.2% in 2023-24.
  • Thus, the evidence does not suggest an across-the-board collapse in household savings.
• Composition of Household Debt
  • The composition of debt is more important than the headline figure.
  • Housing loans create an asset and therefore differ from unsecured borrowing for consumption.
  • By contrast, personal loans, credit-card borrowing and unsecured credit can create repayment obligations without generating corresponding assets.
• Distributional Risks
  • The risks associated with debt vary across households.
  • Salaried households with predictable incomes may service loans comfortably, whereas informal workers, casual labourers and self-employed households face greater risks because of volatile incomes.
  • Productive borrowing is therefore preferable to borrowing driven by financial distress.
• Digitalisation of Credit
  • Instant loans, app-based credit and online consumer finance have substantially reduced barriers to borrowing.
  • While this promotes financial inclusion, easy access can also blur the distinction between what households can afford and what they can borrow.
  • When households borrow for healthcare, education, housing or old-age needs, debt can compensate for inadequate social protection.
  • Household indebtedness is consequently shaped by broader employment conditions, income security and institutional structures.

The Macroeconomic Implications

• Credit and Economic Growth
  • In the short term, credit-financed consumption can stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth.
  • However, excessive leverage can eventually weaken consumption as debt-servicing obligations reduce disposable income.
  • A potentially damaging cycle can emerge:
    • Income stagnation → borrowing to sustain consumption → rising debt service → declining disposable income → weaker consumption → greater dependence on credit.
• Credit-Led versus Income-Led Demand
  • This highlights the distinction between credit-led demand and income-led demand.
  • Credit can temporarily increase purchasing power, but sustainable consumption ultimately depends on stable and rising incomes.
  • An economy relying excessively on borrowing to sustain consumption may face weaker household demand when credit conditions tighten.

The Way Forward

• Need for Balanced Regulation
  • Policy should not simply restrict household lending because formal credit is essential for financial inclusion and economic development.
  • The objective should instead be to distinguish productive credit from distress borrowing and asset-building loans from consumption financing caused by inadequate income.
  • Measures such as consumer protection, financial literacy, transparent lending practices and responsible digital-credit regulation can reduce vulnerabilities.
  • These should be accompanied by employment generation, wage growth and stronger social protection.
• Beyond the Headline Debt Ratio
  • India's household debt story cannot be understood through the overall debt-to-GDP ratio alone.
  • The purpose, cost, distribution and repayment capacity of debt are equally important.
  • Borrowing for housing or productive investment can strengthen household balance sheets, whereas borrowing for basic consumption because current income is insufficient may merely postpone financial stress.
• Building Income Security
  • The central challenge is to ensure that access to credit creates economic opportunity rather than dependence on future income.
  • A healthy financial system should enable households to borrow for investment and manage temporary shocks without trapping them in repayment cycles.

Conclusion

• India does not need to eliminate household borrowing; it needs to ensure that borrowing remains responsible, productive and sustainable.
• Credit should complement rising incomes rather than compensate for stagnant or uncertain earnings.
• Ultimately, sustainable household financial security requires stable employment, rising wages, adequate social protection and responsible access to formal credit.
• The true measure of financial well-being is not how much households can borrow, but whether they can meet present needs without continuously consuming their future incomes.

Context

• The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) between India and the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, entered into force on October 1, 2025.
• Its significance extends beyond tariff concessions to investment, employment, technology transfer and sustainable development.
• TEPA reflects India’s evolving trade strategy, in which trade agreements increasingly serve as platforms for building long-term economic and technological partnerships.

Lasting Partnerships, an India Focus

• TEPA provides substantial market access. EFTA has offered concessions on 92.2% of tariff lines, covering 99.6% of the value of Indian exports, while India has offered concessions on 82.7% of tariff lines, covering 95.3% of EFTA exports.
• More importantly, TEPA is India’s first trade agreement with a dedicated emphasis on investment and job creation.
• EFTA states aim to facilitate $100 billion of investment in India over 15 years and contribute to the creation of one million direct jobs.
• This gives the agreement a long-term developmental dimension.
• Iceland’s importance within this framework comes not from economic scale but from its specialised expertise in geothermal energy, carbon management and fisheries.

