Context

• In the aftermath of the Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998, India moved swiftly to draft its nuclear doctrine, underscoring its vision as a nuclear weapons state.
• On August 17, 1999, the National Security Advisory Board, led by K. Subrahmanyam, presented a draft of this doctrine to the then National Security Advisor.
• After 25 years, it is crucial to examine the historical context, evolving security threats, and ongoing relevance of India's nuclear doctrine, arguing that it remains a beacon of stability despite the changing global and regional security landscape.

Historical Context and Core Principles of India’s Nuclear Journey and Need for a Doctrine

• India's Entry into the Nuclear Club
  • India's journey toward becoming a nuclear weapons state culminated with the Pokhran II tests in May 1998, a significant milestone that demonstrated its capability and resolve.
  • These tests, conducted under a shroud of secrecy, marked India's entry into the exclusive club of nuclear-armed states.
  • However, the tests were not just about showcasing technological prowess; they were a strategic signal to the world, especially to neighbouring Pakistan and China, about India's readiness to defend its sovereignty.
• International Response and the Need for a Doctrine
  • The global community, particularly Western powers, viewed India's nuclear ambitions with suspicion and concern.
  • It was within this context that India needed to articulate a clear and responsible nuclear doctrine that would allay fears of a potential arms race in South Asia, while simultaneously asserting its right to self-defence.
  • The development of a draft nuclear doctrine was a response to this necessity.

An Analysis of the Components of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine and Evolving Threat Landscape

• The Draft Doctrine: Transparency and Democratic Ethos
  • On August 17, 1999, Subrahmanyam, a prominent strategist and the convenor of the first National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), presented the draft nuclear doctrine.
  • This document was significant for several reasons. Firstly, it was one of the few instances where a nuclear weapons state publicly shared its nuclear strategy before finalising it, reflecting a commitment to transparency.
  • Secondly, by making the draft public, the Indian government, led by PM Vajpayee, sought to ensure that the doctrine would be thoroughly debated and understood, both domestically and internationally, before it was officially adopted.
  • This move was in line with India's democratic ethos, where major policy shifts are subject to public discourse and scrutiny.
• Conceptualising Nuclear Weapons as Political Instruments
  • The draft doctrine laid out the foundational principles that would guide India’s nuclear policy.
  • Central to these principles was the conceptualisation of nuclear weapons as primarily political instruments, rather than tools of warfighting.
  • This perspective was rooted in the belief that nuclear weapons, by their very nature, are weapons of mass destruction that should be used solely for deterrence and not for actual combat.
  • The doctrine emphasised that India’s nuclear weapons were intended to deter aggression, particularly nuclear aggression, by maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.
  • This meant that India would build and maintain a nuclear arsenal that was sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary in the event of a nuclear attack, thereby deterring such an attack in the first place.
• The No-First-Use Policy: A Reflection of Restraint
  • This policy stated that India would not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike but would retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear weapons.
  • The NFU policy reflected India’s strategic culture, which has traditionally been marked by restraint and non-aggression.
  • By committing to NFU, India sought to position itself as a responsible nuclear power, one that would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation and not as a tool of coercion.
• Building a Diverse and Flexible Nuclear Force
  • The draft doctrine also advocated for a nuclear force that was effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive.
  • This implied that India’s nuclear arsenal would be designed to survive a first strike and retaliate effectively, ensuring that any adversary contemplating a nuclear attack would be deterred by the certainty of a devastating response.
  • The emphasis on diversity and flexibility highlighted the need for a mix of delivery systems, including land-based missiles, aircraft, and sea-based platforms, to ensure the survivability and credibility of India’s deterrent.
• Evolving Threat Landscape
  • The security environment in South Asia has evolved since the doctrine's conception.
  • Pakistan’s frequent assertions of its full spectrum deterrence and China's rapid expansion of its nuclear capabilities pose significant challenges.
  • Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism and China's increasingly assertive behaviour have emerged as primary security threats for India.
  • The possibility of these two nuclear-armed neighbours collaborating against India further complicates the strategic calculus.

Criticisms of Draft Doctrine and Reasons Why India Does Not Need to Abandon the Core Principles of Draft Doctrine

• The Debate on No-First-Use Policy
  • Critics argue that this policy is overly reactive and cedes strategic initiative to adversaries, particularly considering Pakistan’s and China’s aggressive postures.
  • Some advocate for adopting a first-use strategy or at least maintaining strategic ambiguity to keep adversaries uncertain.
  • However, this argument falters when scrutinised because a credible first-use strategy would necessitate an extensive and sophisticated nuclear arsenal, capable of delivering a disabling strike on an adversary’s nuclear forces.
  • This would require significant investments in accurate delivery systems, ISR capabilities, and ballistic missile defences—none of which would come easily or cheaply.
  • Moreover, the risk of miscalculation and escalation inherent in a first-use policy could lead to catastrophic consequences, particularly against adversaries with robust second-strike capabilities.
• Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Escalation Control
  • The draft doctrine has also faced criticism for not explicitly incorporating the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence.
  • Proponents of this view argue that tactical nuclear weapons, with their purported ability to achieve limited destruction, could provide a more credible deterrent.
  • However, the very nature of nuclear weapons makes the concept of ‘limited destruction’ highly dubious.
  • Even a so-called tactical use could quickly escalate into full-scale nuclear conflict, with unpredictable and devastating consequences.

Way Forward: Measures to Enhance the Survivability and Resilience of India’s Nuclear Arsenal

• Beyond the quantitative aspects of nuclear deterrence, recent technological advancements by adversaries necessitate a closer examination of India’s nuclear strategy.
• These include improvements in conventional delivery systems, cyber capabilities targeting nuclear command and control, and advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
• Such developments could make India’s nuclear forces more vulnerable to a first strike, underscoring the need to enhance the survivability and resilience of its nuclear arsenal.
• However, these technological challenges do not inherently require a change in the core principles of India’s nuclear doctrine.
• Instead, they call for an adaptation in numbers and command structures to ensure the continued effectiveness of the deterrence.
• The emphasis remains on maintaining a credible second-strike capability, rather than shifting towards a first-use policy or altering the foundational doctrine.

Conclusion

• While the evolving security landscape and technological advancements necessitate ongoing adaptations in India’s nuclear force structure and capabilities, the core principles of its nuclear doctrine remain sound.
• India’s nuclear policy is a pillar of stability in an increasingly volatile world, providing a measured and responsible approach to nuclear deterrence that contrasts sharply with the aggressive postures of some of its adversaries.