Why in news?

Israelis voted on October 27, 2026, in the first election since the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks and the subsequent wars in Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Pre-election polling showed PM Benjamin Netanyahu locked in a tight race with Gadi Eisenkot, a former Israel Defense Forces chief. With no bloc projected to win a clear majority, the outcome may remain unresolved for weeks or months — a familiar pattern in Israeli politics.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Electoral System
• What Is a “List” in Israeli Elections?
• The Electoral Threshold: Why It Matters?
• How the Knesset Voting System Works?
• How Results and Government Formation Unfold?

The Electoral System

• Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional representation system — voters elect party lists, not individual constituency representatives.
• The country has a unicameral (single-house) parliament with 120 members, elected nationally every four years.
• Three main branches of power:
  • Legislature (Knesset).
  • Executive (PM holds executive power).
  • Judiciary (headed by the Supreme Court, interprets Basic Laws and reviews legislation).
• The government depends on the Knesset’s confidence and must maintain a working majority (at least 61 seats) to govern.
• National elections are administered and overseen by the CEC (Central Elections Committee).

What Is a “List” in Israeli Elections?

• A list is a slate of candidates prepared for the elections, sponsored by a single party or a group of parties.
• Any registered party or list may contest elections.
• Under Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset, the CEC or the Supreme Court may disqualify a political party or candidate if their platform/actions involve:
  • Denial of Israel’s existence as a Jewish and democratic state.
  • Incitement to racism.
  • Support for armed struggle against an enemy state or terrorist organisation.

The Electoral Threshold: Why It Matters

• Israel’s party-list proportional representation system sets an electoral threshold — the minimum percentage of the national vote a party must win to enter parliament.
• Current threshold: 3.25% — standardised and established by Knesset legislation in 2014.
• Purpose: Balances representation with political stability by preventing extreme parliamentary fragmentation.
• Strategic consequence: A high threshold incentivises ideologically close factions to merge into joint lists before elections — significantly shaping coalition arithmetic later.
• Parties that fail to cross the threshold have all votes cast for them declared “wasted” — these are reallocated among parties that succeeded.

How the Knesset Voting System Works?

• The Knesset (Israeli parliament) has 120 seats; a government needs 61 seats for a majority.
• Israel uses proportional representation — parties win seats in line with their vote share.
• Consequence: Every Israeli government has historically been a multi-party coalition, since no single party has ever won an outright majority alone.
• If no bloc reaches 61 seats:
  • A minority government becomes possible.
  • If that also fails, fresh elections are called.
  • Netanyahu would remain interim PM until a new government forms.

How Results and Government Formation Unfold?

• Exit polls: Published at 10pm local time on election day — but these can diverge significantly from final results.
• Preliminary results: Expected the next day; official results due November 4, 2026.
• Government Formation Process:
  • President Isaac Herzog consults party leaders and invites the one he believes has the best chance of forming a government.
  • This process can take over a month.
  • If that leader fails, Herzog may try another leader.
  • If that also fails, Knesset members can request a third attempt.
  • If all efforts fail, new elections are called.
• Israel held five elections between 2019 and 2022 due to repeated coalition-formation failures — underscoring the chronic political instability inherent in its proportional system.

Why in news?

In India, two people convicted of the same crime can receive vastly different sentences — and the difference often depends less on the law than on which judge heard the case.

Sentencing is where the State converts prescriptive ranges (like “up to ten years”) into actual punishment, yet this crucial decision is left almost entirely to individual judicial discretion, with no structured guidelines on what counts as a serious aggravating factor or genuine mitigation.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The Problem: Unequal Sentences, Unequal Justice
• Judicial and Legislative Acknowledgment
• Existing Alternatives Go Underused
• The English Model: Structuring Discretion, Not Eliminating It
• What an Indian Sentencing Council Could Do?
• Potential Pitfalls

The Problem: Unequal Sentences, Unequal Justice

• Statutes typically set only maximum (and sometimes minimum) sentences — with no checklist for weighing aggravating/mitigating factors, prior conduct, or remorse.
• Analysts contend that the courts have reduced sentences based on legally irrelevant, retrograde factors — like a complainant’s supposed “chastity” or her subsequent marriage — while ignoring psychological harm or breach of trust.
• This isn’t limited to sexual offences — it’s a deep-seated architectural problem in criminal justice.
• Constitutional Stakes: Articles 14 and 21 prohibit arbitrary State action and demand fair, just, reasonable procedures whenever liberty is restricted.
• When similarly placed offenders get wildly different sentences — say, because one judge treats poverty as mitigating and another doesn’t — this is hard to reconcile with equality before the law.

