Why in news?

India is preparing legislative changes to two major laws in its atomic energy sector to attract private and foreign investment.

Amendments to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA) aim to ease liability provisions, addressing long-standing investor concerns.

Another key reform would allow private companies to operate nuclear power plants, potentially enabling foreign firms to hold minority stakes in future projects.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India Plans Major Changes to Nuclear Liability Law
• Opening the Nuclear Sector to Private Participation
• U.S. Clears Regulatory Hurdle for Nuclear Cooperation
• Conclusion

India Plans Major Changes to Nuclear Liability Law

• The government is working on amendments to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA) to address concerns that have deterred foreign and domestic investment in the nuclear sector.
• Foreign Vendor Concerns Over ‘Right of Recourse’
  • Section 17(b) of the CLNDA gives nuclear plant operators the right of recourse against suppliers in case of defects in equipment or services.
  • This provision has been flagged by companies like Westinghouse Electric (U.S.) and Framatome (France) as a major barrier due to fears of future liability.
• Broad Definition of ‘Supplier’ Worrying for Indian Sub-Vendors
  • The current definition of "supplier" is considered too broad, with no distinction between primary suppliers and sub-vendors.
  • Indian equipment manufacturers have expressed concern that they too may be held liable, creating uncertainty and reluctance to participate.
• Proposed Amendments to Align with Global Norms
  • Two key amendments are being considered:
    • Diluting Section 17(b) to bring it in line with international nuclear liability standards.
    • Clarifying the definition of 'supplier' to exclude smaller sub-vendors unless specifically mentioned in contracts.
• Possible Caps on Vendor Liability
• Deliberations are also underway to limit the liability of vendors:
  • Monetary cap pegged to the original contract value
  • Time-bound applicability of liability
• This is expected to reassure both foreign and domestic suppliers.
• Regulatory Oversight as a Safeguard
  • All nuclear projects must be vetted by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which can ensure that contractual clauses for recourse are properly defined, maintaining safety and accountability.
• Move to Align Nuclear Liability Law with Global Norms
  • Amendments to the CLNDA aim to align India’s liability framework with the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).
  • India became a party to the CSC in 2016, and the current legal tweaks would bring its national law in closer conformity with international standards.

Opening the Nuclear Sector to Private Participation

• The government is planning a major amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 to allow private companies to operate nuclear power plants—an activity currently reserved for state-owned entities like NPCIL and NTPC.
• The proposed reform could also enable foreign companies to take minority equity stakes in upcoming nuclear projects, paving the way for greater global collaboration in India's atomic energy sector.
• A Historic Shift in a Traditionally Closed Sector
  • India’s atomic energy sector has remained closed to private and foreign players.
  • These legislative reforms mark a transformational shift aimed at unlocking its commercial potential.
  • Nearly two decades after the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, the amendments are seen as a way to revive and capitalize on its unrealized potential, strengthening bilateral strategic and commercial ties.
  • The nuclear sector reforms are also being positioned as part of a larger trade and investment framework with the U.S., possibly leading up to a formal trade pact currently under negotiation.

U.S. Clears Regulatory Hurdle for Nuclear Cooperation

• In March 2025, the U.S. Department of Energy granted a ‘10 CFR part 810’ specific authorisation to Holtec International. This clearance allows:
  • Transfer of unclassified small modular reactor (SMR) technology to India
  • Collaboration with Holtec Asia, Tata Consulting Engineers, and L&T
• Earlier, this regulation barred U.S. firms from manufacturing or designing nuclear components in India, which had stalled cooperation.
• The responsibility now lies with India to enact the two key legislative amendments to unlock the full potential of the Indo–U.S. civil nuclear deal and expand its domestic nuclear energy capacity.

Conclusion

• Experts underscore the economic necessity of these amendments to attract foreign vendors and enable domestic manufacturing in the nuclear sector.
• With global legal alignment, domestic clarity on liability, and U.S. cooperation now secured, passing these reforms could finally activate the long-awaited civil nuclear partnership and bolster India's energy security and industrial capability.

Why in News?

Recent incidents—including a Delhi-Jammu flight turning back, a tanker collision at the Strait of Hormuz, and a container ship grounding near Jeddah—were all caused by GPS interference, which has now become a major threat to global aviation and maritime navigation.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About GPS Interference
• Dangers Associated with GPS Interference
• Multiple Causes of GPS Interference
• How Aircraft Mitigate GPS Interference
• How Ships Handle GPS Spoofing
• Conclusion

About GPS Interference

• GPS interference refers to deliberate cyber-attacks that disrupt or deceive Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, affecting navigation for aircraft, ships, and other vehicles.
• Types of GPS Interference
  • GPS Jamming
    • Involves the use of a jammer device that emits strong radio signals on GPS frequencies.
    • These signals overpower the weaker satellite signals, causing GPS receivers to lose location and time data.
    • This is a form of signal disruption.
  • GPS Spoofing
    • Uses a device to transmit false signals that mimic those from GPS satellites.
    • It deceives receivers into accepting incorrect location or time data.
    • Unlike jamming, spoofing doesn’t block signals—it manipulates them.
• While often used interchangeably, jamming disrupts GPS functionality, whereas spoofing misleads the receiver.
• Both pose serious threats to navigation and safety in air and sea operations.

Dangers Associated with GPS Interference

• GPS interference poses a serious threat to both civilian and military operations, enabling remote disruption without physical confrontation.
• In 2024, there were reports of up to 700 GPS spoofing incidents daily worldwide, underlining the scale and urgency of the threat.
• Risks to Aviation and Maritime Safety
  • Spoofing can mislead pilots, causing incorrect position judgments and increasing the risk of collisions with terrain or other aircraft.
  • For ships, loss of GPS accuracy can lead to groundings, collisions, and disruption of maritime operations, including port functions.
  • GPS spoofing isn’t limited to air and sea—it can also disrupt road navigation, leading to traffic jams and paralyzing transport systems, particularly during emergencies.
• Impact on Critical Infrastructure
  • Air traffic control, port operations, and vessel traffic systems (VTS) are highly dependent on GPS.
  • Interference can cause systemic failures in these sectors, with wide-ranging safety and operational consequences.

Multiple Causes of GPS Interference

• GPS interference can arise from both natural and intentional sources, including:
  • Electromagnetic radiation from nearby devices
  • Ionospheric disturbances and solar flares
  • Deliberate jamming and spoofing in conflict zones
• Countries with advanced electronic warfare capabilities—especially those involved in active conflicts—are often responsible for intentional interference.
• While military in intent, civilian vessels and aircraft nearby can also be affected.
• Hotspots of GPS Interference
  • Persian Gulf and Red Sea
    • Maritime GPS interference has surged due to regional tensions.
    • Windward’s Q1 2025 data shows a 350% increase in spoofing in the Red Sea compared to 2024.
    • Vessels reported sudden jumps of hundreds of nautical miles.
  • Eastern Europe
    • Ongoing Russia–Ukraine war has led to frequent GPS spoofing incidents, especially affecting airspace safety.

How Aircraft Mitigate GPS Interference

• Use of Backup Navigation Systems
  • Inertial Navigation Systems (INS): Uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to calculate position from the last known location.
  • VHF Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME): Ground-based radio navigation aids that help pilots cross-check their position.
• Other Navigation Techniques
  • Dead reckoning and celestial navigation are rare but can be used in extreme cases.
    • Dead reckoning - the process of calculating one’s position by estimating the direction and distance travelled
  • Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) remain unaffected by spoofing and ensure safe landings.
• Crew Training and Communication
  • DGCA mandates enhanced crew training to identify and respond to spoofing threats.
  • Pilots are encouraged to monitor control room chatter for early warning signs.

How Ships Handle GPS Spoofing

• Manual Navigation During Spoofing
  • Ships typically operate on autopilot using GPS, but spoofing forces a switch to manual helm control.
  • Terrestrial navigation using lighthouses, radars, and paper charts ensures continued situational awareness.
• Adoption of Multi-GNSS Systems
  • Ships increasingly rely on multi-constellation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which includes:
    • U.S. GPS
    • Russia’s GLONASS
    • EU’s Galileo
    • China’s Bei Dou
  • This diversification reduces dependency on a single system and enhances resilience.

Conclusion

• Mitigating GPS interference involves a multi-layered approach:
  • Redundant systems in aircraft
  • Manual navigation and GNSS diversification in ships
  • National autonomy through indigenous systems like NavIC
• This strategy ensures continuity, safety, and sovereignty in navigation and critical operations.

Context:

• The Finance Minister's proposal under the Income-Tax Bill, 2025, allows tax authorities to access an individual’s "virtual digital space" during search and seizure operations.
• While justified as necessary due to increasing online financial activity, the move raises serious concerns about privacy, government overreach, and expanded surveillance powers.

Existing Legal Framework

• India’s current tax law, under Section 132 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, allows for search and seizure in physical spaces like homes, offices, and lockers.
• These powers are justified by a direct link between the location and the suspected undisclosed income or assets.

Expansion to Digital Space

• The new Income-Tax Bill, 2025, proposes to expand search powers to include an individual's “virtual digital space”—such as emails, cloud drives, social media accounts, and digital platforms.
• The inclusion of “any other space of similar nature” makes this scope open-ended and undefined.
• Concerns Over Privacy and Overreach
  • Digital spaces often hold far more information than required for a tax investigation, including data involving friends, family, and colleagues.
  • This significantly increases the risk of disproportionate intrusion and the violation of privacy.
• Implications for Confidential Professions
  • The move is particularly worrying for professionals like journalists, whose devices may hold confidential sources and unpublished materials.
  • Seizures based on vague suspicion could impair press freedom and violate protected communication.
• Operational Challenges
  • The Bill also allows tax authorities to override access codes to digital devices.
  • However, it remains unclear how this will work in practice—especially for encrypted apps like WhatsApp, which were specifically mentioned by the Finance Minister.
• Judicial Safeguards and Supreme Court Intervention
  • India’s judiciary has consistently upheld that search and seizure powers are to be exercised with restraint, requiring solid evidence beyond suspicion.
  • In 2023, the Supreme Court issued interim guidelines on digital device seizures and called on the government to draft appropriate protocols.

Criticism of this Move

• Lack of Transparency and Oversight
  • The proposed provision lacks essential safeguards such as judicial oversight, accountability, and clarity, violating core democratic principles.
  • It does not require authorities to disclose the “reason to believe,” undermining transparency.
• Ignoring the Nature of Digital Data
  • The law fails to appreciate the complexity and sensitivity of digital information.
  • Electronic devices often hold vast, layered personal and professional data that require higher standards of protection.
• Absence of Legal Guardrails
  • There are no clear checks and balances in the proposed provision.
  • Without specific procedural safeguards, it opens the door to potential misuse and abuse of power by tax authorities.

