Why in the News?

• Supreme Court Judge Ujjal Bhuyan’s recent remarks on voter deletions and the right to vote have revived debate over the limits of judicial speech, judicial propriety and comments on matters pending before courts.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Judicial Restraint (Meaning, Importance, Debate On Recent Remarks, Constitutional Principles, Comparative Standards, etc.)

Meaning and Importance of Judicial Restraint

• Judicial restraint refers to the exercise of caution by judges in interpreting laws, reviewing the actions of other branches of government and making public statements that may affect judicial proceedings.
• It does not require judges to remain silent on every public issue. Rather, it seeks to preserve judicial independence, impartiality and public confidence in the administration of justice.
• Judges occupy a unique constitutional position: they must protect fundamental rights and examine governmental actions while ensuring that their conduct does not create an impression of political alignment or prejudgment.
• Judicial restraint is therefore important in maintaining the balance between judicial accountability, freedom of expression and the impartial administration of justice.

The Debate over Justice Ujjal Bhuyan’s Remarks

• Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, speaking at a moot court competition at NALSAR University of Law, stated that the right to vote is constitutional and integral to the basic structure of the Constitution.
• He argued that a process disenfranchising millions would be arbitrary and violate Articles 14 and 326.
• He also emphasised that voters should receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before their names are deleted, except in cases of death.
• His remarks came while litigation concerning the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in West Bengal remained pending before the Supreme Court.
• Former Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai and other retired judges questioned whether commenting on an ongoing controversy was consistent with judicial propriety.

Indian Standards of Judicial Conduct

• The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, adopted by the Supreme Court's Full Court in May 1997, establishes ethical expectations for judges.
• Clause 8 states that judges should not enter public debate or express views on political matters or matters pending, or likely to arise, for judicial determination. Clause 1 requires judicial conduct that sustains public confidence in impartiality.
• Although the Restatement does not prescribe a separate sanction of its own, it has been referred to in judicial decisions and remains an important ethical framework.
• The central concern is not whether judges can discuss constitutional law, but whether a public statement could reasonably create an impression that a judge has prejudged a dispute that may come before them.

Constitutional Principles Governing the Right to Vote

• The controversy also highlights the constitutional and statutory framework governing electoral participation.

• Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, prohibiting arbitrary State action.
• Article 326: Provides for elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies on the basis of adult suffrage, subject to constitutional and statutory qualifications.
• Articles 325 and 326: Support an inclusive electoral framework by prohibiting specified forms of exclusion and establishing adult suffrage.
• Representation of the People Act, 1950: Provides the statutory framework for preparing and revising electoral rolls.
• Rule 21A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960: Provides procedural requirements relating to notice, inquiry, hearing and reasoned determination before deletion of names in applicable circumstances.
• In its May 27, 2026 decision in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, the Supreme Court upheld the Bihar SIR while reiterating that eligible electors must be included and ineligible persons excluded through lawful procedures.
• The ruling provides important context for Justice Bhuyan’s remarks: the constitutional right to vote is protected, but electoral rolls must also be maintained according to the law.

Comparative Standards of Judicial Speech

• International standards recognise that judicial independence does not require complete silence on matters of law and public importance.
• Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
  • The Bangalore Principles recognise judicial freedom to write, lecture and teach on legal issues, judicial independence and the administration of justice.
  • At the same time, judges should avoid comments that could reasonably affect proceedings before them or matters likely to come before them.
• United States
  • The US Supreme Court's 2023 Code of Conduct allows judges to speak, write, lecture and teach, while cautioning against comments on the merits of pending or impending cases.
• United Kingdom
  • During the 2016 Brexit litigation, Lady Hale outlined competing legal arguments but stopped short of expressing a conclusion because the case was expected to come before the Supreme Court.

Judicial Independence and Public Engagement

• The debate over Justice Bhuyan also raises a broader question about the public role of judges.
• Judges have addressed issues such as judicial appointments, executive influence, civil liberties, restrictive bail conditions and the criminalisation of dissent. Such interventions can contribute to public understanding of constitutional governance.
• However, public visibility can also create concerns when remarks become closely connected to pending litigation. A judge's earlier decisions or public speeches should not automatically be treated as predictors of how they would decide a future case.
• The appropriate assessment depends on the subject of the speech, the specificity of its conclusions and its proximity to judicial proceedings.
• Where a judge's remarks raise a reasonable concern about impartiality in a particular case, recusal may need to be considered.