Geothermal Energy and Energy Security

• Iceland has decades of experience in the direct use of geothermal energy for heating, agriculture and food processing.
• This expertise is particularly relevant to India’s Himalayan geothermal belt.
• At Tapri in Himachal Pradesh, an Indian-Icelandic venture uses geothermal heat to dry fruit, helping apple growers process and store their produce rather than selling immediately during the harvest glut.
• Geothermal cooling can further strengthen agricultural value chains.
• The technology also has strategic relevance for remote Himalayan communities and frontier installations that depend on fuel transported through difficult mountain routes.
• Locally available geothermal energy could improve energy security and reduce dependence on vulnerable supply chains.

Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS)

• The second major area is CCUS, particularly important for reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industries such as steel, cement, refining, chemicals and power.
• NITI Aayog has estimated that India could potentially capture around 750 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually by 2050.
• The Department of Science and Technology has developed a CCUS research roadmap, while the Union Budget has allocated ₹20,000 crore over five years to help scale the technology.
• Iceland’s CarbFix technology provides valuable experience in geological carbon storage by dissolving carbon dioxide in water and injecting it into basalt, where it mineralises into rock.
• India’s extensive Deccan Trap basalt formations offer scope for similar applications.
• Iceland also possesses experience in carbon utilisation, including the conversion of captured carbon dioxide into methanol.

New Frontiers

• Fisheries and the Blue Economy
  • Iceland has developed expertise in seafood quality, cold-chain logistics and value-added processing.
  • A particularly relevant lesson is maximum utilisation of marine resources.
  • Iceland reportedly uses around 90% of each cod landed, converting skin, liver and bones into medical products, oils and feed.
  • India can increase value addition, employment and exports by making better use of existing catches rather than depending solely on higher fishing volumes.
  • Technology transfer and seafood processing under TEPA can strengthen coastal industries and generate additional economic opportunities.
• Technology Transfer and Industrial Cooperation
  • Cooperation can include technology licensing, feasibility studies, storage assessment, monitoring and verification, research and commercial-scale project development.
  • Such collaboration can help India move promising technologies from the pilot stage to commercial deployment, strengthening domestic technological capabilities.
• Energy, Trade and Arctic Cooperation
  • Iceland is a founding member of the Arctic Council, while India has been an Observer since 2013 and adopted its Arctic Policy in 2022.
  • India also operates the Himadri research station in Svalbard.
  • Iceland can therefore provide India with an important bilateral channel for cooperation in Arctic governance, scientific research and environmental stewardship.
  • The convergence of trade, energy and Arctic cooperation demonstrates that modern economic partnerships increasingly involve technology, sustainability, scientific research and strategic cooperation.

Challenges and the Way Forward

• Investment commitments must translate into actual projects, employment and technological capabilities.
• Similarly, emerging technologies such as geothermal systems and CCUS require appropriate infrastructure, financing, regulatory frameworks and skilled manpower.
• India must therefore focus on technology absorption, domestic capacity-building and commercially viable projects.
• Cooperation should also encourage Indian firms and institutions to participate actively rather than remain passive recipients of foreign technology.

Conclusion

• TEPA represents a shift from conventional trade liberalisation towards a partnership based on investment, technology, employment and sustainability.
• India contributes its large market, industrial capacity and development opportunities, while Iceland brings specialised expertise in geothermal energy, carbon management and fisheries.
• Its broader significance lies in demonstrating that countries of very different sizes can combine complementary capabilities to address common economic and environmental challenges.
• TEPA can thus serve as a practical model for how India’s engagement with Europe can move beyond tariffs towards innovation, sustainable development, value addition and long-term strategic cooperation.

