Context

• While the May 2025 standoff between India and Pakistan unfolded primarily in the air domain, subsequent developments indicate that the focus of their rivalry has shifted toward the maritime theatre.
• Naval manoeuvres, statements from political and military leaders, and visible demonstrations of capability all suggest that the Indian Ocean is becoming a central arena of competition.
• Unlike past crises that remained confined to land and air, the growing salience of the sea reflects both changing force postures and a wider geopolitical context shaped by Chinese and Turkish involvement.

Naval Posturing After the Air Crisis

• Indian Navy’s Preparedness
  • India’s maritime activity since Operation Sindoor reflects a shift toward forward deterrence and a more assertive naval posture.
  • Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s October warning, invoking the 1965 war, signalled a willingness to escalate in response to Pakistan’s infrastructure buildup in Sir Creek.
  • Similarly, Admiral Dinesh Tripathi’s statement that the Navy would be the first to act in future conflicts underscores a doctrinal recalibration toward proactivity at sea.
  • The induction of INS Nistar and joint patrols with the Philippines in the South China Sea illustrate India’s dual focus: strengthening domestic capability while embedding itself more firmly within the Indo-Pacific strategic framework.
• Pakistan’s Naval Posture
  • Pakistan, meanwhile, has responded with its own demonstrations.
  • The launch of the Chinese-built Hangor-class submarine PNS Mangro and the unveiling of the P282 ship-launched ballistic missile showcase an expanding arsenal.
  • Naval dispersal from Karachi to Gwadar, intended to reduce vulnerability, signals strategic adaptation, while overlapping missile tests and live-fire drills maintain operational pressure on India.
  • Together, these moves demonstrate that Pakistan is no longer content to concede maritime inferiority, but rather seeks to complicate Indian operational planning and deny uncontested dominance in the Arabian Sea.

Escalation Risks at Sea

• Unlike aerial skirmishes, naval confrontations present a unique challenge for escalation control.
• Ships and submarines, once deployed, linger in contested waters, making disengagement slower and costlier.
• Memories of India’s decisive naval blockade in 1971 continue to shape Pakistan’s maritime outlook, motivating its pursuit of anti-access/area-denial capabilities and reinforcing its emphasis on deterrence-by-denial.
• The psychological weight of Gwadar and Karachi adds to the volatility. Both are more than logistical hubs, they are strategic pressure points embedded within Pakistan’s national security psyche.
• Any Indian naval action against these sites risks being interpreted as existential, potentially triggering escalation beyond limited aims.
• The prospect of Chinese involvement through the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further heightens the stakes, narrowing the space for coercion short of war.

The External Dimension

• India and Pakistan’s naval manoeuvres must also be read in a wider geopolitical context.
• China’s presence in Gwadar and Karachi raises the possibility of PLAN involvement in a crisis, eroding India’s traditional dominance in the Indian Ocean.
• Türkiye’s growing role, primarily as a supplier of Babur-class corvettes and naval training, introduces another external actor into the maritime balance.
• For India, joint patrols in the Indo-Pacific and indigenous shipbuilding efforts signal intent to integrate its maritime strategy with broader regional security concerns.
• At the same time, Pakistan’s modernisation trajectory underscores its intent to prevent a repeat of 1971, when its navy was decisively outmatched.
• The interplay of external partnerships thus complicates deterrence, introducing uncertainty into crisis planning on both sides.

Doctrinal Shifts and Strategic Drift

• Both India and Pakistan appear to be adapting their naval doctrines to reflect new realities, yet they remain constrained by precedents from past crises.
• India is under pressure to leverage its naval advantages as a coercive tool, while Pakistan continues to invest in capabilities designed to offset asymmetry.
• However, technological innovations, from hypersonic missiles to unmanned systems, are reshaping the escalatory ladder in ways that traditional assumptions may no longer capture.
• This creates a risk of strategic drift. If decision-making in future crises remains anchored to outdated frameworks, miscalculation becomes more likely.
• At the same time, the continuous presence of naval forces may paradoxically develop mutual awareness, reducing the fog of war through repeated observation and interaction.
• In this sense, the maritime domain may provide both heightened risks and unexpected stabilising effects.

Conclusion

• Naval exercises, missile tests, and capability inductions suggest that both sides are preparing for the possibility of confrontation at sea.
• India retains advantages in numbers and geography, but Pakistan’s modernisation, combined with Chinese and Turkish involvement, is narrowing the gap.
• Ultimately, India faces a choice: whether to treat the maritime theatre as an arena for early signalling in crises, or to hold it in reserve as an escalatory lever.
• Either way, the next India–Pakistan confrontation is unlikely to remain confined to the skies; the Indian Ocean is fast becoming the new frontier of their enduring rivalry.