Why in the News?

• Rising investor preference for gold, especially through gold ETFs, has renewed debate on India’s gold import dependence and its macroeconomic implications.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Gold Imports (Reasons for India Importing so much Gold)
• Steps Taken by Govt to Curb It (Measures & Schemes)
• News Summary

Why India Imports So Much Gold?

• India is one of the world’s largest consumers and importers of gold, despite producing negligible quantities domestically.
• This structural dependence is driven by a combination of cultural, economic, and financial factors.
• First, cultural and social factors play a major role.
  • Gold is deeply embedded in Indian traditions, especially weddings, festivals, and religious ceremonies.
  • It is viewed not merely as a luxury good but as a symbol of prosperity, security, and social status. Household demand remains stable even during economic slowdowns.
• Second, gold as a store of value explains persistent demand.
  • In many Indian households, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas, gold is preferred over financial instruments due to limited financial literacy, distrust of formal markets, and ease of liquidity.
  • Gold is often treated as an inter-generational asset.
• Third, macroeconomic uncertainty and inflation hedging increase gold demand.
  • During periods of high inflation, currency volatility, or weak equity market performance, investors shift towards gold as a safe-haven asset.
  • Historically, whenever equity returns are sub-optimal or global uncertainty rises, gold demand in India increases.
• Fourth, limited domestic alternatives for long-term savings also contribute.
  • Pension penetration remains low, and risk-averse households often find gold more reliable than equities or debt instruments.
  • This structural preference results in sustained imports, adversely impacting India’s current account balance.

Steps Taken by the Union Government to Curb These Imports

• Given the adverse impact of gold imports on the current account deficit (CAD) and foreign exchange reserves, successive governments have adopted multiple policy measures.
• One key step has been the imposition of customs duties on gold imports.
  • Higher import duties aim to discourage excessive physical gold consumption and reduce outflows of foreign exchange.
  • However, such measures have also led to smuggling in the past, indicating policy limitations.
• Another important intervention is the promotion of financial gold instruments.
  • Schemes such as Gold Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Sovereign Gold Bonds (SGBs) encourage investment in paper gold instead of physical gold.
  • These instruments reduce import pressure while providing exposure to gold prices.
• The government has also introduced Gold Monetisation Schemes, allowing households and institutions to deposit idle gold with banks, thereby mobilising domestic gold stocks and reducing fresh imports.
• Further, efforts have been made to deepen financial markets and diversify investment avenues, including mutual funds, digital payment systems, and small savings schemes, to gradually shift household savings away from physical assets.
• Despite these measures, demand moderation has been limited, indicating that gold consumption in India is influenced more by structural and behavioural factors than by short-term policy interventions.

News Summary

• Indian investors witnessed a difficult year in 2025, with benchmark equity indices delivering negative returns and overall market turnover declining. In contrast, gold ETFs saw a sharp rise in investor interest.
• Net inflows into gold ETFs surged to 25,566 crore between January and November 2025, nearly three times higher than the corresponding period in 2024.
• Gold ETFs accounted for 3.2% of total net inflows into open-ended mutual fund schemes, the highest share in recent years.
• Several factors explain this trend. Global uncertainty triggered by trade tensions and geopolitical instability has increased demand for safe-haven assets.
• Additionally, central banks across the world have been increasing gold reserves to diversify away from the US dollar, indirectly supporting global gold prices.
• Gold prices witnessed a historic rally, rising sharply over the last year, while Indian equity markets delivered muted or negative returns.
• This relative performance gap encouraged portfolio reallocation towards gold-linked instruments.
• Experts caution that while long-term fundamentals for gold remain strong, short-term gains could moderate.
• Some analysts describe the surge in gold ETF investments as partly driven by “fear of missing out” (FOMO) behaviour among retail investors.
• Overall, the outlook for gold demand in India will depend on future equity market performance, global monetary conditions, US dollar strength, and central bank policies.

Context

• Air pollution in Delhi’s National Capital Region (NCR) has reached critical levels, with vehicular emissions being the dominant contributor to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and toxic gases such as carbon monoxide, benzene, and nitrogen oxides.
• Despite this, responsibility for Delhi’s worsening air quality has frequently been placed on seasonal stubble burning by farmers in neighbouring Punjab and Haryana.
• This selective attribution obscures the complex, multi-source nature of air pollution and raises concerns regarding fairness and accuracy in environmental liability.

The Polluter Pays Principle and Its Legal Foundations

• The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) assigns the cost of environmental damage to those responsible for pollution.
• In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), the Supreme Court recognised PPP as part of Indian law, later reinforcing it through statutory recognition under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
• PPP aims to internalise environmental costs and prevent polluters from externalising harm onto society.
• However, PPP faces serious limitations in cases involving multiple point and non-point pollution sources.
• Air pollution, unlike land or water pollution, is diffuse, cumulative, and often transboundary.
• Determining precise causal links becomes difficult, weakening the effectiveness of PPP when applied in isolation and without coordinated inter-state or regional mechanisms. 

Proportionality and the Limits of Farmer Liability

• The Standley judgment (European Court of Justice, 1999) introduced proportionality in pollution liability, holding that liability must correspond to actual contribution.
• In that case, farmers challenged restrictions imposed under the EU Nitrates Directive, arguing that industrial pollution was also responsible for nitrate contamination.
• The Court accepted that imposing disproportionate liability violated fairness principles embedded within PPP.
• Applying this reasoning to India, seasonal stubble burning cannot be held singularly or excessively responsible for Delhi’s air pollution when vehicular and industrial emissions account for a substantial share.
• Assigning blame without proportional assessment undermines both legal integrity and environmental justice.

Transboundary Air Pollution and International Precedents

• Air pollution is increasingly recognised as a regional and global phenomenon rather than a purely local issue.
• The Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) established that states are responsible for environmental harm caused beyond their borders.
• Scientific research, including findings by Q. Zhang et al. (2017), demonstrates that PM2.5 pollution linked to international trade produces significant transboundary health impacts, often exceeding those caused by atmospheric transport alone.
• International agreements reinforce this understanding. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP, 1979) and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) recognise long-distance pollution movement.
• The 2012 amendment to the Gothenburg Protocol explicitly included PM2.5, confirming its capacity for long-range dispersion.
• These developments highlight the inadequacy of addressing air pollution solely through localised liability frameworks.

From Polluter Pays to Government Pays: The Indian Experience

• Despite formal recognition of PPP, Indian courts have struggled to operationalise it effectively.
• In cases such as Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action, Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, and S. Jagannath, the judiciary prioritised compensation for victims and environmental restoration over precise cost internalisation by polluters.
• This approach aligns more closely with corrective justice over cost internalisation.
• Consequently, India has witnessed a gradual shift towards a government-pays model.
• Through the Water Act (1974), Air Act (1981), Environment Protection Act (1986), and constitutional mandates under Articles 48A and 51A(g), the state has assumed primary responsibility for environmental regulation.
• Specialised authorities possess extensive powers, including industry closure and enforcement directives.

The Role of an Activist Judiciary and Its Limitations

• Regulatory authorities frequently suffer from administrative inefficiencies, prompting an increasingly activist judiciary to intervene.
• Courts often require governments to bear the primary costs of pollution monitoring and control, while polluter liability is imposed secondarily.
• This judicial stance reflects judicial welfarism protecting vulnerable victims, recognising that affected populations often lack the resources to litigate against polluters.
• While this approach enhances access to environmental justice, it weakens the deterrent function of PPP.
• Pollution prevention costs remain inadequately internalised, and long-term accountability is diluted.
• Moreover, environmental discourse in India continues to emphasise rights over duties, with limited engagement on individual environmental responsibility.

Conclusion

• Delhi’s air pollution crisis exposes the shortcomings of simplistic blame narratives and the limitations of unilateral liability frameworks.
• While PPP remains a cornerstone of environmental law, its effective application requires proportionality, scientific attribution, and regional cooperation.
• India’s reliance on a government-pays approach and judicial intervention provides immediate relief but undermines sustained accountability.
• A balanced framework integrating PPP, administrative efficiency, transboundary cooperation, and individual responsibility is essential for durable environmental justice and improved air quality governance.

Context

• Public policies are shaped by the objectives they prioritise, whether equity, efficiency, fiscal sustainability, or political symbolism.
• In medical education, these choices have far-reaching consequences for access, quality, and public health outcomes.
• The proposed public–private partnership (PPP) model for medical colleges in Andhra Pradesh illustrates how policy design reveals true objectives.
• A close examination shows serious concerns regarding equity, risk allocation, system efficiency, and the long-term viability of public healthcare.

Expansion of Medical Education and the Shift Towards PPPs

• Andhra Pradesh has rapidly expanded medical education infrastructure. Government medical colleges increased to 17, alongside 19 private colleges, with plans for 10 more.
• Each new college was designed with 150 seats and attached to a 650-bed district hospital, financed through public funds, NABARD loans, and central schemes.
• To address fiscal pressures, a three-tier fee structure was introduced, effectively commercialising half the seats even in government colleges.
• The newer proposal pushes this trajectory further. Under the PPP model promoted by NITI Aayog, private investors would receive land and district hospitals on long-term leases at nominal rates, along with viability gap funding, assured bed occupancy, and regulatory clearances.
• In return, they would construct and operate medical colleges while providing limited free services.
• This marks a decisive shift, as the PPP model shifts welfare to market, prioritising investor viability alongside public objectives.

Unequal Risk Sharing and Incentive Distortions

• A central weakness of the proposed framework lies in how risks are distributed.
• Private investors face delayed reimbursements, mandatory free outpatient services, and capped package rates under public insurance schemes.
• These pressures may encourage undesirable practices such as informal fees, faculty shortages, compromised care quality, or selective denial of services to redirect patients to paying beds.
• At the same time, the government assumes long-term systemic risks. Handing over district hospitals for up to 66 years reduces public control over essential health infrastructure.
• If the private partner underperforms or exits, judicial remedies are slow and uncertain.
• This arrangement reflects how unequal risk sharing distorts incentives, undermining both efficiency and accountability.

Impact on Access, Equity, and the Public Health System

• The PPP proposal has generated widespread opposition due to fears of privatisation of public assets.
• Affordable medical education opportunities for middle- and lower-income students may shrink, while employment pathways in public hospitals could narrow as private operators are not bound by reservation or recruitment norms. Patients who currently receive free care may increasingly face out-of-pocket expenses.
• Beyond individual access, the model threatens the coherence of the public health system.
• District-level PPP hospitals fragment service delivery and weaken coordination between primary, secondary, and tertiary care.
• Effective health systems depend on seamless referral pathways and continuity of care, particularly for chronic diseases. The proposed structure risks exactly the opposite, as fragmentation weakens integrated public health.

Structural Weaknesses and Governance Constraints

• Andhra Pradesh’s health system already struggles with chronic underfunding, infrastructure gaps, and severe shortages of specialists, especially in rural areas.
• Commercialisation of medical education is likely to intensify these problems, as graduates burdened with high fees tend to prefer urban, private-sector, or overseas employment.
• Instead of selling seats at high prices, the state could expand subsidised education linked to service obligations, building a stable public health workforce.
• Moreover, PPPs require a strong regulatory state capable of enforcing contracts and standards.
• Past experiences with weak enforcement of health regulations and fragmented primary care contracts indicate limited institutional capacity, making large-scale privatisation of health assets especially risky.

Quality, Sustainability, and the Future of Medical Education

• Medical education in India faces a broader crisis marked by faculty shortages and uneven quality.
• Rapid expansion without adequate teaching staff risks repeating the collapse seen in engineering education after unchecked growth.
• Simply increasing the number of colleges does not guarantee better outcomes. What matters more is ensuring competent faculty, robust clinical exposure, and equitable access.
• In this context, quality and equity trump expansion. The PPP approach, focused largely on financial and infrastructural metrics, fails to address these foundational concerns and does little to strengthen the public health mission of medical education.

Conclusion

• The proposed PPP framework for medical colleges in Andhra Pradesh prioritises financial expediency over evidence-based health system
• By ceding long-term control of public hospitals, exacerbating inequities in education and care, and weakening system integration, the model risks undermining both medical education and public health outcomes.
• In a sector as critical as healthcare, policies must be guided by long-term system strengthening, equitable access, and quality of care rather than short-term fiscal or symbolic considerations.

Context:

• The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act represents the most significant reform of India’s nuclear sector since the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
• It marks a decisive shift from a state monopoly to a regulated, licence-based framework enabling private and foreign participation.
• It is crucial for achieving India’s climate commitments (Net Zero 2070), energy security, and technological self-reliance, especially in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).

Key Features of the SHANTI Act:

• End of State monopoly: It opens civil nuclear power generation to private sector participation, introduces a licence-based regime for nuclear activities, and aims to attract long-term domestic and foreign capital.
• Independent nuclear regulation: It grants statutory backing to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Positions AERB as the sector regulator, enhancing credibility and predictability.

Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability - A Breakthrough:

• Background - CLND Act:
  • Influenced by the Bhopal gas tragedy, the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act (2010) allowed operator recourse against suppliers for defective equipment/services.
  • This deviated from global norms under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC), creating a major deterrent for US, French and Japanese OEMs (Kovvada, Jaitapur stalled).
• Changes under SHANTI Act:
  • Operator recourse against suppliers allowed only when explicitly provided in contract, or in cases of intentional acts to cause nuclear damage.
  • It aligns India with international nuclear liability architecture, enhancing investor confidence and supplier participation.
• Remaining gap:
  • No statutory definition of “supplier”.
  • Earlier proposals suggested categorising manufacturers of systems/components, designers providing specifications, and quality assurance/design service providers.
  • Lack of clarity leaves residual liability uncertainty in the supply chain.

Regulatory and Institutional Concerns:

• Ambiguity in key terms:
  • Undefined terms include -
    • “Sensitive” activities (non-patentable),
    • “National security implications” (may bypass AERB),
    • “Strategic” activities (may trigger separate regulators).
• Risk -
• Start-ups, especially in SMRs, may face expropriation of IP.
• Could deter R&D investment and innovation.
• Multiple regulators (Section 25):
  • Allows creation of additional regulatory bodies for “strategic” activities. Open-ended provision creates regulatory uncertainty.
  • Need: Clearly defined circumstances in rules, or procedural safeguards before jurisdiction shifts.
• Independence of AERB:
  • AERB member selection committee constituted by the Atomic Energy Commission (DAE).
  • Best practices (e.g., Financial Sector Legislative Reform Commission [FSLRC] model) suggest independent experts, retired judges, and limited executive dominance.
  • Section 17(5) allows rules to strengthen structural independence while safeguarding national security.

Pricing of Nuclear Power - A Major Policy Challenge:

• Section 37 - Centralised tariff control: It vests pricing authority for nuclear electricity in the central government, overriding the Electricity Act, 2003.
• Issues with administered pricing:
  • Electricity is fungible — no justification for treating nuclear power differently.
  • The Electricity Act ecosystem supports tariff discovery, open access, power exchanges, and captive generation.
  • Nuclear power’s high cost makes mandatory procurement burdensome for financially stressed DISCOMs.

