Context

• The Election Commission of India’s (ECI) initiative to link Aadhaar with voter IDs has sparked intense debate.
• While presented as a strategy to cleanse electoral rolls and bolster electoral integrity, this policy move raises profound constitutional, legal, and ethical questions.
• A closer examination reveals that the proposed linkage threatens the sanctity of the democratic process, compromises the right to privacy, and risks mass disenfranchisement of legitimate voters.

The Illusion of Voluntariness and Legal Ambiguities

• Though the ECI claims the Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is voluntary, the process offers no genuine opt-out.
• Citizens must either provide their Aadhaar number or declare its absence — a mechanism that coerces even reluctant individuals into compliance.
• By September 2023, over 66 crore Aadhaar numbers had been seeded into the voter database, facilitated by data-sharing practices that raise serious legal and ethical concerns.
• The use of tools like the DBT Seeding Data Viewer and the repurposing of National Population Register data demonstrate how data collected for one purpose is now being leveraged for unrelated, constitutionally sensitive applications.

Concerns Surrounding ECI’s Proposal

• Disregarding Judicial Commitments and Imposing Procedural Burdens
  • The ECI's proposal appears to contravene its own assurances to the Supreme Court in G. Niranjan v. Election Commission of India (2023), where it committed to maintaining the non-mandatory nature of the Aadhaar linkage.
  • Instead of upholding this promise, the new policy mandates that individuals who choose not to submit Aadhaar must justify their stance in person before an Electoral Registration Officer.
  • This requirement disproportionately burdens vulnerable populations, including the elderly, disabled, migrant workers, and those in remote areas, effectively disenfranchising them through procedural hurdles.
  • Compounding the issue is the absence of a clear, time-bound appellate mechanism for challenging arbitrary rejections.
• Misplaced Trust in Aadhaar as a Tool for Electoral Purification
  • The justification that Aadhaar linkage will eliminate duplicate voters is fundamentally flawed. Aadhaar, by design, is a proof of residency, not citizenship.
  • Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and several judicial rulings underscore that possession of Aadhaar does not equate to Indian citizenship.
  • Even the UIDAI has acknowledged that non-citizens residing in India for 182 days are eligible for Aadhaar.
  • As such, using Aadhaar to determine voter eligibility undermines the integrity of electoral rolls rather than enhancing it.
  • The dangers of this approach are not hypothetical.
  • A pilot attempt under the National Electoral Roll Purification and Authentication Programme in 2015 led to the arbitrary removal of over 55 lakh voters in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana due to Aadhaar mismatches.
  • These individuals discovered their disenfranchisement only on election day, highlighting the grave risks associated with such technological fixes.
• Threats to Privacy and Democratic Integrity
  • Linking Aadhaar to voter ID also opens the door to mass surveillance and voter profiling.
  • With the passage of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which grants sweeping exemptions to government bodies, the possibility of voter data being misused for political gain becomes alarmingly real.
  • Cross-referencing electoral data with other databases could enable political micro-targeting, suppression of opposition voters, or even manipulation of rolls, undermining electoral fairness.
  • Moreover, entrusting electoral data to the UIDAI, a statutory body under executive control, jeopardizes the independence of the ECI, a constitutionally mandated authority.
  • This fusion of executive and electoral powers erodes the doctrine of separation of powers and casts a shadow over the legitimacy of elections.

Database Deficiencies and the Need for Traditional Mechanisms

• The Aadhaar database itself suffers from serious inaccuracies. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) 2022 report pointed to the duplication of over 4.75 lakh Aadhaar numbers and the issuance of IDs based on faulty biometric data.
• The lack of a rigorous mechanism to verify residency further undermines the reliability of Aadhaar for electoral verification.
• Rather than relying on a flawed and exclusionary system, the ECI should invest in proven methods of electoral verification.
• Door-to-door verification by booth-level officers, independent audits of electoral rolls, and robust public grievance mechanisms provide more effective, democratic, and constitutionally sound solutions.
• Social audits could enhance transparency and prevent politically motivated manipulations.

Conclusion

• The Aadhaar-voter ID linkage represents a constitutional misstep with far-reaching implications.
• It imposes unjust burdens on citizens, compromises privacy, and introduces unreliable and exclusionary mechanisms into the electoral process.
• In a democracy, the right to vote is sacrosanct, any policy that endangers this right must be abandoned.
• The bipartisan support for such a constitutionally dubious initiative is not only troubling but also indicative of the need for greater vigilance in protecting democratic institutions.