Global Best Practices Emphasize Safeguards

• Canada’s Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects against unreasonable searches, requiring:
  • Prior authorisation
  • Approval by a neutral authority
  • Reasonable and probable cause
• In the United States, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights guarantees due process and limits intrusive action.
  • The Supreme Court ruling in Riley vs California requires warrants to access digital devices, acknowledging the highly personal nature of such data.

Violation of the Proportionality Principle

• The proposed provision grants sweeping access to personal digital data without requiring warrants, relevance checks, or distinctions between financial and non-financial data.
• This violates the proportionality test laid down in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India judgment.
• Supreme Court’s Four-Fold Test
  • The Supreme Court mandates that restrictions on privacy must:
    • Serve a legitimate aim
    • Be necessary
    • Use the least intrusive means
    • Be proportionate
  • The proposed provision fails to meet these criteria, particularly on necessity and intrusiveness.

Way Forward

• Digital Enforcement Must Respect Rights
  • The solution isn’t to discard digital enforcement, but to align it with principles of legality, proportionality, and transparency.
  • Enforcement must protect, not erode, constitutional rights.
• Unchecked Surveillance Is Overreach
  • Allowing unfettered access under the guise of regulation amounts to surveillance, not governance. It undermines public trust and violates the right to privacy.
• Hope for Reform Through Legislative Scrutiny
  • There is still scope for correction. The Select Committee reviewing the Bill should:
    • Narrow the definition of “virtual digital space”
    • Mandate prior judicial warrants
    • Require disclosure of reasons
    • Establish grievance redress mechanisms

Conclusion

• The path forward must balance enforcement with constitutional protections. Without adequate checks, the proposed law risks becoming a tool of intrusion rather than accountability.

Why in the News?

India has decided to ban the import of jute products and woven fabrics from Bangladesh through all land routes.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Import Curb on Jute (Background, Items Covered, Impact, Fallout, Policy Response, Way Forward)

Background

• In June 2025, India imposed strict restrictions on the import of jute products from Bangladesh through all land routes, restricting entry only through the Nhava Sheva seaport in Maharashtra.
• This policy shift, announced via a Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) notification, excludes Bangladeshi goods in transit to Nepal and Bhutan.
• This move comes amidst rising concerns about Dhaka’s growing strategic proximity to Beijing and persistent trade malpractices by Bangladeshi exporters, including circumvention of anti-dumping duties (ADD).
• These factors have combined to harm India’s domestic jute industry, especially in states like West Bengal and Bihar.

Items Covered Under the Import Curbs

• The restrictions apply to a wide range of jute-related goods, including:

• Jute products, Flax tow and waste, Jute and other bast fibres, Single yarn of jute or flax, Multiple folded woven fabrics, Unbleached woven jute fabrics

• These categories previously enjoyed duty-free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement.

Impact of Subsidised Imports on the Indian Jute Industry

• India’s jute sector has long suffered due to dumped and subsidised imports from Bangladesh. According to official sources, Bangladeshi exporters continue to receive direct subsidies from their government, undermining Indian manufacturers.
• Although India imposed anti-dumping duties following investigations by the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping and Allied Duties (DGAD), these measures were circumvented through:

• Technical exemptions
• Export through firms exceeding production capacity
• Mis-declaration and under-invoicing

• Despite the ADD, jute imports from Bangladesh rose from USD 117 million in FY 2021-22 to USD 144 million in FY 2023-24.

Fallout for Indian Farmers and Mills

• The increased influx of low-cost jute goods has disrupted the domestic market. In FY 2024-25, jute prices in India fell below Rs. 5,000 per quintal, lower than the Minimum Support Price (MSP) of Rs. 5,335, triggering liquidity crises and mill closures.
• Six jute mills remain shut with Rs. 1,400 crore in unpaid dues, including Rs. 400 crore in legacy liabilities.
• Over 4 lakh workers are employed in the organised jute sector, with rural livelihoods in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, and Odisha heavily dependent on the crop.
• The availability of under-priced Bangladeshi products has also led to under-utilisation of Indian mills, threatening their viability and disrupting local procurement.

Policy Response and Strategic Signals

• The Indian government’s decision to channel imports exclusively through Nhava Sheva port is a calibrated move aimed at:

• Ensuring better quality checks (especially hydrocarbon oil-free status)
• Preventing misdeclaration and fraudulent labelling
• Closing loopholes that allow routing through third countries

• India's response is not limited to trade concerns. It signals dissatisfaction with Bangladesh’s interim government’s increasing tilt towards China and its inadequate response to repeated trade violations.
• While Bangladesh has made minor adjustments under diplomatic pressure, it has continued to incentivise the export of value-added jute products, further exacerbating the trade imbalance.

Long-Term Outlook: Revival of the Indian Jute Sector

• India's jute industry is poised for regulatory protection, with more streamlined import monitoring and potential policy reforms on the horizon.
• Officials indicate a willingness to enforce tighter scrutiny and push back against trade practices that destabilise domestic production.
• Moreover, the government may explore extending protection mechanisms to raw jute, which currently remains outside the ADD regime, to protect the incomes of Indian farmers.

Why in the News?

The Election Commission of India (ECI) has initiated steps to de-list 345 Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs).

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About RUPPs (Overview, Reasons Behind Their Delisting, Legal Framework, Financial Implications, Reforms, etc.)

Overview of Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs)

• RUPPs are associations registered with the Election Commission of India (ECI) under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
• These parties are distinct from recognised national or state parties as they have not secured a sufficient vote share or seats in previous elections.
• Despite not having official recognition, RUPPs enjoy certain benefits:

• Tax exemption under Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
• Eligibility for common poll symbols during elections.
• Permission to nominate up to 20 ‘star campaigners’ for canvassing.

• They are, however, required to:

• Contest elections periodically.
• File annual audit accounts and contribution reports.
• Disclose donations exceeding Rs. 20,000, and ensure that no donations above Rs. 2,000 are accepted in cash.

Reasons Behind the Election Commission Delisting 345 RUPPs

• The Election Commission has initiated the process of delisting 345 RUPPs that have:

• Not contested even a single election in the last six years.
• Failed to maintain physical offices at their registered addresses.
• Ignored statutory filing requirements, including financial disclosures.

• This is part of a broader clean-up initiated by the ECI, which began identifying and acting against “non-functional” parties as early as 2022.
• Since then, 284 RUPPs have been delisted and 253 declared inactive for failing to comply.
• The latest batch of 345 brings this drive to a sharper focus, particularly with upcoming elections in view.
• The Election Commission has tasked the Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs) of the respective States and UTs to issue show-cause notices to these parties before delisting.
• Final decisions will be made based on the CEO’s recommendations.

Legal Framework and Loopholes

• The right to form a political association is protected under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.
• Registration is governed by Section 29A of the RP Act, 1951, which does not grant ECI explicit power to de-register a political party once registered, except in cases of fraud or violation of constitutional allegiance.

• This legal vacuum means that while the ECI can delist or declare parties inactive (affecting their privileges), it cannot de-register them outright.
• The Supreme Court, in Indian National Congress vs Institute of Social Welfare (2002), affirmed this interpretation.
• Thus, ECI’s current action is limited to delisting RUPPs from the list of parties eligible for benefits, not erasing them as legal entities.

Financial Implications and Risks

• Many of these parties were found to be:

• Availing 100% tax exemptions despite non-compliance.
• Operating as shell entities or even engaging in money laundering activities.
• Selling nominations by fielding dummy candidates to extract withdrawal payments from major parties.

• By delisting such entities, the ECI aims to block misuse of public trust and state-sanctioned benefits.

Reforms Needed and Way Forward

• The Law Commission, in its 255th report (2015), recommended empowering the ECI to de-register parties that fail to contest elections for 10 consecutive years.
• The ECI echoed this in its 2016 electoral reform memorandum.
• Additionally, the lack of inner-party democracy remains an unresolved concern. Many RUPPs, and even some recognised parties, operate without periodic internal elections or transparency in leadership appointments.
• The 170th and 255th Law Commission Reports called for specific amendments to the RP Act to instil internal democracy.
• Policy Recommendations:

• Amend the RP Act to explicitly allow de-registration for non-contesting or non-compliant parties.
• Mandate inner-party democracy through legal provisions.
• Establish independent auditing of party finances, possibly under a public accounting body.

Context

• In 2023, the Government of India undertook a sweeping reform of its colonial-era criminal laws by introducing three new criminal laws.
• One year into their implementation, the early outcomes of these legislative changes are beginning to take shape, particularly in the realm of policing and investigation.
• After a year, now it becomes imperative to critically examine the new criminal laws' implementation, highlight technological innovations, evaluate progress, and underscore continuing challenges.

Key Features of New Criminal Codes

• Legislative Overhaul and Structural Transition
  • The central government's legislative reforms marked a significant departure from colonial jurisprudence, attempting to modernize the administration of criminal justice.
  • As part of this process, the transition to the new codes has largely been smooth, thanks in part to digital platforms like the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), a backbone of the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
  • The CCTNS has enabled jurisdictional routing of zero FIRs and streamlined police operations across states.
  • The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) deserves credit for overseeing this crucial phase of systemic transformation at the ground level.
• Technological Integration through ‘e-Sakshya’
  • The hallmark of this reform has been the e-Sakshya mobile application, developed by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) in collaboration with the MHA.
  • This app allows real-time recording and preservation of evidence, such as photographs and videos, embedded with geo-coordinates and time stamps.
  • It complies with several mandatory provisions under the BNSS, including Sections 105, 173, 176, 180, 185, and 497, all of which emphasize the digital documentation of searches, seizures, statements, and property disposal.
  • Feedback from Investigating Officers (IOs) has been encouraging.
  • The app has introduced greater accountability, prevented delegation of investigation tasks to unauthorised personnel, and increased the credibility of the evidence by visibly involving witnesses at crime scenes.
  • Mandatory selfies and digital footprints left by IOs help ensure responsibility and eliminate ambiguities.
• Strengthening Forensic Practices
  • Another critical reform is the mandatory visit of a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) expert to crime scenes, as per Section 176 of the BNSS.
  • Despite limited growth in forensic infrastructure, this mandate ensures scientific rigor in crime scene analysis.
  • The government has responded with plans for institutions like the National Forensic Science University (NFSU) and a Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) in Raipur, which could address current deficiencies.

