Context

• The proposal for One Nation, One Election (ONOE) aims to synchronise elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies so they occur simultaneously.
• Proponents argue that this reform would reduce election expenditure, limit prolonged security deployment, prevent constant political campaigning, and reduce disruptions caused by the Model Code of Conduct.
• However, comparative global experiences and India’s constitutional framework raise serious concerns.

Lessons from Comparative Experience

• In 2019, Indonesia conducted simultaneous elections for the presidency, national legislature, regional legislatures, and local councils.
• Intended to improve administrative efficiency and reduce costs, the election imposed immense strain on the electoral system.
• Nearly 900 poll workers died, and thousands fell ill due to the heavy workload. Continued problems in 2024 led the Constitutional Court of Indonesia to mandate separate national and local elections beginning in 2029.
• Other democracies demonstrate that stable governance does not require synchronised polls. In Canada, federal elections and provincial elections occur independently.
• In Australia, synchronisation is structurally impossible because state legislatures serve fixed four-year terms while the federal House of Representatives has a shorter maximum tenure.
• Similarly, Germany maintains stability not through synchronised elections but through the Constructive Vote of No Confidence, which requires parliament to elect a successor before removing a Chancellor.
• Elections across German states remain deliberately staggered, reinforcing federal autonomy rather than national uniformity. 

Electoral Systems and Democratic Safeguards

• Countries such as South Africa and Indonesia operate under proportional representation, which distributes political power across multiple parties and protects minority representation.
• India’s first-past-the-post system operates differently. A strong national electoral wave could sweep both parliamentary and state elections simultaneously, weakening regional parties and reducing political diversity.
• The example of the United States offers limited relevance. Its presidential system separates the executive from legislative confidence, ensuring fixed electoral cycles.
• India’s parliamentary system, by contrast, requires governments to retain the confidence of the legislature to remain in office.

Constitutional Design and Parliamentary Responsibility

• India’s constitutional framework prioritises executive accountability over guaranteed stability.
• During debates in the Constituent Assembly of India, B. R. Ambedkar emphasised that democracy cannot maximise both stability and responsibility simultaneously.
• The Constitution reflects this choice. Article 75 of the Constitution of India and Article 164 of the Constitution of India establish collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature.
• Meanwhile, Article 83 and Article 172 prescribe only a maximum tenure of five years rather than a guaranteed term.
• Early dissolution therefore functions as a democratic safeguard, allowing voters to renew mandates when governments lose legislative support.

The Problem of Unexpired-Term Elections

• A central feature of the 129th Amendment Bill, 2024, developed from recommendations of the committee chaired by the former President Mr Ram Nath Kovind, is the concept of unexpired-term elections.
• If a legislature dissolves early, the newly elected body would serve only the remaining portion of the original cycle.
• This arrangement creates multiple distortions. First, it devalues the franchise, as voters would elect governments with truncated mandates.
• Second, short-term governments may lack incentives for long-term policy reform, encouraging populism and policy drift.
• Third, the absence of a clear minimum residual term could produce a governance dead zone.
• At the state level, postponing elections to maintain synchronisation could prolong Article 356 of the Constitution of India (President’s Rule).
• At the Union level, prolonged caretaker arrangements could conflict with the parliamentary meeting requirement under Article 85 of the Constitution of India.

Discretionary Powers and Risks of Abuse

• The proposed Article 82A allows the Election Commission of India to recommend deferring state elections if simultaneous conduct is impracticable.
• However, the amendment lacks clear criteria, time limits, and parliamentary oversight.
• A state government could collapse mid-term, be placed under President’s Rule, and have elections delayed until the national cycle resumes.
• Even if rarely used, such provisions expand the constitutional possibility of misuse. As Alexander Hamilton warned that the mere possibility of abuse can undermine constitutional safeguards.
• The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India reaffirmed that constitutional validity depends on institutional design, not assurances of benign exercise.

The Cost Argument

• Supporters of ONOE emphasise the financial burden of elections, yet the costs remain relatively small. Parliamentary estimates place combined Lok Sabha and state election expenditure at roughly ₹4,500 crore, around 0.25% of the Union Budget and about 0.03% of GDP.
• India’s phased election model allows the Election Commission of India to rotate EVMs, VVPATs, and security forces, improving logistical efficiency.
• Conducting simultaneous elections nationwide may require additional resources, weakening claims of administrative savings.

Conclusion

• The ONOE proposal promises administrative convenience, cost reduction, and reduced campaign disruption, yet its constitutional implications are far-reaching.
• Synchronised elections risk weakening federalism, diluting legislative accountability, and altering the balance of India’s parliamentary democracy.
• The system of staggered elections provides continuous democratic oversight and preserves the autonomy of states.
• Electoral frequency should not be viewed as an administrative burden but as an essential feature of representative government.