Why in news?

Recently, the Centre signed a tripartite agreement with the Nagaland Government and the Eastern Nagaland Peoples’ Organisation (ENPO) to establish the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA).

The FNTA is designed as a model of “devolutionary autonomy”, granting substantial administrative and financial powers to six relatively underdeveloped eastern districts — Kiphire, Longleng, Mon, Noklak, Shamator, and Tuensang. The aim of this devolution is to address long-standing demands for greater self-governance and focused development.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• ENPO’s Demand for a Separate Frontier Nagaland
• Why the Centre Accepted the Eastern Nagaland Autonomy Demand?
• Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA): Powers and Provisions
• Can the FNTA Model Address the Kuki-Zo Demand in Manipur

ENPO’s Demand for a Separate Frontier Nagaland

• ENPO has long demanded the creation of a separate State called Frontier Nagaland, carved out of existing Nagaland.
• First formally conveyed to the Centre in 2010, the demand stems from historical neglect dating back to British-era policies that left the eastern hills largely unadministered.
• After Nagaland became a State in 1963, eight Naga tribes in the eastern districts felt politically and economically marginalised compared to western tribes.
• This perceived developmental and administrative imbalance gradually intensified into a sustained movement for greater autonomy and, ultimately, statehood.

Why the Centre Accepted the Eastern Nagaland Autonomy Demand?

• The Centre’s move to grant autonomy through the Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA) was shaped by both political pressure and strategic concerns.
• Earlier measures, including a ₹500-crore package and standard operating procedures, failed to address the deeper political aspirations of the ENPO region.
• Tensions peaked in 2024 when ENPO leaders called for a Lok Sabha election boycott, highlighting their significant political leverage.
• Additionally, eastern Nagaland’s location along the sensitive Myanmar border made prolonged unrest a security risk, given the presence of armed groups across the porous frontier.
• The FNTA is thus viewed as a stabilising measure — a way to address regional grievances while safeguarding a strategically vital border region.

Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA): Powers and Provisions

• Semi-Autonomous Governance Structure - The FNTA grants semi-autonomous status to six eastern Nagaland districts. A mini-Secretariat, headed by a senior officer, will function within the region to decentralise administration and reduce reliance on Kohima.
• Financial and Administrative Devolution - Development funds will be allocated proportionately based on population and area, with the Ministry of Home Affairs supporting initial establishment costs. This ensures direct financial empowerment of the region.
• Legislative and Executive Authority - The FNTA will exercise powers over 46 subjects, enabling local decision-making in areas such as land use, agriculture, rural development, and infrastructure, tailored to local needs.
• Safeguarding Constitutional Protections - Importantly, the arrangement does not alter Article 371(A), preserving Nagaland’s special constitutional safeguards related to customary laws and social practices.

Can the FNTA Model Address the Kuki-Zo Demand in Manipur

• The FNTA demonstrates that the Centre can create territorial authorities as a compromise between full statehood and regular district administration.
• Structurally, it resembles Manipur’s Hill Areas Committee under Article 371(C), designed to protect tribal interests.
• The model suggests that constitutional innovation can grant autonomy without redrawing State boundaries.
• This raises the possibility that a similar territorial arrangement could address the Kuki-Zo demand for a separate administrative setup.
• However, conditions differ sharply. In Nagaland, negotiations occurred without violent conflict and had the cooperation of Chief Minister. In Manipur, deep ethnic tensions persist, and the Meitei-dominated state government strongly opposes administrative separation.
• The presence of other groups, including the Tangkhul Naga-influenced NSCN, with overlapping claims in hill districts complicates any clean administrative restructuring, making replication of the FNTA model far more challenging.