An Overview of Operational Challenges and Gaps

• Implementation of E-Sakshya
  • Courts have not yet integrated with the ICJS to directly access evidence from the National Government Cloud (NGC). As a result, IOs must still resort to submitting pen drives manually, adding to costs and redundancy.
  • The dependence on personal mobile phones for official tasks has been problematic.
  • The app requires Android 10+ devices with at least 1 GB storage, compelling IOs to upgrade at their own expense.
  • Limited tablets provided to police stations are insufficient to meet operational demand.
  • There are also software limitations. In non-linked FIR scenarios, only five Sakshya IDs can be generated offline, and image or video errors cannot be rectified in linked cases.
  • These constraints may undermine the app’s utility in critical situations.
  • Reluctance from accused persons to be digitally recorded while revealing crime details has emerged as another barrier, although such documentation could significantly boost conviction rates.
• Legal Ambiguities and Incomplete Digitization
  • Section 303 of the BNS does not clearly define when thefts under ₹5000 are to be treated as cognizable offences, while Section 112 on organised petty offences remains overly broad.
  • Furthermore, provisions such as video-conferencing for witness examination under Section 530 of the BNSS are underutilised, despite being legally permissible.
  • Although the seven-day limit for forwarding medical examination reports of rape survivors has been successfully implemented, post-mortem reports continue to be delayed.
  • The MedLEaPR system, still under testing in Chhattisgarh, promises to streamline this process by digitally linking hospitals with police systems.

The Way Forward: Feedback and Resource Allocation

• For the reforms to succeed fully, feedback loops from IOs, courts, and state governments must be institutionalised.
• An ongoing review mechanism should be established to revise ambiguous provisions, address legal loopholes, and simplify procedural bottlenecks.
• Moreover, the allocation of additional resources to forensic units, IT infrastructure, and training programs is urgently required.
• Ensuring that every police station is equipped with sufficient tablets and that officers no longer rely on personal devices is not just practical, it is essential for professionalism and data security.

Conclusion

• One year after their implementation, the new criminal laws, the BNS, BNSS, and, BSA represent a paradigm shift in India's criminal justice system.
• The integration of technology, particularly through tools like e-Sakshya, has brought a tangible difference to policing and investigations.
• Yet, operational challenges, infrastructural limitations, and legal ambiguities persist, calling for adaptive policymaking, robust training, and resource augmentation.

Why in News?

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs has flagged the growing presence of extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a major strategic challenge, especially China’s expanding footprint.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Significance of the Indian Ocean
• Chinese Advances in the Indian Ocean
• Key Highlights of the Report
• India’s Response: Regional Partnerships and Sensitisation

Significance of the Indian Ocean

• Since the early 2000s, the Indian Ocean's significance has resurged, becoming a critical zone in global security and economic dynamics.
• Rise of Regional Economies and Trade Networks
  • The emergence of new economies, especially India and China, has increased the Indian Ocean’s role in global trade and connectivity, turning it into a central hub of commerce.
• Maritime Security and Piracy Threats
  • The rise of piracy off the Somali coast highlighted vulnerabilities in Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), prompting enhanced maritime security efforts across the region.
• Indo-Pacific as the New Geostrategic Construct
  • The Indo-Pacific framework, which links the Indian and Pacific Oceans, has elevated the Indian Ocean’s strategic value, positioning it as a central axis in the evolving global order.

Chinese Advances in the Indian Ocean

• Unlike its overt assertiveness in the South China Sea, China has adopted a long-term, calculated approach in the Indian Ocean, gradually enhancing its footprint through economic, political, and maritime initiatives.
• Strategic Port Infrastructure and Political Engagement
  • China is expanding its influence in the IOR by:
    • Strengthening political and economic ties with littoral states like Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh.
    • Investing in dual-use port infrastructure across the region.
• Surveillance via Research Vessels
• China has been deploying research and survey vessels in the Indian Ocean, docking them in countries like Sri Lanka and Maldives.
• These vessels are believed to support underwater surveillance and data gathering, posing a potential security threat to India’s maritime interests.
• Launch of the China-Indian Ocean Forum
  • In 2022, China initiated the China-Indian Ocean Forum, aiming to take the lead in regional governance and multilateral cooperation.
  • India’s notable absence from the forum highlights a growing geopolitical divergence in the region.

Key Highlights of the Report

• The Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs identifies the increasing involvement of extra-regional players, especially China, as a major strategic challenge for India in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
• Dual-Use Infrastructure and Surveillance Expansion
  • China is developing ports, airports, and logistics hubs for dual-use purposes.
  • It is also deploying survey and research vessels to gather sensitive maritime and oceanographic data, boosting its maritime domain awareness.
• Naval Power Projection and Military Base in Djibouti
  • Since establishing a military base in Djibouti (2017), China has expanded its naval presence, increasing both the number of vessels and the duration of deployments across the IOR.
• Strategic Assets Near India’s Maritime Boundary
  • China is actively building dual-use infrastructure in IOR littoral states, including areas near India’s maritime boundary, aiming to support logistical functions and assert maritime dominance.

India’s Response: Regional Partnerships and Sensitisation

• India is working with partner nations in the IOR to raise awareness about China's long-term strategic intentions and the security implications of its expanding footprint.
• Assurance from Sri Lanka
  • In December 2024, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reiterated that Sri Lanka would not allow its territory to be used against India’s security or regional stability.
• India’s Stand on BRI and the CPEC
  • India maintains a principled opposition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• Projecting Leadership in Maritime Security
  • India is emerging as a first responder and preferred security partner in the IOR, particularly in:
    • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
    • Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
    • Developmental aid
  • PM Modi’s launch of the MAHASAGAR doctrine (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth for All in the Region) redefines India’s regional vision.
• Strengthening Regional Security Institutions
  • India is actively reinforcing institutional maritime cooperation, aiming to exclude China from Indian Ocean affairs:
    • Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
    • Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
    • Information Fusion Centre – IOR (IFC-IOR)
    • Quad and Colombo Security Conclave
• Naval Modernisation and Indigenous Capability Building
  • India is investing heavily in the indigenous development and modernisation of naval assets, with a focus on force build-up and operational readiness in the Indian Ocean.

Why in the News?

A recent study has revealed that Secondary Pollutants are responsible for nearly one-third of India’s fine particulate matter (PM2.5) pollution.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About Pollutants (Primary & Secondary, Key Findings of CREA Study, Emission Control Measures, NCAP Cities, Strategies for Mitigation)

Understanding Secondary PM2.5 Pollution in India

• Particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns (PM2.5) is one of the most hazardous components of air pollution, responsible for serious respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.
• Traditionally, primary pollutants such as soot and dust from burning fossil fuels have been considered the chief contributors to PM2.5 levels.
• However, new research highlights the rising significance of secondary pollutants, especially ammonium sulphate, as key components of India’s air pollution challenge.

Primary and Secondary Pollutants: A Distinction

• Primary pollutants originate directly from emission sources such as vehicle exhaust, coal-fired power plants, and biomass burning.
• In contrast, secondary pollutants are formed when primary pollutants react with each other or with atmospheric elements like water vapour and sunlight.
• These reactions lead to the formation of complex particles like ammonium sulphate and ammonium nitrate, which can be equally or more harmful.

Key Findings of the CREA Study

• According to a study by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), secondary pollutants, especially ammonium sulphate, constitute up to 34% of India’s PM2.5 mass.
• This widespread presence was identified using satellite-based imagery and atmospheric modelling.

• Nationwide Impact:
• The average ammonium sulphate concentration across India was found to be 11.9 μg/m³.
• These concentrations are not limited to cities near pollution hotspots, but extend nationwide due to the transboundary nature of air pollution.
• Coal Plants as a Major Source:
• Over 60% of India’s sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emissions, the precursor to ammonium sulphate, are linked to coal-fired thermal power plants. These facilities become the primary driver of secondary PM2.5 formation.
• Higher Concentration near Coal Plants:
• Within 10 km of coal power plants, ammonium sulphate concentrations were 2.5 times higher (15 μg/m³) compared to areas beyond that range (6 μg/m³).
• Near these plants, it accounts for 36% of PM2.5 pollution, whereas even distant areas reported a significant 23% contribution.

Status of Emission Control Measures

• Although it is mandatory for Indian coal thermal plants to install Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) systems to reduce SO₂ emissions, compliance has been poor; only about 8% of such plants have installed the required units.
• Further, reports suggest that the government is contemplating rolling back this requirement, which could severely undermine efforts to reduce secondary PM2.5.

Impact Across NCAP Cities

• The findings are particularly significant for the 130 cities identified under the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP).
• These cities are mandated to reduce pollution by 20-30% by 2025-26, but face an uphill task given the high concentration of secondary pollutants.

• Concentration Levels:
• PM2.5 levels due to ammonium sulphate in these cities ranged from 3.9 to 22.5 μg/m³.
• Widespread Presence:
• In 114 out of the 130 NCAP cities, ammonium sulphate made up more than 30% of the total PM2.5 burden.
• Combined Effect:
• Including ammonium nitrate, secondary pollutants could constitute up to 50% of PM2.5 pollution in urban areas.

Strategies for Mitigation

To address the growing burden of secondary pollutants, a multipronged strategy is required.

• Strict Implementation of Emission Norms:
• Enforcement of FGD installation in coal power plants must be non-negotiable. Regulatory rollback would be counterproductive to public health goals.
• Agricultural and Industrial Reforms:
• Efficient fertiliser management can reduce ammonia emissions, which are a key reactant in forming secondary particles.
• Source-Specific Action:
• Pollution mitigation efforts must target both direct emission sources and precursor gases like SO₂ and NH₃.
• Transboundary Cooperation:
• Given the dispersal nature of secondary pollutants, regional coordination between states is essential for effective air quality management.
• Real-Time Monitoring and Research:
• Investments in air quality monitoring infrastructure and continuous data-driven research are needed to identify evolving patterns in pollution dynamics.

Why in the News?

In a bid to enhance real-time monitoring of the country’s financial health, a recent study by the RBI has proposed the construction of a Financial Conditions Index (FCI) for India with a daily frequency.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Financial Conditions Index (Introduction, Purpose, Structure, Evolution of Financial Conditions, Recent Trends, Significance, Future Outlook)

Introduction

• To enhance real-time assessment of India’s financial ecosystem, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has proposed a Financial Conditions Index (FCI) with a daily frequency.
• The FCI is a composite indicator that aggregates data across major financial segments to evaluate how tight or relaxed financial conditions are, relative to their historical average since 2012.
• This move aligns with global central banking practices, where FCIs help gauge monetary transmission, inform policy decisions, and signal systemic stress.