Way Forward - Market-Based Nuclear Expansion:

• Enable private-to-private transactions: Encourage captive nuclear generation, natural buyers (data centres, industrial clusters, SEZs, GCCs, power-intensive commercial consumers), and SMRs (ideal for 24×7 clean baseload demand).
• Learn from renewable energy models: For example, in offshore wind proposals, generators find their own C&I (commercial and industrial) buyers. Similar models can drive scalable nuclear adoption.
• Reform Section 37:
  • Legislative amendment: To remove administered pricing.
  • Alternative: Exempt private-to-private contracts via notification. Retain tariff control only for PSUs and DISCOM-linked transactions. Ensure non-discriminatory grid access. 

Conclusion:

• The SHANTI Act is a landmark reform.
• However, clarity in regulatory scope, market-driven tariff mechanisms, etc., will determine whether India can truly harness nuclear power for clean energy transition, energy security, and industrial growth.
• The success of this reform lies not just in legislation, but in its implementation architecture.

Why in news?

India’s Malaria Elimination Technical Report, 2025 has flagged urban malaria driven by the invasive mosquito Anopheles stephensi as a growing national concern.

It could threaten India’s target of eliminating malaria by 2030, with an interim goal of zero indigenous cases by 2027, aligned with World Health Organisation strategy.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Urban Malaria: A New Challenge
• Why Anopheles stephensi Is a Serious Threat?
• Persistent High-Burden Pockets
• India’s Progress So Far
• Strategic Frameworks Guiding Elimination
• The Road Ahead: 2030 Malaria-Free India

Urban Malaria: A New Challenge

• The spread of Anopheles stephensi in cities such as Delhi marks a shift from traditional rural malaria transmission.
• The species thrives in urban environments, breeding in artificial containers like overhead tanks, tyres, and construction sites.
• It efficiently transmits Plasmodium falciparum and P. vivax, complicating malaria control efforts.

Why Anopheles stephensi Is a Serious Threat?

• Recognised globally as an invasive vector.
• Adapted to high population density, informal settlements, and fragmented urban healthcare systems.
• Requires city-specific vector control and surveillance strategies, unlike conventional rural-focused approaches.

Persistent High-Burden Pockets

• India has entered the pre-elimination phase, but malaria is now concentrated in specific pockets rather than widespread.
• High-burden districts persist in Odisha, Tripura, and Mizoram.
• Cross-border transmission from Myanmar and Bangladesh continues to affect northeastern border districts.
• Key Drivers of Continued Transmission
  • Asymptomatic infections, making detection difficult.
  • Difficult terrain and remote tribal and forest areas.
  • Population mobility and migration.
  • Occupational exposure and uneven access to health services.

India’s Progress So Far

• Malaria cases reduced from 11.7 lakh (2015) to ~2.27 lakh (2024).
• Deaths declined by 78% over the same period.
• Active surveillance intensified in tribal, forest, border, and migrant-population settings.
• Health System Gaps Identified
  • Inconsistent reporting by the private sector.
  • Limited entomological capacity.
  • Drug and insecticide resistance.
  • Operational gaps in remote tribal regions.
  • Occasional shortages of diagnostics and treatment supplies.
• Priority Actions and Research Areas
  • Strengthen surveillance systems and vector monitoring.
  • Improve supply-chain reliability for diagnostics and medicines.
  • Focus operational research on:
    • Asymptomatic malaria infections
    • Ecology and control of Anopheles stephensi
    • Drug and insecticide resistance
    • Optimisation of P. vivax treatment regimens

Strategic Frameworks Guiding Elimination

• India’s success rests on a clear policy roadmap:
  • National Framework for Malaria Elimination (NFME), 2016: Target of zero indigenous cases by 2027.
  • National Strategic Plan for Malaria Elimination (2023–2027): Focus on enhanced surveillance, “test–treat–track” strategy, and real-time monitoring through the Integrated Health Information Platform (IHIP).
• Vector Control and Urban Malaria Management
  • Integrated Vector Management (IVM) has been central, including:
    • Indoor Residual Spraying (IRS)
    • Long-Lasting Insecticidal Nets (LLINs)
    • Special attention has been given to controlling the invasive Anopheles stephensi mosquito, strengthening urban malaria control.
• Strengthening Diagnostics, Health Systems, and Communities
• Establishment of National Reference Laboratories under the National Centre of Vector Borne Diseases Control (NCVBDC).
• District-specific action plans for tribal, forested, and high-endemic areas.
• Integration of malaria services into Ayushman Bharat, with Community Health Officers and Ayushman Arogya Mandirs delivering care at the grassroots level.
• Capacity Building, Research, and Partnerships
  • Over 850 health professionals trained in 2024 through national refresher programmes.
  • Research on insecticide resistance and drug efficacy guiding evidence-based interventions.
  • Intensified Malaria Elimination Project–3 (IMEP-3) covering 159 districts in 12 states, focusing on vulnerable populations, Long-Lasting Insecticidal Nets (LLINs) distribution, entomological studies, and surveillance.

The Road Ahead: 2030 Malaria-Free India

• India remains committed to achieving zero indigenous malaria cases by 2027 and elimination by 2030, with safeguards against re-establishment.
• By combining strong policy frameworks, scientific interventions, community participation, and sustained funding, India is emerging as a global benchmark in malaria elimination.

Why in news?

Amid widespread violence and political unrest in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) acting chairman Tarique Rahman returned to the country after 17 years in exile. The turmoil has also been marked by intensifying anti-India rhetoric, raising regional and diplomatic concerns.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Forces Driving the Current Turmoil in Bangladesh
• Mobocracy and Media Control as Tools
• Economic Unravelling and India Ties
• Tarique Rahman’s Return: Political Impact After 17 Years
• Rising Anti-India Rhetoric in Bangladesh
• Why the India–Bangladesh Relationship Matters Deeply?

Forces Driving the Current Turmoil in Bangladesh

• A Planned Regime-Change Operation (July–August 2024)
  • The unrest that began in July–August 2024 has often been described as a spontaneous uprising, but evidence points to a planned operation aimed at regime change.
  • Bangladesh’s chief adviser Muhammad Yunus publicly acknowledged this in September, identifying a close aide as the strategist behind it.
  • The Jamaat-e-Islami, long aligned with Pakistan, emerged as a key driving force—and now exerts significant influence over the administration.
• Dismantling the Post-1971 Political Order
  • A central objective has been to erase the post-1971 legacy.
  • From August 5, 2024, symbols and institutions linked to the Liberation War and the Awami League have been targeted, signalling an attempt to rewrite national memory and politics.
• Minority Repression and Visible Islamisation
  • Another major strand is a crackdown on minorities and a push toward more overt Islamisation.
  • Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas have faced attacks, including allegations of killings, sexual violence, property destruction, and land grabs.
  • The lynching of Dipu Chandra Das drew international condemnation, underscoring the severity of abuses.

Mobocracy and Media Control as Tools

• Jamaat-e-Islami’s consolidation of power has been accompanied by violence and unrest as methods of control.
  • Mobocracy: Crowds surround offices, officials, and judges until demands are met.
  • Institutional Capture: Jamaat-aligned appointees are replacing incumbents across bureaucracy and academia.
  • Media Suppression: Attacks on journalists and outlets have surged; offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star were recently attacked, and some journalists detained without trial.

Economic Unravelling and India Ties

• The turmoil has disrupted long-standing economic cooperation with India, built over decades under Sheikh Hasina.
• An economy that grew 6.5–7% annually for 15 years has slowed sharply: growth has halved, factories are closing, unemployment is rising, private investment has stalled, and inflation is high.

Tarique Rahman’s Return: Political Impact After 17 Years

• Tarique Rahman, acting chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), has returned after 17 years in exile and is widely seen as a frontrunner if elections are held soon.
• However, with the Awami League barred from contesting, any poll in the current climate would likely fall short of being free or fair.
• Rahman’s return is expected to trigger a surge of public support, partly driven by sympathy for his ailing mother.
• Still, an electoral victory is not assured, given shifting alliances and internal party dynamics.
• Rahman’s homecoming does not materially alter the fundamentals: a constrained electoral field, a fragmented BNP, and an emboldened Jamaat.
• Popular enthusiasm may be high, but structural realities limit Rahman’s room to reshape outcomes in the near term.

Rising Anti-India Rhetoric in Bangladesh

• Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh is not new. Even during 1971, around 20% of the population opposed the Liberation War and India’s role.
• This strand has endured over decades alongside mainstream politics.
• Parallel to this undercurrent, India–Bangladesh relations have been anchored by deep economic cooperation and people-to-people links—including tourism, medical travel, education, and trade—creating mutual stakes beyond politics.
• India’s First Priority: Reassure the Bangladeshi People
  • India should signal goodwill toward the people of Bangladesh, not regimes alone.
  • New Delhi has already demonstrated this by continuing aid and trade, keeping communication channels open, and recently agreeing to export 50,000 metric tonnes of rice.
  • Maintaining strategic restraint while engaging all principal actors remains key.
• India’s Second Priority: Push for Inclusive Elections
  • New Delhi should insist on free, fair, and inclusive elections that allow participation by all parties, including the Awami League.
  • Only an inclusive process can restore legitimacy and stability; exclusion risks prolonging violence and volatility.

Why the India–Bangladesh Relationship Matters Deeply?

• For Bangladesh, cooperation with India was central to its economic success under Sheikh Hasina.
• India has consistently been the first responder in times of need and a reliable partner due to geographic proximity, competitive pricing, shared history, and strong people-to-people ties.
• While the current regime is engaging Pakistan, China, and Turkey, none can replicate the scale, speed, or depth of support India provides.
• Vital for India’s Security Interests
  • For India, Bangladesh is pivotal primarily due to security considerations.
  • The two share a 4,000+ km porous land border and a maritime boundary, making cooperation essential.
  • In the past, Pakistan-backed terror networks and Northeast insurgent groups used Bangladeshi territory as a haven—an issue the Hasina government actively helped address.
• Growing Strategic Risks Since August 2024
  • Since August 2024, Pakistan’s state and military have reportedly re-established pre-1971 command-and-control linkages with Bangladesh, seeking deeper military embedding, including near the India–Bangladesh border.
  • This raises concerns about regional security spillovers.

Why in news?

The Communist Party of India (CPI) has completed 100 years, tracing its origins to the Kanpur conference of December 26, 1925. The milestone has renewed attention on how communism took root in India, its ideological influences, organisational evolution, and role in the freedom struggle.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Global Antecedents of Indian Communism
• Three Political Strands Behind CPI’s Formation
• Origin Story: Tashkent vs Kanpur Debate
• Social Reform and Anti-Oppression Stance
• Role in the Freedom Struggle (1925–1947)
• Shaping the Constitution and Mass Mobilisation
• Post-Independence Trajectory

Global Antecedents of Indian Communism

• The roots of communism lie in European political upheavals after the French Revolution (1789) and Napoleonic Wars (1796–1815), which polarised society between defenders of monarchy and advocates of republican change.
• The Industrial Revolution intensified inequalities, creating fertile ground for socialist ideas.
• Karl Marx, writing in 19th-century Europe, argued for a transition from capitalism to socialism.
• While Marx expected socialist revolutions in advanced capitalist societies, the first successful socialist revolution occurred in Russia in 1917, a relatively backward, Tsarist empire.
• The Russian Revolution combined anti-feudal, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist elements, making it especially attractive to colonised countries like India.

Three Political Strands Behind CPI’s Formation

• Indian communism emerged from three distinct but converging strands:
• The MN Roy–Comintern Strand
  • MN Roy, a revolutionary who lived in the US, Mexico, Berlin, and later the USSR, played a pivotal role.
  • He attended the 1920 Comintern (Communist International) meeting as India’s representative.
  • The Comintern assessed how communism could adapt to colonial conditions, influencing Indian communists.
  • There were other groups of diasporic Indian revolutionaries active in Berlin, led by Virendranath Chattopadhyay, and Kabul, led by Raja Mahendra Pratap.
• Independent Left Groups in India
  • Separate Left formations emerged in Lahore (Ghulam Hussain), Bombay (S A Dange), Calcutta (Muzaffar Ahmad), and Madras (Singaravelu Chettiar).
  • These groups operated independently but shared anti-imperialist and socialist goals.
• Worker–Peasant Organisations
  • Trade unions and peasant bodies such as the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), formed in 1920, provided a mass base.
  • These organisations linked socialism with labour and agrarian struggles.

Origin Story: Tashkent vs Kanpur Debate

• 1920, Tashkent
  • Four Indian revolutionaries (including MN Roy and Abani Mukherji) set up a Communist Party under Comintern influence.
  • Aim: liberate India from British rule and establish socialism.
  • However, it lacked support from Indian-based Left groups and the diaspora.
• 1925, Kanpur Conference
  • Indian communist groups organised a national conference in Kanpur, resolving to form the Communist Party of India.
  • Objectives included:
    • Ending British rule
    • Establishing a workers’ and peasants’ republic
    • Socialising the means of production and distribution
• Key ideological divide
  • The CPI(M) later traced its origins to Tashkent (1920), emphasising internationalism.
  • The CPI identified Kanpur (1925) as the foundation, highlighting the Indian component of communism.

Social Reform and Anti-Oppression Stance

• Early Communists opposed not only colonial exploitation but also caste oppression and patriarchy.
• At Kanpur, conference chair M Singaravelu condemned untouchability.
• The CPI became the first organisation to bar members of communal bodies, underscoring its secular and inclusive ethos.

Role in the Freedom Struggle (1925–1947)

• 1925–28: Communists were active in organising workers’ and peasants’ movements.
• 1929: Leaders were arrested in the Meerut Conspiracy Case, accused of organising railway strikes; many were jailed or deported.
• 1930s: Communists worked with the Congress Socialist Party in a United Front against imperialism.
• 1939: The United Front collapsed due to ideological and political differences.
• Post-1945: Communists led major peasant struggles, especially in Bengal and Telangana.

Shaping the Constitution and Mass Mobilisation

• Communist influence was evident in Constituent Assembly debates on land reforms, workers’ rights, and protections for backward classes.
• Movements like the Telangana Rebellion showcased commitment to agrarian justice.
• The CPI mobilised society through organisations such as the All India Trade Union Congress, All India Kisan Sabha, All India Students’ Federation, and the Progressive Writers’ Association, embedding ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice in post-Independence discourse.

Post-Independence Trajectory

• After 1947, Indian communists followed divergent paths:
  • Some adopted armed, insurrectionary strategies.
  • Others chose the parliamentary democratic route, seeking power through elections.
• These differences eventually led to splits within the communist movement, most notably in 1964 (CPI–CPI(M) split).

Why in news?

The Ministry of Civil Aviation has issued no-objection certificates (NOCs) to two new regional airlines—Al Hind Air and FlyExpress—bringing the total number of proposed regional carriers to four. Two others, Air Kerala and Shankh Air, received NOCs last year but are yet to secure Air Operator Certificates (AOCs) and begin flights.

