Context:

• India’s nuclear power programme has long suffered from policy uncertainty, liability bottlenecks, and investor hesitation, especially after the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
• In this backdrop, Parliament has passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill.
• It aims to reset India’s nuclear governance framework and align it with global nuclear commerce norms while strengthening energy security and decarbonisation goals.

Why the SHANTI Bill Matters?

• Nuclear power is a clean, reliable baseload energy source, crucial for India’s net-zero ambitions.
• India targets 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047, requiring large-scale investment, global collaboration, and regulatory credibility.
• The SHANTI Bill represents India’s “second chance” to emerge as a credible nuclear energy leader.

Key Features of the SHANTI Bill:

• Legislative reset:
  • Replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 with a single, integrated legal framework.
  • Seeks to harmonise Indian law with global nuclear liability regimes.
• Balanced public–private participation (PPP):
  • Allows involvement of both public and private sectors, but maintains a state-led system. Foreign-incorporated companies excluded as licensees.
  • Sensitive stages such as fuel cycle, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel management remain exclusively with the central government.
  • This balanced PPP is termed as a cautious expansion strategy.
• Regulatory architecture and safety:
  • Licensing: Retained by the government.
  • Safety authorization: Assigned to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) with enhanced statutory powers, stronger radiation safety norms, mandatory public outreach, and improved emergency preparedness.
  • It ensures independent regulators, nuclear safety, institutional capacity.
• Nuclear liability framework – The core reform:
  • Operator-centric liability: Aligns with global practice where primary liability rests with the operator. Limits operator liability to 300 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights).
  • Curtailment of supplier liability:
    • Operator’s right of recourse limited to contractual terms, intentional wrongdoing, etc.
    • It shifts a share of responsibility beyond the operator’s cap to the central government through a Nuclear Liability Fund.
    • It points to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for supplementary funds if claims exceed that level.
    • This indicates a shift from the expansive supplier liability introduced in 2010.
• State as insurer of last resort:
• Terrorism recognised as a sovereign risk.
• The state assumes liability in extreme cases.
• Ensures victims are not left uncompensated after catastrophic events, assuring last-resort liability of the state.
• Graded liability and transparency:
  • Liability graded according to the nature of installation, risk profile.
  • No category allowed below a minimum threshold without regulator-certified rationale.
  • Annual public disclosure on liability and compensation financing.
• Victim-centric compensation:
  • Expanded definition of nuclear damage: long-term health impacts, environmental degradation, loss of livelihood and income, and preventive measures.
  • Claims pathway with timelines, faster disbursement via dedicated funds - establishing the principle of speed of compensation equals justice.
• Intellectual property (IP) reforms:
  • Creation of a special nuclear inventions regime.
  • Amendments to patent laws to encourage nuclear energy–related innovations, safety software, radiation applications, robotics and specialised manufacturing.
  • Impact: Strengthens domestic nuclear supply chains and skilled employment.

Challenges and Concerns:

• Political and moral insensitivities: Dilution of supplier liability may be criticised as pro-corporate, diluting victim justice and a strong emotional legacy of the Bhopal disaster.
• Weak institutional capacity: AERB needs more specialised inspectors, faster rule-making ability, and strong enforcement credibility.
• Public trust deficit: Nuclear safety concerns, limited public understanding of liability mechanisms.

Way Forward:

• Capacity building and public engagement:
  • Strengthen AERB autonomy and staffing.
  • Build insurance and reinsurance capacity.
  • Enhance public communication and transparency.
• Use SHANTI as a platform to:
  • Deepen India–US civil nuclear cooperation.
  • Diversify nuclear partnerships beyond single suppliers.
  • Integrate nuclear energy firmly into India’s climate strategy.

Conclusion:

• The SHANTI Bill does not claim perfection, but it offers credibility, clarity, and convergence with global norms—three essentials for scaling nuclear energy.
• By balancing safety, liability, innovation, and investment, SHANTI provides India with an opportunity to move from prolonged debate to delivery, transforming India from a cautious nuclear outlier into a reliable global nuclear builder.