Context:

• An air force’s combat effectiveness rests on advanced weapon systems, trained personnel, and a reliable supply chain working in sync.
• The Indian Air Force operates a mixed fleet of Russian, Western, and indigenous fighters, with the Tejas adding to the portfolio.
• Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) handles repair and overhaul for all fighters, making its role critical—but its overloaded order book, government work culture, and delivery/quality concerns have drawn scrutiny, including from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
• Against this backdrop, reports that the development contract for five prototypes of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) may be awarded to a private player—excluding HAL—aiming to create a second aircraft manufacturer are broadly welcome.
• However, the shift raises serious professional and execution risks that require careful consideration as decisions are finalised, to ensure timelines, quality, and integration with the IAF’s operational needs.

The Complexities of Private Participation in Fighter Aircraft Development

• Private Players as First-Time Developers
  • One key concern is that the three shortlisted private entities, despite being major industrial players, would effectively be first-time developers of a fighter aircraft.
  • The technical and organisational demands of designing, building, and testing a fifth-generation fighter prototype are far greater than those involved in producing helicopters, ships, or aerospace components.
• Historical Precedent: HAL’s Integrated Model
  • Historically, India’s fighter development followed an integrated, single-agency model. Aircraft like the HF-24 Marut were:
    • Designed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s Aircraft Design Bureau
    • Built, tested, upgraded, and weapon-integrated within the same organisation
    • Supported through series production and lifetime spares by HAL
  • Similar end-to-end models applied to trainer aircraft such as the HT-2 and HJT-16.
• Tejas: A Hybrid Development Structure
  • The Tejas programme marked a shift to a hybrid model:
    • Design and development led by the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA)
    • Series production and lifetime support handled by HAL
  • This split already introduced coordination challenges between design and manufacturing.
• Implication for AMCA
  • Moving AMCA prototype development entirely to private players represents a further departure from past practice.
  • The absence of prior fighter-development experience and the fragmentation of design, testing, production, and long-term support raise questions about execution risk, timelines, and system integration.

Singular Control and Execution Challenges in the AMCA Programme

• Ownership and Accountability Gaps
  • In earlier programmes, both Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) functioned under the government, ensuring singular control by the Ministry of Defence.
  • In the AMCA model, with ADA as designer and a private firm as executor, questions arise over project ownership, accountability, and authority during prototype testing and eventual production.
• Infrastructure Concentration in Bengaluru
  • Over eight decades, HAL has built extensive infrastructure—tools, rigs, hangars, and production facilities—centred in Bengaluru.
  • The IAF has been deeply embedded in this ecosystem, contributing test aircrew and operational feedback through its Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment, co-located with HAL.
  • For Tejas, a dedicated National Flight Test Centre was created at ADA, alongside nearby DRDO labs specialising in avionics and electronic warfare—all within a tight geographic cluster.
  • Replicating this ecosystem elsewhere would require huge capital, land acquisition, and time, raising doubts about feasibility for a private AMCA developer.
• Design–Manufacturing Integration Risks
  • Aircraft development globally relies on close fusion between designers and production engineers—from design boards to flight testing and upgrades.
  • As prototypes fly, manufacturing lines are simultaneously readied so production can begin immediately after certification.
  • Expecting a private entity to simultaneously test prototypes and build a fifth-generation manufacturing ecosystem—without an assured production order and with a contract limited to five prototypes—poses significant financial and execution risks.
• Test Aircrew Bottlenecks
  • Testing a futuristic fighter requires highly trained test pilots and engineers. India has only one test pilots school, with limited throughput.
  • A private AMCA developer would need multiple trained test aircrew from the outset, creating a critical bottleneck in manpower.
• A Pragmatic National Approach
  • Given that ADA, the National Flight Test Centre, and IAF test units are all based at HAL Airport, Bengaluru, it would be logical for a private AMCA developer to co-locate within this ecosystem.
  • An out-of-the-box proposal is to co-opt parts of HAL’s public-funded real estate and facilities—including hangars and testing infrastructure—for the private entity.

The Issue of Location: Where AMCA Should Be Built

• For a strategic programme like the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), the location of the production facility is critical.
• Past decisions—such as placing the C-295 aircraft factory in Vadodara, Gujarat, close to international borders—should not be repeated for frontline combat aircraft.
• AMCA production should be located deep in the hinterland, with strong connectivity and proximity to HAL’s Bengaluru airfield, India’s aviation hub.
• Co-location would enhance security, testing efficiency, infrastructure sharing, and coordination with existing design, flight-test, and manufacturing ecosystems essential for a fifth-generation fighter programme.