Context:

• Union Agriculture Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan launched the ‘Khet Bachao Abhiyan’ (Save the Farm Campaign) in Karnal, Haryana, urging farmers to adopt balanced use of chemical fertilisers.
• Excessive and imbalanced application is degrading soil health, contaminating groundwater and increasing air pollution.
• However, farmer behaviour is strongly influenced by fertiliser prices. Despite the Nutrient-Based Subsidy (NBS) introduced in 2010 to correct nutrient imbalance, India’s fertiliser use has become more skewed towards nitrogen (N).

Worsening N:P Imbalance:

• An ICRIER policy brief (Repurposing India’s Fertiliser Policy towards Nutrient Optimisation) compares actual nutrient use with crop- and irrigation-specific recommended doses across 20 major States between 2009-10 and 2024-25.
• Nitrogen (N) use has shifted from 7% below the recommended level to 6% above it. The phosphorus (P) deficit has narrowed only from 29% to 22%.
• Potassium (K) deficit has widened sharply from 48% to 72%. Farmers apply only 9 kg of potash/ha against a requirement of 32 kg.
• As a result, India’s N:P ratio is 10.5:4.1:1, against the normative 2.8:1.5:1. 11 of 20 States overuse nitrogen, while every State underuses potassium.
• Punjab and Jharkhand are among the largest nitrogen overusers, while Haryana and Jharkhand use only around one-tenth of their required potassium.

Perverse Price Signals:

• The principal problem is the unequal subsidy structure. NBS allowed prices of phosphatic and potassic fertilisers to respond to global markets, while urea remained under a heavily controlled price regime.
• For example, between 2010-11 and 2024-25, Diammonium phosphate (DAP) prices nearly tripled to ₹54/kg, muriate of potash (MOP) prices increased six-fold to ₹52/kg, while the price of nitrogen contained in urea rose by only 1%.
• Consequently, farmers have a strong economic incentive to use urea. Nitrogen also produces visible short-term greening, whereas potassium deficiency often manifests gradually through lower resilience and productivity.
• Nitrogen’s share in total NPK use has consequently returned to around 67%, comparable to the level in 1970-71. 

Environmental and Nutritional Costs:

• The imbalance is damaging both soil health and human health. For example, under the Soil Health Card (SHC) programme, among 96 lakh samples tested in 2025-26 -
  • 72% were low in nitrogen;
  • 52% in organic carbon;
  • 42% in boron; and
  • 37% in zinc.
• Excess nitrogen application is inefficient because crops absorb only 30-40% of applied nitrogen. The remainder can enter the atmosphere as nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas, or leach into groundwater as nitrate.
• Nitrate contamination above safe limits has been reported in parts of 502 districts, posing risks including infant methemoglobinemia (“blue baby syndrome”) and chronic health problems.
• Potassium deficiency reduces crop resistance to drought and disease, while phosphorus deficiency can delay flowering.
• Micronutrient deficiencies also reduce nutritional quality of food, contributing to hidden hunger.

Fiscal and Regional Costs:

• The fertiliser subsidy allocation for 2026-27 is ₹1.71 lakh crore. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz could raise this to ₹2.5-3 lakh crore, with urea accounting for about two-thirds.
• The subsidy structure is also regionally unequal. Punjab receives around ₹25,700 of nitrogen subsidy per hectare, nearly ten times Kerala’s level.
• Combined with MSP-based procurement and subsidised electricity, cheap fertilisers reinforce the rice-wheat cropping pattern, intensifying groundwater depletion in north-western India.

Way Forward:

• Shift from input subsidy to nutrient-neutral support:
  • Move towards per-hectare Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) that is neutral across nutrients and crops.
  • This would expose farmers to market prices and remove urea’s artificial price advantage.
  • AgriStack’s farmer IDs and land-linked digital infrastructure could facilitate targeted transfers, although identifying tenant farmers remains a challenge.
  • Alternatively, urea could gradually be brought under NBS while reducing DAP and MOP prices.
• Incentivise States: PM-PRANAM should be strengthened and implemented effectively to reward States that reduce excessive fertiliser use and promote nutrient balance.
• Redirect subsidy savings: Savings should support drip irrigation, fertigation and fertiliser innovation, including customised/coated fertilisers, triple super phosphate (TSP), biofertilisers, nano-fertilisers and nitrogen-efficient seeds.
• Promote the 4Rs:
  • Right Source, Right Rate, Right Time and Right Place — using plot-level soil-test-based recommendations.
  • Crop diversification and cereal-pulse rotations can further reduce nitrogen requirements.
  • However, meaningful change in Punjab and Haryana also requires reform of electricity pricing and procurement incentives.