While the government is keen to expand domestic aviation in one of the world’s fastest-growing markets, the regional airline segment remains high-risk, with a history of more failures than successes.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• What an NOC Allows—and How It’s Granted?
• Duopoly Worries After IndiGo Disruption
• Why Regional Airlines Struggle in India?

What an NOC Allows—and How It’s Granted?

• Issued by the Ministry of Civil Aviation, an NOC lets applicants set up offices, hire staff, and pursue further approvals.
• It’s granted after assessing financial soundness, operational plans, and security clearances, and is typically valid for three years.

Duopoly Worries After IndiGo Disruption

• The announcement of new regional airlines comes weeks after a major operational disruption at IndiGo, which renewed concerns about India’s airline duopoly.
• Together, IndiGo and the Air India group command over 90% of the domestic market, heightening risks from over-concentration.
• In this context, the NoC is being read as a signal to encourage competition, though experts urge caution.
• New Entrants Unlikely to Shift Market Shares
  • While fresh regional players are a positive signal, experts doubt they will significantly dent the dominance of the two majors.
  • The tougher question is whether these startups can survive India’s unforgiving aviation economics.
• The New Regional Players
  • Al Hind Air: Backed by the Kerala-based Al Hind Group; plans a regional commuter model using ATR-72 turboprops.
  • FlyExpress: Plans yet to be detailed publicly.
  • Air Kerala: Envisions an ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC) connecting tier-2 and tier-3 cities to major hubs with turboprops; despite an NOC last year, it has struggled to induct aircraft—required for an AOC from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation.
  • Shankh Air: Promoted by UP-based entrepreneur; aims to operate regional routes within and beyond Uttar Pradesh from the upcoming Noida International Airport, with operations planned in the coming months.

Why Regional Airlines Struggle in India?

• Despite a few successes—Star Air, Fly91, and government-owned Alliance Air—India’s regional aviation space has seen many collapses.
• Past failures include Paramount Airways, Air Pegasus, TruJet, Zoom Air, Air Carnival, Air Costa, Air Mantra, and Air Odisha.
• More recently, Fly Big suspended operations in October.
• Structural Challenges in the Market
  • India is a tough aviation market, especially for small carriers.
  • High price sensitivity, thin profit margins, high debt, and dollar-denominated costs (fuel, leasing, maintenance) favour large airlines with scale, efficient fleets, and deep pockets.
  • Most regional airlines lack the financial resilience to withstand shocks.
• Demand Constraints at Smaller Airports
  • Regional routes often suffer from limited and seasonal demand, while most passenger traffic remains concentrated at major hubs.
  • This makes load factors volatile and route planning risky for small carriers.
• Financing and Revenue Limitations
  • Without backing from a major airline group, regional carriers struggle to access finance and debt, as lenders perceive higher risk.
  • Short-haul routes also face stiff competition from trains and road transport, and offer fewer opportunities for ancillary revenues like belly cargo.
• What Could Improve Viability?
  • There is cautious optimism that a growing, upwardly mobile middle class could improve regional airline prospects.
  • Success will hinge on lean operations, serving genuinely underserved regions, building dominance in specific geographies, and—crucially—strong financial backing to sustain operations through inevitable downturns.

Why in the News?

• The government has linked the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) with the National Population Register (NPR), enabling security agencies to access family-wise data of nearly 119 crore residents.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About NATGRID & NPR
• News Summary (Linking NATGRID & NPR, Significance, Concerns, Way Forward)

Background: National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

• NATGRID is a secure and integrated data-sharing platform developed to assist law enforcement and intelligence agencies in India.
• Conceived after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, NATGRID aims to enable real-time access to multiple government and private databases for faster investigation and intelligence gathering.
• Operationalised in recent years, NATGRID links datasets such as banking transactions, telecom records, travel data, vehicle registration, and identity documents.
• Initially restricted to a limited number of central agencies, access has now been expanded to include State police forces, particularly officers of Superintendent of Police rank and above.
• The core objective of NATGRID is to overcome information silos between agencies and improve coordination in tackling terrorism, organised crime, financial fraud, and transnational criminal networks.

National Population Register (NPR)

• The NPR is a comprehensive database containing demographic and family-wise details of residents in India.
• It was first compiled during the 2011 Census and later updated in 2015 through door-to-door enumeration.
• The NPR includes information such as name, age, gender, address, and family relationships.
• The NPR is considered the first step towards the creation of a National Register of Citizens (NRC), although the government has clarified that no decision has been taken to update the NPR during the forthcoming Census exercise.
• Despite this, the NPR remains one of the largest repositories of personal data in the country.

News Summary

• The Union Home Ministry has linked NATGRID with the NPR, allowing authorised police and security agencies to access family-wise details of nearly 119 crore residents through a secure platform.
• This integration enables investigators to trace relationships, household details, and identity linkages while probing criminal or terror-related cases.
• According to officials, upgraded analytical tools within NATGRID, such as “Gandiva”, can perform entity resolution, facial recognition, and multi-source data analysis.
• If a suspect’s image or identity detail is available, the system can match it with databases such as telecom KYC, driving licences, vehicle registrations, and travel records, thereby reducing investigation time.
• Requests on NATGRID are categorised as non-sensitive, sensitive, and highly sensitive.
• Financial records, tax data, and banking information fall under the highly sensitive category, with access subject to additional safeguards.
• Each query is logged, the purpose must be specified, and senior officers provide oversight to ensure accountability.
• The government has encouraged States to make wider use of NATGRID for intelligence-led policing and faster resolution of criminal cases.

Significance for Internal Security

• The integration of NATGRID with NPR significantly strengthens India’s internal security framework.
• By enabling real-time access to verified demographic and relational data, security agencies can identify suspects, dismantle organised crime networks, and track terror financing more efficiently.
• The move also supports coordinated action between central and State agencies, especially in counter-terrorism operations, narcotics control, and financial crime investigations.
• From a governance perspective, it reflects India’s shift towards technology-driven policing and data-based decision-making.

Concerns Related to Privacy and Civil Liberties

• Despite its security benefits, the NATGRID–NPR linkage has raised concerns about data privacy and potential misuse.
• Since agencies can access vast amounts of personal data without necessarily registering a First Information Report (FIR), critics argue that this could weaken procedural safeguards.
• India currently lacks a fully operational data protection law, which makes issues of consent, proportionality, and redress mechanisms especially relevant.
• The government has maintained that strict access controls, audit trails, and hierarchical approvals are in place, but the debate highlights the need to balance national security with individual rights.

Way Forward

• To ensure public trust, the use of NATGRID must be accompanied by robust legal safeguards, clear accountability mechanisms, and parliamentary oversight.
• The operationalisation of a comprehensive data protection framework will be critical in defining limits on data access and ensuring proportional use.
• For India, the challenge lies in leveraging technology to enhance security while upholding constitutional values of privacy and due process.

Context:

• The Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan (VBSA) Bill 2025 was introduced in the Winter Session of Parliament and referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.
• With the Bill now in the public domain, it has triggered debate on the balance between institutional autonomy and centralisation in higher education governance.
• The Bill operationalises key ideas of the National Education Policy (NEP), 2020, particularly the principle of a “light but tight” regulatory framework.

Objectives and Vision of the Bill:

• To propel India towards Viksit Bharat @2047, by advancing the decolonisation of the Indian education system.
• It will enhance autonomy, quality, transparency, and global competitiveness of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs).
• It tries to shift regulation from control-based to facilitative governance.

Key Features of the VBSA Bill 2025:

• Unified higher education regulator:
  • The Bill proposes a single overarching commission by subsuming UGC (1956), AICTE (1987), NCTE (1993), and other education regulators.
  • However, it excludes law and medical education regulators.
  • So, the Bill addresses long-standing fragmentation and regulatory overlap.
• Three-council structure for clarity:
  • The Commission will function through three clearly demarcated councils -
    • Viniyaman Parishad – Regulatory Council
    • Gunvatta Parishad – Accreditation Council
    • Manak Parishad – Standards Council
  • Significance: Clear mandates reduce regulatory ambiguity and discretion.
• Enhanced institutional autonomy:
  • Graded and time-bound autonomy for HEIs.
  • Shift from micromanagement to self-governance.
  • Regulator to play a facilitator, not controller.
  • Single technology-driven window for approvals and compliance.
• Outcome-based evaluation framework:
  • Moves away from input-based UGC norms (infrastructure, faculty count), and focuses on learning outcomes, student skills, employability, societal and real-world impact.
  • It aligns with global best practices and accountability standards.
• Internationalisation of Indian higher education: Enables high-performing Indian universities to establish campuses abroad. Supports India’s aspiration to become a global education hub.
• Transparency and student-centric governance:
  • Mandatory public self-disclosure (online and offline) of academic, operational, and financial details.
  • It ensures robust grievance redressal mechanisms, building trust, fairness, and accountability in the system.

Concerns and Clarifications:

• Concerns:
  • Fear of excessive centralisation, despite assurances of autonomy.
  • Perception of reduced role of states in higher education governance.
  • Implementation challenges in transitioning from multiple regulators to a single body.
• Government’s clarifications:
  • No dilution of institutional autonomy. No adverse impact on funding.
  • States retain powers under their respective Acts, including establishing universities, and curriculum development.

Way Forward:

• Strengthen Centre–State consultation mechanisms.
• Ensuring federal balance and cooperative federalism in education
• Ensure transparent appointments and functioning of councils.
• Capacity-building of HEIs to adapt to outcome-based evaluation.
• Periodic parliamentary and public review of the new regulatory framework.

Conclusion:

• The VBSA Bill 2025 represents a structural and philosophical shift in India’s higher education governance.
• Its success, however, will depend on balanced implementation, safeguarding federal principles, and ensuring that autonomy translates into genuine academic excellence rather than centralised control.

Context

• Cities occupy a central position in global development, shaping economic growth, governance, science, and innovation.
• Despite this prominence, urban progress frequently overlooks the most fundamental element of city life: the people who inhabit these spaces.
• A persistent disconnect exists between the cities that are designed, the cities people aspire to live in, and the cities they actually experience.
• This gap is most visible in the lives of migrants and linguistically diverse residents, revealing a critical weakness in contemporary urban thinking that prioritises systems over lived realities.

Linguistic Exclusion and the Invisible Tax

• Migration into cities often comes with an unspoken expectation of assimilation.
• Language becomes the primary measure of belonging, determining who can fully participate in urban life.
• Those unable to meet this standard are burdened with an invisible linguistic tax, facing daily barriers to communication, recognition, and validation.
• This exclusion goes beyond inconvenience; it affects emotional security and reinforces the idea that belonging must be earned rather than assumed.

Economic Implications of Marginalisation

• Linguistic exclusion quickly translates into economic and social exclusion.
• Navigating employment markets, housing systems, healthcare services, and government institutions becomes disproportionately difficult when official processes remain monolingual.
• These structural barriers frequently push migrants toward informal employment, where exploitation is more likely and opportunities for advancement are limited.
• Cities depend heavily on migrant labour and tax contributions, yet simultaneously restrict access to formal economic pathways.
• This contradiction undermines social cohesion and weakens long-term urban resilience.

The Limitations of Modern Urban Planning

• A fundamental weakness in contemporary urban design lies in flawed urban planning assumptions. Cities are often planned for a static, homogeneous population, despite their increasingly diverse reality.
• Infrastructure, public services, and smart city technologies typically serve established residents who already meet linguistic and bureaucratic norms.
• As a result, innovation benefits a narrow segment of the population while rendering newcomers invisible.
• This problem is intensified when governance and planning bodies lack cultural and demographic diversity, allowing uniform perspectives to dominate decision-making for heterogeneous communities.

Reimagining Cities for All

• Inclusive urban futures require a conceptual shift. Cities must be understood as cities as dynamic ecosystems, capable of adaptation, expansion, and regeneration. Designing better infrastructure alone is insufficient if cultural belonging is ignored.
• Urban planners must anticipate friction between established populations and new arrivals, addressing it proactively rather than reactively.
• Targeted cultural sensitisation training for public-facing staff can improve institutional efficiency, safeguard democratic access, and reduce everyday barriers.
• While such transitions may involve temporary disruption, they are essential for sustainable and equitable development.

Empathy as the Foundation of Urban Futures

• The most critical element missing from urban design is empathy as planning principle.
• Successful cities are not measured solely by technological advancement or economic output, but by the comfort, security, and belonging experienced by their residents.
• A city designed with empathy recognises all inhabitants: those born there, those who have settled over time, and those yet to arrive.
• This approach transforms urban planning from a technical exercise into a social commitment grounded in human experience.

Conclusion

• As cities continue to expand and diversify, the challenge is no longer simply how to build smarter or faster, but how to build fairer and more humane environments.
• Linguistic and cultural diversity should be recognised as strengths rather than obstacles.
• By embedding empathy, inclusion, and adaptability into urban planning and governance, cities can bridge the gap between design and reality, ensuring that progress is defined not only by infrastructure, but by the dignity and belonging of all who call the city home.

Context

• After a politically focused 2024, New Delhi anticipated renewed diplomatic momentum, progress on long-pending trade agreements, and greater regional stability in 2025.
• Engagements with major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, alongside outreach to neighbouring states, suggested confidence and ambition.
• However, by the end of the year, India faced mounting pressures across economic, energy, global, and regional security domains.
• The trajectory of 2025 exposed structural weaknesses and highlighted the limits of performative diplomacy in a rapidly changing international environment.

Economic and Energy Security Challenges

• India’s most severe setbacks emerged in the economic and energy spheres, particularly in relations with the United States.
• Rather than a reset under the second Trump administration, ties deteriorated sharply.
• High tariffs on Indian exports disrupted labour-intensive sectors, leading to job losses and contract cancellations.
• Immigration restrictions further weakened remittance inflows, a vital support for India’s balance of payments.
• Despite early optimism, major trade agreements with the United States and the European Union remained incomplete, underscoring the gap between diplomatic intent and tangible outcomes.
• Energy security became an equally pressing concern. India’s increased reliance on discounted Russian oil initially strengthened supply resilience, but renewed sanctions pressure forced difficult trade-offs.
• The possibility of reducing Russian imports raised economic and reputational risks, recalling earlier disruptions caused by compliance with sanctions on Iran and Venezuela.
• High-profile engagements with Moscow failed to deliver major agreements in defence, energy, or strategic cooperation, reinforcing the limited returns of symbolic engagement amid rising economic coercion.

Shifting Global Strategic Environment

• The global strategic landscape in 2025 grew increasingly unpredictable.
• The United States’ revised National Security Strategy adopted a more cautious tone toward China and Russia while offering limited articulation of India’s broader global role.
• This shift weakened assumptions about deeper strategic alignment with Washington.
• Discussions of a potential U.S.–China G-2 arrangement intensified concerns over India’s position in the Asian balance of power, particularly as traditional U.S. allies also faced diminished attention.
• Simultaneously, the global response to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza reflected a weakening commitment to the rules-based international order.
• Peace proposals perceived to favour aggressors, combined with China’s push for alternative global governance frameworks, signalled an evolving international architecture.
• For India, these developments highlighted the risks of strategic ambiguity and the need to articulate a clearer vision for global order rather than relying on declining multilateral mechanisms.