Purpose and Structure of the Financial Conditions Index

• The proposed FCI aims to serve as a dynamic and high-frequency barometer of India’s financial stability by integrating data from:

• Money Markets
• Government Securities (G-Sec)
• Corporate Bonds
• Equity Markets
• Foreign Exchange Markets

• According to the RBI study published in its June 2025 Bulletin, the FCI is designed to:

• Measure the ease or tightness of financial conditions daily.
• Capture trends across calm and volatile phases.
• Serve as a macro-financial surveillance tool for policymakers.

• The FCI is built using 20 market-based indicators, and values are standardised to reflect changes in financial tightness or looseness in standard deviation units. A positive value indicates tighter conditions, while a negative value suggests easier financial conditions.

Evolution of Financial Conditions in Recent Years

• Post-Pandemic Recovery and Easy Financial Conditions
  • The COVID-19 pandemic led to a dramatic tightening of financial conditions due to a sharp sell-off in equity and corporate bond markets.
  • However, this was followed by an exceptionally loose financial environment in 2021-2022, driven by the RBI’s proactive interventions, including:

• Large-scale liquidity infusion
• Policy rate cuts
• Regulatory forbearance measures

• During this period, the FCI reached a low of -2.197 in mid-June 2021, indicating extremely easy financial conditions.

• Periods of Tightening
  • Significant peaks in the FCI were observed during historical stress episodes, such as:

• July 2013 Taper Tantrum: A peak of +2.826, primarily driven by tightening in bond and forex markets due to fears of US Federal Reserve tapering.
• September 2018 IL&FS Crisis: Equity and bond markets contributed to financial tightening, reflecting stress in the NBFC sector.
• Early 2020 COVID-19 Onset: Market panic due to the global economic shutdown led to a sharp tightening again.

Recent Trends and Current Financial Landscape

• Since mid-2023, India’s financial conditions have largely remained easy, aided by:

• Robust equity market performance
• Ample liquidity in the money market
• Supportive government bond yields

• From November 2024, conditions started to tighten slightly, attributed to:

• Rising global financial uncertainty following the US presidential election
• Changing risk perception in bond and equity markets
• Policy normalisation by global central banks

• However, by March 2025, the FCI moderated and returned to near-neutral levels, signalling stabilisation.

Significance and Policy Implications

• The introduction of a daily FCI is expected to strengthen India’s macro-financial analysis toolkit. Key implications include:

• Real-time Monitoring: Enables early identification of stress build-up or excess exuberance.
• Policy Calibration: Supports timely and data-backed monetary and fiscal policy decisions.
• Market Guidance: Offers insights to financial market participants regarding liquidity and systemic risk.

• Globally, FCIs are used by institutions like the US Federal Reserve and European Central Bank. For India, a customised FCI tailored to its unique market dynamics will aid in improving monetary transmission and crisis management.

Future Outlook

• As India’s financial architecture becomes increasingly complex, the RBI’s daily FCI will play a pivotal role in ensuring financial stability.
• By offering a unified, real-time view of multiple market segments, it empowers both policymakers and investors with actionable intelligence.
• Continued refinement of the index, such as inclusion of newer market indicators, algorithmic adjustments, and integration with other macroeconomic dashboards, can further enhance its utility.

Why in News?

India has slipped to 131st out of 148 countries in the 2025 Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum.

While gaps in economic participation, education, and health have improved or remained stable, political empowerment has worsened. Despite more women voting, their representation in top political positions remains low.

The upcoming 33% reservation for women in legislatures from 2029 may improve this, but sustained efforts are needed to ensure long-term impact.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Reasons Behind the Fall in the Index
• Impact of Women’s Reservation on Political Representation
• From Exclusion to Participation: A Historic Shift
• Rising Voters, Stagnant Representation

Reasons Behind the Fall in the Index

• India's drop in the 2025 Global Gender Gap Index is primarily due to a decline in political empowerment indicators.
• The 18th Lok Sabha have 74 women Members of Parliament (MP), marking a slight dip from 2019 when 78 women MPs were elected.
• Additionally, the share of women in ministerial roles declined from 6.45% to 5.56%, further impacting India’s overall ranking.

Impact of Women’s Reservation on Political Representation

• The 33% reservation for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, passed in 2023, will be implemented only after the next Census and delimitation, making 2029 the earliest possible rollout.
• If implemented in 2029, the law would raise women’s representation to at least 33%, significantly improving India’s political empowerment metrics on global indices.
• Current Representation Levels Remain Low
  • The 18th Lok Sabha (2024) has approximately 13.6% women members of the total 543 members.
  • In 2023, women made up only 9% of MLAs across States.
  • Chhattisgarh had the highest share (18%), while Himachal Pradesh had just one woman MLA and Mizoram had none.
• Limited Timeframe, Uncertain Long-Term Gains
  • The reservation law is valid for only 15 years, meaning it will likely apply to just two general elections (2029 and 2034).
  • Concerns remain about the sustainability of progress beyond that period.
• Gaps in Ministerial and Leadership Pipelines
  • Even with more women MPs, ministerial appointments may not rise proportionately. Despite decades of 33–50% reservation at local levels, there's no structured pathway to elevate women from panchayats to higher politics.

From Exclusion to Participation: A Historic Shift

• In 1952, 28 lakh women were excluded from voting rolls due to being listed only as someone’s wife or mother. Since then, women’s inclusion has drastically improved.
• Gender Gap in Voting Narrows
  • The voter gender gap has shrunk from 17 percentage points in 1962 to less than 2 points in 2014.
  • In the last two general elections, women voters outnumbered men, partly due to male migration for work.
• Women as a Key Votebank
  • With growing turnout, political parties now actively court women voters, launching targeted welfare schemes like free bicycles for girls and monthly cash allowances for poor women.
  • The rise in women voters is reshaping electoral strategies and policy priorities, making women a central force in India’s democratic process.

Rising Voters, Stagnant Representation

• Despite the surge in women voters, this has not led to a rise in women candidates fielded by political parties.
• Parties Avoid Giving Women Winnable Seats
  • Parties often cite “lack of winnability” to deny women tickets in stronghold constituencies.
  • Instead, they field women in reserved SC/ST seats to meet multiple quotas.
  • Experts note that women voters don’t vote solely for women. Unlike caste-based voting, women prefer performance and policies over identity.
• The Need for Systemic Change
  • Since 1952, women candidates have had a higher average winning percentage than men.
  • The issue lies in low nomination rates, with women making up only 8–9% of candidates from major parties.
  • Structural barriers, internal party dynamics, and outdated assumptions continue to block capable women from entering the political arena in larger numbers.

Why in News?

• India’s coastline has increased by nearly 50%, not due to territorial expansion but because of more accurate recent measurements.
• The number of offshore islands has also risen slightly following a reassessment and recount. While these changes hold administrative and strategic significance, they do not reflect any actual change on the ground.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India’s Coastline Now Measures 11,098 km
• The Coastline Paradox: Why Lengths Keep Changing
• Island Counting: A Different Challenge

India’s Coastline Now Measures 11,098 km

• India’s coastline has increased from 7,516 km to 11,098 km, a rise of 3,582 km (nearly 48%).
• This change is due to improved measurement techniques, not territorial expansion.
• 
• From Low to High-Resolution Mapping
  • The previous measurement used low-resolution data (scale 1:4,500,000), which missed fine land features.
  • The new measurement used high-resolution data (scale 1:250,000), capturing more bends, curves, and irregularities, thereby increasing the measured length.
• How Scale Affects Measurement
  • Using a smaller-scale “ruler” (low resolution) smoothens out intricate details, showing straight lines where bends exist.
  • High-resolution tools now map minute variations more precisely, thanks to modern GIS software, replacing older manual methods.
• Inclusion of Offshore Islands
  • Another contributor to the increase is the inclusion of many previously uncounted offshore islands, which were either invisible in older data or missed due to manual limitations.
• Significance
  • Though the actual land has not changed, the updated coastline data holds strategic and administrative value, improving mapping accuracy and planning for coastal development and security.

The Coastline Paradox: Why Lengths Keep Changing

• India’s new coastline measurement is more accurate but still not definitive.
• This is due to the coastline paradox, which states that irregular natural features like coastlines have no fixed length, as the measured length increases with finer resolution.
• Precision Changes Everything
  • The more detailed the measurement (higher resolution), the longer the coastline appears.
  • Advancements in mapping technologies, such as GIS, lead to greater precision and thus a longer calculated length.
• The Paradox Beyond Coastlines
  • The coastline paradox applies to other natural features too, like river networks and mountain ranges.
  • For instance, river banks are irregular, but river lengths are typically calculated along the main stream, avoiding the same variability.
• Periodic Reassessment Now a Norm
  • Due to evolving technology and natural processes (like erosion and land reclamation), India has decided to recalculate its coastline every 10 years.
  • This aligns with practices in other countries to maintain updated and precise coastal data.
• Implications
  • The changing length has administrative, environmental, and strategic relevance, even if it doesn’t reflect a change in physical territory.
  • It emphasizes the importance of continuous monitoring and adaptive planning.

Island Counting: A Different Challenge

• Unlike coastlines, island counts don’t face measurement paradoxes, but they do suffer from classification ambiguities—such as whether a landmass submerged at high tide qualifies as an island.
• Previous Discrepancies in Island Numbers
  • In 2016, the Surveyor General of India listed 1,382 offshore islands, while state agencies, Coast Guard, and Navy reported a lower count of 1,334.
  • The difference arose due to varying definitions and criteria.
• Standardisation and Updated Island Count
  • A data reconciliation and standardisation exercise resolved these discrepancies. The final count is:
    • 1,298 offshore islands
    • 91 inshore islands
    • Total: 1,389 islands
  • This count excludes river islands like those in Assam and West Bengal.
• Why It Matters
  • Standardising island counts has administrative, security, and environmental implications, especially for maritime boundaries, disaster planning, and coastal development.

Why in news?

India refused to endorse the joint declaration at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ meeting in China, objecting to the omission of references to terrorism.

As the current SCO chair, Beijing hosted the 2025 defence ministers' meeting in Qingdao.

According to the MEA, India had strongly pushed for including terrorism concerns, but one country blocked the consensus, leading to the exclusion and India’s decision to withhold endorsement.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
• India Refuses to Sign SCO Draft Statement
• India’s Refusal to Sign SCO Draft Statement - Analysis

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)

• SCO is a regional bloc of 10 countries: India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus.
• It is the world’s largest regional organisation by area and population.
• Origins and Formation
  • The SCO evolved from the “Shanghai Five” (1996), formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to address post-Soviet security concerns, including religious extremism and ethnic tensions.
  • It was formally established on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai.
• Focus on Regional Security
  • Unlike most global organisations, the SCO focuses on security cooperation among Asian nations. It addresses challenges like terrorism, separatism, and extremism.
• RATS – The Security Arm
  • The SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is its key security mechanism.
  • It facilitates intelligence sharing and coordination among member states through regular meetings and exchanges.