Conclusion:

• India must shift the policy yardstick from the quantity of fertiliser consumed to the balanced supply of nutrients.
• Fertiliser policy must simultaneously address soil health, groundwater depletion, fiscal sustainability, climate change and nutritional security.
• Without correcting the underlying price and procurement incentives, awareness campaigns alone are unlikely to reverse the nutrient imbalance.

Context

• The crackdown on journalists during protests organised by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), has reignited the debate over press freedom, journalistic identity and government accreditation.
• Freelance and independent journalists were removed and detained, while only those accredited by the Press Information Bureau (PIB) or Directorate of Information and Publicity (DIP) were allowed to cover the protests.
• The incident raises two fundamental questions: Who qualifies as a journalist, and who has the authority to recognise one?
• Resolving these questions is crucial to protecting freedom of expression while ensuring professional accountability.

The Crackdown on Journalists and Freedom of Expression

• Police Action During the Protests
  • The CJP protests in July over the NEET paper leak and in October over the demand for the Chief Election Commissioner's resignation attracted journalists from established media organisations, freelancers and digital content creators.
  • During the protests, police removed several independent journalists and detained them.
  • This action raises concerns about equal access to public events and freedom of the press.
  • Independent journalists frequently document demonstrations, report police actions and present perspectives overlooked by mainstream media.
• Judicial Debate and Competing Concerns
  • During a Public Interest Litigation seeking protection for freelance journalists and content creators, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi questioned whether freedom of expression entitled every citizen to become a journalist.
  • Senior advocate Indira Jaisingh advocated a national protocol preventing police from obstructing journalists carrying valid employer-issued identification.
  • Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, however, warned that individuals could misuse journalistic claims to create sensationalised or one-sided social media content for popularity and financial gain.

Recognising Journalists

• The Legal Definition of a Working Journalist
  • The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020, defines a working journalist as someone whose principal occupation is journalism and who is employed in newspaper, electronic or digital media.
  • Those working in managerial or administrative capacities are excluded.
  • The Central and State governments provide accreditation to eligible journalists, freelancers, camerapersons and technicians.
• Government Accreditation and Its Limitations
  • In Delhi-NCR, the PIB facilitates coverage of the Central government, while the DIP provides accreditation for covering the Delhi government.
  • However, accreditation depends on eligibility criteria and quotas linked to newspaper circulation, news agency subscriptions, television licences and digital platforms' unique visitors.
  • Consequently, not every journalist receives official accreditation, including some working in recognised media organisations. Freelancers and journalists associated with smaller digital platforms face additional difficulties.
  • This creates a distinction between professional journalistic work and official recognition.
  • Making accreditation the sole criterion for covering public events risks excluding legitimate journalists and restricting access to information.

The Way Forward

• The Need for a National Media Council
  • A proposed solution is establishing an independent national media council or commission to recognise journalists across different platforms.
  • Institutions such as the Bar Council of India and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India regulate their respective professions.
  • A similar media council could establish transparent recognition procedures for working journalists, freelancers, camerapersons and technicians.
  • It could maintain a national register, issue professional identification, establish ethical guidelines and provide mechanisms for addressing complaints against journalists and authorities.
  • The Press Club of India previously drafted a Media Transparency (and Accountability) Bill, proposing a national media council. Other journalists' organisations have also demanded similar reforms.
• Balancing Professional Accountability and Press Freedom
  • Social media has blurred the boundaries between journalists, influencers and content creators.
  • Although digital platforms have democratised information, they have also facilitated misinformation, sensationalism and unverified reporting.
  • A national media council could promote transparent accreditation, ethical standards and accountability.
  • Nevertheless, it must safeguard editorial independence and remain free from political interference.
  • Government accreditation should not become the sole criterion for practising journalism or reporting public events.
  • Restrictions should be based on legitimate security requirements, objective rules and applicable law, rather than arbitrary distinctions between accredited and non-accredited journalists.
  • Any framework must protect journalists against intimidation, unlawful detention and obstruction while ensuring that restrictions are necessary, proportionate and legally justified.