Regional Security and Diplomatic Constraints

• India’s immediate neighbourhood became more volatile as the year progressed.
• Terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir demonstrated the persistence of security threats despite years of counterterrorism measures.
• While India’s military responses were tactically effective, they failed to secure strong and sustained international diplomatic backing.
• This gap exposed a recurring challenge: military action alone does not guarantee political legitimacy.
• Regional instability further complicated India’s strategic environment. Political transitions and protests in neighbouring countries reduced predictability and constrained New Delhi’s influence.
• Relations with several regional and extra-regional actors deteriorated, while new defence alignments involving Pakistan altered the regional security calculus.
• Despite active engagement, India struggled to shape outcomes in its immediate periphery, revealing limits to its regional leadership aspirations.

Credibility, Norms, and Foreign Policy Consistency

• A central lesson from 2025 lies in the importance of credibility. India’s external advocacy for democracy, minority rights, and regional stability risks losing force when domestic and regional practices appear inconsistent.
• Normative influence depends on alignment between principles and actions.
• In a world increasingly driven by transactions rather than values, India’s ability to invoke principles rests on normative consistency across both its foreign and domestic policies.

Conclusion

• India’s foreign policy in 2025 was marked by a sharp contrast between early promise and eventual disillusionment.
• External pressures exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities, while overreliance on symbolism limited diplomatic returns, at the same time, regional instability and global uncertainty constrained India’s strategic choices.
• As New Delhi looks ahead, it must recalibrate its approach by prioritising substance over spectacle, aligning principles with practice, and adopting a realistic assessment of its strategic environment.
• Such adjustments are essential for strengthening India’s credibility and resilience in an increasingly unstable international order.

Why in the News?

• India’s persistent lag in manufacturing growth has come under focus due to renewed debate on structural constraints, wage dynamics, and their impact on industrial competitiveness.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Manufacturing (Performance, Role of Wages, Dutch Disease Framework, Constraints, Uneven Growth, Implications for Economic Policy, etc.)

Manufacturing and Structural Transformation

• Manufacturing has historically played a central role in economic development by absorbing surplus labour, driving productivity growth, and enabling exports.
• Countries such as China and South Korea used manufacturing-led growth to transition from low-income to middle- and high-income economies.
• In contrast, India’s structural transformation has followed an atypical path, with services expanding rapidly while manufacturing’s share in GDP has remained broadly stagnant.
• Despite beginning the 20th century at levels comparable to several East Asian economies, India did not experience a sustained manufacturing boom.
• Instead, growth increasingly shifted toward services such as software, finance, and business process outsourcing.
• This divergence raises important questions about the structural weaknesses of India’s industrialisation strategy.

India’s Manufacturing Performance

• Manufacturing’s share in India’s GDP has remained roughly constant over decades and has recently ceded further ground to services.
• While India has witnessed pockets of industrial success, these have not translated into large-scale employment generation or broad-based technological upgrading.
• This underperformance becomes more apparent when compared with China and South Korea, where manufacturing expanded both in scale and sophistication.
• The limited growth of manufacturing has also constrained India’s ability to absorb low-skilled labour exiting agriculture, contributing to informal employment and underemployment.
• As a result, India faces the challenge of high economic growth without commensurate job creation in productive sectors.

Role of Public Sector Wages

• One explanation for India’s manufacturing stagnation lies in the wage structure shaped by public sector policies.
• Experts argue that relatively high government salaries drew workers away from manufacturing, pushing up economy-wide wages.
• Manufacturing firms, operating with lower productivity levels, found it difficult to match these wages, reducing their competitiveness.
• Higher public sector incomes also increased demand for domestic goods and services, raising prices.
• This indirectly hurt manufacturing by making domestically produced goods less competitive compared to imports. Over time, these dynamics weakened incentives for industrial expansion and discouraged firms from scaling up operations.

Dutch Disease Framework

• Traditionally, Dutch disease describes how a resource boom, such as oil or gas, raises wages and appreciates the currency, harming manufacturing exports.
• In India’s case, the analogy is applied to non-tradable government services rather than natural resources.
• Expansion of the public sector with high wages raised domestic prices and led to a real exchange rate appreciation, even without changes in the nominal exchange rate.
• This made imports cheaper and domestic manufacturing less competitive, reducing demand for locally produced goods.
• Thus, policy-driven wage increases functioned similarly to a resource windfall in weakening manufacturing.

Technology and Productivity Constraints

• A key question emerging from this analysis is why Indian manufacturing failed to respond through technological upgrading.
• Economic theory suggests that high wages can induce innovation, pushing firms to adopt labour-saving technologies and improve productivity.
• This process played a crucial role in historical industrialisation in countries like Britain, Germany, and Japan.
• In India, however, manufacturing firms did not sufficiently invest in technology or capital-intensive production.
• Instead, many industries continued to rely on abundant cheap labour, limiting productivity growth.
• This failure to move up the value chain meant that manufacturing could neither sustain higher wages nor compete effectively in global markets.

Uneven Growth and Rising Inequality

• India’s growth story has been marked by strong performance in services alongside weak wage growth for a large segment of workers.
• Even in fast-growing sectors such as software and platform-based services, entry-level wages have stagnated over long periods.
• Many modern Indian “unicorns” depend more on labour reserves than on genuine technological innovation.
• This pattern has contributed to rising income inequality. While the private sector has generated wealth and entrepreneurship, its growth has been uneven and insufficiently linked to mass employment creation.
• Manufacturing’s stagnation thus reflects deeper issues in India’s development trajectory, including inadequate diffusion of technology and skills.

Implications for Economic Policy

• The lag in manufacturing has significant implications for India’s long-term growth and employment prospects.
• Without a strong industrial base, India risks premature de-industrialisation, where services dominate before manufacturing reaches maturity.
• This limits job creation for semi-skilled workers and constrains export diversification.
• Policy responses need to focus on improving manufacturing productivity, encouraging technological adoption, and aligning wage growth with productivity gains.
• Investments in skills, infrastructure, and industrial clusters are critical to revive manufacturing as a driver of inclusive growth.

Why in the News?

• The Union government has constituted the Bureau of Port Security as a statutory body under the Merchant Shipping Act, 2025, to strengthen port and maritime security governance.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Coastal Landscape (Background, Statistics, Need for Port Security Authority)
• Bureau of Port Security (Mandate, Structure, Key Functions, Concerns & Criticism)

India’s Maritime and Coastal Landscape

• India has a long coastline of over 7,500 km and a rapidly expanding maritime economy.
• As of 2025, the country has 12 major ports and 217 non-major ports, of which 66 are cargo-handling ports, while the rest largely serve fishing and coastal activities.
• Major ports, administered by the Union government, handle more than half of India’s maritime cargo traffic.
• In recent years, India has witnessed a sharp rise in port capacity, coastal shipping, and inland waterway cargo movement.
• This growth has significantly enhanced India’s trade connectivity and logistics efficiency, but it has also increased exposure to security threats such as smuggling, terrorism, cyber intrusions, and illegal migration through maritime routes.
• Ensuring secure ports and vessels has therefore emerged as a key national security priority.

Need for a Dedicated Port Security Authority

• Until recently, India’s coastal and port security responsibilities were distributed across multiple agencies, including the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, CISF, State maritime police, and port authorities.
• While operational agencies remain crucial, the absence of a single statutory body for regulatory oversight and coordination often leads to gaps in communication, duplication of efforts, and uneven implementation of security standards.
• Recognising these challenges, the government decided to establish a specialised institution that could function as the nodal regulator for port and ship security, similar to how aviation security is governed in India.

Bureau of Port Security: Mandate and Structure

• The Bureau of Port Security (BoPS) has been constituted under Section 13 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 2025, as a statutory body.
• It functions under the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways and is modelled on the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS).
• The BoPS is responsible for regulatory oversight relating to the security of ships, port facilities, and maritime infrastructure.
• Its role is not operational in nature but focuses on standard-setting, compliance, coordination, and supervision across both major and non-major ports.

Key Functions of the Bureau of Port Security

• The BoPS addresses a wide range of maritime security concerns.
• These include maritime terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration, piracy, poaching, and other illicit activities carried out through sea routes.
• A notable feature of the BoPS is its emphasis on cybersecurity.
• With ports increasingly dependent on digital systems, the Bureau is expected to monitor and protect port IT infrastructure from cyber threats, in coordination with national cybersecurity agencies.
• The BoPS has the legal authority to ensure compliance with international obligations such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which mandates minimum security standards for ports and vessels engaged in international trade.

Role of CISF and Security Implementation

• Under the BoPS framework, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) has been designated as a recognised security organisation.
• The CISF will prepare standardised security plans, conduct security assessments, and train private security agencies deployed at ports.
• Security measures are to be implemented in a graded and risk-based manner, taking into account factors such as vulnerability, trade volume, location, and threat perception. This approach aims to balance security needs with ease of doing business.

Maritime Growth and Strategic Context

• India’s maritime sector has expanded rapidly over the last decade. Cargo handled at ports increased from 974 million tonnes in 2014 to nearly 1,600 million tonnes by 2025.
• Ship turnaround time has halved, and coastal shipping volumes have more than doubled. Inland waterway cargo movement has increased eightfold during the same period.
• The creation of the BoPS aligns with the Maritime India Vision 2030, which seeks to develop world-class port infrastructure, promote green shipping, and ensure a safe and secure maritime ecosystem.

Concerns and Criticism

• Some coastal States have expressed concerns that recent port legislation, including the Indian Ports Act, 2025, increases Union government control over non-major ports, raising questions related to maritime federalism.
• There are also criticisms regarding wide inspection powers granted to port officials under the new legal framework, though these concerns relate to legislation as a whole rather than the BoPS specifically.

Why in News?

• On November 12, 2023, the Silkyara Bend–Barkot Tunnel on NH-134 (Char Dham Mahamarg Pariyojana) collapsed, trapping 41 workers for 17 days.
• Though all were rescued safely, the incident exposed systemic weaknesses in tunnel planning, geological assessment, and emergency preparedness, especially in fragile Himalayan terrain.
• In response, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) issued comprehensive guidelines to prevent and mitigate road tunnel collapses, particularly relevant for strategic and border area connectivity projects.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Why Tunnel Safety Matters?
• Key Provisions of the New Guidelines
• India’s Tunnel Infrastructure Snapshot
• Challenges and Way Forward
• Conclusion

Why Tunnel Safety Matters?

• Tunnels enable seamless connectivity in mountainous, snow-bound, eco-sensitive, congested and border areas.
• India’s expanding highway network under strategic and Char Dham projects has increased tunnelling activity, raising geological and safety risks.

Key Provisions of the New Guidelines:

• Strengthening planning (DPR, GBR and risk register):
  • Issues identified: Many Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) reduced to procedural formalities. Inadequate geological and geotechnical investigations.
  • Guidelines:
    • Project authority responsible for verifying correctness of geological investigations.
    • Mandatory preparation of Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR), risk register (hazards, risks, mitigation measures).
    • Principle of risk allocation: “Risk shall be borne by the party best equipped to manage it.”
    • GBR and risk register to be shared with bidders to ensure transparency and realistic costing.
• Geological realities and design challenges:
• Issues:
  • Tunnel design is critical as ground itself acts as a support system.
  • Predicting ground properties from limited tests is an oversimplification, especially in the Himalayas.
  • Poor investigations lead to time overruns, cost escalation, and safety failures.
• Special conditions to be assessed: Squeezing and swelling ground, rock bursts, shallow cover zones, tunnels below perennial streams/nalas, hot water ingress, and toxic/flammable gases (long tunnels).
• Tunnelling technologies (NATM vs TBM):
  • NATM (New Austrian Tunnelling Method): “Design-as-you-go” approach, suitable for non-uniform rock conditions, controlled blasting, and mandatory excavation and support sheet for each round.
  • TBM (Tunnel Boring Machine): Used in uniform geological stretches, requires vigilance against roof collapse and water ingress.
• Collapse risk zoning and safety infrastructure: Tunnels to be classified into collapse-risk zones. High-risk zones must include Np-4 escape pipe (minimum 0.9 m diameter), mobile rescue containers, fixed rescue containers, minimum 24-hour survival capacity.
• Emergency response and human capacity:
  • Shift managers must be trained as first responders.
  • Emergency Response Plan (ERP): Prepared in advance, updated weekly based on site conditions.

India’s Tunnel Infrastructure Snapshot:

• According to MoRTH’s reply in Parliament (December 12, 2024), a total of 42 tunnels covering 60.37 km in length in 27 projects of National Highways have been completed to date.
• Apart from this, 57 tunnels covering 93.96 km in length are currently under implementation in 37 projects on NHs in the country.
• 3 tunnels covering 9.68 km in length have been approved for construction in 3 projects at an estimated cost of Rs 1,962 crore.
• One 6-lane project in Maharashtra costing Rs 4501 crore, including the construction of 2 tunnels having a total length of 3.47 km, has been apprised by Public Private Partnership Appraisal Committee (PPPAC).

Challenges and Way Forward:

• Weak DPR quality: Institutionalise scientific, data-driven DPRs.
• Complex Himalayan geology: Integrate real-time geological monitoring.
• Inadequate on-site emergency preparedness: Strengthen capacity-building of site managers. Periodic independent safety audits.
• Coordination gaps during rescue operations: Clear role definition for -
  • Incident commander (District Magistrate)
  • Construction agencies
  • Local administration
  • NDRF/SDRF commanders
  • The Armed Forces must ensure coordination, technical support, and responder safety.
• Use guidelines as a template: For other infrastructure sectors (metros, hydropower).

Conclusion:

• The Silkyara tunnel collapse was a watershed moment in India’s infrastructure journey.
• MoRTH’s new guidelines mark a shift from procedural compliance to risk-based engineering, emphasising geological realism, accountability, and human safety.
• Effective implementation will be crucial to ensuring that India’s push for strategic connectivity and infrastructure-led growth does not come at the cost of lives and sustainability.

Why in News?

• Fresh violence erupted in West Karbi Anglong district of Assam, leading to two deaths, multiple injuries, arson of shops and markets, suspension of mobile internet services, and imposition of prohibitory orders.
• The unrest is rooted in long-standing disputes over land rights, particularly encroachment on grazing reserve lands under the jurisdiction of the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC).

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Immediate Trigger of the Violence
• Background of the Karbi Anglong Dispute
• The Land Question - PGR and VGR
• Legal Constraints on Evictions
• Challenges and Way Ahead
• Conclusion

Immediate Trigger of the Violence:

• Hunger strike over grazing lands:
  • For over two weeks, nine Karbi protesters were on a fast unto death at Phelangpi in West Karbi Anglong.
  • Their demand - eviction of alleged encroachers from PGR (Professional Grazing Reserve) lands and VGR (Village Grazing Reserve) lands.
  • These lands are traditionally reserved for livestock grazing, dating back to British colonial land policies, and are crucial for tribal livelihoods.
• Perception of arrest: When protesters were shifted to Guwahati for medical reasons, locals believed they were arrested, triggering stone-pelting, arson, and escalation into widespread violence.