India Refuses to Sign SCO Draft Statement

• At the 2025 SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh refused to sign the joint statement.
• This was after the joint statement excluded any mention of the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack but included a reference to the Jaffar Express hijacking in Balochistan.
• India’s Objection: Terrorism Omitted
  • According to MEA, India had pushed to include references to terrorism, particularly Operation Sindoor and the Pahalgam attack, but “one particular country” objected—a veiled reference to Pakistan.
  • As consensus was required, the statement was not adopted.
• India Highlights Pahalgam Attack and Operation Sindoor
  • In his speech, Indian Defence Minister strongly condemned the Pahalgam terror attack, where victims were targeted based on religious identity.
  • He named The Resistance Front, a proxy of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), as responsible.
  • He described India’s retaliatory Operation Sindoor as a demonstration of its zero tolerance for terrorism.
• No Tolerance for Double Standards
  • India asserted that peace cannot coexist with terrorism or WMD proliferation. It called for:
    • Decisive global action against terror sponsors
    • Consequences for countries enabling cross-border terrorism
    • An end to SCO’s silence on state-sponsored terror

India’s Refusal to Sign SCO Draft Statement – Analysis

• SCO, traditionally dominated by Russia and China, now sees China playing a more dominant role due to Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war.
• China-Pakistan Nexus at Play
  • China, a staunch ally of Pakistan, has extended military and diplomatic support to Islamabad following India’s Operation Sindoor.
  • It has consistently shielded Pakistan in global forums from criticism over terrorism.
• India’s Refusal – A Strategic Signal
  • Rajnath Singh’s refusal to sign the SCO draft document, which ignored the Pahalgam terror attack but mentioned the Balochistan train hijacking, sent a strong diplomatic message.
  • As a result, no joint statement was issued at this year’s meeting.
• Reaffirming India’s Stance on Terrorism
  • India reiterated its "no compromise on terrorism" doctrine.
  • Indian Minister’s action reflects New Delhi’s consistent position that terrorism and normal diplomatic engagement cannot coexist.
• What Lies Ahead
  • All eyes are now on the upcoming SCO Council of Heads of State meeting in Tianjin this autumn.
  • India’s stance may influence future regional discourse on terrorism and security cooperation.

Context

• China recently held its first trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh in Kunming, following a similar May meeting with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• These China-led trilaterals aim to boost regional cooperation and revive Pakistan’s role in regional dynamics.
• Strategically, Beijing is leveraging India’s tense relations with Bangladesh and growing footprint in Afghanistan to counter New Delhi’s influence and divert its attention.

A War That Redefined Regional Alignments

• The 1962 India-China war shaped lasting regional dynamics. Post-war, China found a strategic ally in Pakistan to contain India and safeguard its own geopolitical interests.
• China-Pakistan Strategic Bond
  • Pakistan views China as a reliable partner for economic and military support.
  • By the end of 2024, Pakistan owed China over $29 billion, and over 80% of its arms imports were Chinese in origin.
• China's Diplomatic Shielding
  • China has repeatedly shielded Pakistan-backed terrorists at the UN and other platforms, solidifying their alliance beyond bilateral trade and defense.
• Operation Sindoor and Recent Tensions
  • During India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025—retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack—China criticized India’s response as “regrettable” and pushed for dialogue.
  • It endorsed Pakistan’s call for an investigation instead.
  • The conflict saw Pakistan deploying Chinese-made equipment—from radars, drones, and missiles to fighter jets—underscoring Beijing’s deep military support.
• Post-Conflict Diplomacy and Trilateral Outreach
  • Soon after the escalation, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister met his Chinese counterpart to reaffirm their “iron-clad friendship.”
  • The subsequent trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and others are seen as a diplomatic extension of that bond.

Resurfacing an Old Strategy

• The China-Pakistan “plus one” strategy—using third countries to isolate India—is not new.
• As early as 1965, Pakistan considered using East Pakistan, China, and Nepal to sever India from its Siliguri Corridor.
• The idea appears to be reviving, especially as both Beijing and Rawalpindi confront a confident and assertive India.
• India’s Assertive Posture
  • India’s retaliatory strikes post-Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025) show a decisive shift from past restraint.
    • No tolerance for nuclear blackmail
    • Indus Waters Treaty suspended, trade halted, port access restricted
    • Military strikes have weakened Pakistan’s operational confidence
    • Diplomatically, India has worked to isolate Pakistan globally
• Stiff Pushback Against China
• India’s response to Chinese aggression in Doklam and Galwan surprised Beijing.
• It included:
  • Increased cooperation with like-minded democracies
  • Expanded presence in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia
• Diplomatic outreach by India has slowed China’s regional influence.
• Shifting Regional Ties
  • India’s pragmatic diplomacy is undermining Chinese momentum in South Asia:
    • Maldives: President Muizzu, once anti-India, has turned to Delhi to save the economy.
    • Nepal: Despite signing BRI agreements, funding disputes stall progress.
    • Sri Lanka: President Anura Kumara Dissanayake visited India before China.
    • Bangladesh: Despite tensions, India allowed trilateral energy cooperation with Nepal.

China's Strategic Trilateral Push

• China’s trilateral meetings with Afghanistan and Bangladesh aim to:
  • Reclaim influence post-regime changes in 2021 (Afghanistan) and 2024 (Bangladesh)
  • Offset India’s deepening ties with the Taliban
  • Reinforce Pakistan’s relevance in the region
• Potential Security Threats
  • China-backed Pakistan is using historic linkages with Bangladesh and Afghanistan to:
    • Foster cross-border terrorism.
    • Distract India with security threats.
    • Undermine India's neighbourhood influence, opening space for Chinese BRI investments and geostrategic dominance.

China – The Primary Strategic Challenge

• Recent regional shifts reaffirm that China—not Pakistan—is India’s most formidable challenge.
• Beijing is leveraging its growing influence and alliance with Pakistan to counter India’s rising confidence and regional outreach.
• Trilateral Nexus as a Geopolitical Tool
  • China views the trilateral mechanism as a way to undermine India’s diplomacy and distract it with fresh security and political challenges, especially as India builds regional consensus against terrorism.

Conclusion

• South Asian countries now face the difficult task of balancing between India and China, as Beijing uses Islamabad as a proxy to complicate India’s strategic environment and expand its regional footprint.
• India must continue to:
  • Assert its redlines clearly
  • Warn neighbours of consequences—economic, military, and political
  • Deter misadventures through visible and credible retaliatory strategies

Why in the News?

• India has rejected a Court of Arbitration ruling that issued a "supplemental award" on its competence concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About Grievance Redressal Mechanism
• News Summary (Treaty Review, India’s Rejection, Implications, etc.)

Grievance Redressal Mechanism under the Indus Waters Treaty

• The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the World Bank as a guarantor, includes structured mechanisms for resolving disputes and differences over the interpretation and application of its provisions.
• These mechanisms include:
  • Permanent Indus Commission (PIC):
    • Comprising one commissioner from each country, the PIC serves as the first tier for resolving issues.
    • It conducts annual meetings and field visits and works to resolve technical and operational matters through mutual consultation.

• Neutral Expert Mechanism:
• For technical differences that cannot be resolved at the PIC level, either party can approach the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert.
• The expert’s mandate is limited to factual and technical questions, and their decisions are binding on both parties.
• Court of Arbitration (CoA):
• For disputes involving legal interpretations or the validity of treaty provisions, a Court of Arbitration can be constituted.
• However, both countries must agree on invoking this mechanism. Any deviation from mutual consent challenges the treaty’s fundamental design.

• India has consistently favoured the Neutral Expert route, while Pakistan has pushed for the arbitration court on issues like the design of hydropower projects.
• India maintains that parallel proceedings before both mechanisms violate the treaty's structure and purpose.

India’s Rejection of the Court of Arbitration’s Authority

• Recently, the Hague-based Court of Arbitration issued a supplemental award asserting its jurisdiction over disputes concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir.
• India has categorically rejected the authority of the Court of Arbitration, labelling it “illegally constituted” and devoid of legal legitimacy.
• Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that the very constitution of the court violates the provisions of the IWT, and hence, any decisions or awards issued by it are “per se void.”
  • India reiterated that it never recognised the court’s authority and views its functioning as lacking legal standing.
• In response to Pakistan's request, the arbitration court examined India’s move to place the IWT in abeyance after the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack.
• India clarified that its suspension of treaty obligations was a sovereign act justified under international law and that a tribunal formed without mutual consent has no jurisdiction over such decisions.

Pakistan’s Legal Strategy and India’s Firm Opposition

• India has accused Pakistan of manipulating international legal mechanisms to divert global attention from its support of cross-border terrorism.
• The MEA described the court’s proceedings as a “charade at Pakistan’s behest” and reiterated that Pakistan must permanently renounce terrorism before India considers resuming its treaty obligations.
• The legal confrontation stems from longstanding differences over the design parameters of the Kishenganga (Jhelum tributary) and Ratle (Chenab) hydroelectric projects.
• In 2015, Pakistan approached the World Bank for the appointment of a Neutral Expert, but later shifted to seek arbitration in 2016.
• India, upholding the original treaty provisions, continued to insist on the Neutral Expert route, rejecting arbitration as a breach of the IWT's sequential dispute resolution framework.

Treaty Review, Neutral Expert Engagement, and Strategic Implications

• In October 2022, in an unusual move, the World Bank appointed both a Neutral Expert and constituted a Court of Arbitration simultaneously, based on separate requests by India and Pakistan.
• India objected to this parallel process, asserting it violated the treaty’s single-track mechanism for handling disputes.
• Consequently, while India has actively participated in the Neutral Expert proceedings, it has refused to recognise or engage with the arbitration court.
• India’s recent decision to suspend treaty obligations is part of this larger recalibration.
• The government maintains that under international law, this action is valid until Pakistan takes verifiable steps to cease support for terrorism.
• These developments mark a significant turning point in the water-sharing relationship between the two nations, with far-reaching diplomatic and political implications for the future of the treaty.

Context

• On May 13, 2025, the Supreme Court of India passed a judgment in Jitender @ Kalla vs State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, revisiting its earlier decisions in Indira Jaising vs Supreme Court of India (2017 and 2023).
• The judgment focused on refining the methodology for designating lawyers as senior advocates.
• Despite its significant implications for judicial equity and democratic access to justice, the ruling received little public attention, mistakenly perceived as an internal matter of the judiciary.
• However, the issue cuts much deeper, revealing the systemic inequality entrenched within the Indian legal profession.