Conclusion

• The detention of independent journalists during the CJP protests demonstrates the need to reconsider how journalists are recognised and protected in India.
• Existing legal definitions and accreditation systems do not adequately address the challenges of freelance journalism and digital media.
• An independent, transparent and inclusive national media council could bridge this gap, provided it promotes professional standards without monopolising the right to report.
• Ultimately, democracy requires both responsible journalism and an independent press.

Context

• Recent protests in Delhi against the exclusion of voters during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls have raised concerns about constitutional freedoms.
• Protesters have demanded the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, while the government’s response has intensified debates over the suppression of peaceful demonstrations.
• India has a rich tradition of protests, from the freedom struggle to movements led by farmers, students, trade unions and civil society.
• The right to protest is a constitutional freedom, not a government privilege.

The Democratic Significance of Dissent

• Dissent enables citizens to question government policies, demand accountability and express grievances.
• However, a growing culture of suspicion towards dissent threatens democratic participation.
• Questioning protesters about permissions or funding can undermine their autonomy and portray disagreement as hostility towards the government.
• A mature democracy must recognise that peaceful criticism strengthens democratic institutions.
• Governments should address public grievances through dialogue and accountability rather than coercion. 

Constitutional Protection of the Right to Protest

• Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) protects the right to assemble peacefully and without arms.
• These provisions enable citizens to organise demonstrations and collectively demand policy changes.
• However, Article 19(3) permits reasonable restrictions on peaceful assembly in the interests of sovereignty, integrity and public order.
• The challenge lies in distinguishing reasonable regulation from arbitrary restriction.
• Authorities may regulate the timing, location and manner of demonstrations, but such measures must not eliminate the practical exercise of fundamental rights.

Misuse of Preventive Laws and Police Powers

• Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, empowers authorities to issue preventive orders in urgent cases involving potential danger or public disturbance.
• Although necessary during genuine emergencies, its excessive application can restrict peaceful demonstrations.
• Reported practices, including disproportionate force, prolonged detention, restrictions on access to lawyers and essential necessities, and deportation notices to participating Overseas Citizens of India, raise concerns about civil liberties.
• Such measures create a chilling effect on freedom of speech and assembly, discouraging citizens from expressing legitimate grievances.
• Preventive powers must be exercised with restraint and remain subject to legal scrutiny. Public order cannot justify blanket suppression of dissent.

Judicial Precedents and the Limits of State Authority

• In Himmat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police (1972), the Supreme Court distinguished reasonable regulation of public meetings from arbitrary exclusion.
• It warned against restrictions that effectively eliminate opportunities for public gatherings in streets and parks.
• The judgment establishes that accessible public spaces are essential for democratic participation. Without them, the right to assemble risks becoming merely theoretical.
• In Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra (1961), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the predecessor provision to Section 163 but observed that it was intended for emergencies.
• These judgments underline the importance of proportionate restrictions and judicial oversight.
• Preventive powers must not become routine instruments for suppressing political expression.

Designating Protest Sites

• The denotification of Jantar Mantar, a prominent protest site in Delhi, raises concerns about access to public spaces.
• Relocating demonstrations to distant or inaccessible locations can weaken their effectiveness by separating protesters from the public, media and policymakers.
• On October 9, the Supreme Court directed authorities to designate suitable alternative protest sites while hearing petitions concerning a blanket transport ban affecting access to Delhi.
• However, no interim relief was granted in the cases challenging Jantar Mantar’s denotification, leaving the site inaccessible at the time described.
• Alternative locations must be genuinely accessible, well-connected and sufficiently visible to facilitate democratic participation.
• Merely designating distant sites cannot adequately protect the right to assembly.
• The judiciary must scrutinise restrictions that weaken constitutional freedoms while recognising the state’s responsibility to maintain public order. 

Conclusion

• Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) protect expression and peaceful assembly, while Article 19(3) permits only reasonable restrictions.
• Excessive preventive measures, disproportionate police action and inaccessible protest sites threaten civil liberties and democratic participation.
• The government must distinguish peaceful criticism from genuine threats to public order, while courts must prevent arbitrary executive action.
• Ultimately, a strong democracy does not fear dissent; it protects the freedom to disagree. Safeguarding peaceful protests and accessible public spaces is essential to public trust, accountability and constitutional governance.

Why in news?

The UN climate convention’s Loss and Damage Fund has approved a $21.6 million payout (approx. ₹205 crore) to Nepal — its first-ever country-specific allocation — to aid rebuilding after devastating August 2026 floods.

