About Exercise Yudh Abhyas:

• It is the annual bilateral military exercise between the Indian Army and the United States Army.
• It focuses on enhancing interoperability, joint operational capabilities, and military cooperation between the two countries.
• 2026 Edition:
  • It is the 22nd edition of the exercise.
  • The first phase is scheduled at the Mahajan Field Firing Range in Rajasthan, near the Pakistan border.
  • The forces will then move to the high-altitude terrain of Auli in Uttarakhand, close to the Line of Actual Control with China.
  • It focuses on high-altitude warfare, long-range precision fires, counter-drone capabilities, and greater operational interoperability.
  • It features the deployment of Arctic-trained soldiers from the US Army’s 11th Airborne Division, based at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, to the high altitudes of India.
  • The exercise is bolstered by the participation of the 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force, introducing advanced long-range precision fires and integrated command-and-control systems to the bilateral framework.
  • The drills consist of a command post exercise and a field training exercise, culminating in a combined live-fire demonstration involving U.S. and Indian long-range precision fires and rocket systems.
  • Operating under the strategic framework of Operation Pathways, this year’s exercise marks a historic milestone with the first-of-its-kind deployment of advanced counterdrone systems to India.
  • The integration of the mobile low, slow, small unmanned aircraft integrated defeat system (MLIDS) allows both nations to adapt together to emerging battlefield threats and reinforce regional readiness.

Other Exercises between India and USA:

• Vajra Prahar: Indian Army Special Forces + U.S. Army Special Forces
• Cope India: Indian Air Force + U.S. Air Force
• Malabar: Indian Navy + U.S. Navy, Japan, and Australia
• Tiger Triumph: India–U.S. tri-service exercise with a focus including amphibious and HADR operations.

About UNESCO International Literacy Prize:

• It has been awarded since 1967.
• The Prizes aim to promote literacy as a foundation for lifelong learning, equity and sustainable development, especially in light of ongoing global challenges.
• Eligibility: Individuals, non-governmental organisations and government bodies involved in literacy promotion can apply when their programmes demonstrate measurable impact and align with that year’s theme.
  • International Literacy Day 2026 theme was “Literacy for people, the planet, and prosperity”.
• The prizes include six annual awards:
• UNESCO King Sejong Literacy Prize(3 awards)
  • It is supported by the Government of the Republic of Korea since 1989, the Prize highlights mother-tongue and multilingual literacy
  • Each laureate receives a medal, a diploma and US$ 30,000.
• UNESCO Confucius Prize for Literacy (3 awards):
  • It is supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China since 2005.
  • It recognizes programmes supporting functional literacy in rural areas and among out-of-school youth, particularly through technology.
  • Each laureate receives a medal, a diploma, and US$ 30,000.

About AlphaGenome Atlas:

• It is an extensive, high-resolution digital directory designed to predict how genetic alterations impact molecular biology.
• It is an AI-powered interactive resource, mapping the predicted impact of all 9 billion DNA variants.
• It works in a regular web browser, without any coding required, and is free for academic researchers.
• Capacity: It is a 1 petabyte (PB) dataset containing every single possible nucleotide variant alongside an AlphaGenome Variant Impact (AVI) score.
• It is available to researchers around the world, with coding and non-coding variations available.
• It provides several powerful, interconnected resources, allowing researchers to link variants directly to the functional DNA sequences they disrupt.
• Key Technical Features
  • Molecular effect predictions: Atlas contains thousands of molecular effect predictions for each variant, across multiple important aspects of gene regulation, spanning hundreds of human and mouse cell types and tissues.
  • AVI score: A single number describing the impact for each genetic variant.
  • AVI feature attributions: Each AVI score is also linked to distinct biological features driving it, such as the aspects of gene regulation predicted by AlphaGenome or the protein impact score from AlphaMissense.
  • DNA sequence motifs: A comprehensive collection of over 2,500 recurrent DNA sequences — the "words" of the genome — and their locations.

