Context

• The renewed scrutiny of the role of Governors in India has brought attention back to the intentions of the framers of the Constitution and the divergence between those intentions and contemporary practices.
• As the Constitution was adopted on November 26, 1949, the Constituent Assembly engaged in extensive debate to ensure that institutions such as the Governor’s office operated within the spirit of parliamentary democracy.
• The evolving debate on the role of Governors highlights a clear divergence between constitutional intention and administrative practice.

The Vision of the Constitution’s Framers

• The Assembly voiced strong concerns about the impartiality and democratic legitimacy of a nominated Governor.
• Many feared that such an appointee, being selected by the Centre rather than elected by the people, could be susceptible to political influence, mirroring the colonial-era Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935.
• The apprehension was that post-independence India might replicate the hierarchical power structures of the British Raj.
• Throughout these debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar clarified that the Governor was intended to be a purely constitutional Governor, required to act strictly on the advice of the Council of Ministers.
• He emphasised that the Governor’s responsibility was to make the parliamentary system work, not to rival the elected Ministry.
• This design ensured that democratic authority remained solely with elected representatives, not with nominated functionaries.

The Question of Discretion: Limited and Clearly Defined

• A major concern related to the Governor’s discretionary powers.
• Members feared that granting any discretionary authority risked reintroducing the overriding powers of colonial Governors.
• Ambedkar responded categorically that the Constitution provided only a very limited discretion, applicable only in explicit circumstances such as choosing a Chief Minister when no party commands a clear majority.
• He repeatedly asserted that no power of discretion is to be inferred unless expressly provided.
• This principle was essential in ensuring that Governors could not unilaterally expand their authority through interpretation or convention.
• The office was meant to be restrained, predictable, and firmly subordinate to the democratic executive.

The Debate on Withholding Assent to Bills

• The power to withhold assent or reserve Bills for the President also triggered significant debate.
• Critics argued that allowing a nominated Governor to impede legislation passed by an elected Assembly threatened the very basis of representative government.
• Leaders such as N.G. Ranga warned that permitting such control would be dangerous, as it placed elected legislatures at the mercy of an unelected figure.
• Ambedkar clarified that this power was not a discretionary veto but a procedural safeguard meant only for exceptional cases involving federal concerns or violations of constitutional principles.
• He stressed that the Governor was not a judge of legislative wisdom, stating that where the Constitution required action on ministerial advice, he must act on advice.
• His assurance that there was no ground for fear that the Governor will become a rival authority captured the framers’ determination to uphold democratic supremacy.

The Framers’ Expectations and Changed Realities

• Ambedkar extended the principle of limited authority even to emergencies, asserting that Governors did not gain special powers and remained bound by ministerial advice.
• His confidence in the restrained nature of the office led him to remark that the role was so limited, so nominal, so ornamental that few would even desire it.
• In contrast, present-day political realities reveal a growing departure from this constitutional vision.
• In several States, Governors have been accused of delaying assent, withholding decisions, and engaging in political disagreements, challenging the norms of cooperative federalism.
• The constitutional requirement to act as soon as possible has, in some instances, been reinterpreted as ‘as late as possible’, causing friction between State governments and the gubernatorial office.
• These developments echo K. R. Narayanan’s profound question on the 50th anniversary of the Republic: “Has the Constitution failed us, or have we failed the Constitution?”
• The evidence suggests that constitutional function is compromised not by structural flaws but by individuals who disregard the ethical and moral responsibilities embedded in their offices.

Conclusion

• The framers envisioned a Governor who was neutral, restrained, and bound by democratic accountability.
• Contemporary deviations do not reflect ambiguity in constitutional design but a failure to adhere to constitutional morality.
• Ambedkar’s caution that if the system breaks down, Man was vile, remains a powerful reminder that democratic institutions rely not only on legal provisions but also on the integrity of those entrusted with authority.
• Upholding the limited authority, constitutional propriety, and democratic ethos intended by the framers is essential for preserving the balance of India’s parliamentary democracy.