Why in the News?

• A recent US Department of State report on India’s investment climate has highlighted regulatory restrictions, differences between foreign and domestic investors, corruption risks and import-related barriers affecting foreign investment in India.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Foreign Investment in India (Framework, Key Concerns in Report, Regulatory Governance, Taxation, FDI Performance, etc.)

India’s Foreign Investment Framework

• India permits 100% FDI through the automatic route in most sectors, although certain sectors remain subject to government approval and other conditions.
• The US report noted that foreign investors are required to seek government approval in sectors including multi-brand retail, private banking, pharmaceuticals, defence, print and digital media, and satellites. It characterised these sector-specific requirements as creating differences in the treatment of foreign and domestic investment.
• Such restrictions can reflect legitimate policy considerations, particularly in sectors involving national security, strategic assets, financial stability or sensitive information.
• At the same time, predictable and transparent rules are important for investment decisions.

Key Concerns Highlighted by the Report

• Regulatory Uncertainty
  • The report identifies regulatory uncertainty as a concern for foreign businesses operating in India.
  • Investment decisions generally involve long-term commitments. Frequent changes in rules, unclear procedures or uncertainty regarding approvals can increase the cost and risk of investment, particularly for capital-intensive industries.
  • The report also highlighted India's Import Management System (IMS).
  • It said that requirements for importing specialised used equipment, including high-end servers, semiconductors and advanced testing equipment, can create difficulties because of authorisation requirements and a perceived lack of transparent guidelines.
• FDI-FPI Restrictions
  • The report raised concerns about restrictions on investors using both the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI)
  • Under the existing framework described in the report, an investor entering a company through FDI before its IPO may face restrictions on acquiring additional shares through the FPI route until its pre-IPO FDI holdings are fully divested.
  • The report argues that this can create difficulties for large investment groups managing multiple independent funds.
  • It also notes that the existing 10% FPI cap already limits the ability of foreign portfolio investors to acquire strategic stakes in listed Indian companies.

Corruption and Regulatory Governance

• The report also identifies actual or anticipated corruption, particularly within regulatory systems, as a barrier reported by US businesses.
• India's Companies Act, 2013 contains several corporate governance and anti-corruption mechanisms, including provisions relating to independent directors, whistleblower protection and codes of conduct.
• The report noted, however, that publicly available information is limited regarding the extent to which internal compliance and control mechanisms are implemented across the private sector. 
• For investors, transparent regulatory procedures and effective institutional safeguards can reduce transaction costs and uncertainty.

Taxation and Banking

• The report highlighted a difference in the effective tax burden between foreign and domestic banks.
• According to the report, foreign banks face an effective tax rate of 38.22%, which is 4.63 percentage points higher than that faced by domestic banks.
• At the same time, the report noted that India maintains stable correspondent banking relationships with major global and US banks.
• It also recognised that India's tightly regulated banking and capital-market systems contribute to financial stability and continued access for foreign financial institutions.

India’s FDI Performance

• The report noted that US direct investment stock in India stood at $58.54 billion in 2024, representing a 3.37% decline from 2023.
• However, investment flows can fluctuate considerably from month to month. RBI data cited in the report showed that India's net FDI inflow reached $7.35 billion in July, its highest monthly level since May 2021, when it stood at $8.80 billion.
• Therefore, a single indicator should not be interpreted as representing the entire trajectory of India's foreign investment environment.

Importance of Ease of Doing Business

• Foreign investment contributes not only capital but can also facilitate technology transfer, managerial capabilities, employment and integration into global value chains.
• An effective investment framework therefore requires a combination of:

• Predictable regulations
• Transparent approval procedures
• Efficient dispute resolution
• Consistent tax treatment
• Strong corporate governance
• Transparent import and export procedures
• Effective anti-corruption mechanisms

• India has also developed institutional mechanisms to facilitate investment, including the National Single Window System, which provides businesses with access to multiple Central and State approvals through a common digital platform.