Background of the Karbi Anglong Dispute:

• Sixth Schedule and autonomous governance:
  • Karbi Anglong and West Karbi Anglong are tribal-majority hill districts governed under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.
  • The KAAC enjoys powers over land, forest management, and local governance, aimed at protecting tribal identity and resources.
• History of insurgency:
  • Since the late 1980s, Karbi insurgent groups have operated in the region.
  • The original demand was for a separate Karbi state, which later moderated to greater autonomy under KAAC.
  • The legacy of insurgency has deepened hostility towards ‘outsiders’.

The Land Question - PGR and VGR:

• Encroachment vs settlement claims:
  • Karbi tribal bodies allege large-scale illegal settlement on grazing lands.
  • Settlers (Biharis, Bengalis, Nepalis) claim residence for decades, seeking regularisation.
  • For example, KAAC identified 1,983 families encroaching in Hawaipur mouza, and reported 103 families encroaching in Phuloni circle.
• Political flashpoint:
  • Protests intensified after a Bihari Nonia community organisation submitted a memorandum to the President of India, demanding legalisation of settlers.
  • Karbi groups viewed this as a threat to Sixth Schedule protections.

Legal Constraints on Evictions:

• KAAC issued 15-day eviction notices. However, evictions were stalled due to a PIL pending in the Gauhati High Court.
• Authorities cited risk of contempt of court if evictions proceeded during judicial consideration.

Challenges and Way Ahead:

• Conflict between customary rights and settlers’ claims: Transparent rehabilitation or relocation policy for long-settled non-tribal populations.
• Weak enforcement of Sixth Schedule: Legal clarity on status and protection of PGR and VGR lands. Strengthening KAAC capacity for land governance and conflict resolution.
• Judicial delays: Time-bound judicial resolution of PILs related to land disputes.
• Mistrust between administration and local communities: Dialogue-based approach involving tribal bodies, settlers, and state authorities.
• Risk of ethnic polarisation: Early warning and community policing mechanisms to prevent escalation.

Conclusion:

• The Karbi Anglong violence underscores the fragile balance between tribal autonomy, land rights, and demographic pressures in Sixth Schedule areas.
• Without institutional clarity, sensitive governance, and inclusive conflict resolution, such disputes risk recurring, threatening social cohesion, constitutional safeguards, and internal security in Northeast India.
• Addressing land issues through rule of law and participatory governance is essential for lasting peace.

Context

• The labour reforms enacted by the Indian government in 2019 and 2020 have faced sustained opposition from trade unions and worker collectives across the country.
• These labour reforms have generated widespread concern, particularly for unorganised workers, who form over 90% of India’s workforce and contribute nearly 65% of national output.
• The new labour codes, covering wages, industrial relations, social security, and working conditions, were passed without tripartite consultation.
• Their implementation raises serious concerns about the future of worker rights and protections in India.

Background and Claims of the Labour Codes

• The Union government has justified the reforms as an attempt at consolidation of labour laws and expansion of social protection.
• However, the restructuring has instead resulted in the dilution of several sector-specific protections that previously addressed the realities of informal employment.
• Rather than strengthening safeguards, the reforms centralise authority while weakening legal mechanisms built through decades of labour struggles.

Criticism of New Labour Codes

• Dilution of Occupational Safety and Health Protections
  • One of the most significant consequences of the reforms is the weakening of occupational safeguards under the Occupational Safety Health and Working Conditions framework.
  • The repeal of protections governing the construction sector has removed detailed safety regulations despite the hazardous nature of work and high fatality rates.
  • The shift from physical workplace inspections to digital systems has undermined effective inspections, limiting enforcement and accountability.
  • This approach reduces on-ground verification and weakens compliance mechanisms essential for protecting workers in informal and high-risk settings.
• Neglect of Occupational Health of Informal Workers
  • Informal workers face severe occupational health risks across sectors.
  • Construction workers suffer from silicosis, agricultural labourers are exposed to carcinogenic pesticides, and salt workers experience chronic eye, skin, and kidney ailments.
  • The absence of structured mechanisms for diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation leaves these workers without meaningful protection.
  • Without access to formal insurance systems, occupational diseases remain unrecognised, untreated, and uncompensated, deepening health-related vulnerabilities among informal workers.
• Threats to Welfare Boards and Social Security
  • The restructuring of social protection frameworks poses serious risks to worker welfare.
  • Sector-specific funding mechanisms, including dedicated cesses, have been removed without viable alternatives.
  • This has disrupted financial support systems for workers in mining, construction, beedi, and salt industries.
  • The move towards a single welfare structure undermines existing State-level boards that provide pensions, maternity benefits, and educational assistance.
  • These boards were designed to address sector-specific needs and have played a crucial role in supporting informal workers. 

Federal Concerns and the Case of Tamil Nadu

• The reforms raise important federal concerns, particularly for States with long-standing welfare architectures.
• Tamil Nadu has built an extensive system supporting informal workers through legislation and welfare boards developed over decades.
• The introduction of the e-Shram registry raises apprehensions regarding central control over accumulated welfare funds, estimated to be substantial.
• Such centralisation threatens State autonomy and risks diverting resources away from intended beneficiaries.

Conclusion

• The labour reforms mark a significant retreat from worker-centric protections.
• The erosion of safety standards, weakening of welfare mechanisms, and centralisation of authority have intensified worker precarity.
• Without corrective measures, these changes risk deepening inequality and insecurity among informal workers.
• Preserving State initiatives and ensuring participatory reform processes are essential to uphold worker dignity and long-term social justice.

Context

• The replacement of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) with the Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 marks a decisive transformation in India’s welfare regime.
• Enacted in 2005, MGNREGA established a demand-driven, legally enforceable guarantee of employment for rural citizens.
• The new law overturns this framework, replacing entitlement with discretion and decentralised implementation with centralised authority.
• This transition represents a fundamental ideological redefinition of welfare, altering the relationship between the state and its most vulnerable citizens.

Background: The Origins and Significance of MGNREGA

• MGNREGA emerged from the contradictions of post-liberalisation India, where economic growth failed to generate adequate employment or livelihood security.
• Persistent agrarian distress, jobless growth, and widening inequalities exposed the limits of market-led development.
• In response, the United Progressive Alliance introduced a rights-based legislative framework that included the Right to Information Act and the Forest Rights Act.
• MGNREGA stood at the centre of this framework. It recognised Employment as a legally enforceable right, affirming that political equality requires material security.
• Rather than rejecting liberalisation, the programme sought to mitigate its social costs by embedding enforceable entitlements within governance.
• Employment was treated as the most dignified and effective form of social protection in an economy dominated by informal labour.

Structural Changes under the VB-G RAM G Act

• The VB-G RAM G Act reverses the defining principle of guaranteed employment.
• By shifting from a demand-driven to a supply-driven model, it grants the Centre decisive authority over allocations, scope, and implementation.
• Work becomes contingent on administrative approval rather than citizen demand, reinforcing the centralisation of power and discretion.
• The revised funding structure deepens this shift. The Centre–State cost-sharing ratio has changed from 90:10 to 60:40, transferring substantial financial responsibility to States without corresponding fiscal support.
• Many poorer States may struggle to meet these obligations, compelling them to curtail project approvals and suppress employment generation.
• This combination of fiscal decentralisation and administrative centralisation undermines both federal balance and programme viability.

Ideological and Political Dimensions

• The repeal of MGNREGA represents a deliberate ideological break.
• The removal of Mahatma Gandhi’s name severs the programme from a moral legacy grounded in justice, dignity, and the upliftment of the poorest.
• This symbolic shift aligns with a broader political economy that prioritises market imperatives and corporate interests.
• Rights-based welfare schemes empower workers, decentralise authority, and institutionalise claims on the state.
• Such features conflict with governance models that favour executive discretion and market dominance.
• Discretionary welfare reframes social protection as benevolence, depoliticising structural inequality and transforming welfare into an instrument of political loyalty rather than social justice.

Democratic and Legislative Implications

• The legislative trajectory of the VB-G RAM G Act contrasts sharply with that of MGNREGA.
• While MGNREGA was enacted with unanimous parliamentary support, the 2025 Act was rushed through Parliament amid Opposition walkouts and without scrutiny by a Parliamentary Standing Committee.
• The absence of consultation with affected communities further underscores the erosion of democratic accountability.
• Restrictions on public protest and the procedural hurdles imposed on dissent highlight a shrinking civic space.
• Long-standing rights can be dismantled swiftly, while opposition is delayed through bureaucratic regulation, weakening participatory democracy.

Broader Consequences for Social Justice and Federalism

• MGNREGA demonstrated that large-scale welfare programmes could enhance productivity, raise rural wages, and strengthen democratic participation.
• Its nationwide reach and rights-based design converted welfare into enforceable citizenship claims.
• Its repeal, particularly after its critical role during the COVID-19 pandemic, constitutes a rollback of legal, fiscal, and institutional safeguards.
• By making livelihoods contingent on fiscal discretion, the new framework weakens constitutional commitments to dignity through work as a right and redefines welfare as conditional assistance rather than obligation.

Conclusion

• The dismantling of MGNREGA marks the end of India’s most ambitious experiment with rights-based welfare.
• The repeal signifies a retreat from enforceable entitlements and a reorientation toward discretionary governance.
• Beyond the fate of a single programme, it raises fundamental questions about social justice, federalism, and the future of democratic accountability in India.

Why in news?

The arrest of Ravindra Soni, alleged mastermind of the ₹1,000-crore BlueChip Group scam, highlights how digital footprints are transforming policing in India.

Tracked down in Dehradun after a year on the run, Soni was caught not through traditional surveillance but via a food delivery order.

The case underscores law enforcement’s growing use of everyday digital data—OTPs, delivery logs, and e-commerce histories—to trace suspects, showing how routine online activity now leaves an electronic trail that can unravel even sophisticated criminal networks.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• The BlueChip Scam: How a Global Investment Fraud Unfolded
• Digital Residue as Evidence: A New Tool for Law Enforcement
• Regulatory Changes to Tackle Digital Crime

The BlueChip Scam: How a Global Investment Fraud Unfolded

• Ravindra Soni, in 2021, founded the BlueChip Group, claiming to trade in forex and commodities like gold, oil, and metals. The firm drew investors from India, the UAE, Malaysia, Canada, and Japan.
• By 2024, investigators found the operation to be an elaborate fraud, with the company disappearing along with investors’ money.
• After nearly a year on the run, Soni was traced back to India and arrested in Dehradun on November 30, when police tracked him via a food delivery.
• Authorities allege he ran multiple investment fronts, with the scam’s scale estimated at up to ₹1,000 crore.

Digital Residue as Evidence: A New Tool for Law Enforcement

• Investigators are increasingly using digital residue—data from everyday apps and services—as key evidence.
• In a ₹5,300-crore GST fraud, uncovered in May 2024, seemingly minor data points such as OTPs from food-delivery apps and FASTag alerts helped map suspect movements and expose networks of fake firms and forged tax credits.
• Tracking Evasion Tactics
  • Suspects tried to evade detection by frequently changing phones, SIM cards, and hotel identities, keeping devices switched off except to receive OTPs. This pattern itself became a tell.
  • FASTag toll data was used to trace luxury vehicles along the Delhi–Noida–Lucknow corridor, narrowing locations despite constant digital churn.
• Multi-App Linkages Crack Cyber Rings
  • In October, Delhi Police dismantled a ₹22 lakh cyber-fraud network after a nine-day, 1,800-km operation across four states.
  • WhatsApp data indicated overseas operations from Malaysia, while footprints from Flipkart, Swiggy, and Zomato helped identify suspects despite frequent location changes.
• Legal Pathways for Data Sharing
  • Most apps’ privacy policies permit data sharing with law enforcement when required to investigate or prevent illegal activity or to comply with legal processes—making such digital traces admissible and actionable.
• Beyond Financial Crime: Global Parallels
  • The evidentiary shift isn’t limited to financial cases.
  • In the United States, prosecutors investigating the 2025 Palisades Fire in California used digital evidence to build their case.
  • They cited the suspect’s interactions with ChatGPT, including questions about starting fires and AI-generated images of burning landscapes.
  • These digital records were used to link the accused to the fire, which burned over 23,000 acres and destroyed thousands of homes.

Regulatory Changes to Tackle Digital Crime

• Cybersecurity incidents in India have surged from 10.29 lakh in 2022 to 22.68 lakh in 2024, reflecting the growing scale and sophistication of digital crime.
• The financial impact is also rising, with cyber fraud losses of ₹36.45 lakh reported on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal by February 2025.
• SIM-to-Device Binding for Messaging Apps
  • To curb misuse of digital platforms, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has directed messaging services like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal to enforce SIM-to-device binding.
  • These apps must remain continuously linked to the SIM used at registration and deny access if the device does not contain that SIM.
• New Legal Basis: Telecommunication Cybersecurity Amendment Rules, 2025
  • The Centre is using powers under the Telecommunication Cybersecurity Amendment Rules, 2025 to regulate digital identifiers more tightly.
  • The rules introduce the concept of a Telecommunication Identifier User Entity (TIUE).
  • A TIUE is any non-telecom entity that uses telecommunication identifiers, such as mobile numbers, to identify users.
  • This means apps that require phone numbers for registration fall within the regulatory scope.
• Possible Expansion Beyond Messaging Apps
  • The current directive targets messaging platforms.
  • However, experts note that the broad TIUE definition could extend to other services, including food delivery apps like Swiggy and Zomato, since they also rely on mobile numbers for user onboarding.

Why in news?

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is set to launch the LVM-3 rocket carrying its heaviest-ever satellite, BlueBird Block-2 (≈6,100 kg).

The satellite will be placed into a low Earth orbit (LEO) of about 520 km roughly 15 minutes after liftoff.

BlueBird Block-2 will be the largest commercial communications satellite deployed in LEO to date. Designed by AST SpaceMobile, the satellite is part of a constellation aimed at direct-to-mobile connectivity.

Unlike traditional satellites that rely on ground stations, this system will communicate directly with standard smartphones, enabling 4G/5G voice and video calls, messaging, streaming, and data access globally.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• LVM3: India’s Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle
• ISRO’s Push to Optimise LVM3 Engines
• Significance of LVM3-M6 Mission

LVM3: India’s Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle

• The Launch Vehicle Mark-3 (LMV3) is a three-stage launch vehicle weighing about 640 tonnes and standing 43.5 metres tall.
• Developed over decades, it represents the peak of India’s launch vehicle engineering.
• S200 Solid Strap-On Boosters: Power at Lift-Off
  • The first stage comprises two S200 solid-propellant boosters, among the most powerful solid rockets in use worldwide.
  • They provide the massive thrust needed at lift-off to overcome gravity and pass through Earth’s dense lower atmosphere.
• L110 Liquid Core Stage: Controlled Acceleration
  • After booster separation, the L110 liquid stage takes over, using hypergolic propellants for smooth, controllable thrust.
  • This stage plays a crucial role in shaping the satellite’s trajectory and reflects India’s long-standing expertise in liquid propulsion.
• C25 Cryogenic Upper Stage: Precision and Efficiency
  • The C25 cryogenic stage burns supercooled liquid oxygen and hydrogen stored below –180°C.
  • It is India’s largest and most advanced cryogenic engine, offering high efficiency, longer burn duration, and precise orbit insertion—key to technological self-reliance achieved after decades of effort.