Nepal’s own request was for $20 million (~₹190 crore), against an estimated $4.75 billion (~₹44,600 crore) recovery and reconstruction need — making the payout extremely small relative to the actual damage.

Still, it marks the beginning of implementation of a new international loss-and-damage regime, arriving weeks before COP31 opens in Turkiye.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What Triggered This?
• What Is the Loss and Damage Fund?
• Why the Nepal Decision Is Significant?
• How the Money Actually Flows?
• The Larger Climate Finance Shortfall
• Credibility Concerns

What Triggered This?

• On August 26, 2026, an ice-and-rock avalanche — linked by experts to human-accelerated climate change — triggered flooding along the Bhotekoshi-Trishuli-Narayani river system.
• Nepal’s estimated losses: at least $2.69 billion, with recovery needs of at least $4.71-4.75 billion.

What Is the Loss and Damage Fund?

• Formally called the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) — created to help developing countries vulnerable to climate change cope with economic and non-economic losses, particularly the most fragile nations facing climate-related disasters.
• Operates under the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism.
• Origin: Agreed at COP27 (2022); Governing Instrument adopted at COP28 (2023).
• Current Funding Status (as of March 2026):
  • 27 countries pledged $822.06 million (~₹7,809.6 crore); $629.70 million as grant contributions.
  • Start-up allocation: $342 million, with at least half reserved for small island states and least developed countries.
• Top 5 donors to FRLD: Italy ($110.31M), France ($108.23M), UAE ($100M), Germany ($98.24M), UK ($91.92M).
• First funding call drew 176 requests from 119 countries, worth ~$2.8 billion; Board deferred decisions to December 2026.
• India has also made three requests to the FRLD — underscoring that even large developing economies are turning to this fund for climate-disaster support.

Why the Nepal Decision Is Significant?

• The first time the Fund has earmarked money for a specific country — decided at its first “extraordinary meeting” (virtual, October 22, 2026).
• The Board approved a pilot mechanism letting Nepal submit its request outside the normal closed submission window; future exceptions need separate Board approval.
• Nepal’s case is being treated as a template for how the mechanism should ideally work — swift consideration and quick access to money for disaster-hit nations.

How the Money Actually Flows?

• Of the $21.6 million approved, $1.6 million is oversight fees for implementing organisations.
• Nepal must submit a formal funding request, reviewed at the Fund’s tenth meeting in Manila, December 2026 — money releases only after this approval.
• The Fund hasn’t disclosed cash holdings beyond signed contributions — disbursement depends on donors honouring pledges.

The Larger Climate Finance Shortfall

• Huge Demand, Limited Supply: Most pending FRLD requests involve both economic and non-economic losses — extreme weather, slow-onset events like glacial melt, sea-level rise, biodiversity loss, and desertification — requiring resilience-building, early warning systems, and psychosocial support for affected populations.
• Broken Promises on Climate Finance: Developed nations had pledged to mobilise $100 billion/year between 2020-2025 — a target never fully delivered.
  • In 2024, developing countries assessed their actual climate finance need at $1.3 trillion/year — yet developed nations committed only to $300 billion/year, starting only from 2035.
  • Under the UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement, developed countries are mandated to fund developing nations’ climate response — but just as they’ve lagged on greenhouse gas reduction targets, they’ve similarly failed to fully meet their financial obligations.

Credibility Concerns

• Experts noted the Fund still operates like a conventional development fund — an 11-step funding cycle from origination to Board approval, with the World Bank as interim trustee.
• The US withdrew its board representation in January 2025 (Trump administration), part of its Paris Agreement exit.
• In Nepal’s case, the analysts called it landmark but noted the sum is less than 0.5% of Nepal’s reconstruction cost, risking delays since funds release only after further approvals.

Conclusion

The Nepal payout is a genuine procedural breakthrough, proving the Loss and Damage Fund can act on a specific crisis rather than remain an abstract pledge-collection exercise.

But it also lays bare a much larger pattern: the persistent gap between what developed nations promise and what they actually deliver on climate finance — from the unmet $100-billion annual target to a $300-billion commitment pushed out to 2035, against an assessed need of $1.3 trillion a year.

For Nepal, and for India’s own pending FRLD requests, this episode is a reminder that symbolic firsts matter, but without faster disbursement and genuinely scaled-up funding, the global loss-and-damage architecture risks remaining more aspiration than action.