Judicial and Legislative Acknowledgment

• Supreme Court, Sunita Devi vs State of Bihar (2024): Held that “sentencing shall not be a mere lottery” and directed the Centre to examine a national sentencing policy, potentially via a Sentencing Commission.
• The Centre has tasked the Law Commission of India with examining the issue; recommendations are expected soon.
• Notably, the Law Commission first flagged this concern over 50 years ago in its 47th Report (1969) — yet Parliament has never designed a coherent framework. Framing sentencing policy is a legislative task, with implementation falling to the executive.

Existing Alternatives Go Underused

• India already has statutory alternatives to custody:
  • Sections 401 and 402, BNSS (Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita).
    • Section 401 (earlier Sections 360 of CrPC): Order to Release on Probation of Good Conduct or After Admonition
    • Section 402 (earlier Sections 361 of CrPC):
    • Special Reasons to be Recorded in Certain Cases
  • Sections 3, 4, and 6, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 — requiring courts to consider probation in eligible cases.
• Problem: No general framework explains how to balance these alternatives against competing sentencing aims — deterrence, reformation, rehabilitation.
• Soman vs State of Kerala (2012): The Supreme Court recognised these competing principles but noted sentencing remains one of the weakest parts of criminal justice administration.
• Consequently, appellate courts are repeatedly tasked with correcting harsh or lenient sentences case-by-case, without a common yardstick — consuming significant judicial time.
• Section 258(2), BNSS: Requires a Sessions Judge to hear the convicted person separately on sentence — an opportunity to gather material on mitigating/aggravating circumstances that currently lacks structured guidance.

The English Model: Structuring Discretion, Not Eliminating It

• England and Wales created a Sentencing Council under the Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, backed by a consolidated Sentencing Code.
• Step-by-Step Method
  • Classify the offence by culpability (blameworthiness) and harm caused.
  • Each culpability-harm combination gets a starting point and category range (a sentencing band).
  • Judges then adjust for aggravating/mitigating factors, guilty-plea reductions, multiple offences, and ancillary orders.
• The goal isn’t identical punishments for superficially similar crimes — it’s uniform principles that structure (not replace) judicial discretion.

What an Indian Sentencing Council Could Do?

• A Council created by Act of Parliament could perform three core functions:
  • Develop offence-specific guidelines using a three-stage framework:
    • Assess seriousness via culpability and harm (planning, violence, weapon use, victim vulnerability, demonstrable harm).
    • Set an indicative starting point and range within the statutory envelope.
    • Individualise and justify the sentence using recognised purposes like rehabilitation.
  • Build a national sentencing database, using the National Judicial Data Grid’s infrastructure — anonymised data on offence type, harm/culpability factors, starting points, adjustments, and final sentences — enabling Parliament, courts, and the public to identify disparities.
  • Issue guidelines as delegated legislation, placed before Parliament for approval — advisory but strongly presumptive.
    • Courts must consider them in every case and give reasons when departing, preserving judicial independence while making discretion accountable.

Potential Pitfalls

• Penal populism (especially around sexual offences) could push guidelines toward ever-longer sentences without evidence of deterrence.
• Excessive centralisation risks ignoring state-level differences in court capacity and prison conditions — significant since prisons fall under the State List while criminal law is in the Concurrent List.
• Mechanical compliance risk: Judges might simply “tick guideline checklists” without genuinely changing their reasoning.
• These risks can only be managed if the Council is independent and empirically grounded.

Conclusion

India’s criminal justice debate has long focused on its “front end” — policing, speedy trials, victims’ rights — while neglecting the equally critical “back end” question: once convicted, how should punishment actually be decided? As the Supreme Court itself has warned, sentencing today functions as a lottery, shaped more by judicial temperament than by principled, consistent reasoning.

A Sentencing Council — modelled on England’s approach but adapted for India’s federal and evidentiary realities — offers a path to structure discretion without eliminating it, ensuring accountability without compromising judicial independence.

The real test will be whether such a body, once recommended, finally receives the legislative attention that successive Law Commissions have sought for over five decades.

Why in the News?

• Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Emerging Science, Technology and Innovation Conclave (ESTIC) 2026 at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, emphasising measurable research outcomes, indigenous technologies and the contribution of science to India’s development.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• ESTI Conclave (Objective, Transition Towards Scientific Leadership, Research Funding & Innovation Ecosystem, AI, Nuclear Energy, etc.)

Emerging Science, Technology and Innovation Conclave

• The Emerging Science, Technology and Innovation Conclave (ESTIC) 2026 brought together scientists, Nobel laureates, industry leaders, startup founders and young researchers to discuss India’s scientific and technological priorities.
• The central objective highlighted at the conclave was to move beyond discussions and establish measurable targets for innovation.
• Researchers and entrepreneurs were encouraged to identify technologies, prototypes, pilot projects or products they could develop over the next three years in support of Viksit Bharat.
• India’s scientific ambitions are increasingly focused on developing indigenous capabilities, creating globally competitive technologies and addressing domestic and international challenges.

India’s Transition Towards Scientific Leadership

• India’s scientific and technological trajectory has evolved from adopting innovations developed elsewhere towards building domestic research capabilities and contributing to global technological development.
• Examples highlighted at the conclave included:
  • Space technology: Chandrayaan’s landing near the lunar south pole, the success of Mangalyaan and advances in satellite docking.
  • Healthcare: Vaccines developed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Semiconductors and AI: Domestically developed AI models and Indian-made chips reaching international markets.
  • Nuclear energy: Progress in indigenous fast breeder reactor technology.
  • Battery technology: Research into batteries using Indian raw materials.
• These developments illustrate the growing range of India's technological ambitions.
• Sustaining this progress requires investment in research, skilled human resources, industrial capacity and commercialisation.

Research Funding and Innovation Ecosystem

• A country's technological capabilities depend substantially on the strength of its research ecosystem and its ability to translate scientific discoveries into commercially viable products.
• Anusandhan National Research Foundation
  • The Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) is intended to strengthen research and innovation in India.
  • The emphasis at ESTIC 2026 was on accelerating its work and expanding the country's research capabilities.
  • The conclave also highlighted a commitment of Rs. 1 lakh crore towards research and innovation through the Research Development and Innovation Fund.
• Bridging the Laboratory-to-Market Gap
  • The Prime Minister referred to approximately Rs. 12,000 crore committed towards technologies ready to transition from laboratories to the market.
  • Private-sector participation was described as matching the government's contribution, taking the total commitment to approximately Rs. 24,000 crore.
  • This approach seeks to address a major challenge in innovation policy: translating scientific research into practical applications, industrial products and economic value.
  • The number of patent applications filed in India was also cited as having increased from approximately 50,000 to 1.5 lakh, reflecting the expansion of the country's innovation ecosystem.

Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Judgement

• Artificial intelligence can accelerate routine tasks, improve productivity and assist researchers in analysing complex problems.
• However, its growing role also raises questions about scientific independence and the reliability of AI-generated results.
• The discussion at ESTIC 2026 emphasised that AI should support, rather than constrain, independent scientific thinking. Researchers must continue to question established assumptions, examine problems from new perspectives and ensure that AI-assisted findings meet appropriate standards of accuracy.
• The challenge is to integrate AI into scientific research without compromising critical thinking, verification and intellectual independence.

Nuclear Energy and Indigenous Technology

• India's growing energy requirements make nuclear power an important component of its long-term energy strategy.
• The conclave highlighted the 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), which had reached first criticality.
• This milestone represents an important stage in reactor development and supports India's efforts to strengthen indigenous nuclear technology.
• The discussion also emphasised the significance of domestic technological capabilities in nuclear energy, semiconductors, space exploration and advanced batteries.

Making Science Relevant to Society

• A key principle emerging from the conclave was that scientific progress should be assessed by its practical contribution to society, not merely by its technical sophistication. Priority areas identified included:

• Healthcare: Developing technologies that improve health outcomes.
• Agriculture: Creating solutions that address agricultural challenges.
• Education and employment: Expanding opportunities through innovation.
• Disaster mitigation: Applying science and technology to reduce disaster risks.

• The emphasis on real-world applications highlights the importance of collaboration between research institutions, startups, industry and government.

Context:

• Seven years after the government tasked the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with restructuring military commands and establishing theatre commands, India remains caught in inter-service disagreements.
• The Army seeks assured air support, the Air Force fears fragmentation of scarce air assets, while the Navy worries that a predominantly continental outlook may undermine maritime priorities.
• While these concerns deserve consideration, prolonged disagreement is increasingly difficult to justify given the changing nature of warfare and India's complex security environment.

