Context

• The intersection of consent, deception, and the law in cases involving sexual intercourse under the false promise of marriage has been a controversial legal and social issue in India.
• While concerns about misuse of rape laws exist, they must be balanced against the need to protect the bodily autonomy and dignity of women.
• The introduction of Section 69 in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, has reignited debates about the adequacy and coherence of legal provisions governing such cases.
• Now it is important to examine the evolution of judicial interpretation, the legislative attempt through Section 69 BNS, and its potential redundancy and constitutional concerns.

The Legal Backdrop and Section 69 of the BNS

• The newly codified BNS introduced Section 69, which explicitly criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means, including a false promise to marry, as a separate offence from rape.
• This provision did not exist as a standalone clause in the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
• Section 69 prescribes a maximum punishment of ten years and a fine, which is comparatively lesser than the punishment for rape under Section 63 BNS (analogous to Section 375 IPC).
• However, the insertion of this clause has not been without criticism.
• It is argued that Section 69 not only duplicates existing legal provisions but also inadvertently dilutes the severity of the act by treating it as an offence of lesser gravity.
• Notably, the BNS retains the definition of consent under Section 28, which includes ‘misconception of fact’, a category under which false promises of marriage already fall.
• Thus, the legal framework continues to recognise such instances as rape, rendering Section 69 legally redundant.

Judicial Interpretation and Limitations Imposed by Courts

• Indian courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have significantly narrowed the scope of rape charges in cases involving false promises of marriage.
• Through a series of landmark rulings, the judiciary has attempted to distinguish between genuine relationships that went sour and cases of deception from the outset.
• Anurag Soni v. The State of Chhattisgarh (2019)
  • In this case, the Court clarified that a breach of a sincere promise due to unforeseen events cannot be construed as rape.
  • The element of criminal intent—i.e., whether the accused intended to marry the woman at the outset—is crucial to determining the nature of the offence.
• Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. (2025)
  • Similarly, in this case, the Court quashed a case involving a 15-year-long consensual relationship, highlighting that prolonged physical relations without coercion or deceit undermined the claim of rape based on false promise.
  • The complainant had even represented herself publicly as the accused’s wife, leading the Court to conclude that the relationship was consensual and devoid of manipulation.
• Abhishek Arjariya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2025): The High Court ruled that if the woman was already married, consent obtained for a relationship based on a promise of marriage does not fall under misconception of fact, further limiting the ambit of such claims.

Redundancy and Constitutional Concerns of Section 69

• Section 69, by isolating these cases from the definition of rape, creates a legal inconsistency.
• If sexual intercourse under a false promise of marriage is already prosecutable as rape (via “misconception of fact” in Section 28), there is little justification for introducing a lesser offence.
• Furthermore, Section 69 lacks a non-obstante clause, a legislative tool that establishes a provision’s precedence over conflicting laws—raising concerns about its constitutional validity.
• In the absence of an explicit exclusion from Section 63 (rape), Section 69 may not withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.
• The creation of a separate offence for the same act potentially violates the principle of equal treatment and legal consistency.
• Unless the legislature amends Section 63 to exempt cases under Section 69 or clarifies the boundary between the two provisions, Section 69 risks being struck down as arbitrary and redundant.

The Way Forward: Need for Procedural Prudence and Judicial Economy

• Given the trend of courts quashing FIRs in such cases, there is a need for procedural caution by the police.
• Law enforcement agencies should undertake preliminary inquiries to ascertain the existence of a cognisable offence before filing formal charges.
• This approach would prevent undue harassment of accused individuals and reduce the burden on the judiciary.
• It also reinforces the principle that criminal law should not be weaponised in interpersonal disputes unless there is clear evidence of deception or coercion.

Conclusion

• The introduction of Section 69 in the BNS was perhaps well-intentioned, aiming to fill perceived legislative gaps.
• However, its overlap with existing definitions of rape under the law, combined with judicial precedents that have already provided a nuanced understanding of consent, renders it largely unnecessary and potentially unconstitutional.
• A more effective approach lies in judicial vigilance, cautious policing, and legislative clarity, rather than duplicative or ambiguous provisions that may undermine the integrity of the legal system.