Why in news?

The Government recently announced plans to introduce agri-photovoltaics (agrivoltaics) under the second phase of PM-KUSUM (Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan) — its flagship scheme to solarise irrigation.

The approach combines solar power generation with crop cultivation on the same land, letting farmers keep growing crops while earning extra income from electricity generation.

The announcement came at the Agrivoltaics World Conference 2026 – “Powering the Global South” in New Delhi on October 25.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What Is Agrivoltaics?
• Why the Government Is Pushing This
• Not All Crops Are Suitable
• The Cost Factor
• Concerns Over Crop Yields and Farmers’ Interests

What Is Agrivoltaics?

• Agri-photovoltaics (agri-PV) involves installing solar panels on elevated structures over agricultural land.
• This lets farmers continue cultivation underneath, while electricity is generated from the same plot.
• Technology-wise, the photovoltaic panels themselves are identical to those used in conventional ground-mounted solar projects.
• The key difference: the additional infrastructure needed to elevate the panels, leaving enough space below for farming activities to continue.
• As per MNRE, panels are installed at a height of 3.5 to 4 metres above ground — enough to allow routine agricultural operations, including movement of machinery, without interruption.

Why the Government Is Pushing This?

• The govt said the approach could address the shortage of land for solar projects while letting farming continue beneath elevated panels.
• Around 30% of India’s 160 million hectares of cropland could be suitable for agrivoltaic projects.
• Potential capacity estimated at 1-2 terawatts (TW), or 1,000-2,000 gigawatts (GW) — a massive scale compared to India’s current total renewable capacity.
• Agri-PV is expected to mainly help states with less non-agricultural land, enabling large-scale solar deployment without compromising food security requirements.

Not All Crops Are Suitable

• Agrivoltaics doesn’t work uniformly across all crop types.
• Government assessment studies show agri-PV is suitable for fruits and leafy vegetables.
• It has not been found suitable for crops like rice and sugarcane — meaning the approach currently applies to a limited crop range.

The Cost Factor

• Agri-photovoltaic projects cost around 25-30% more than conventional ground-mounted solar projects, due to the additional civil and structural infrastructure needed to elevate panels.
• This higher upfront cost is a key challenge for scaling the model, especially for small and marginal farmers.

Concerns Over Crop Yields and Farmers’ Interests

• Most agri-PV projects in India are still at the pilot stage.
• The government faces the challenge of developing a policy framework that allows solar power generation to expand without compromising crop yields, soil health, or farmers’ livelihoods.
• Union Agriculture Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan, speaking at the conference, flagged several issues needing resolution before the approach can be scaled up.
• Key farmer-equity concern: Over 85% of India’s farmers are small and marginal, with average landholding just 0.96 hectares.
• The Minister stressed that the policy must be designed to benefit small farmers and protect agricultural production — not sideline them in favour of large-scale solar developers.
• The model must ensure farmers don’t lose control of their agricultural land or suffer a decline in crop production.
• Since most projects remain at the pilot stage, their impact on farming must be properly assessed before scaling up.

Conclusion

Agrivoltaics represents a genuinely promising solution to one of India’s toughest land-use dilemmas: how to expand solar capacity without competing with agriculture for scarce land.

With an estimated 1-2 terawatt potential, the approach could meaningfully advance India’s renewable energy goals while giving farmers a new income stream.

However, with over 85% of India’s farmers being small and marginal landholders, and projects still largely at the pilot stage, the real test will be whether the policy framework protects farmer control over land, crop yields, and livelihoods — rather than letting higher project costs and limited crop suitability turn agrivoltaics into a model that benefits large developers more than the smallholders it is meant to serve.

About Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD):

• It is an international climate-finance fund set up to help developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change respond to economic and non-economic losses, including from extreme weather and slow-onset events.
• It operates under the financial mechanism of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
• It was established at the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP 27) to the UNFCCC in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2022 and operationalised at COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 2023.
• A Board of 26 members was constituted in 2023, and subsequently, the Philippines was selected as the host of the Board in 2024, while the World Bank was selected to host the Secretariat, and as the Fund Trustee.
• The Board of the FRLD consists of members from Parties to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, with members from developed and developing country
• By financing recovery initiatives from climate-related losses and damage, the Fund empowers communities to rebuild and adapt.
• It strives for country-led, locally driven solutions, ensuring interventions are aligned to country needs, priorities, and contexts.