The Legal Profession’s Public Character and Systemic Inequality

• The legal profession, unlike many others, bears a distinctly public character. It forms a cornerstone of both judicial and political democracies.
• Consequently, any stratification within this profession, especially one sanctioned by statute and reinforced by judicial endorsement, has profound repercussions on the integrity of the justice delivery system.
• India's legal hierarchy, particularly the designation of senior advocates under Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961, embodies what may be described as a form of legal plutocracy.
• This classification, predicated on ambiguous criteria such as ‘standing at the Bar’ and ‘special knowledge or experience in law,’ institutionalises inequality within a profession that should ideally be democratic and egalitarian.
• The resultant divide undermines the constitutional promise of equality before the law and reduces access to justice for marginalized voices.

Comparative Analysis: Lessons from the United States

• The danger of elite capture in the legal profession is not unique to India.
• The American experience, as detailed in Reuters' 2014 report ‘The Echo Chamber, is illustrative.
• The study revealed that a mere 66 out of 17,000 lawyers who petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court controlled 43% of the appeals, a clear indication of corporate and elite dominance.
• Though India has not replicated this model wholesale, the structural vulnerability is apparent.
• With the senior advocate system, Indian courts risk gravitating toward a similarly exclusionary structure where a privileged few monopolize legal representation in constitutional and high-stakes matters.

Judicial Response and Its Limitations

• The Supreme Court's attempts to reform this process, notably through the 2017 Indira Jaising judgment, and more recently in Jitender, have focused largely on procedural refinements rather than substantive reform.
• While the Court acknowledged that the point-based system for designation was highly subjective, it chose not to strike down the classification altogether.
• Instead, it suggested peripheral adjustments, such as High Courts framing new rules without addressing the core constitutional challenge: whether this classification passes the test of Article 14 (equality before law).
• In fact, the Jitender judgment paradoxically critiques the very guidelines laid down in Jaising as subjective, yet continues to endorse the structure.
• This internal inconsistency raises questions about the coherence of the Court’s reasoning.
• The deeper issue whether such classification serves any public or constitutional interest, remains ignored.

The Core Constitutional Challenge and Consequences

• The Core Constitutional Challenge
  • The challenge to Section 16 and related Supreme Court Rules was grounded in the argument that the classification is inherently arbitrary and discriminatory.
  • The designation does not necessarily advance the legal system; rather, it reinforces social stratification.
  • Many competent lawyers who are not designated continue to contribute significantly to the cause of justice.
  • As such, the distinction lacks a rational nexus with the objectives it purports to serve.
  • Nevertheless, the Court sidestepped this argument, asserting that as long as procedural safeguards exist, the classification can be maintained. This is problematic.
• Consequences: Intellectual Apartheid and Judicial Insularity
  • The stratification of the legal profession creates what can only be described as intellectual apartheid.
  • A small cadre of star lawyers dominates the judicial discourse, marginalising thousands of competent but less visible lawyers.
  • This insularity narrows the perspectives available to the Court, impacting the richness and representativeness of legal arguments, especially on matters of national importance.
  • The challenge to the Waqf (Amendment) Act serves as a recent example, where only a select few voices were heard.

Conclusion

• A truly democratic legal profession should prioritise competence, commitment to justice, and representation of diverse voices, not social pedigree or courtroom visibility.
• The time has come for India to evolve a more equitable, transparent, and constitutionally sound system that recognizes all advocates as equal participants in the justice system.
• Only then can the promise of justice, social, economic, and political, be truly realised.

Why in the News?

The Union Environment Ministry has given approval for funding for the ‘tigers outside of tiger reserve’ pilot scheme to manage human-tiger conflicts better through enhanced monitoring and protection.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• About the Scheme (Need, Scope, Implementation, Causes for Human-Tiger Conflict, Institutional & Policy Framework, Govt Support, Future Outlook)

Addressing the Challenge of Tigers Beyond Protected Areas

• In response to the rising incidence of human-tiger conflict in several parts of India, the Union Ministry of Environment has approved a pilot scheme focused on “tigers outside of tiger reserves.”
• This scheme, with an outlay of Rs. 88 crore until 2026-27, aims to enhance the protection, monitoring, and conflict management capabilities in regions where tigers roam outside officially designated tiger reserves.
• The executive committee of the National Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA) has given in-principle approval for a year of pilot implementation.
• This decision follows data-driven identification of forest divisions with high conflict zones, where ~30% of India’s tiger population resides.

Scope and Implementation of the Pilot Scheme

• Initially, 80 forest divisions across 10 states have been shortlisted for funding under the scheme.
• These divisions were identified based on the frequency and severity of human-tiger conflicts in recent years.
• Key objectives of the pilot scheme include:

• Strengthening monitoring systems through technology.
• Capacity building of forest staff to manage conflict.
• Partnering with civil society organisations and expert veterinarians.
• Supporting prey base augmentation to reduce livestock predation.

• The scheme will be implemented at the ground level by the Chief Wildlife Wardens of state forest departments in collaboration with the National Tiger Conservation Authority (NTCA).
• The NTCA is currently finalising the list of eligible divisions and has been asked to submit revised, year-wise financial estimates before final approval by the CAMPA governing body.

Underlying Causes of Human-Tiger Conflict

• Tigers outside designated reserves often inhabit agricultural landscapes or forest fringes near human settlements.
• These areas lack the dedicated protection mechanisms available within official tiger reserves.
• Being apex predators and territorial in nature, tigers often push other predators like leopards into human spaces, escalating conflict risk.
• Notably, some of the major conflict hotspots include:

• Chandrapur near Tadoba Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra
• Sugarcane fields around Dudhwa and Pilibhit, Uttar Pradesh
• Forest divisions near Ranthambore, Rajasthan
• Wayanad, Kerala

• Between 2020 and 2024, 382 people were killed in tiger-related incidents, with 111 deaths recorded in 2022 alone. These numbers underscore the urgent need for proactive and well-resourced intervention outside traditional protected zones.

Institutional and Policy Framework

• The pilot scheme is financially backed by the National CAMPA, which manages the Compensatory Afforestation Fund.
• This fund consists of payments collected in lieu of forest land diverted for non-forest purposes and has been used in the past for wildlife initiatives such as the Great Indian Bustard recovery and Project Cheetah.
• CAMPA’s involvement ensures the utilisation of existing funds for a cause directly linked to forest and wildlife sustainability.
• The National Board for Wildlife, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had earlier discussed this scheme during its meeting in March 2025.

Government Support and Future Outlook

• Speaking at the India Conservation Conference held at the Wildlife Institute of India, Union Environment Minister reaffirmed the government’s commitment to tackling man-animal conflict.
• Citing personal visits to conflict-prone areas like Dudhwa and Kabini, he acknowledged the complexity of managing tiger populations that venture outside reserves.
• The minister emphasised the importance of adopting a region-specific approach, recognising that the dynamics of conflict and coexistence differ significantly between forest types and human settlements.

Context:

• The participation of Indian astronaut Shubhanshu Shukla in the Axiom-4 mission to the International Space Station (ISS) marks a historic moment in India's space journey.
• It represents the dawn of India's human spaceflight era and signals a strategic leap in ISRO's ambitions and global collaborations.

The Milestone Moment - Shubhanshu Shukla at the ISS:

• A symbol of a new era:
  • Shubhanshu Shukla’s presence aboard the ISS is symbolic not just of individual achievement but of a national milestone in space exploration.
  • Though not part of an indigenous mission, this represents the operational beginning of India’s human spaceflight programme.
• More than a first flight: His journey is not an isolated feat but a strategic stepping stone towards ISRO’s Gaganyaan mission, India’s first crewed space mission, now scheduled for 2027.

Strategic Importance of the Axiom-4 Participation:

• Bridging the gap to Gaganyaan:
  • Originally selected for the Indian crewed mission, Shubhanshu Shukla’s participation in Axiom-4 allows ISRO to gain first-hand exposure to launch operations and astronautics.
  • It helps India refine protocols, safety procedures, and training modules.
• International collaborations and learning: ISRO sent a team to assist in launch operations, emphasizing India’s active and competent role in global space ventures.

Global Context - Human Spaceflight Capability:

• India joins the big league:
  • Only three countries—USA, Russia, and China—have independent human spaceflight capability.
  • India is on course to become the fourth, bolstered by increasing cooperation with global agencies like NASA.
• Strategic autonomy in space:
  • Without this capability, India would remain dependent on foreign platforms for critical space research and missions.
  • Human spaceflight is essential for planetary exploration, especially for Moon and Mars missions.

Evolving Space Ecosystem and India’s Role:

• Rise of the private sector and LEO activity:
  • The Lower Earth Orbit (LEO), ranging from 200–2,000 km altitude, is increasingly crowded with commercial satellites.
  • Private players, especially from the US, are driving innovation, allowing national agencies to shift focus to deep space missions.
• India’s vision beyond the ISS:
  • The ISS, a model of international cooperation, is slated for decommissioning by 2030.
  • India, not a part of the current ISS consortium, plans to launch its own space station by 2035—possibly becoming a critical player in the next global space platform.

Technological and Institutional Developments:

• Setting up indigenous astronaut training infrastructure:
  • Shubhanshu Shukla and others received astronaut training in Russia and NASA, exposing India’s lack of domestic facilities.
  • Their experience paves the way for India to establish its own astronaut training centre, with potential to serve other countries commercially.
• Boost to R&D and strategic capabilities:
  • Human spaceflight and space stations enable microgravity experiments, vital for scientific progress.
  • India’s inclusion in future multinational space missions will provide priority access to space-based research.

Space Diplomacy, Global Partnerships and Geopolitical Implications:

• ISRO’s growing stature has led to enhanced India-US cooperation, seen in India’s role in Axiom-4.
• Human spaceflight capability gives India bargaining power in future multilateral collaborations in space.

Conclusion:

• Shubhanshu Shukla’s flight is more than a symbolic success—it’s the launchpad of a new era in Indian space exploration.
• As India sets sights on the Moon, Mars, and its own space station, human spaceflight capability is emerging as a strategic asset, enabling scientific advancement, national prestige, and global collaboration.
• This event marks a significant inflection point in India's transformation from a space-faring nation to a space-power.

Why in News?

Global leaders will begin the once-in-a-decade Financing for Development (FFD4) Conference in Seville, Spain, aiming to reform global aid, tax systems, and climate finance structures.