About Digital Bharat Nidhi:

• It was formerly known as the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF).
• It now operates under the Telecommunication Act, 2023.
• Mandate: It has mandate to support universal service through promoting access and delivery of telecommunication service in underserved rural, remote and urban areas.
• It is an attached office of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT), Ministry of Communications.
• Objectives of Digital Bharat Nidhi:
  • Support universal service through promoting access to and delivery of telecommunication services in underserved rural, remote and urban areas
  • Support research and development of telecommunication services, technologies, and products
  • Support pilot projects, consultancy assistance and advisory support towards provision of service under clause (a) above
  • Support introduction of telecommunication services, technologies, and products
• Funding: The contributions made by telecom companies towards the Digital Bharat Nidhi will first be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI).
• The balance to the credit of the DBN is not lapsed at the end of the financial year.
• Utilization of Funds: Funds collected under the DBN will be used to support promoting access to and delivery of telecommunication services in underserved rural, remote and urban areas; fund research and development of telecommunication services, technologies, and product.
• Administration: Administration of DBN is managed by the Administrator appointed by Central Government of India.
• The administrator selects “DBN implementers” through “bidding” or invitation of applications from eligible persons.

About Red-Naped Ibis:

• It is a common, resident, non-migratory wading bird.
• It is also known as the Indian black ibis or black ibis.
• Habitat: It is found in a variety of habitats, including lakes, marshes, riverbeds, and irrigated farmlands. It is often found in dry fields, away from water bodies.
• Distribution: It is widespread across the plains of the Indian Subcontinent.
• It is a common breeding resident in regions such as Haryana, Punjab, and the Gangetic plain, extending into southern India but absent from forested and arid zones.
• Behaviour: It is diurnal, active during the day, and often seen foraging in small groups.
• Diet: It is also an opportunistic omnivore, consuming insects, amphibians, reptiles, small fish, livestock carcasses and occasionally plant material.
• Threats: The species has declined greatly due to hunting and habitat loss. 
• Conservation Status:
  • IUCN Red List: Least Concern
  • Wild Life Protection Act 1972:Schedule-II.

About Bakhira Lake:

• Location: It is located in the Ghaghara–Rapti alluvial system.
• Formation: It represents a perennial oxbow/floodplain wetland formed through the migration and subsequent cut-off of the Rapti River.
• It is one of the largest wetlands in Uttar Pradesh.
• It was designated as a Ramsar Site in 2022.
• Its floodplain–lacustrine setting favours the accumulation and preservation of sediments derived from both the lake and surrounding catchment.
• It serves as a vital wintering and breeding ground for numerous migratory and resident waterfowl species.

Key Facts about Oxbow Lake

• Formation: It is formed when a meandering river cuts off a loop, leaving behind a crescent-shaped water body
• It is common in floodplains where rivers frequently change course
• It usually shallow and may dry up over time due to silt deposition
• It is rich in nutrients, making them suitable for agriculture and fishing nearby
• Example: Oxbow lakes along the Ganga River plains.

Why in news?

A recent media investigation has revealed that six Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs), all based in Gujarat, received donations of around Rs 1,700 crore in 2023-24. This is more than the combined donations of five nationally recognised parties, excluding the BJP, which received Rs 1,480 crore in the same period.

The revelation has raised serious concerns about opaque political funding and the misuse of tax exemptions by non-serious parties.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What Are Registered Political Parties?
• The Problem of "Letter Pad Parties"
• Why the Six Gujarat Parties Remain Active?
• Poor Compliance and Lack of Transparency
• Way Forward

What Are Registered Political Parties?

• Political parties are associations or bodies of individuals formed by citizens.
• Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act) lays down the requirements for registering a political party with the Election Commission (EC).
• After scrutiny of the documents submitted, the EC registers the party as RUPP.
• RUPPs enjoy three key benefits:
  • Tax exemption on donations received under Section 12 of the Income Tax Act, 2025.
  • A common symbol for contesting general elections to the Lok Sabha or State Assemblies.
  • Twenty "star campaigners" during election campaigns.
• In return, RUPPs must fulfil certain obligations:
  • Maintain details of individual donors contributing more than Rs 20,000 in a financial year and submit them to the EC annually.
  • Under Section 29C of the RP Act, failure to do so leads to loss of income tax exemption.
  • Accept donations above Rs 2,000 only through cheque or bank transfer, as required by the Income Tax Act, 2025.