ISRO’s Push to Optimise LVM3 Engines

• ISRO is upgrading the LVM3 to meet human-rating requirements for Gaganyaan and to increase lift capacity for modules of the proposed Bharatiya Antariksh Station.
• This involves adding redundancies for safety and boosting overall performance.
• More Thrust from the Cryogenic Upper Stage
  • ISRO is enhancing the cryogenic upper stage, which provides nearly 50% of the velocity needed for geosynchronous missions.
  • The current C25 stage carries 28,000 kg of propellant and produces 20 tonnes of thrust.
  • The planned C32 stage will carry 32,000 kg of fuel, increasing thrust to 22 tonnes, enabling heavier payloads.
• Switch to a Semi-Cryogenic Second Stage
  • The agency is considering replacing the liquid-propellant second stage with a semi-cryogenic engine using refined kerosene and liquid oxygen.
  • This change would lower costs, improve efficiency, and raise LEO payload capacity from ~8,000 kg to ~10,000 kg, a configuration likely for space-station module launches.
• Bootstrap Reignition for Multi-Orbit Missions
  • To support missions deploying satellites into multiple orbits, ISRO is developing bootstrap reignition for cryogenic engines.
  • This allows the upper stage to restart without external gases (like helium), reducing system mass and increasing payload capability—especially valuable for LEO constellation missions.

Significance of LVM3-M6 Mission

• The LVM3-M6 / BlueBird Block-2 mission is a dedicated commercial launch using ISRO’s LVM3 rocket to deploy the BlueBird Block-2 communication satellite of AST SpaceMobile.
  • It represents the sixth operational flight of the LVM3 launch vehicle.
• This is ISRO’s third commercial mission with the LVM-3, after launching OneWeb satellites in 2022–23.
• With alternatives like SpaceX’s Falcon-9 and European Space Agency’s Ariane-6 available, the launch is a chance for ISRO to prove it can deliver heavy launches at lower cost.
• Expanding the LVM-3’s Role
  • Originally designed for geosynchronous missions (~36,000 km), the LVM-3 has now proven versatile in low Earth orbit (LEO) deployments.
  • This marks the third LEO mission for the vehicle, reflecting its evolution from the earlier GSLV-Mk3.
• Operational Readiness and Turnaround Time
  • The launch follows the CMS-03 mission on November 2, making it the shortest gap between two LVM-3 launches.
  • It tests ISRO’s ability to assemble and execute heavy missions rapidly, a key metric for commercial reliability.
• Record-Breaking Payload
  • At 6,100 kg, the BlueBird payload is ISRO’s heaviest satellite ever placed into orbit, surpassing the cumulative OneWeb payloads (~5,700 kg) to LEO and the 4,410 kg CMS-03 sent to geosynchronous transfer orbit last month.
• Strategic Momentum
  • This is the second year since 2023 that ISRO flies two LVM-3 missions in a single year, underscoring growing cadence, capability, and confidence in India’s heavy-lift launch ecosystem.

Why in the News?

• Recent analysis of RBI State-wise export data shows that India’s export growth is increasingly concentrated in a few States, exposing structural imbalances in regional development.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India’s Export Concentration (Overview, Concentration Among Few States, Regional Divergence, Employment Outcomes, Labour Trends, Suggestions, etc.)

Overview of India’s Export Performance

• India’s export numbers appear robust at the national level, even amid a weakening rupee.
• However, a disaggregated view reveals that export growth is not evenly distributed across States.
• According to the RBI Handbook of Statistics on Indian States (2024-25), a small group of States accounts for a disproportionately large share of India’s total exports.
• This pattern challenges the long-held assumption that export expansion naturally leads to broad-based industrialisation and employment growth across regions.

Concentration of Exports Among a Few States

• India’s export geography is increasingly dominated by five States, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh, which together contribute nearly 70% of the national export basket.
• Half a decade ago, their share was around 65%, indicating a steady rise in concentration.
• This trend reflects a core-periphery pattern, where coastal and industrially advanced States integrate more deeply into global supply chains, while large parts of northern and eastern India remain marginalised.
• The rising Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of export concentration signals growing regional imbalance rather than convergence.
  • The HHI is used by anti-trust agencies that possess the mandate to promote competition. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each producer in the market and then comparing the sum to a scale.

Structural Reasons Behind Regional Divergence

• Several structural factors explain why exports are clustering instead of dispersing:
  • First, global trade conditions have changed. The era of labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing as a pathway to development is narrowing.
  • Global merchandise trade growth has slowed, and capital now seeks regions with high economic complexity rather than just cheap labour.
  • Second, export-leading States possess dense industrial ecosystems, logistics, skilled labour, supplier networks, and financial depth that reinforce agglomeration.
  • Firms benefit from spatial clustering, making it costly to relocate to less-developed regions.
  • Third, hinterland States suffer from persistent deficits in infrastructure, human capital, and institutional capacity, preventing them from entering complex global value chains.

Shift from Labour-Intensive to Capital-Intensive Exports

• A key insight from the analysis is that India’s export growth is increasingly capital-intensive rather than labour-absorbing.
• Data from the Annual Survey of Industries (2022-23) shows that while fixed capital investment grew by over 10%, employment growth lagged behind at about 7%.
• Fixed capital per worker has risen sharply, indicating capital deepening. As a result, exports generate value without proportionate job creation.
• This breaks the traditional development link where exports absorb surplus labour from agriculture into manufacturing.

Employment Outcomes and Labour Market Trends

• The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) reinforces this concern. Manufacturing’s share in total employment has stagnated around 11.6-12%, despite record export values.
• This suggests a collapse in the employment elasticity of exports.
• Most new export-linked jobs are concentrated in capital-intensive hubs, such as electronics clusters in Tamil Nadu or Noida, rather than dispersed factory employment across the hinterland.
• Wage share in Net Value Added has also declined, indicating that productivity gains accrue more to capital than to workers.

Financial and Institutional Constraints in Hinterland States

• Regional inequality is further deepened by financial asymmetries. Credit-Deposit (CD) ratios in export-leading States often exceed 90%, ensuring local recycling of savings into industry.
• In contrast, States like Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh have CD ratios below 50%, implying capital outflow to already developed regions.
• This creates a vicious cycle: weaker States lose capital, struggle to build industrial capacity, and remain excluded from export growth.

Rethinking Exports as a Development Metric

• The evidence suggests a structural shift; exports are no longer a driver of development but an outcome of prior development.
• States do not export their way into prosperity; they export because they already possess industrial and institutional strength.
• This raises important policy questions. Treating export growth as a proxy for inclusive development risks overlooking employment generation, regional equity, and human capital outcomes.

Context:

• India’s nuclear power programme has long suffered from policy uncertainty, liability bottlenecks, and investor hesitation, especially after the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
• In this backdrop, Parliament has passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill.
• It aims to reset India’s nuclear governance framework and align it with global nuclear commerce norms while strengthening energy security and decarbonisation goals.

Why the SHANTI Bill Matters?

• Nuclear power is a clean, reliable baseload energy source, crucial for India’s net-zero ambitions.
• India targets 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047, requiring large-scale investment, global collaboration, and regulatory credibility.
• The SHANTI Bill represents India’s “second chance” to emerge as a credible nuclear energy leader.

Key Features of the SHANTI Bill:

• Legislative reset:
  • Replaces the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 with a single, integrated legal framework.
  • Seeks to harmonise Indian law with global nuclear liability regimes.
• Balanced public–private participation (PPP):
  • Allows involvement of both public and private sectors, but maintains a state-led system. Foreign-incorporated companies excluded as licensees.
  • Sensitive stages such as fuel cycle, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel management remain exclusively with the central government.
  • This balanced PPP is termed as a cautious expansion strategy.
• Regulatory architecture and safety:
  • Licensing: Retained by the government.
  • Safety authorization: Assigned to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) with enhanced statutory powers, stronger radiation safety norms, mandatory public outreach, and improved emergency preparedness.
  • It ensures independent regulators, nuclear safety, institutional capacity.
• Nuclear liability framework – The core reform:
  • Operator-centric liability: Aligns with global practice where primary liability rests with the operator. Limits operator liability to 300 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights).
  • Curtailment of supplier liability:
    • Operator’s right of recourse limited to contractual terms, intentional wrongdoing, etc.
    • It shifts a share of responsibility beyond the operator’s cap to the central government through a Nuclear Liability Fund.
    • It points to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) for supplementary funds if claims exceed that level.
    • This indicates a shift from the expansive supplier liability introduced in 2010.
• State as insurer of last resort:
• Terrorism recognised as a sovereign risk.
• The state assumes liability in extreme cases.
• Ensures victims are not left uncompensated after catastrophic events, assuring last-resort liability of the state.
• Graded liability and transparency:
  • Liability graded according to the nature of installation, risk profile.
  • No category allowed below a minimum threshold without regulator-certified rationale.
  • Annual public disclosure on liability and compensation financing.
• Victim-centric compensation:
  • Expanded definition of nuclear damage: long-term health impacts, environmental degradation, loss of livelihood and income, and preventive measures.
  • Claims pathway with timelines, faster disbursement via dedicated funds - establishing the principle of speed of compensation equals justice.
• Intellectual property (IP) reforms:
  • Creation of a special nuclear inventions regime.
  • Amendments to patent laws to encourage nuclear energy–related innovations, safety software, radiation applications, robotics and specialised manufacturing.
  • Impact: Strengthens domestic nuclear supply chains and skilled employment.

Challenges and Concerns:

• Political and moral insensitivities: Dilution of supplier liability may be criticised as pro-corporate, diluting victim justice and a strong emotional legacy of the Bhopal disaster.
• Weak institutional capacity: AERB needs more specialised inspectors, faster rule-making ability, and strong enforcement credibility.
• Public trust deficit: Nuclear safety concerns, limited public understanding of liability mechanisms.

Way Forward:

• Capacity building and public engagement:
  • Strengthen AERB autonomy and staffing.
  • Build insurance and reinsurance capacity.
  • Enhance public communication and transparency.
• Use SHANTI as a platform to:
  • Deepen India–US civil nuclear cooperation.
  • Diversify nuclear partnerships beyond single suppliers.
  • Integrate nuclear energy firmly into India’s climate strategy.

Conclusion:

• The SHANTI Bill does not claim perfection, but it offers credibility, clarity, and convergence with global norms—three essentials for scaling nuclear energy.
• By balancing safety, liability, innovation, and investment, SHANTI provides India with an opportunity to move from prolonged debate to delivery, transforming India from a cautious nuclear outlier into a reliable global nuclear builder.

Context

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in early December for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit drew intense international attention.
• While India viewed the visit as part of a long-standing bilateral process, the West saw it through the prism of the Russia-Ukraine war and the diplomatic boycott imposed on Moscow since 2022.
• The visit ultimately reaffirmed India’s commitment to strategic autonomy, while revealing both continuity and subtle recalibration in India–Russia ties.

Historical Foundations of a Strategic Partnership

• India–Russia relations are anchored in deep historical trust and shared strategic interests.
• Meetings between leaders of the two countries have often reshaped regional geopolitics, most notably the 1971 India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.
• That agreement decisively altered South Asia’s strategic balance, enabling India’s victory over Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh.
• Beyond landmark treaties, symbolic and substantive gestures have sustained mutual confidence, such as President Putin’s 2009 decision to waive penalties to facilitate India’s acquisition of its second aircraft carrier.
• Over decades, Russia’s consistent support, especially during periods when the West aligned with Pakistan, cemented a relationship based on mutual accommodation and reliability.
• Since the Gorbachev era and under President Putin’s long tenure, successive Indian Prime Ministers have strengthened this partnership.

Ukraine, the West, and India’s Strategic Autonomy

• The Russia-Ukraine conflict posed a critical test for India-Russia relations.
• India maintained neutrality and refused to align with Western efforts to isolate Russia, a stance that has caused persistent friction with the U.S. and the European Union.
• Against this backdrop, President Putin’s visit acquired heightened symbolic significance.
• Western expectations that global political shifts, U.S. tariffs on Indian purchases of Russian oil, and diplomatic pressure might weaken India-Russia ties were not borne out.
• The warmth displayed between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Putin, coupled with extensive media coverage, underscored continuity rather than divergence.

The Joint Statement: Continuity with Subtle Nuances

• The Joint Statement issued after the summit reaffirmed the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership, marking 25 years of formal strategic cooperation.
• It reiterated mutual trust, respect for core national interests, and the intention to strengthen traditional areas while exploring new avenues.
• Particular emphasis was placed on connectivity initiatives, including the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic and the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, alongside enhanced technological and industrial cooperation.
• The optics of the visit-public warmth, coordinated messaging, and expanded cooperation-were widely viewed as successful.

Defence Ties: An Enduring but Questioned Pillar

• Despite these affirmations, the conspicuous absence of defence cooperation from the Joint Statement was striking.
• Defence has historically been the bedrock of India-Russia relations, especially during the Putin era.
• Whether this silence reflects deliberate diplomatic caution or a gradual shift in priorities remains open to interpretation.
• Nevertheless, defence cooperation remains central to India’s security architecture.
• Russia has been India’s most consistent and reliable supplier of advanced military systems, spanning land, sea, and air domains.
• Critical platforms include the S-400 air and missile defence system, the jointly developed BrahMos missile, Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft, T-90 tanks, and transport helicopters.
• These systems continue to form the core of India’s defence capabilities and have significantly enhanced operational effectiveness in recent conflicts.

Western Contradictions and Strategic Realities

• A shift away from Russia towards Western defence sources carries significant strategic risks. Western partners have historically proven inconsistent, particularly in South Asia.
• This concern is reinforced by recent U.S. decisions to approve major upgrade and sustainment packages for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter fleet, even as Washington publicly characterises U.S.-India ties as the defining relationship of the century.
• Such contradictions reinforce India’s strategic scepticism and highlight why Russia continues to be viewed as a trusted long-term partner.

Conclusion

• President Putin’s visit demonstrated the resilience and adaptability of India-Russia relations amid global turbulence.
• While the partnership remains robust and symbolically strong, the muted emphasis on defence suggests nuanced recalibration rather than rupture.
• India’s foreign policy continues to prioritise strategic autonomy, reliable partnerships, and long-term national interest, resisting pressure to conform to transient geopolitical alignments.