This Conference is crucial for mobilizing the necessary resources and fostering international cooperation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Seville FFD4 Conference to Set Ambitious Global Development Agenda
• Key Objectives of the Seville Commitment
• U.S. Absence a Double-Edged Sword
• The Financial Backdrop to FFD4 in Seville

Seville FFD4 Conference to Set Ambitious Global Development Agenda

• The fourth Financing for Development (FFD4) conference begins in Seville, bringing together political, financial, and trade leaders to address key development challenges including aid, trade, and debt.
• The 'Seville Commitment' Blueprint
  • Leaders will adopt a 38-page political document, the "Seville Commitment," outlining a non-binding roadmap for global development financing over the next decade.
• Building on Past Milestones
  • Monterrey Consensus (2002): Set ODA targets and backed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.
  • Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015): Introduced the 17 SDGs and focused on tax reform and tackling illicit financial flows.
• A Challenging Global Backdrop
  • FFD4 convenes amid major aid cuts in wealthy nations and climate change scepticism from influential leaders like former U.S. President Donald Trump.

Key Objectives of the Seville Commitment

• The 2024 Seville Commitment aims to support poorer nations in facing climate crises through:
  • Debt reforms: Including debt-for-climate swaps and disaster-linked debt pause clauses.
  • Global solidarity levies: Proposals to tax polluters or the ultra-rich to fund sustainable development.
  • Debt restructuring frameworks: Streamlining global debt solutions.
  • Innovative financing: Leveraging special drawing rights via multilateral development banks.
  • Seville Platform for Action: A new coalition-building mechanism to fast-track implementation of key goals.
• High-Profile Attendance, U.S. Missing
  • Over 70 heads of state and key global leaders are attending.
  • The United States, which exited negotiations after failing to remove language on climate, sustainability, and gender equality.

U.S. Absence a Double-Edged Sword

• While the U.S. withdrawal weakens global consensus, some believe progress may be easier without its attempts to dilute climate and equity goals.
• Barriers to Debt Reform Progress
  • Tensions persist over global debt frameworks, particularly between African nations and key lenders like China, hampering unified action on a debt convention.
• Challenges to Global Tax Reform
  • Opposition from former U.S. President Donald Trump and others makes it harder to achieve global tax rule changes, a core agenda item.
• Strong Global Consensus on Climate Action
  • Despite disagreements, there is broad international agreement on the urgent need to scale up climate adaptation financing for vulnerable countries.

The Financial Backdrop to FFD4 in Seville

• The UN estimates a $4 trillion shortfall in financing for sustainable development worldwide, highlighting the urgent need for large-scale financial reform.
• Multilateral development banks have mobilised only a few hundred billion dollars—far below the trillions needed to meet development goals.
• Since 2014, the average interest costs for developing countries have nearly doubled as a share of their tax revenues, straining public finances.
• China’s loans to Africa have become net negative, with repayments exceeding new disbursements, reducing available financial support on the continent.
• Roughly 3.3 billion people—over half of Africa’s population—live in countries where debt servicing costs exceed public health expenditures.

Context

• The recent cessation of hostilities between Israel and Iran, as announced by U.S. President Donald Trump, marks a potential turning point.
• However, despite the announcement of peace, the region remains mired in geopolitical ambiguity and latent volatility.
• Unless the principal actors show strategic restraint, the conclusion of this grim chapter may be as disruptive as its onset.

Military Gains, Strategic Realignments & Iran’s Future

• Military Gains and Strategic Realignments
  • Over the past 21 months, Israel, backed firmly by the United States, has achieved a string of military victories that, while tactically impressive, may ultimately be pyrrhic.
  • Hamas has been significantly degraded in Gaza, although some Israeli hostages remain in captivity.
  • Hezbollah in Lebanon, once considered the most formidable non-state actor, has been rendered ineffective.
  • Syria’s once-hostile al-Assad regime has been replaced by a feeble Islamist government.
  • Yemen’s Houthi rebels, though initially disruptive, were subdued by overwhelming force.
  • Most significantly, Israel and the U.S. claim to have dismantled Iran’s decades-long pursuit of nuclear capabilities.
  • In tandem with targeted assassinations of Iranian scientists and generals, this marks a major blow to Tehran’s regional ambitions.
  • While these military accomplishments have shifted regional power balances, they have also stirred a hornet’s nest of unresolved political questions.
• Iran’s Future: A Strategic Pivot
  • The most pressing geopolitical question now is: What lies ahead for Iran? As the region’s most populous and historically defiant state, Iran’s trajectory will significantly influence West Asia’s future.
  • Despite enduring severe sanctions, economic hardship, and war, Tehran remains a strategic fulcrum.
  • Its ideological opposition to Israel and the West, coupled with its network of proxy forces, ensures its continued relevance in regional affairs.
  • There exists a delicate paradox: while the victors officially eschew regime change in Tehran, the existence of the current Mullah-led government, unrepentant and ideologically rigid, presents an ‘unfinished agenda’ for Washington and Jerusalem.
  • The aim now is to neutralise Iran’s WMD ambitions through sanctions and intrusive inspections.

The Dilemma of Regime Change

• The notion of an externally enforced regime change in Iran is fraught with risk and the failures of similar attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan are cautionary tales.
• Iran’s deeply rooted political structure, its nationalist sentiment, and the fractious ethnic composition of its population render a direct intervention unfeasible and potentially disastrous.
• Instead, a subtler approach is likely, an attempt to internally reorient the regime. However, this is easier said than done.
• The Revolutionary Guards and radical clergy hold substantial power, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, now 86, favouring the status quo.
• The succession race, likely between Khamenei’s son Mojtaba and Hassan Khomeini (grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder), is crucial.
• Mojtaba represents ideological continuity, while Khomeini may herald a pragmatic reset.
• This transition, uncharted for over three decades, carries profound implications for both Iran and the broader region.

The Compounded Crisis of Gaza

• Amid the larger geopolitical theatre, the Israel-Palestine conflict remains unresolved and increasingly desperate.
• The recent war has further complicated matters, with Gaza facing mass starvation and staggering civilian casualties.
• The West Bank, too, is destabilising under settler violence and a stagnating Palestinian Authority under the aged Mahmoud Abbas.
• There is concern that the U.S. administration may attempt to resurrect its controversial plan to deport Gazans and repurpose the territory into a commercial ‘international riviera’- a vision that is both ethically fraught and politically implausible.
• Post-war trauma has left Gazans in a survivalist limbo, making long-term planning nearly impossible.

The Way Ahead: A Moment of Reckoning for West Asia

• This moment offers West Asia a rare opportunity. Should Iran, Israel, and the U.S. resist the temptations of triumphalism and instead embrace moderation, the region could move toward a more peaceful, stable future.
• The benefits are tangible: lower oil prices, stabilised logistics, and reduced extremism and terrorism.
• Conversely, failure to consolidate peace could plunge the region back into the familiar cycle of violence punctuated by fragile truces.
• The path forward demands statesmanship over brinkmanship, negotiation over domination, and vision over vengeance.

Conclusion

• If the major actors, Israel, Iran, and the United States, choose moderation over triumphalism, and focus on rebuilding over posturing, a new era of peace and economic cooperation could emerge.
• Stability in West Asia would bring global benefits: lower oil prices, reduced radicalisation, and improved international trade logistics.
• However, if the past is prologue, there is a risk that the region could revert to its familiar cycle of violence and uneasy ceasefires.

Why in News?

In recent months, India’s poverty statistics have gained attention. In April 2025, the government cited a World Bank report claiming 171 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty over a decade.

Later, the World Bank updated its poverty estimates, stating that only 5.75% of Indians now live in abject poverty, down from 27% in 2011–12.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Poverty Line
• Reasons Behind India Using the World Bank’s Poverty Line to Estimate Poverty
• About World Bank’s poverty line
• Key Takeaways from the Latest World Bank Data on Poverty in India
• India’s Own Domestic Poverty Lines
• Poverty in India: A Matter of Perspective

Poverty Line

• A poverty line is the income threshold used to determine who is considered poor in a given economy.
• The poverty line varies with time and location. Income sufficient in 1975 may be inadequate today, and lifestyles differ across regions.
• There is no universal poverty line. Different benchmarks can be set based on context and purpose, allowing for more accurate analysis.

Reasons Behind India Using the World Bank’s Poverty Line to Estimate Poverty

• India’s last recognised poverty line was based on the 2009 Tendulkar Committee formula, using 2011–12 data.
• In 2014, the Rangarajan Committee proposed a new method, but it was never formally adopted.
• Due to data gaps and outdated methods, India now relies on NITI Aayog’s Multidimensional Poverty Index or the World Bank’s poverty line.
• In the absence of updated national metrics, the World Bank’s poverty line is increasingly used to estimate poverty trends in India.

About World Bank’s Poverty Line

• The World Bank’s poverty line reflects the cost of basic living, adjusted to each country’s purchasing power parity (PPP), to allow fair comparisons.
• Origins of the $1-a-Day Benchmark
  • In 1990, researchers used PPP exchange rates to compare national poverty lines of the poorest countries, establishing the first global standard: $1/day (1985 prices).
• Adjustment for Inflation and Global Context
  • As global prices rose, the World Bank updated its poverty line—most recently raising it to $3/day in June 2025.
  • At the 2025 PPP rate (₹20.6/USD), India’s extreme poverty line equals ₹62/day. For comparison, the PPP rate is 0.67 for the UK and 3.45 for China.

Key Takeaways from the Latest World Bank Data on Poverty in India

• There are few takeaways from the latest World Bank data shown on poverty in India.
• Revised Historical Poverty Estimates
  • The World Bank’s latest data shows India’s past poverty levels were overestimated. For example, 1977-78 poverty was 47%, not 64%.
• New Poverty Line: $3 Per Day (PPP)
  • The World Bank adopted a new poverty line of $3/day (PPP-adjusted).
  • Using this, India’s poverty fell from 27% in 2011–12 to under 6% in 2022–23.
• Sharp Reduction in Extreme Poverty
  • India’s extreme poor declined from about 34.4 crore in 2011–12 to 7.5 crore in 2022–23 — a significant improvement.
• Misconceptions About the Poverty Line
  • A common mistake is converting $3 using the market rate (₹85/USD).
  • Instead, PPP conversion applies — approximately ₹20.6 per dollar — reflecting actual purchasing power.
    • The $3/day poverty line is not a direct cash figure but reflects what $3 can buy in India, adjusted for local costs.