The Problem of "Letter Pad Parties"

• As per the EC notification, India had more than 2,800 RUPPs as of July, but only around 750 contested the 2024 general elections.
• The rest have earned the moniker "letter pad parties", existing largely on paper.
• The core issue is the EC's limited power. The RP Act does not explicitly empower the EC to de-register a party that fails to contest elections, conduct inner-party elections or file required returns.
• In Indian National Congress vs Institute of Social Welfare & Ors (2002), the Supreme Court held that the EC cannot de-register a political party under the RP Act, except in exceptional circumstances:
  • Registration obtained by fraud.
  • The party ceasing to owe allegiance to the Constitution.
  • The party being declared unlawful by the government.
• The EC periodically publishes lists of de-listed RUPPs. The October 2025 notification contained over 800 such parties.

Why the Six Gujarat Parties Remain Active?

• The six parties named in the investigation are Aam Janmat Party, Bharatiya National Janata Dal, Garib Kalyan Party, New India United Party, Satyawadi Rakshak Party and Swatantrata Abhivyakti Party.
• All remain on the EC's active list as of October 2025 because they collectively fielded 15 candidates in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.
• Contesting a token number of seats allows them to retain their registration and tax benefits.

Poor Compliance and Lack of Transparency

• The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) periodically publishes reports on RUPP compliance.
• Its July 2025 report, analysing annual reports for 2022-23, found that reports of only 26 per cent of RUPPs were available in the public domain.
• Poor compliance with statutory requirements, combined with weak transparency, allows these parties to function as opaque channels for tax evasion and money laundering.

Way Forward

• Empower the EC to de-register parties. The Law Commission, in its 255th report, recommended amendments to allow de-registration of a party that fails to contest elections for ten consecutive years.
  • The EC, in its 2016 memorandum on electoral reforms, also sought powers to de-register parties.
  • These reforms would enable action against non-serious parties that serve merely as a front for illegal financial transactions.
• Strengthen enforcement. Even if de-registration powers are granted, parties may contest a few seats simply to meet the statutory requirement while continuing to misuse tax exemptions.
  • In today's digital environment, the Income Tax Department and other enforcement agencies can easily monitor the transactions of such parties.
  • Strict action against wrongdoing would act as a deterrent.
• Introduce a vote threshold for tax exemptions. The EC had earlier suggested that tax exemptions be given only to parties that win seats in the Lok Sabha or State Assemblies.
  • Analysts consider this undemocratic and extreme, since many parties contest elections consistently without winning.
  • Instead, they propose a vote percentage threshold, similar to the 1 per cent vote threshold used for allotting common symbols to RUPPs.
  • Only parties crossing this threshold should be eligible for tax exemptions on donations.

Conclusion

The RUPP framework was designed to nurture political participation, but weak statutory provisions and poor compliance have turned it into a loophole for opaque funding.

Empowering the EC to de-register non-serious parties, strengthening enforcement and linking tax exemptions to a reasonable vote threshold would restore integrity to political funding without stifling genuine small parties.

Why in news?

India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, as the grouping marks 20 years since its formalisation in 2006.

In this context, this article assesses what BRICS has achieved, the tensions within it, and how India can give it a practical developmental agenda instead of an anti-West posture.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• BRICS vs G7: The Numbers
• Evolution of BRICS
• India's Strategic Engagement
• Divergences: Anti-West Bloc or Economic Forum?
• Expansion and the Consensus Problem
• The Dollar Question
• Pakistan's Membership Bid

BRICS vs G7: The Numbers

• In 2000, Brazil, Russia, India and China together held roughly 23 per cent of global GDP (PPP), while the G7 held nearly 52 per cent.
• By 2024, the positions had reversed. The expanded 11-member BRICS accounted for about 36.8 per cent, while the G7's share fell below 29 per cent.
• Other key comparisons:
  • Population: BRICS ~3.7 billion (49.5 per cent of world); G7 ~771 million (10 per cent)
  • Nominal GDP: BRICS ~$28.5 trillion; G7 ~$46.6 trillion
  • Land area: BRICS ~39.7 million sq km; G7 ~21.7 million sq km
  • Oil production: BRICS ~43.6 per cent of global output
  • Natural gas: BRICS ~36 per cent of global production
  • Rare-earth reserves: BRICS ~72 per cent of global reserves
  • Agriculture: BRICS produces 42 per cent of world wheat, 52 per cent of rice, 46 per cent of soybeans
  • Growth: BRICS projected at 3.8 per cent in 2025 and 3.7 per cent in 2026, over three times the G7 average
• BRICS accounts for roughly a quarter of global trade.
  • Intra-BRICS merchandise trade reached $1.17 trillion in 2024, a 13-fold rise from $84 billion two decades ago.
  • The bloc holds $5.2 trillion in foreign reserves and produces 78.2 per cent of global mineral coal.
• However, per capita GDP tells a different story: the G7 averages around $53,000 while BRICS averages roughly $8,200.
• The bloc's weight comes from population and resource scale, not individual prosperity.

