Context

• Maoism in India, once among the most serious internal security challenges, has been substantially weakened over the past decade.
• Violent incidents have declined sharply since 2010, and the geographical spread of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) has contracted dramatically.
• From over a hundred affected districts, Maoist influence is now largely restricted to a few pockets in the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh, with only three districts, Bijapur, Narayanpur and Sukma, classified as most affected.
• This transformation marks a major success for the Indian state, though the durability of peace will depend on addressing long-standing structural issues.

Historical Roots of Maoist Expansion in Dandakaranya

• The Maoist movement consolidated itself in the Dandakaranya region (DKR) during the early 1980s after facing pressure in Andhra Pradesh.
• DKR’s dense forests, rugged terrain, and location across multiple State boundaries made it an ideal rear area.
• More significantly, the region’s tribal population had experienced prolonged marginalisation and minimal state presence.
• Severe governance deficit characterised the region, shaped by administrative neglect and policies that isolated tribal areas from mainstream development.
• This vacuum enabled Maoists to build parallel systems of authority and project themselves as defenders of tribal interests.
• The state’s emphasis on mineral extraction, combined with tribal struggles over land, forests and water, created fertile ground for insurgency.
• Maoism thus expanded not only through armed strength but also through the exploitation of unresolved socio-economic grievances.

The Security-Centric Turn and Its Impact

• The decline of Maoism is closely linked to a strategic shift towards establishing security camps in remote and previously insurgent-controlled areas.
• Despite initial local resistance, these camps gradually gained acceptance as they began delivering visible benefits.
• Expansion of security camps significantly increased the state’s presence, improving the police-to-population ratio and limiting Maoist freedom of movement.
• Faster response times during emergencies placed insurgents on the defensive and enhanced the confidence and morale of security forces.
• Just as importantly, the visible dominance of state forces produced a psychological impact, reassuring local communities of the government’s ability to provide safety and stability.
• These developments generated cumulative advantages. Improved human intelligence strengthened counterinsurgency operations, while infrastructure projects such as roads and mobile towers began to transform daily life.
• Under the protection of security camps, the civil administration expanded its reach. For many villagers, this marked the first meaningful interaction with state officials beyond the police or forest department, altering long-held perceptions of the government.

Erosion of Maoist Capability and Appeal

• As governance deepened and security improved, Maoist influence weakened considerably. Declining Maoist recruitment reflected the loss of ideological appeal and organisational capacity.
• Access to weapons, ammunition and funding diminished, while numerous cadres and leaders surrendered or were neutralised through security operations.
• The shrinking support base among tribal communities underscored a critical reality: insurgencies rooted in governance failures lose relevance when those failures are systematically addressed.
• Nevertheless, military success alone cannot guarantee lasting peace. The underlying grievances that once sustained Maoism cannot be resolved solely through security measures.

The Imperative of Structural Reform and Constitutional Guarantees

• The post-insurgency phase presents a more complex challenge. As communities emerge from isolation, rights-based demands are expected to intensify.
• Some surrendered Maoist leaders have already indicated their intent to pursue tribal causes through democratic means, signalling a transition from armed struggle to political engagement.
• Implementation of PESA and FRA is therefore central to the next phase. These constitutional frameworks are essential for strengthening local self-governance, protecting forest and land rights, and empowering tribal communities.
• In many regions, civil administration must effectively begin anew, rebuilding institutions while simultaneously earning public trust.
• A long-term development vision aligned with the Viksit Bharat 2047 framework can help consolidate peace.
• Long-term inclusive development must balance economic growth with ecological sustainability and tribal autonomy, avoiding the extractive approaches that previously fuelled alienation and conflict.

Conclusion

• The containment of Maoism represents a significant achievement for the Indian state, reflecting effective coordination between security forces and civil administration.
• Yet the true measure of success lies beyond the decline of violence. Sustainable peace will depend on translating security gains into justice, inclusion and democratic participation.
• The sacrifices made by security forces have created a critical opening; its outcome will be determined by the state’s ability to address the structural inequities at the heart of the conflict.