Balancing Regulation and Investment

• A major policy challenge is to balance strategic regulation with investment facilitation.
• Certain restrictions may be justified in sensitive sectors, but excessive procedural complexity can increase compliance costs.
• Conversely, complete deregulation may create risks relating to national security, financial stability, strategic technologies or market concentration.
• The investment climate therefore depends not merely on the number of restrictions but also on whether rules are transparent, predictable, proportionate and consistently implemented.

Why in News?

• The Ministry of Power notified the third phase of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE-III) norms.
• The regulations will be implemented from April 1, 2027, to March 31, 2032, requiring automobile manufacturers to progressively improve the fuel efficiency of their passenger vehicle fleets.
• The new framework seeks to reduce fuel consumption and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions while providing flexibility through multiple technological pathways. It also resolves the contentious debate over special concessions for small cars.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Understanding CAFE Norms
• Progressively Stricter Fuel Efficiency Targets
• Small Cars vs Large Cars - Resolving the Industry Debate
• Incentives for Electric Vehicles and Alternative Fuels
• Flexible Compliance Mechanism
• Incentives for Technological Innovation
• Significance and Way Forward
• Conclusion

Understanding CAFE Norms:

• Introduced in 2017 under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, CAFE norms regulate the average fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions of a manufacturer's entire passenger vehicle fleet.
• Unlike vehicle-specific emission standards, CAFE norms assess the weighted average performance of all eligible vehicles sold by a manufacturer.
• CAFE-II came into effect in 2022, while CAFE-III will remain applicable for five years, covering M1-category passenger vehicles manufactured or imported for sale in India.
• The framework encourages manufacturers to improve fleet-wide fuel efficiency rather than focusing exclusively on individual models.

Progressively Stricter Fuel Efficiency Targets:

• CAFE-III mandates an improvement of approximately 16.7% in fuel efficiency over five years through progressively tightening annual targets.
• The annual fuel-consumption target is calculated using the following formula -
  • Annual average fuel consumption = a × (W − b) + c
  • Where,
    • W: Weighted average unladen weight of a manufacturer's eligible vehicles.
    • b: Reference weight, fixed at 1,229 kg.
    • a: Weight adjustment factor.
    • c: Baseline fuel-consumption target.
  • The reference weight has increased from 1,082 kg under the existing norms to 1,229 kg under CAFE-III, reflecting changes in the passenger vehicle fleet.
  • The baseline fuel-consumption target will decline from 3.996 litres/100 km in 2027–28 to 3.3273 litres/100 km in 2031–32.
  • The revised formula also uses a flatter weight adjustment, allowing different targets based on the average weight of manufacturers' fleets. 

Small Cars vs Large Cars - Resolving the Industry Debate:

• The treatment of small cars was one of the most contentious aspects of CAFE-III.
• The September 2025 draft proposed an additional relaxation of 3 g CO₂/km for petrol cars weighing below 909 kg.
• This proposal faced opposition from some manufacturers, including Tata Motors and Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M), who argued that it would disproportionately benefit Maruti Suzuki, which dominates the lightweight car segment.
• The final notification has removed the separate 3 g/km concession but revised the weight-adjustment formula to provide relatively favourable targets for lighter vehicles.
• Consequently, a small car's target, which would have been 54.1 g/km under the earlier draft, has been relaxed to 63.7 g/km under the final framework.
• However, there is no separate regulatory category for cars weighing below 909 kg. The fuel-efficiency target depends on the manufacturer's overall fleet weight.