Evolution of BRICS

• BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) began in 2006, following a Goldman Sachs projection identifying these economies as future growth engines.
• It evolved from a foreign ministers' dialogue into a leaders' forum. The first summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.
• South Africa joined in 2010.
• In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were added.
• Indonesia became the 11th member in January 2025.
• BRICS has grown from an economic grouping into a geopolitical entity presenting itself as the voice of the Global South.
• Yet its central grievance remains unchanged: global institutions have not kept pace with the shift in economic and political power.

India's Strategic Engagement

• India's participation reflects multi-alignment underpinned by strategic autonomy. New Delhi engages simultaneously with BRICS, the G20, the Quad and the SCO without alliance commitments.
• For India, multi-alignment is about creating room for manoeuvre, not choosing between power centres.
• India's institutional contribution is significant. At the 2012 New Delhi summit, India proposed a BRICS development bank, which became the New Development Bank (NDB).
  • By mid-2026, the NDB had approved about $44 billion across 141 projects.

Divergences: Anti-West Bloc or Economic Forum?

• The most fundamental tension is over purpose. China and Russia position BRICS as a counterweight to Western dominance and the dollar.
• Beijing has driven expansion to project leadership of the Global South. Moscow, excluded from SWIFT and under sanctions, sees BRICS as an economic lifeline.
• India and Brazil view BRICS as an economic and reform-oriented grouping. India does not share the enthusiasm for confronting the West.
• Two episodes illustrate this:
  • In 2023, Russia demanded payment for oil in yuan. India refused, insisting on dollars or rupees.
  • In February 2026, India signed a framework trade agreement with the US, reportedly agreeing to halt Russian oil purchases in exchange for reduced tariffs, prioritising national interest over bloc solidarity.

Expansion and the Consensus Problem

• Expansion has introduced sharp contradictions. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi in May 2026, members failed to agree on a joint declaration because of a direct confrontation between Iran and the UAE, who are on opposite sides of an active conflict.
• India, as host, issued a chair's statement noting "differing views" on West Asia. Since BRICS works on consensus, expansion has made agreement on geopolitical crises far harder.

The Dollar Question

• US President Donald Trump has threatened 100 per cent tariffs on BRICS nations if they create a new currency. This has largely shelved the idea of a single BRICS currency.
• Members have instead moved towards bilateral settlement in national currencies:
  • Russia and China settle over 90 per cent of trade in ruble and yuan.
  • Russia and India have moved about 90 per cent of direct payments to national currencies through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts authorised by the RBI.
  • India and the UAE have run a rupee-dirham system since July 2023.
  • India and Indonesia operationalised a rupee-rupiah framework in July 2026, with local-currency trade rising 163 per cent to $8.45 billion in the first two months of 2026.
• The BRICS Pay system, to be unveiled at the New Delhi summit, will link Russia's SPFS, China's CIPS, India's UPI and Brazil's Pix, allowing settlement without dollar correspondent banks.
• India favours interoperable central bank digital currencies over a supranational currency, reflecting its UPI experience.
• Yet the dollar still holds 57.13 per cent of global central bank reserves (Q1 2026), and no BRICS member is building rupee, yuan or rand reserves at scale.

Pakistan's Membership Bid

• Pakistan applied for membership in November 2023, but its bid remains contentious due to recurring balance-of-payments crises, IMF dependence, its record on terrorism, political instability and weak policy continuity.
• Its dependence on China could increase Beijing's influence, and it has limited capacity to contribute to the BRICS agenda.