Why the Status Quo is Unsustainable?

• India currently has 17 geographically dispersed, single-service commands, each reporting to its respective Service Headquarters.
• Their areas of responsibility do not necessarily correspond with those of the other services.
• In a modern conflict involving the western or northern borders or the maritime domain, operations could simultaneously cross several command boundaries.
• Lack of coordination among multiple commands can cause delays at a time when AI-enabled, algorithmic and network-centric warfare demands rapid decision-making.
• Theatre commands seek to overcome this fragmentation by placing the forces required for a particular geographical or operational theatre under a single theatre commander, with adequate operational authority.
• Theatreisation is not merely administrative restructuring; it is intended to achieve jointness, integrated planning, faster decision-making and coordinated application of military power.

The Air Power Debate:

• The strongest resistance has centred on the Air Force's doctrine of “centralised control and decentralised execution.”
• Critics argue that assigning aircraft to different theatre commanders could fragment India's already limited air assets.
• However, theatreisation need not require physically distributing squadrons among theatres, and
  • Air assets can remain at their existing bases.
  • Centralised control over air power can be retained.
  • Operational tasking can be decentralised according to theatre requirements.
  • A senior IAF Component Commander can advise the theatre commander on the employment of air power.
• Thus, the real issue is not the doctrine itself but who exercises operational control over air assets.

Lessons from the US - Managing Inter-Service Rivalry:

• The US experience demonstrates that service rivalry cannot simply be wished away; it requires political arbitration and negotiated allocation of roles and missions.
• Key West Agreement, 1948:
  • Following the creation of an independent US Air Force, intense disputes emerged among the Army, Navy and Air Force over operational responsibilities.
  • Then Defence Secretary (James Forrestal) brought the Joint Chiefs together at Key West and compelled them to negotiate their respective roles.
  • The broad settlement was -
    • Air Force: Primary responsibility for strategic air warfare.
    • Navy: Carrier aviation.
    • Marine Corps: Its amphibious and expeditionary role.
    • Army: Land combat.
  • The agreement established an important principle: military roles and missions should be settled through negotiation under civilian political authority.
• 1966 Army-Air Force Agreement:
  • Another dispute arose over fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters during the Vietnam era.
  • The Army and Air Force negotiated a redistribution of responsibilities, with the Army giving up most fixed-wing aircraft in exchange for greater responsibility for combat helicopters.
• Lesson for India: Inter-service disagreements can be resolved through institutionalised negotiation, political oversight and clearly defined responsibilities.

Modern Warfare is Changing:

• India cannot simply copy foreign models, but neither can it ignore contemporary conflicts.
• For example, Ukraine has demonstrated how missiles, drones and other asymmetric capabilities can challenge conventional naval power; Ukrainian attacks severely damaged Russia's Black Sea Fleet.
• Similarly, Iran's use of missiles and drones illustrates how long-range and unmanned systems can compensate, to some extent, for limitations in conventional air power.
• These developments underline the growing importance of multi-domain operations, unmanned systems, precision weapons, networked warfare and integrated command structures.
• The emerging model of warfare increasingly blurs the boundaries between land, sea, air, space and cyber domains, making inter-service integration a strategic necessity rather than merely an organisational preference.

Britain - Innovation in Military Leadership:

• The UK provides another useful lesson in institutional flexibility. For example, Sir Richard Knighton, an aeronautical engineer and the first non-pilot to head the Royal Air Force, later became Chief of the Defence Staff.
• Such appointments demonstrate an institutional willingness to move beyond traditional service conventions when strategic circumstances demand it.
• India's prolonged seven-year debate, by contrast, reflects the difficulty of overcoming entrenched service identities and organisational interests.

Way Forward for India:

• Though the US itself took decades to achieve deeper jointness, India faces a security environment that does not permit indefinite experimentation or delay.
• Therefore, it needs -
  • Bold and reform-oriented Service Chiefs willing to challenge entrenched organisational practices.
  • A strong CDS capable of acting as an honest broker among the three services.
  • Civilian political oversight to resolve disputes over roles, resources and operational control.
  • A clearly articulated National Security Strategy (NSS) to provide strategic direction.
  • Greater emphasis on joint planning, interoperability, integrated logistics and tri-service training.
  • Theatre structures tailored to India's geography, threat perception and force availability, rather than mechanically replicating foreign models.

