Context

• The issue of gubernatorial assent to State legislation has long strained India’s federal structure, particularly in States governed by parties opposed to the Union government.
• In April 2025, the Supreme Court appeared to decisively correct this imbalance in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu by imposing definitive timelines on Governors and allowing courts to treat unexplained inaction as deemed assent.
• This intervention reaffirmed democratic accountability and legislative supremacy.
• However, the subsequent advisory opinion in Special Reference No. 1 of 2025 significantly diluted these safeguards, raising serious concerns about executive overreach and constitutional regression.

The April Verdict and Advisory Opinion

• The April Verdict: Restoring Democratic Accountability
  • The April judgment was widely regarded as a democracy-affirming correction to the persistent misuse of gubernatorial powers.
  • Governors had routinely delayed assent to Bills, resulting in policy paralysis and procedural limbo.
  • By imposing clear timelines and recognising deemed assent as a judicial remedy, the Court transformed Article 200 into a mechanism of constitutional discipline.
  • Importantly, the judgment clarified that the Governor’s role is procedural rather than veto-like.
  • By limiting prolonged silence and obstruction, it ensured that unelected constitutional functionaries could not dominate elected legislatures, thereby restoring balance in Centre-State relations and reinforcing the primacy of democratic institutions.
• The Advisory Opinion: A Course Reversal in Disguise
  • This clarity was short-lived. In Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, a Constitution Bench rejected judicially imposed timelines as lacking textual support and declared deemed assent incompatible with the constitutional scheme.
  • The Court endorsed a broad elasticity in the discretionary powers of Governors and the President, legitimising delays in assent.
  • Although advisory in nature, the opinion carries immense persuasive authority.
  • It effectively neutralises the April verdict by converting what was previously condemned as obstruction into constitutionally permissible discretion, once again exposing States to indefinite executive inaction.

The Illusion of Constitutional Dialogue

• A central justification offered is the notion of constitutional dialogue under Article 200.
• The Court presents assent and reconsideration as a communicative process between constitutional actors. However, dialogue without timely response is ineffective.
• The primary grievance against Governors has been their strategic silence, which converts dialogue into deadlock.
• The April judgment addressed this problem by foreclosing prolonged inaction.
• In contrast, the Reference opinion affords leniency to motivated silence, limiting judicial relief to mere directions to decide.
• By removing timelines and the threat of deemed assent, silence itself becomes a tool of political control.

The Troubling Aspect of Reference Opinion: Diluting the Binding Nature of Re-enacted Bills

• The most troubling aspect of the Reference opinion lies in its interpretation of the first proviso to Article 200.
• The constitutional text clearly provides that once a legislature re-enacts a Bill, the Governor must assent.
• The April judgment reinforced this binding nature.
• The Reference opinion undermines this safeguard by allowing Governors to refer even reconsidered and re-enacted Bills to the President in all circumstances.
• This negates the finality of legislative reiteration and creates a constitutional black hole where Bills can be indefinitely stalled.
• The principle that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is effectively abandoned. 

Checks, Balances, and a False Equivalence

• The Court invokes checks and balances to justify expanded gubernatorial discretion, citing concerns that legislatures may enact unconstitutional or repugnant laws.
• This reasoning rests on a false equivalence. Legislative excesses are always subject to judicial review, whereas denial or delay of assent has no effective remedy.
• Elevating the Governor’s procedural role into a quasi-judicial safeguard misconstrues constitutional design.
• Assent is a formal step in law-making, not a preliminary judicial review.
• Treating it as such transforms a procedural check into a substantive veto, distorting institutional balance.

Conclusion

• Taken together, the two decisions reveal a retreat from principled constitutional restraint.
• While State of Tamil Nadu imposed necessary limits on gubernatorial power, Special Reference No. 1 of 2025 dismantles those limits under the guise of textual fidelity and dialogue.
• The outcome is a renewed empowerment of unelected Governors, a weakening of State legislative authority, and an unwanted tilt towards Union dominance.
• Whether binding or not, the advisory opinion marks a moment of constitutional retrogression, normalising legislative paralysis and undermining the federal balance essential to India’s democracy.