Conclusion

The Iran-Israel-US conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war will test India's ability to secure a joint declaration. Visits by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin offer scope for high-level consultations.

Beyond geopolitics, the summit will focus on resilient supply chains, reform of global financial institutions, strengthening the NDB and expanding intra-BRICS trade.

Over the next decade, India can preserve the reform agenda while adding digital public infrastructure, climate finance, health cooperation, critical minerals, local-currency payments and inclusive connectivity.

Context:

• At the Southern Zonal Council meeting, held recently in Mamallapuram, Union Home Minister Amit Shah stressed the need for early resolution of water disputes in the southern region.
• He also spoke of linking major rivers from the Brahmaputra to the Godavari and the Cauvery, claiming this could ensure India faces no water shortage for 100 years.
• In this context, this article argues that while the intent appears well-meaning, resolving water issues is far harder than it sounds, and river-linking is not the solution.

The Pennaiyar Dispute: A Case of Delay

• The Centre's handling of Tamil Nadu's demand for a tribunal on the Pennaiyar river dispute shows how slow the process can be:
  • Tamil Nadu alleged that Karnataka violated the 1892 inter-State agreement.
  • In November 2019, it requested the Centre to constitute a tribunal and also moved the Supreme Court.
  • Since then, two negotiation committees have been formed and 11 meetings held, without result.
  • In February this year, the Supreme Court directed the Centre to form the tribunal within a month. The deadline was later extended by six months.
  • The tribunal is still not in place.
• Instead of constituting a new tribunal, the Centre asked the court whether the Pennaiyar dispute could be referred to the Mahadayi Water Dispute Tribunal.
• Critics call this illogical, as the two disputes have nothing in common. The Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956 also does not permit such a transfer.
• Similarly, the Centre has not yet replied to Tamil Nadu's March 2026 demand for a tribunal on the Mekedatu dam project proposed by Karnataka.

Why River-Linking Is Problematic?

• If routine disputes take years to resolve, the complications of inter-linking rivers would be far greater.
• Proponents, including Tamil Nadu, argue that river-linking would not disturb natural flows but only divert surplus water. Many experts are not convinced, for several reasons:
  • Once linking is allowed, beneficiary regions may demand water even during distress periods, eventually depriving original beneficiaries of their share.
  • There are serious concerns about adverse ecological consequences.
  • Kerala has strongly opposed the Pamba-Achankovil-Vaippar link, warning that it would harm the Vembanad wetland system, into which the Pamba and Achankovil rivers drain.
• The National Water Development Agency counters that it has accounted for improving river flows during lean periods.

India's Limited Experience with Inter-Basin Transfers

• In the last 130-odd years, India has seen only a handful of inter-basin transfer projects, mostly in south India.
• The successful examples include:
  • Mullaperiyar dam
  • Parambikulam-Aliyar project
  • Krishna Water Supply Project
  • Indira Gandhi Canal Project
• After 2014, the Union government formed a Special Committee for Interlinking of Rivers, which has held over two dozen meetings. Yet there has been little progress.
• In 2024, PM Modi laid the foundation stone for the Rs 44,000 crore Ken-Betwa Link Project. This has already led to agitations by tribal populations in Chhatarpur.

The Case for Demand-Side Management

• Many experts argue that governments at the Centre and in the States, along with civil society, should shift focus from supply-side interventions to demand-side management.
• The reasons are practical:
  • Land is increasingly scarce.
  • Public resistance to land acquisition is growing.
  • The era of mega irrigation projects is almost over.
• The priority must be conserving available water and using it judiciously. Specific measures suggested include:
  • A massive programme to sensitise and incentivise farmers on optimal water use.
  • Immediate curbs on indiscriminate groundwater extraction, which is encouraged by free electricity schemes for agriculture in many States and is leading to ecological disaster.
• Unless water conservation becomes a shared commitment of all stakeholders, disputes will remain the norm.

Conclusion

• River-linking promises a supply-side fix but ignores ecological risks, federal tensions and the Centre's own poor record in resolving existing disputes.
• With land scarce and mega projects facing resistance, India must prioritise conservation, efficient irrigation and groundwater regulation.
• Demand-side management, not grand engineering, offers the sustainable path to water security.