Conclusion:

• Theatreisation is ultimately a test of India's ability to move from service-centric thinking to jointness.
• Inter-service concerns must be negotiated rather than allowed to become an indefinite veto over reform.
• India's next security crisis will not wait for organisational disagreements to be settled; therefore, a workable theatre-command structure must be established before-not after-the next crisis.

Context

• The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek (August 31–September 1, 2026) and the BRICS summit in New Delhi (September 12–13, 2026) marked significant developments in Indian foreign policy.
• India endorsed declarations supporting Iran and Prime Minister Narendra Modi appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine.
• It revealed the growing challenges of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment amid intensifying geopolitical rivalries.

The Strategic Significance of SCO and BRICS

• The SCO and BRICS provide platforms for cooperation among Russia, India, China, and other emerging powers.
• Russia uses them to demonstrate that it is not internationally isolated, while China seeks to expand its geopolitical influence and challenge Western dominance.
• India participates in these organisations while maintaining relations with Western forums such as the G-7.
• This approach enables New Delhi to protect its national interests without aligning exclusively with any major power.

A Surprise Pivot

• At Bishkek, India endorsed a declaration condemning attacks on Iran, reaffirming its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mourning the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in U.S.-Israeli air strikes.
• This represented a departure from India’s traditional reluctance to directly criticise Washington and Tel Aviv.
• India also supported strong statements affirming Palestinian rights and the two-state solution, despite maintaining close relations with Israel.
• Meanwhile PM Modi publicly urged Mr. Putin to end Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine.
• India’s position may have been influenced by its desire to secure the participation of Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit.
• Following Operation Sindoor (2025), India faced concerns about diplomatic marginalisation, while Pakistan gained prominence through its mediation role in the Iran conflict.
• A successful BRICS summit was therefore important for restoring India’s international standing.

Contradictory shifts

• India’s support for Iran did not signify a complete break with Washington.
• Mr. Modi’s public appeal to Putin demonstrated concern about the Ukraine conflict and reassured Western governments of India’s continuing engagement with their position.
• Consequently, India supported declarations accommodating Russian interests while publicly urging Moscow to end the war.
• These contrasting approaches expose the difficulties of multi-alignment.
• India seeks to maintain relations with Israel while opposing attacks on Iran, purchase Russian oil while strengthening Western partnerships, and participate in BRICS without appearing anti-American.
• Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi met on the side-lines of the New Delhi summit, although they had not held bilateral talks in Bishkek.
• Neither summit declaration mentioned Ukraine, allowing the organisations to avoid directly criticising Moscow.

The Problem of Selective Diplomacy

• At the 2022 SCO summit in Samarkand, PM Modi told Putin that today’s era is not an era of war.
• India subsequently used this statement to explain that purchasing discounted Russian oil did not imply support for Russia’s invasion.
• However, India has not issued comparable public admonitions to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over military campaigns across West Asia or to U.S. President Donald Trump following American attacks on Iran.
• India’s own military action against Pakistan during Operation Sindoor also complicates its opposition to warfare. Such selective diplomacy may undermine India’s credibility.
• Moscow could interpret Mr. Modi’s statements as performative gestures intended to reassure the West rather than expressions of consistently applied principles.

Where Ties with Russia Stand?

• Russia remains important to India for energy security, defence cooperation, and military supplies.
• However, India has diversified its defence procurement by increasingly turning to France, Israel, and the United States, reducing its dependence on Russian arms.
• Meanwhile, Russia is strengthening its partnership with China.
• Although India and Russia continue to share strategic interests, their relationship is becoming increasingly transactional, shaped by immediate economic and geopolitical considerations.
• India must therefore balance closer Western engagement with the need to preserve its longstanding relationship with Moscow.
• Excessive criticism could weaken mutual trust, while continued dependence on Russian supplies could constrain India’s strategic flexibility.

Conclusion

• The 2026 SCO and BRICS summits demonstrated both the opportunities and limitations of India’s multi-alignment strategy.
• India’s positions on Iran and Ukraine reflect its efforts to preserve diplomatic flexibility, but inconsistent responses to international conflicts risk undermining its credibility.
• India must reconcile strategic autonomy with diplomatic consistency, diversify its partnerships, and protect its national interests without becoming dependent on any single power.
• Its global influence will ultimately depend on strategic clarity, credible diplomacy, and principled decision-making in an increasingly fragmented international order.

