Why in news?

The recent surrender of a top CPI (Maoist) leader signals a major collapse of the insurgency’s leadership and suggests the movement is nearing its end.

However, while the armed struggle is declining, deeper issues of governance and inequality remain unresolved. The key challenge now is whether the state can convert its security success into lasting public trust, and whether far-left politics can still re-emerge in a changing but unequal India.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• How the Indian State Gained the Upper Hand Over Maoists?
• Origins of Maoism in India
• Managing the Vacuum After Maoist Decline
• Can Maoism Rise Again

How the Indian State Gained the Upper Hand Over Maoists?

• Over the past decade, the Maoist movement has weakened due to sustained pressure on both its leadership and ground network.
• Top leaders from the Central Committee and Politburo have been eliminated, arrested, or surrendered, leading to a fragmented command structure.
• At the same time, improved intelligence, local police involvement, and specialised forces have reduced the Maoists’ traditional advantages in terrain and surprise.
• Sustained military pressure, better governance outreach, and infrastructure development have together weakened the Maoist insurgency. Even Maoist leadership has acknowledged the decline, with cadres being advised to either relocate or surrender.
• Strategic Policy and Security Push
  • The foundation of this success dates back to 2006, when the government identified Maoism as a major internal security threat.
  • A comprehensive strategy was later implemented under the Ministry of Home Affairs, involving large deployment of central forces, modernisation of state police, and the “clear, hold and develop” approach.
  • This meant clearing Maoist strongholds, maintaining control through camps, and extending governance through infrastructure and public services.
  • Subsequent governments continued and intensified this strategy.
• Infrastructure and Ground-Level Expansion
  • The state significantly expanded its presence in remote areas by building over 15,000 km of roads, installing 9,000+ mobile towers, fortifying 656 police stations, and setting up nearly 200 security camps in key Maoist regions, especially in Chhattisgarh and the Andhra–Odisha belt.
• Sharp Decline in Violence and Influence
  • The results have been substantial. Maoist-related violence and deaths have fallen by over 80% since 2010.
  • Affected districts have reduced from nearly 200 in the early 2000s to just 38 by 2025, with only 7 districts currently classified as LWE-affected, and just 3 as most affected (Bijapur, Narayanpur, Sukma).

Origins of Maoism in India

• Maoism in India traces its roots to the Naxalbari uprising of 1967, where early groups viewed India as a “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” society.
• They believed armed struggle was necessary to secure land, dignity, and justice for the poor.
• Spread Across Marginalised Regions
  • Over time, Maoists expanded across the “Red Corridor”, covering parts of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha.
  • They gained support by embedding themselves among landless peasants, Dalits, and Adivasis, especially in areas where the state was weak, exploitative, or absent.
• Structural Causes Behind the Movement
  • Several deep-rooted issues created space for Maoism:
    • Unequal land distribution and failed land reforms
    • Bonded labour and caste-based oppression
    • Displacement without proper rehabilitation due to development projects
    • Corruption and abuse by forest and police authorities
    • Exclusion of tribal communities from decisions about land and resources
• Role of Maoists in Local Governance
• In many remote villages, Maoists acted as an alternative authority.
• They resolved disputes, enforced wages, and punished local elites, combining coercion with a sense of justice where formal governance was ineffective.
• State Absence as a Key Factor
  • Experts note that Maoist influence grew not just due to poverty, but because of the absence or invisibility of the state.
  • In many isolated regions, Maoists became the only functioning authority people experienced.

Managing the Vacuum After Maoist Decline

• As Maoist influence fades, the key risk is not their return but the emergence of new alienation or criminal networks in areas where they once controlled power and resources.
• Recognising this, the government has identified 31 “Legacy Thrust” districts for continued security and development support to prevent relapse.
• Focus on Development and Governance
  • The long-term solution lies in effective delivery of development—roads, schools, hospitals, and basic services.
  • Past initiatives, such as infrastructure expansion in Andhra Pradesh and CRPF field hospitals in Chhattisgarh, showed that when the state delivers, people respond positively, even in conflict zones.
• Building Local Institutions
  • A sustainable transition requires replacing external security dominance with local governance structures.
  • This includes recruiting locals into police and administration, expanding police stations, and ensuring functioning schools, healthcare, and grievance redress systems.
  • Experts stress that success depends on strong political will and responsive bureaucracy.
  • Clear direction from leadership must translate into effective governance on the ground to consolidate gains and prevent any resurgence.

Can Maoism Rise Again

• Experts believe a full-scale revival of Maoism is unlikely, as the traditional model of controlling isolated regions has been weakened by better connectivity, roads, mobile networks, and social media, which have increased awareness and aspirations.
  • Earlier, Maoists thrived by dominating remote areas and acting as the only “state.”
• Internal Decline of the Movement
  • The movement has also weakened from within.
  • Declining ideological strength, infiltration of non-committed elements, and failure to attract educated youth have reduced its appeal and organisational strength.
• Inequality: A Continuing Risk Factor
  • While some argue that poverty has not led to widespread urban insurgency, others caution that rising inequality and visible disparities could still create space for far-left ideas, especially if grievances deepen.
  • Instead of a return to armed insurgency, the future may see issue-based, non-violent or low-intensity radicalism in urban and peri-urban areas—focused on land rights, environmental concerns, and job insecurity.
• Role of State Legitimacy
  • With access to multiple viewpoints through digital media, people are less likely to see violence as the only solution.
  • However, the state’s credibility and governance, not just its security strength, will determine whether Maoist-like spaces re-emerge.