Context

• The Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 marks a significant reform in India’s rural employment and livelihood framework.
• By expanding the statutory employment guarantee from 100 to 125 days and restructuring implementation around planning, convergence, and accountability, the Act seeks to strengthen rural livelihoods while enhancing long-term productivity.
• Criticism that the reform weakens employment rights, undermines decentralisation, or signals fiscal withdrawal rests on a flawed assumption that welfare and development are competing objectives.
• The Act is grounded in the principle that welfare and development are mutually reinforcing, and embeds this understanding within its statutory and institutional design.

Key Features of the VB- G RAM G Act

• Strengthening the Statutory Right to Employment
  • A key feature of the Act is the expansion of the guaranteed employment entitlement from 100 to 125 days, reinforcing the legal right to work.
  • The Act also strengthens enforceability by removing procedural dis-entitlement clauses that previously rendered unemployment allowances ineffective.
  • Time-bound grievance redress mechanisms have been reinforced, addressing the gap between statutory promise and lived reality.
  • The employment guarantee remains statutory, justiciable, and substantively stronger than before.
• Demand-Based Employment and Participatory Planning
  • The Act retains the demand-driven nature of employment, with workers continuing to initiate requests for work.
  • The reform lies in anticipatory, participatory village-level planning, ensuring that employment is available when demanded rather than being denied due to administrative unpreparedness.
  • Planning operationalises demand instead of replacing it, shifting the framework from reactive distress response to proactive livelihood assurance.
• Decentralisation and Institutional Architecture
  • Decentralisation remains central to the Act’s architecture. Gram panchayats continue as the primary planning and implementing authorities, while gram sabhas retain approval powers over local plans.
  • The introduction of Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans institutionalises decentralised planning rather than diluting it.
  • Aggregation of plans at higher administrative levels enables coordination, convergence, and visibility, while decision-making authority remains local. Centralisation is limited to coherence, not control.
• Consultation and Cooperative Federalism
  • The Act reflects the principles of cooperative federalism, having been shaped through extensive consultations with State governments, technical workshops, and multi-stakeholder discussions.
  • Key design elements, such as structured village planning, convergence mechanisms, and digital governance, are informed by State-level feedback and implementation experience.
  • States are positioned as development partners, not merely implementing agencies.

Fiscal Commitment and Addressing Structural Weakness

• Fiscal Commitment and Equity in Allocation
  • Claims of fiscal withdrawal are inconsistent with budgetary trends. Central allocations have increased to nearly ₹95,000 crore, demonstrating sustained fiscal commitment.
  • The 60:40 funding model, with a 90:10 ratio for northeastern and Himalayan States and Jammu and Kashmir, follows established norms.
  • Rule-based, normative allocation ensures equity, while flexibility provisions allow States to seek relaxations during natural disasters or extraordinary circumstances, balancing accountability with responsiveness.
• Addressing Structural Weaknesses of Earlier Frameworks
  • Implementation experience under earlier frameworks revealed episodic employment, weak enforceability of unemployment allowances, fragmented asset creation, and vulnerability to corruption and duplication.
  • These weaknesses became evident during droughts, migration surges, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • The Act responds by integrating livelihood security with durable asset creation, agricultural stability, and productivity enhancement, treating income support and development outcomes as a continuum.

Comparative Perspective: Lessons from the UPA Era

• Wage freezes ignored inflation, budgetary allocations declined despite rising demand, and worker participation fell.
• Delayed fund releases and administrative apathy weakened the employment guarantee.
• The Comptroller and Auditor General’s 2013 report documented widespread corruption, including fake job cards, financial irregularities, delayed wages, and poor record-keeping, particularly in States with high rural poverty.
• These failures underscored the necessity of structural correction rather than policy stagnation.

Conclusion

• The Viksit Bharat–Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 represents renewal, not retreat, in India’s rural welfare framework.
• By expanding entitlements, strengthening enforceability, institutionalising decentralised planning, and enhancing fiscal and administrative coherence, the Act integrates welfare and development into a unified statutory model.
• Income support and productivity enhancement are treated as interdependent goals, laying the foundation for a resilient, self-reliant rural economy grounded in enforceable rights, cooperative federalism, and sustainable development.

Why in news?

Amid criticism over the government’s new definition of the Aravalli Hills, the Environment Ministry said there was no immediate ecological threat and that the range remains protected, with mining allowed in only 0.19% of its total area.

While the government has paused new mining leases pending further study, critics argue that official assurances do not address disputed court submissions or broader environmental threats beyond mining.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• New Aravalli Definition: What Changes and Why It Matters?
• What Remains Protected in the Aravallis?
• What the New Aravalli Definition Excludes?
• What the Centre Told the Supreme Court?
• Inclusion vs Exclusion: The Core of the Aravalli Debate

New Aravalli Definition: What Changes and Why It Matters?

• 
• A new definition of the Aravalli Hills, approved by the Supreme Court in November 2025, classifies only landforms rising 100 metres or more above local relief—along with their slopes and adjoining areas—as part of the range.
• Critics argue that using local profile instead of a standard baseline could exclude large stretches of the Aravallis from protection.
• The Environment Ministry has said that no new mining leases will be granted until a detailed study is completed under the court’s order.

What Remains Protected in the Aravallis?

• Several parts of the Aravallis continue to enjoy strong legal protection, including tiger reserves, national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, eco-sensitive zones, notified wetlands, and compensatory afforestation plantations.
• These areas remain closed to mining or development unless explicitly permitted under wildlife or forest laws, regardless of whether they fall within the revised Aravalli definition.
• Protection Is Not Always Permanent
  • However, such safeguards can be revised or diluted.
  • A recent attempt by the Centre and Rajasthan to redefine the boundaries of the Sariska tiger reserve—which could have opened nearby areas to mining—was halted only after intervention by the Supreme Court, highlighting the fragility of regulatory protection.
• How the New Benchmark Still Includes Some Areas?
  • The new benchmark does not exclude all landforms below 100 metres.
  • Any landform rising at least 100 metres above its local profile qualifies as part of the Aravalli Hills.
  • Moreover, if two such hills are within 500 metres, the intervening land—regardless of its elevation—will also be treated as part of the Aravalli range.

What the New Aravalli Definition Excludes?

• The new parameters exclude large areas earlier identified as Aravalli under the Forest Survey of India (FSI) 3-degree slope formula, which classifies land as Aravalli if it lies above a state’s minimum elevation (115 m in Rajasthan) and has a slope of at least 3 degrees.
• Rajasthan—home to nearly two-thirds of the Aravalli range—faces the biggest exclusions.
• Entire Districts Dropped from the Aravalli List
  • Several districts earlier counted among the 34 Aravalli districts across Gujarat, Rajasthan, Haryana, and Delhi are now excluded. Notably below mentioned areas are missing from the updated list submitted to the Supreme Court:
    • Sawai Madhopur (Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve; Aravalli–Vindhya convergence),
    • Chittorgarh (UNESCO World Heritage fort on an Aravalli outcrop),
    • Nagaur (where FSI mapped 1,110 sq km as Aravalli),
• Overstated Extent and the Mining Claim
  • While the government cited mining as limited to 0.19% of a 1.44 lakh sq km Aravalli expanse, this figure effectively covers the entire landmass of the 34 listed districts, not the actual hill range.
  • Under the FSI method, the Aravallis span 40,483 sq km across 15 districts of Rajasthan—about 33% of those districts’ area.
• Scale of Exclusion Under the 100-Metre Benchmark
  • Applying the new 100-metre local relief definition would exclude 99.12%—1,17,527 of 1,18,575—of the Aravalli hills (including slopes and surroundings) identified by the FSI in these 15 districts, dramatically shrinking the range’s officially recognised footprint.

What the Centre Told the Supreme Court?

• The Environment Ministry informed the Supreme Court that the 100-metre definition would include a larger area of the Aravallis than the 3-degree slope formula used by the Forest Survey of India (FSI).
• This was despite the FSI flagging concerns that the new benchmark would exclude vast tracts earlier identified as Aravalli.
• Argument Based on District Averages
  • The Ministry argued that in 12 of the 34 Aravalli districts, the average slope is below 3 degrees—implying these districts would be excluded under the FSI method.
  • Critics note this averages plains with hills, understating the slopes of actual hilly areas and thereby weakening the comparison.
• Local Profile as the Baseline
  • The Ministry told the court that elevation would be measured from the local profile rather than a standardised reference point (such as Rajasthan’s lowest elevation of 115 m used by the FSI).
• Why This Matters?
  • Using local profiles can exclude even 100-metre-high hills if surrounding terrain is already elevated (saddles), potentially shrinking the officially recognised Aravalli footprint despite claims to the contrary.

Inclusion vs Exclusion: The Core of the Aravalli Debate

• Limits of the Mining Argument
  • The government has highlighted that only a small fraction of the Aravallis would be legally open to mining.
  • However, concerns persist about illegal mining, the future expansion of mining in areas excluded by the 100-metre definition, and the cumulative ecological impact of individual mining blocks on surrounding landscapes.
• Environmental Risks Beyond Mining
  • Mining is not the only threat.
  • By de-recognising large hilly tracts, especially in the Delhi NCR, where Aravalli ranges taper in height, the new definition could open vast areas to real estate and infrastructure development, posing serious environmental risks.
• Committee’s Rationale: Avoiding ‘Over-Inclusion’
  • The ministry-led committee told the Supreme Court that not every hill is Aravalli and not every part of Aravalli is hilly, warning against “inclusion errors” if slope alone is used to define boundaries.
  • It argued for caution in wrongly categorising non-Aravalli land.
• Critics’ Concern: Exclusion Takes Priority
  • While acknowledging non-hilly stretches, the submission places greater emphasis on preventing inclusion of extra areas rather than on the risk of excluding genuine Aravalli landscapes, raising concerns that environmental protection may be weakened in the process.

Why in news?

India and New Zealand have concluded talks on a free trade agreement, granting India tariff-free access to New Zealand’s market, attracting $20 billion in investment over 15 years, and aiming to double bilateral trade to $5 billion within five years.

The FTA will be formally signed in the first half of 2026.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India–New Zealand Bilateral Relations
• India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: A New Phase in Bilateral Ties
• India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: Key Highlights

India–New Zealand Bilateral Relations

• India and New Zealand established diplomatic relations in 1952 and share enduring ties rooted in Commonwealth membership, common law traditions, and democratic governance.
• Sporting links—especially cricket, hockey, and mountaineering—and tourism have long fostered goodwill between the two societies.
• Strategic Vision and Policy Frameworks
  • New Zealand has identified India as a priority partner through initiatives such as “Opening Doors to India” (2011) and the NZ Inc. India Strategy.
  • This was further deepened by the “India–NZ 2025: Investing in the Relationship” strategy, envisioning a more enduring strategic partnership across political, economic, and people-centric domains.
• Trade and economic ties
  • New Zealand is India's 11th largest two-way trading partner.
    • India-New Zealand total trade in 2023-24 was valued at US$ 1.75 billion.
  • Key trade sectors: Education, tourism, dairy, food processing, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, and critical minerals.
  • Indian exports to NZ: Pharmaceuticals, precious metals & gems, textiles, motor vehicles, and non-knitted apparel.
  • Indian imports from NZ: Logs, forestry products, wool, edible fruit & nuts.
• Defence and Maritime Cooperation
  • Defence ties are expanding steadily:
    • Regular naval visits and port calls by Indian Navy ships.
    • High-level naval leadership exchanges.
    • Cooperation under Combined Task Force-150, with Indian Navy personnel contributing while NZ leads the task force.
  • These engagements support maritime security and Indo-Pacific stability.
• Education and Knowledge Partnerships
  • India is the second-largest source of international students in NZ (≈8,000 students).
  • Collaboration through:
    • NZ Centre at IIT Delhi
    • Joint research projects in cancer, robotics, cybersecurity, waste management, and medical technology
    • Education cooperation agreements with GIFT City and IIM Ahmedabad
• People-to-People and Cultural Ties
  • Indian-origin population in NZ: ~292,000, with Hindi as the fifth most spoken language.
  • Vibrant celebration of Indian festivals and strong presence of Indian cultural institutions.
  • Deep sporting connections, including shared mountaineering heritage linked to Sir Edmund Hillary.

India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: A New Phase in Bilateral Ties

• India and New Zealand have concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), ending negotiations that began in March 2025.
• FTA talks were launched during Luxon’s visit to India, and the deal was finalised in a record nine months, reflecting strong political commitment and a shared goal of deepening bilateral relations.

India–New Zealand FTA: Key Highlights

• The FTA is expected to double bilateral trade within five years, deepen economic engagement, and strengthen cooperation beyond trade—covering defence, education, sports, innovation, and people-to-people ties.
• Investment and Market Access Gains
  • Investment: New Zealand will invest $20 billion in India over 15 years.
  • Healthcare: A dedicated health and traditional medicine annex—New Zealand’s first such agreement with any country—facilitates trade in health services.
• Tariff Liberalisation
  • 95% of New Zealand’s exports will see tariffs eliminated or reduced.
  • 57% of exports to India will be duty-free from day one, rising to 82% on full implementation; the remaining 13% will see significant tariff cuts.
  • India protected sensitive sectors—no concessions on dairy, onions, sugar, spices, edible oils, rubber, rice, wheat, and soya.
• Boost to Jobs and Exports
  • The FTA is expected to lift labour-intensive sectors—apparel, leather, textiles, rubber, footwear, home décor—and promote exports of automobiles, auto components, machinery, electronics, electricals, and pharmaceuticals.
• Mobility and Services Access
  • 5,000 temporary employment visas annually for Indian professionals, valid up to three years.
  • India gains market access across 118 services sectors and MFN status in 139 sectors, expanding opportunities for Indian professionals.
    • Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status is a key WTO principle that requires countries to treat all WTO members equally in trade.
  • Coverage includes IT, engineering, healthcare, education, construction, and niche roles like AYUSH practitioners, yoga instructors, chefs, and music teachers—strengthening services trade and workforce mobility.

Why in the News?

• Rising air pollution in Delhi-NCR has renewed debate on recognising the right to a healthy environment as an explicit constitutional right.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Environmental Degradation (Background, PM & Health Risks, Constitutional Basis, Role of Judiciary, Environmental Principles, etc.)

Background: Environmental Degradation and Public Health

• India faces recurring environmental crises, particularly during winter months, when air pollution levels in Delhi-NCR deteriorate sharply due to vehicular emissions, industrial activity, fossil fuel use, construction dust, waste burning, and agricultural residue burning.
• These conditions severely affect public health, leading to respiratory illnesses, cardiovascular diseases, and reduced life expectancy.
• The persistent nature of such crises has highlighted gaps in policy enforcement and raised questions about the legal responsibility of the State to protect environmental health.

Particulate Matter and Health Risks

• Among various pollutants, particulate matter is considered the most harmful. PM10 particles can enter the respiratory system, while finer PM2.5 particles penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream.
• Diesel particulate matter, a sub-category of PM2.5, is especially toxic and poses serious risks to children and vulnerable populations.
• In response to worsening air quality, the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) has strengthened the Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP), mandating school closures and staggered office timings during severe pollution phases, indicating growing administrative recognition of environmental health risks.

