Context

• The evolving global security order, particularly under the shifting policies of the United States, has brought new urgency and opportunity to defence relationships among middle powers.
• Trump’s return to the White House has introduced uncertainty into America’s longstanding security guarantees, including its commitments to NATO and other global alliances.
• This climate of unpredictability offers a pivotal moment for countries like India and Australia to step forward and strengthen their bilateral defence ties.
• Their deepening partnership, underpinned by shared interests and growing trust, is emerging as a key pillar of regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic Convergence and Shared Concerns

• India and Australia’s geographical and geopolitical orientations make their partnership especially relevant in the Indo-Pacific theatre.
• Australia, positioned between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and possessing strong linkages with Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, complements India’s maritime aspirations.
• Meanwhile, both countries share common concerns over China’s assertive behaviour in the region, as well as a mutual vision for maintaining regional sovereignty and stability.
• Over the past decade, India and Australia have elevated their partnership through robust bureaucratic frameworks, more so than with some of India’s other strategic partners like Japan or South Korea.
• Canberra’s recognition of New Delhi as a top-tier security partner reflects this evolution.
• As American security commitments appear increasingly conditional, the groundwork laid by both capitals offers a strategic launchpad for a more autonomous and collaborative regional defence posture.

Institutional Foundations and Operational Milestones

• Several high-level agreements and mechanisms solidify this bilateral relationship.
• The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) of 2020 and the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue initiated in 2021 have created institutional channels for strategic coordination.
• Practical cooperation is also visible through operational arrangements like the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) and the Air-to-Air Refuelling arrangement initiated in 2024, which extends the reach of Indian aircraft via the Royal Australian Air Force.
• Additionally, regular military exercises, AUSTRAHIND (Army), AUSINDEX (Navy), and participation in multilateral exercises like Pitch Black and Malabar, demonstrate a steady, decade-long effort to build operational synergy.
• These initiatives are no longer symbolic; they reflect a genuine effort to build interoperability and mutual trust.

Limits of Strategic Substitution

• Despite their growing collaboration, India and Australia cannot fully substitute the role the United States has historically played in regional security.
• India remains preoccupied with its continental security challenges, including border disputes with China and longstanding tensions with Pakistan.
• Similarly, Australia is undergoing a strategic recalibration under frameworks like AUKUS and is also expanding its engagement with Pacific Island nations.
• Given these constraints, both countries must focus on areas where bilateral cooperation can offer tangible security dividends.

Five Focus Areas for Strengthening the Partnership

• Rebalancing Beyond the Navy
  • While naval cooperation has thrived, it’s time to break down service-specific silos.
  • Joint exercises involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force that simulate real-world conditions could develop comprehensive operational familiarity.
  • A long-term goal could be the planning and execution of a large-scale, fully integrated joint exercise.
• Upgrading India’s Defence Representation in Canberra
  • India’s Defence Adviser (DA) position in Canberra, traditionally held by a naval officer, should be upgraded to a one-star rank.
  • Supporting this post with Army and Air Force assistants would enhance balanced service representation.
  • Moreover, dedicating personnel to Pacific Island engagement would reflect India’s expanding regional interests.
• Incorporating Ground-Level Operational Insights
  • Strategic dialogues often remain diplomatic and abstract.
  • Including more operational personnel, such as mid-level officers, in these dialogues and encouraging classified, candid discussions could yield innovative ideas.
  • Initiatives like war-gaming exchanges and academic fellowships would deepen mutual understanding and operational synergy.
• Cooperation in MRO and Small-Island Maritime Security
  • India has proven its capability in Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) through contracts with U.S. and British navies.
  • Australia could benefit from this capacity, and both nations could jointly manufacture patrol boats for small island nations.
  • These seemingly modest steps can lead to broader technological exposure and logistical alignment.
• Reviving the MSME and Start-Up Ecosystem in Defence
  • Defence collaboration between India and Australia has largely excluded the Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (MSME) sector. This is a missed opportunity.
  • Both nations are developing indigenisation in defence and have increasing aerospace and dual-use technology start-ups.
  • A bilateral model akin to the U.S.-India INDUS X initiative could catalyse joint innovation and production.

Conclusion

• In a world of shifting alliances and uncertain great-power commitments, India and Australia have an opportunity, and a responsibility, to strengthen their bilateral defence relationship.
• This partnership is no longer peripheral; it is central to the architecture of a stable Indo-Pacific.
• Through enhanced coordination, cross-service integration, operational innovation, and industrial collaboration, both nations can transform strategic alignment into actionable deterrence and resilience.
• As the global order becomes more transactional, partnerships built on mutual respect and shared purpose will define the future, and the India-Australia defence relationship is poised to be one of its cornerstones.