Incentives for Electric Vehicles and Alternative Fuels:

• CAFE-III introduces a super-credit mechanism to encourage cleaner technologies and diversify India's automotive energy mix.
• For example, for BEVs and range-extended electric vehicles (REEVs) volume derogation factor is 3. It is 2.5 for plug-in hybrids and strong hybrids running on flex-fuel.
• Under this mechanism, one BEV or REEV is counted as three vehicles when calculating fleet performance.
• Additional carbon-neutrality factors (CNFs) recognise the contribution of alternative fuels. For example, 8% for E20 or higher ethanol-blended petrol vehicles, and 22.3% for flex-fuel ethanol vehicles.
• EVs also benefit from a separate energy-consumption calculation, with electricity consumption converted into petrol-equivalent consumption using a prescribed conversion factor of 0.1028.
• These provisions encourage electrification, hybridisation and the adoption of cleaner fuels.

Flexible Compliance Mechanism:

• CAFE-III introduces a credit-debit system to provide manufacturers with greater flexibility.
• Manufacturers exceeding their prescribed efficiency targets earn credits, while those falling short accumulate debits.
• Credits can be carried forward within compliance blocks and traded between manufacturers.
• Manufacturers with outstanding deficits can purchase credits from the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE).
• The buyout price starts at ₹2,500 per g CO₂/km in 2027–28 and increases by ₹500 annually, reaching ₹4,500 in 2031–32.
• The 3+2-year compliance block structure allows manufacturers to balance deficits across three-year and two-year periods instead of meeting every annual target independently.

Incentives for Technological Innovation:

• Manufacturers can claim efficiency improvements from specified technologies, including -
  • Start-stop systems and tyre-pressure monitoring.
  • Regenerative braking and efficient transmissions.
  • Motor-generators and efficient alternators.
  • LED lighting and advanced glazing.
  • Electric water pumps and improved air-conditioning systems.
• Each qualifying technology can provide a claimed reduction of 1 g CO₂/km, subject to an overall cap of 9 g CO₂/km.
• Self-declaration is permitted during the first compliance block, while claims in the second block require validated testing.
• Manufacturers producing or importing fewer than 1,000 eligible vehicles during a reporting period are exempt from specific CAFE targets but must report their actual fleet-average fuel consumption.

Significance and Way Forward:

• CAFE-III seeks to achieve multiple objectives -
  • Environmental sustainability: Reduce vehicular emissions and fossil-fuel consumption.
  • Energy security: Lower dependence on imported petroleum through improved fuel efficiency and alternative energy sources.
  • Technological innovation: Encourage investment in EVs, hybrids, cleaner fuels and energy-efficient vehicle technologies.
  • Regulatory certainty: Provide a predictable framework for long-term investment and product development.
  • Consumer choice: Allow manufacturers to adopt different technological pathways according to market demand and capabilities.
• However, manufacturers must balance compliance costs, technological investments and vehicle affordability, particularly in the price-sensitive small-car segment.

Conclusion:

• CAFE-III represents an important step towards decarbonising India's passenger vehicle sector. It seeks to promote cleaner mobility while accommodating the diverse capabilities of automobile manufacturers.
• Its success will depend on effective implementation, technological innovation and the affordability of cleaner vehicles.

About Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN):

• UNICORN, also known as NORA-50, is a shipborne integrated antenna system.
• It is a mast with integrated communication systems that is engineered to dramatically enhance a warship's stealth and situational awareness.
• Developed jointly by three Japanese companies (NEC Corporation, Sampa Kogyo K.K., and The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd.), the system is already in service aboard Japan’s Mogami-class frigates.
• What does UNICORN do?
  • Conventional warships typically carry several exposed antennas – for radar, communications, and electronic warfare – bolted onto a mast.
  • Each of these surfaces adds to a ship’s radar cross-section, making it easier for an adversary to detect.
  • UNICORN does away with that arrangement by consolidating multiple antennas into a single enclosed radome mounted on one mast, cutting down the number of reflective surfaces a hostile radar can pick up.
  • Its design stacks the antennas vertically inside a bar-shaped dome, moving components such as the tactical air navigation antenna from an exposed position at the top of the mast to a more sheltered spot lower down.
  • A lightning diverter strip runs across the mast's surface as a safety measure, given the exposure of ships at sea to lightning strikes.
  • Inside this unified mast are several vital subsystems, including those for tactical data links, Tactical Air Navigation Systems (TACAN), Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), Electronic Support Measures (ESM), and general communications.
  • This innovation significantly reduces the cross-section of naval platforms, thereby enhancing their stealth characteristics and enabling them to operate with reduced electronic signatures.
  • Beyond stealth, the system is also designed to reduce mutual interference between closely packed antennas, improve the range at which external radio signals can be detected, and simplify installation and maintenance.
• India-Japan Agreement:
  • India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Implementation (MOI) on 15 November 2024 for the co-development of UNICORN masts.
  • It is the first military hardware co-development pact between the two countries.
  • Japan will provide the design and engineering support, while India will handle integration, adaptation, and co-production through Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL).
  • The integrated mast is expected to gradually replace existing communication and sensor mast systems across the Navy's fleet.

