Why in news?

Maoist insurgency, once dominant across the Red Corridor, is now limited to 18 districts.

Experts attribute this decline to targeted development initiatives, continuous counterinsurgency efforts, internal divisions, rigid ideology, leadership crises, and loss of local support.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Overview of LWE
• Decline of Maoist Influence in India
• Key Reasons Behind the Decline
• Changing Social Outlook
• Challenges Ahead

Overview of LWE

• Left Wing Extremism (LWE), or Naxalism, is among India’s most serious internal security challenges.
• Rooted in socio-economic inequalities and guided by Maoist ideology, it has historically targeted security forces, infrastructure, and democratic institutions.
• Emerging from the Naxalbari movement in 1967, it spread across the “Red Corridor,” affecting states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, and parts of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and others.
• While claiming to fight for marginalized tribal communities, Maoists have engaged in armed violence, extortion, infrastructure destruction, and recruitment of civilians, including children.

Decline of Maoist Influence in India

• Once a formidable internal security threat, the Maoist insurgency has shrunk from nearly 180 districts in the late 2000s to just 18 today.
• Incidents of Left-Wing Extremism have fallen by over 50% between 2004–14 and 2014–23, with fatalities dropping nearly 70%.
• Naxal violence peaked in 2010 with 1,936 incidents and 1,005 deaths but declined to 374 incidents and 150 deaths by 2024.

Key Reasons Behind the Decline

• Targeted Development and Security Operations
  • Government-led development schemes, along with sustained counterinsurgency efforts, have weakened Maoist control in their former strongholds.
  • Landmark security operations, such as the 21-day offensive in Narayanpur, have significantly reduced their operational capacity.
• Leadership Crisis and Strategic Missteps
  • The resignation of long-time leader Muppala Lakshmana Rao (Ganapathy) in 2018 marked a turning point.
  • His successor, Basava Raju, relied heavily on military offensives over political outreach, alienating the support base.
  • Raju’s death in 2025, reportedly due to internal betrayal, deepened the leadership vacuum.
• Internal Rifts and Political Isolation
  • Internal divisions, highlighted by surrendered members, have fragmented the organisation.
  • The CPI (Maoist) Politburo is now believed to have only four active members, further eroding decision-making strength.
• Loss of Public Support
  • In areas like Dandakaranya, Maoists prioritised military preparedness over local development, causing the very communities they claimed to protect to suffer.
  • Younger tribals and peasants increasingly favour education, jobs, and mainstream integration over armed struggle.

Changing Social Outlook

• Former insurgents, such as Ginugu Narsimha Reddy, now advocate peaceful solutions.
• Initiatives like fish farming in Gumla, Jharkhand, have inspired many to abandon violence, with over 150 families in Basia block joining such ventures.
• This shift reflects the waning ideological appeal of Maoism and the rise of alternative livelihoods in once Naxal-affected regions.

Challenges Ahead

• Critics claim that the persistence of Naxalism is the result of a systemic “protection ecosystem”:
  • political patronage enabled its rise;
  • state inaction allowed entrenchment, and
  • intellectual advocacy granted moral cover.
• Reducing it to a fight for tribal rights concealed its violence, coercion, and extortion, allowing political forces to appear humanitarian while enabling terror.
• As the Centre targets elimination of the insurgency by 31 March 2026, the real challenge lies in confronting those in politics, academia, and activism who enabled and legitimised Naxalism.
• Without this reckoning, security forces may win operational battles, but the war of narratives will remain unresolved.