Constitutional Basis of Environmental Protection

• Although the original Constitution did not explicitly guarantee environmental rights, judicial interpretation has expanded the scope of Article 21 (Right to Life) to include the right to a clean and healthy environment.
• This interpretation was gradually developed through landmark judgments, beginning with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which broadened the meaning of “life” beyond mere physical existence.
• Subsequently, constitutional amendments strengthened environmental responsibility.
• Article 48A (Directive Principles) places a duty on the State to protect and improve the environment, while Article 51A(g) imposes a fundamental duty on citizens to safeguard natural resources.
• Together, these provisions create a shared constitutional obligation toward environmental protection.

Role of Judiciary and Public Interest Litigation

• Since the mid-1980s, rapid industrialisation and liberalisation have intensified environmental degradation, prompting judicial intervention.
• The judiciary has played a proactive role by using Public Interest Litigations (PILs) under Articles 32 and 226 to address environmental harm.
• Courts have consistently balanced development needs with environmental sustainability, reinforcing the idea that economic growth cannot come at the cost of ecological destruction.
• The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, further strengthens this framework by defining the environment as an interconnected system of air, water, land, and living beings.
• Judicial rulings have clarified that the right to live with dignity includes the right to pollution-free air and water, making environmental protection an enforceable legal concern.

Environmental Principles in Indian Jurisprudence

• Indian environmental law has adopted key global principles to deal with ecological harm.
• The principle of absolute liability was introduced to address industrial disasters involving hazardous substances, ensuring that enterprises bear full responsibility for damage regardless of fault.
• The precautionary principle requires preventive action even in the absence of scientific certainty, while the polluter pays principle mandates that polluters bear the cost of environmental damage.
• These principles, affirmed by the judiciary, emphasise prevention, accountability, and sustainable development as core governance values.

Public Trust Doctrine and State Responsibility

• The public trust doctrine reinforces the idea that natural resources are held by the State in trust for the people.
• Under this doctrine, the State cannot exploit environmental resources for private or commercial gain at the cost of public interest.
• Constitutional provisions under Article 39 further support community ownership of material resources and equitable distribution for public welfare.
• Recent judicial recognition of climate change impacts has expanded environmental rights further.
• The Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of protection against adverse climate effects as part of Articles 21 and 14 reflects the evolving nature of environmental constitutionalism in India.

Need for Explicit Constitutional Recognition

• Despite progressive judicial interpretation, the absence of an explicit fundamental right to a healthy environment limits enforceability.
• Since rights must be linked to Part III for direct claims, the article argues for formally incorporating the right to a clean and healthy environment into the Constitution.
• Such recognition would clearly define State accountability and citizen responsibility, strengthening environmental governance in an era of climate uncertainty.

Why in News?

• NITI Aayog released a report titled “Internationalisation of Higher Education in India: Prospects, Potential, and Policy Recommendations”.
• The report aligns with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 and comes soon after the introduction of the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan Bill, 2025, which aims to overhaul higher education regulation.
• The focus is on correcting the severe imbalance between inbound and outbound student mobility and positioning India as a global education and research hub.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Rationale for Internationalisation
• Key Findings of the Report
• Major Policy Recommendations
• Methodology of the Study
• Challenges Identified and Way Forward
• Conclusion

Rationale for Internationalisation:

• In 2024, for every 1 international student studying in India, 28 Indian students went abroad (1:28 ratio).
• As of 2022, India hosted only about 47,000 international students, despite a 518% increase since 2001.
• Forecasts suggest 7.89–11 lakh international students by 2047, depending on policy intensity.
• Internationalisation is seen as crucial for knowledge diplomacy, talent circulation, reducing brain drain, and economic sustainability.

Key Findings of the Report:

• Economic and strategic concerns:
  • Outward remittances under RBI’s Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) increased by about 2000% in the last decade.
  • Indian students’ overseas education expenditure is projected at ₹6.2 lakh crore by 2025 (~2% of GDP).
  • This spending equals about 75% of India’s trade deficit (FY 2024–25).
  • Concentration of 8.5 lakh out of 13.5 lakh outbound students in high-income countries (USA, UK, Australia).
  • Over 16 lakh Indians renounced citizenship since 2011, indicating long-term talent loss.
• Perception and institutional gaps:
  • 41% of institutes cited limited scholarships/financial aid as a key barrier.
  • 30% institutes flagged perception of education quality in India.
  • Other constraints include inadequate international infrastructure, limited global programme offerings, weak international student support systems, and cultural adaptation challenges.

Major Policy Recommendations:

• Strategic and financial measures:
  • Bharat Vidya Kosh: As a national research sovereign wealth fund (suggesting a $10 billion corpus, of which 50% can be raised from diaspora/philanthropy + 50% from Centre).
  • Vishwa Bandhu scholarship: To attract foreign students.
  • Vishwa Bandhu fellowship: To attract foreign research talent and faculty.
  • Bharat ki AAN (Alumni Ambassador Network): To leverage diaspora Indians who have studied at top India universities into acting as ambassadors for Indian higher education.
• Mobility and global partnerships:
  • Europe’s Erasmus+ like programme:
    • To suggest the creation of a “multilateral academic mobility framework” tailored to specific country groupings like ASEAN, BRICS, BIMSTEC, etc.
    • This could be called the “Tagore framework”, named after Asia’s first Nobel laureate, Rabindranath Tagore.
  • Promotion of “campus within campus” and more international campuses in India.
• Regulatory and governance reforms:
  • Easier entry–exit norms for foreign students and faculty.
  • Fast-track tenure pathways for foreign faculty.
  • Competitive, internationally benchmarked salaries.
  • Single-window clearance system for visas, bank accounts, tax IDs, housing and administrative needs.
  • Alignment with non-binding internationalisation frameworks under the proposed Manak Parishad (Standards Council).
• Branding, rankings and outreach:
  • Expansion of NIRF parameters to include outreach and inclusivity, globalisation and partnerships.
  • Bharat ki AAN: Mobilising Indian diaspora alumni as global ambassadors of Indian HEIs.
• Curriculum and academic culture: Updated and globally relevant curricula. Emphasis on international research collaboration and cross-cultural learning ecosystems.

Methodology of the Study:

• Online survey of 160 Indian institutions.
• Key informant interviews with 30 institutions across 16 countries.
• National Workshop at IIT Madras.
• Transnational Education Roundtable in the UK.

Challenges Identified and Way Forward:

• Persistent quality perception gap: Leverage diaspora capital, soft power, and civilisational knowledge.
• Fragmented regulatory ecosystem: Ensure policy coherence between NEP 2020, regulatory reforms, and global engagement.
• Weak internationalisation culture: Treat internationalisation as a strategic national priority, not merely an academic reform.
• Risk of continued brain drain and capital flight: Shift from student export model to a global education destination model.

Conclusion:

• The NITI Aayog’s roadmap underscores that internationalisation of higher education is central to India’s economic resilience, strategic autonomy, and soft power projection.
• India can transform from a net exporter of students to a global knowledge hub, in line with the aspirations of NEP 2020 and Viksit Bharat 2047.

Context

• The replacement of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) by the Viksit Bharat Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) (VB-G RAM G) Act, 2025 marks a decisive shift in India’s rural employment framework.
• MGNREGA was a rights-based, decentralised and demand-driven law, whereas the new Act reflects a centralised, discretionary and fiscally restrictive approach.
• This transition raises serious concerns regarding the constitutional right to livelihood, federalism, decentralisation, and social equity.

Constitutional and Legal Foundations of MGNREGA

• MGNREGA drew legitimacy from Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life.
• In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court held that the right to livelihood is an intrinsic component of the right to life.
• MGNREGA operationalised this interpretation by recognising the right to work as a legal entitlement rather than a welfare measure.
• The Act created justiciable rights, including employment on demand, unemployment allowance if work was not provided within 15 days, timely wage payments with compensation for delays, gender parity in wages, and minimum wage guarantees.
• These provisions transformed rural workers into rights-holders and imposed clear legal obligations on the State, distinguishing MGNREGA from earlier public works programmes.

Achievements and Social Impact of MGNREGA

• MGNREGA produced multiple positive outcomes.
  • First, it was universal and not targeted, reducing exclusion errors.
  • Second, it led to increased rural incomes and a decline in poverty levels.
  • Third, it significantly addressed gender and caste inequalities, with women constituting around 58% of workers in recent years.
  • Importantly, 45% of women workers had not participated in paid work prior to MGNREGA, highlighting its transformative role.
• The programme also reduced dependence on moneylenders by 21%, improved school enrolment, and created durable assets that alleviated ecological distress.
• As an instrument of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, MGNREGA strengthened panchayati raj institutions through decentralised planning and execution.
• Its effectiveness was globally acknowledged, and its role as a critical safety net during the COVID-19 pandemic further reinforced its significance.

Gradual Undermining of MGNREGA

• Despite its success, MGNREGA faced systematic erosion over the past decade.
• Chronic underfunding resulted in persistent wage delays and rationing of work, undermining its demand-driven character.
• Technocratic interventions, such as photo-based attendance systems and complex payment mechanisms, led to exclusions and new avenues for corruption.
• Additionally, staff shortages and underfunding of social audits weakened accountability structures.
• These developments diluted the Act’s effectiveness and paved the way for legislative replacement rather than corrective reform.

Broader Implications of the VB-G RAM G Act

• Centralisation and Fiscal Burden under the VB-G RAM G Act
  • The VB-G RAM G Act fundamentally alters the governance of rural employment.
    • Section 5(1) grants the Union government wide discretionary powers over the nature and location of public works.
    • Section 4(5) introduces State-wise normative allocations, replacing demand-driven employment with a command-driven model.
  • This shift undermines decentralisation and federal principles, placing States at the mercy of central allocations.
  • Unlike MGNREGA, the new Act removes the Union government’s obligation to compensate for wage delays, despite its dominant financial role earlier.
  • The revised Centre–State funding ratio of 60:40, coupled with the provision that States must bear expenditure beyond their allocations, imposes a severe fiscal burden.
  • These clauses risk political favouritism, as States with limited fiscal capacity may be compelled to suppress work demand, leading to higher unemployment and distress migration.
• Reinforcing Inequality and Weakening Worker Rights
  • Several provisions of the new Act threaten to entrench existing inequalities.
    • Section 6(2) permits suspension of employment for 60 days during the agricultural season, disproportionately affecting landless workers and women, for whom year-round employment is essential.
    • This provision artificially pits farmers against labourers, despite evidence of mutual benefits under MGNREGA.
  • Although the Act promises 125 days of employment per household, this claim lacks credibility when average employment had already declined to around 50 days due to funding constraints.
  • Crucially, the new Act introduces no substantive mechanisms to address corruption, while dismantling existing safeguards.

Conclusion

• MGNREGA embodied a rare convergence of Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of decentralised governance and B.R. Ambedkar’s commitment to enforceable rights.
• By formalising years of dilution, the VB-G RAM G Act reduces a constitutional entitlement to a discretionary scheme, weakens federalism, and exacerbates inequality.
• Rather than advancing inclusive development, it represents a retreat from the constitutional promise of dignity, livelihood, and social justice.

Context

• The introduction of the Right to Disconnect Bill as a private member’s bill marks a significant moment in Indian labour law, particularly in the context of the recent consolidation of labour regulation through the four labour codes.
• These codes govern working hours, overtime, and employer control, reflecting a framework designed primarily for physical workplaces.
• The Bill responds to the growing reality of digital work, where technological connectivity has blurred the boundaries between professional and personal life.
• Despite acknowledging this transformation, the Bill continues to operate within a time-based regulatory framework, giving rise to unresolved questions regarding the definition of work, the scope of the proposed right, and its constitutional character.

Definitional Gaps in the Concept of Work

• A central limitation of the Right to Disconnect Bill lies in the absence of a definition of work in the context of the digital economy.
• Indian labour law has traditionally been grounded in physical presence and fixed working hours.
• While the Bill grants employees the right to refrain from responding to work-related communications beyond prescribed working hours, it does not clarify whether after-hours digital engagement constitutes work.
• This omission becomes particularly significant when read alongside the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020, which continues to regulate working hours and overtime.
• The Code prescribes limits on working time but does not expressly address digital engagement outside formal hours.
• By regulating communication without integrating it into the legal framework governing working time, the Bill creates a conceptual gap.
• As a result, the right to disconnect risks functioning as a behavioural norm rather than a binding labour standard, weakening its enforceability. 

Comparative Perspectives on Employer Control and Working Time

• Comparative analysis highlights these shortcomings more clearly. In the European Union, judicial interpretations of working time have evolved to focus on employer control rather than physical activity alone.
• Decisions such as SIMAP, Jaeger, and Tyco adopted an expansive understanding of working time, including on-call duties, standby periods, and other forms of availability where the employer exercises control, even in the absence of active work.
• This jurisprudence reflects the principle that an employee’s time belongs to the employer whenever autonomy is constrained.
• France adopts a similar approach by clearly demarcating working time and rest time, treating periods of availability under employer control as working time.
• Digital communication is integrated through collective bargaining, allowing sector-specific flexibility while maintaining statutory protection.
• Germany likewise enforces strict limits on working hours and mandatory rest periods.
• These jurisdictions illustrate a shared engagement with a fundamental question: when does an employee’s time become the employer’s time?

Scope and Enforceability of the Right in Indian Labour Law

• Within the Indian context, this question remains unresolved.
• The labour codes combine mandatory statutory provisions, such as limits on working hours, with contractual terms negotiated through employer policies and agreements.
• The Right to Disconnect Bill does not clarify whether the right is a mandatory labour standard or one that can be modified through contract.
• This ambiguity weakens the normative force of the right and risks uneven application across sectors and workplaces.
• Without clear statutory grounding, the right may remain dependent on employer discretion rather than legal obligation.

Constitutional Dimensions of the Right to Disconnect

• The Bill also raises important constitutional concerns.
• The freedom to disengage from work bears a clear relationship with Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.
• The ability to disconnect directly implicates individual autonomy, dignity, and mental well-being, all of which have been recognised as components of Article 21.
• However, the Bill does not articulate this constitutional foundation or explain how such guarantees are to be realised within the employment relationship.
• Consequently, it remains unclear whether the right to disconnect is purely statutory or reflective of a deeper constitutional commitment to personal autonomy at work.

Conclusion

• The Right to Disconnect Bill recognises that digital technologies have blurred the traditional boundaries between working time and personal life.
• But it does not adequately explain how this shift should be accommodated within the existing legal framework governing working hours, overtime, and employer control.
• Comparative experience demonstrates that the right to disconnect becomes effective only when digital availability is treated as working time, a step yet to be taken in Indian labour law.
• The Bill also leaves unresolved whether the right carries a constitutional dimension rooted in Article 21, allowing for divergent interpretations.
• For these reasons, the Bill is best understood as the beginning of a broader legal and constitutional conversation, one that Indian labour law jurisprudence will eventually need to address.