About International Whaling Commission:

• It is an intergovernmental organization established to regulate whaling and promote the conservation of whale populations.
• It was established under the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
• Formed in response to the alarming decline of whale stocks in the 1930s, the IWC initially aimed to ensure sustainable whaling practices among its member nations.
• The Convention also applies to factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the contracting governments, and to all waters in which they carry out whaling.
• Membership:
  • Beginning in 1979, IWC membership started to grow: 23 members in 1979, 41 by 1985. Currently, there are 88 contracting governments.
  • Countries that do not hunt whales can also join the IWC.
  • Some of the current members include: Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Japan (until 2019), Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
• The IWC's main office is in Impington, near Cambridge, England.
• There are generally three types of whaling that the Commission regulates:
• Commercial Whaling:
  • In 1986, a global moratorium, or a temporary ban, on commercial whaling was adopted due to the overexploitation of whale stocks.
  • The Commission has also designated sanctuary areas in the Indian and Southern Oceans where commercial whaling is not allowed.
  • Although the moratorium is still in place, some countries, such as Norway and Iceland, continue to engage in commercial whaling
• Scientific Research Whaling:
  • Article VIII of the Convention allows contracting governments to issue special permits authorizing the taking of whales for purposes of scientific research.
  • Japan’s lethal scientific research in the North Pacific and Southern Oceans under such special permits ended in 2019 with their withdrawal from the Convention.
• Subsistence Whaling:
  • The Commission also regulates aboriginal subsistence whaling (whaling by native people to sustain themselves).
  • Currently, the Commission permits indigenous communities in Denmark (Greenland), the Russian Federation, Vincent and the Grenadines, and the United States to engage in this type of whaling on certain whale stocks.

• Over the years, the IWC has faced significant
  • It does not have a way to force countries to follow its rules or punish
  • It often becomes a platform for member nations to negotiate over whaling quotas rather than prioritizing conservation efforts.
• In 2018, the IWC members made the "Florianópolis Declaration."
  • They decided that the IWC's main purpose is to protect whales forever.
  • They also want all whale populations to return to their numbers before large-scale whaling began.
  • The declaration also stated that using deadly methods for research is not needed.
  • After this, Japan announced on December 26, 2018, that it was leaving the IWC.

About Didymocarpus nautiyalii:

• It is a new plant species.
• It was discovered in Arunachal Pradesh’s Shi-Yomi district.
• It belongs to the Gesneriaceae, a family of flowering plants.
• The small herb grows on moist rock surfaces, including roadside walls and areas near waterfalls, in subtropical evergreen forests at elevations above 1,000 metres.
• It grows to only around 8 cm and has leathery leaves and distinctive bluish-purple flowers.
• The plant resembles Didymocarpus albiflorus but differs in several characteristics, including its much shorter stem, very short or absent leaf stalks, leathery leaf blades, smaller calyx, shorter bluish-purple corolla, and a hairless ovary.
• The researchers have currently assessed D. nautiyalii as ‘Data Deficient’ under the IUCN Red List criteria.