Context

• The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has warned that the world could cross the 1.5°C global warming threshold within the next few years, increasing pressure for faster decarbonisation.
• India must balance economic growth with climate commitments, but its unfinished infrastructure development offers an opportunity to adopt low-carbon growth from the beginning.
• According to NITI Aayog, 86% of India’s building stock in 2070 is yet to be constructed. Total floor space is projected to rise from 18 billion square metres in 2020 to 42 billion by 2070.
• Steel capacity is targeted to reach 300 million tonnes by 2030–31, while cement production could increase to 660 million tonnes by 2030.
• These projections demonstrate the need to integrate sustainability into infrastructure planning to prevent long-term environmental damage.

The Advantage of Choice

• India’s Infrastructure Opportunity
  • India’s infrastructure deficit is often considered an obstacle to decarbonisation because demand for steel, cement and electricity will continue to grow.
  • However, much of its future infrastructure remains a choice rather than an inheritance.
  • India can incorporate energy efficiency and cleaner technologies into new investments, avoiding costly retrofits and stranded assets.
  • The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that approximately 80% of the building stock advanced economies will use in 2050 already exists.
  • In the European Union, 85% of buildings predate 2000, around three-quarters perform poorly in energy efficiency, and only about 1% are renovated annually.
• Strengthening Building Regulations
  • India can avoid similar problems by adopting sustainable building designs from the outset.
  • The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) reports that 27 States have notified the Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC) 2017, but only 21 have legally incorporated it.
  • The Energy Conservation and Sustainable Building Code (ECSBC) 2024 and Eco-Niwas Samhita (ENS) 2024 provide updated standards for commercial and residential buildings.
  • States should integrate these codes into building permits, occupancy certificates and grid connections, making compliance enforceable rather than voluntary.

The Issue in the Power Sector

• Expanding Transmission and Storage
  • India has expanded renewable-energy generation rapidly, but transmission infrastructure has not kept pace.
  • The IEA estimates that transmission bottlenecks have constrained approximately 60 GW of renewable capacity.
  • Meanwhile, the Ministry of Power plans around 590 GW of generation additions between 2023 and 2032.
  • Without adequate transmission and storage, renewable electricity may not reach consumption centres reliably.
  • Electrification of transport, cooling and industry will further increase demand.
  • Therefore, transmission networks and energy storage must be developed alongside, or sometimes ahead of, new generation capacity.
• Decarbonising Steel and Cement
  • Decarbonising steel and cement is more difficult because technologies such as hydrogen-based green steel and large-scale carbon capture remain economically or technologically challenging.
  • Premature technology mandates could increase costs and lock industries into inefficient processes.
• Using Public Procurement to Encourage Green Industry
  • Instead, public procurement can create demand for low-emission materials.
  • Government agencies, Indian Railways and the National Highways Authority of India purchase substantial quantities of steel and cement, giving them considerable influence over industrial practices.
  • India’s green-steel taxonomy and proposed aggregated procurement through competitive bidding offer a practical approach.
  • Tenders can establish emissions-intensity thresholds without prescribing production methods.
  • Competition would encourage innovation, reveal the additional cost of greener materials and allow standards to become progressively stricter.
  • Aligning these thresholds with the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) would ensure consistent policy incentives and encourage industrial decarbonisation.

Costs and Risks

• Addressing High Financing Costs
  • The IEA estimates that India’s cost of capital for grid-scale renewable projects is about 80% higher than in advanced economies.
  • High upfront costs and expensive borrowing can make otherwise viable clean-energy projects unattractive.
  • Targeted support through payment-security mechanisms, partial credit guarantees and concessional debt can reduce financing and payment risks, encouraging private investment.
• Balancing Public Support and Financial Risks
  • Public finance must be used carefully. Subsidising unproven technologies could transfer commercial risks to taxpayers.
  • Governments should distinguish between mature technologies requiring financial support and emerging technologies that still face significant technical and economic uncertainty.
  • A balanced financing strategy can promote clean infrastructure while protecting public resources and maintaining financial discipline.

Conclusion

• India must invest heavily to build its future economy, but the environmental consequences will depend on the choices made today.
• Efficient infrastructure, renewable energy and sustainable construction should be prioritised wherever technologies are mature.
• By making informed investment decisions today, the country can reduce future costs, strengthen energy security, limit emissions and achieve sustainable economic growth.