India’s Own Domestic Poverty Lines

• Pre-Tendulkar (2009): ₹17/day (urban), ₹12/day (rural)
• Tendulkar Committee (2009): Raised to ₹29/day (urban), ₹22/day (rural)
• Updated for 2011–12: ₹36/day (urban), ₹30/day (rural)
• Rangarajan Committee (2014): Recommended ₹47/day (urban), ₹33/day (rural)

Poverty in India: A Matter of Perspective

• Despite India’s history of poverty research, defining who is poor varies widely. Estimates range from 5.75% to 66%, depending on the benchmark used.
• Multiple Measures, Conflicting Realities
  • 5.75% live below the World Bank’s $3/day (₹62) poverty line.
  • 24% is the poverty benchmark for lower middle-income countries.
  • 20% voluntarily offer labour for minimal wages.
  • 66% receive free food under government schemes.
  • These diverse indicators present a conflicting picture of poverty.
• Policy vs Reality: Income Tax Benchmark
  • The 2024 Union Budget waived tax for those earning up to ₹12 lakh/year (₹3,288/day), contrasting sharply with the ₹62/day poverty line — highlighting the vast income spectrum.
• Two Ways to Interpret WB Data
  • First, celebrate the reduction in extreme poverty.
  • Second, reflect on broader economic hardship, as 83% of Indians live on just ₹171/day — a figure that includes total income or expenditure.
• The Bigger Question: What Truly Defines Poverty?
  • The variation in definitions and data prompts a deeper inquiry into India’s actual economic well-being and whether poverty is being accurately understood or just statistically managed.

Context

• The United States has withdrawn its AI export control plan called the Framework for AI Diffusion. This move is seen as positive. The framework was considered harmful to AI growth and global relations.
• However, new developments show that AI controls will still continue, but in different ways.

AI Diffusion Framework

• In its final days, the Biden administration introduced the AI Diffusion Framework, treating AI like nuclear technology.
• It imposed export controls and licenses, favoring allies and restricting adversaries like China and Russia.
• Rationale Behind the Framework
  • The U.S. believed that computational power drives AI strength.
  • To maintain its edge, it aimed to limit adversaries’ access to powerful compute while centralizing AI development within allied nations.
• Counterproductive Impact of the Framework
  • While trying to tighten controls, the Framework unintentionally harmed global cooperation, even among allies.
  • It prompted partners to seek independence from the U.S. tech ecosystem, undermining trust and collaboration.
• Mischaracterization of AI as Military Tech
  • AI is primarily a civilian technology with military applications, unlike nuclear tech.
  • Treating it as a defense tool restricted innovation, which is international and collaborative by nature.
• Innovation Driven by Restriction
  • Tight controls encouraged alternative innovations.
  • China’s DeepSeek R1 is a result of such restrictions, achieving top-tier AI performance with less compute, reducing the effectiveness of export controls.
• Revocation and the Road Ahead
  • The Trump administration revoked the framework due to its flaws.
  • This benefits countries like India, which were disadvantaged.
  • However, the U.S. approach to controlling AI diffusion, especially towards China, is expected to continue in new forms.

The Possible Replacement

• Continued Efforts Despite Framework Withdrawal
  • Although the AI Diffusion Framework has been rescinded, the U.S. continues to tighten controls on Chinese access to AI chips.
• Expansion of Export Controls
  • In March 2025, the U.S. broadened export restrictions and added more companies to its blacklist, reinforcing efforts to limit AI chip access.
• Hardware-Based Monitoring Measures
  • The administration is considering new on-chip features to monitor and restrict AI chip usage, targeting functionality and specific applications.
  • New U.S. legislation proposes built-in location tracking in AI chips to prevent their diversion to countries like China and Russia.
• Shift from Trade to Technological Enforcement
  • Rather than relying solely on trade restrictions, the U.S. now aims to achieve the framework’s goals through technological controls embedded in AI hardware.

Emerging Concerns with New Control Measures

• Technologically enforced AI controls raise issues of ownership, privacy, and surveillance.
• These measures may deter legitimate users while failing to stop malicious actors.
• Undermining Trust and Autonomy
  • Such controls reduce user autonomy and create trust deficits.
  • Nations—even allies—may fear losing strategic autonomy and seek alternatives to U.S.-based AI systems.
• Tactical Shift, Not Strategic Change
  • The withdrawal of the AI Diffusion Framework reflects a tactical adjustment, not a change in the core U.S. strategy to control AI proliferation.
• Risk of Repeating Past Mistakes
  • If technologically-driven controls are fully adopted, they could reproduce the same harmful outcomes as the rescinded framework, weakening global trust in U.S. leadership.

Conclusion: A Missed Opportunity for Strategic Reflection

• Persisting with control-based policies signals that the U.S. has not fully absorbed the lessons of the Framework’s failure, potentially undermining its global AI leadership.

Why in News?

The Supreme Court stated that summoning lawyers for advising clients violates their rights and undermines the autonomy of the legal profession, which is protected by statutory provisions.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Background of the Case
• Privileges Associated with the Attorney-Client Communication
• Judicial Stand on Summoning Lawyers
• The Significance of Attorney-Client Privilege for Legal Sanctity

Background of the Case

• The Supreme Court made its remarks while hearing a case involving a Gujarat-based lawyer summoned by police for helping his client secure bail in a loan dispute.
• The observation followed the Supreme Court Bar Association's criticism of the Enforcement Directorate's summons to senior advocates Arvind Datar and Pratap Venugopal.
• They were called in connection with an Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) probe involving Care Health Insurance and former Religare Enterprises chairperson Rashmi Saluja.

Privileges Associated with the Attorney-Client Communication

• The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (replacing the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), grants privileged status to communications between lawyers and their clients, protecting them from third-party disclosure.
• Conditions for Disclosure
  • Section 132 of the BSA prohibits advocates from disclosing client communication, even post-employment, except when:
    • The client consents,
    • The communication involves illegal activity,
    • The lawyer observes criminal conduct during employment.
• Exemption from Testifying
• Lawyers are exempt from testifying or disclosing client communications in any form—oral, written, or electronic.
• Exclusive Protection for Legal Professionals
  • This privilege is exclusive to legal professionals; other experts like chartered accountants, company secretaries, and cost accountants do not enjoy such protection.

Judicial Stand on Summoning Lawyers

• Indian courts have consistently held that police or prosecution agencies cannot summon lawyers merely for advising their clients.
• A. V. Pavithran v. CBI (2024) – Bombay High Court Ruling
  • The Bombay High Court quashed a CBI summons to Advocate Pavithran, asserting that legal advice is privileged under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 132 of the BSA).
  • The court reiterated the principle: “once privileged, always privileged.”
• Praram Infra v. State of M.P. (2025) – Madhya Pradesh High Court Decision
  • The Madhya Pradesh High Court also quashed summons issued to Advocate Rahul Maheshwari, emphasizing that an advocate who is neither an accused nor a witness should not be summoned.
  • The court again cited the protection under Section 126 of the Evidence Act.

The Significance of Attorney-Client Privilege for Legal Sanctity

• Attorney-client privilege, as upheld by Section 132 of the BSA, 2023 and reinforced by the Advocates Act, 1961, is central to maintaining the integrity of the legal profession and the rule of law.
• This privilege ensures lawyers can provide impartial and fearless advice without fear of coercion or reprisal.
• Summoning legal professionals without any evidence of wrongdoing not only violates this protection but threatens the institutional balance between the Bar, Bench, and Executive.
• Such actions create a chilling effect—discouraging legal advocacy, fostering self-censorship, and undermining public interest litigation and constitutional advocacy.

Why in News?

• In a historic moment, India's Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla piloted the Axiom-4 mission aboard SpaceX’s Dragon capsule, which lifted off from Florida’s Kennedy Space Center.
• Shukla became the first Indian in 41 years to cross the Karman line after Rakesh Sharma in 1984.
  • The Kármán line is an imaginary boundary at an altitude of 100 kilometers (62 miles) above sea level, which is widely recognized as the boundary between Earth's atmosphere and outer space.
• PM Modi congratulated Shukla, calling him the first Indian en-route to the International Space Station.
• 

What’s in Today’s Article?

• India’s Human Spaceflight Milestone and the Road Ahead
• Leveraging Space as a Strategic and Economic Frontier

India’s Human Spaceflight Milestone and the Road Ahead

• Shukla’s mission marks the beginning of human spaceflight becoming routine for India, similar to its satellite launches.
• Gaganyaan and Strategic Shifts
  • Though ISRO missed its 2022 deadline for human spaceflight, the Gaganyaan program has injected urgency and focus into the agency, positioning India for strategic advantages in space exploration.
• Human Spaceflight as a Strategic Capability
  • Human spaceflight is now a key tool for scientific, commercial, and geopolitical leverage.
  • As global space travel risks becoming exclusionary, India’s capabilities ensure it stays in the race.
• Equal Partnership in Axiom-4
  • ISRO played an active role in Axiom-4, not merely as a passenger partner.
  • A large ISRO team, including Chairman V. Narayanan, was deeply involved in planning and troubleshooting the mission.
• Preparing for Future Missions
  • The knowledge gained from Axiom-4 will strengthen the Gaganyaan program, with India’s first indigenous crewed mission expected by 2027.
  • ISRO also plans to establish its own space station and send astronauts to the Moon by 2040.

Leveraging Space as a Strategic and Economic Frontier

• Space is poised to be one of the most impactful technologies of the future, alongside AI, quantum computing, and clean energy, with vast economic and strategic implications.
• India Among Global Front-Runners
  • Unlike other tech domains where India lags, space is an area where India holds a leading position.
  • However, maintaining this edge will require competing with space giants like the U.S. and China.
• Private Sector and Economic Potential
  • India’s space capabilities offer significant business opportunities.
  • While India is a top space power, it contributes only about 2% to the global space economy—leaving immense room for growth.
• Inspiring Youth and Driving Innovation
  • Human spaceflight can inspire young Indians, attract talent to the space sector, and boost innovation, employment, and economic development.
• Capitalising on Shukla’s Mission
  • Shukla’s journey must be leveraged not just as a symbolic milestone but as a springboard to accelerate India’s space ambitions and build a thriving space ecosystem.

Context

• Bihar, with one of the highest out-migration rates in India, is set for elections later this year.
• In the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, the state's voter turnout was only 56%, well below the national average of 66%.
• A key reason for this low turnout is the large migrant population, many of whom could not return home to cast their votes.
• In this context, the present article analyses various options to enable migrants—both inter- and intra-State—to exercise their voting rights, highlighting the need for a multi-pronged approach.

Migration Trends and Risk of Voter Disenfranchisement

• As of 2021, India's migration rate stood at 28.9%, with most migrations occurring for marriage, especially among women.
• However, about 10% of migrants relocate for work, a figure notably higher in States like Bihar.
• With rising labour migration from poorer to richer regions, many citizens risk being disenfranchised unless voting mechanisms for migrants are implemented.
• Although public discussions have taken place and the Election Commission of India proposed a concrete solution in 2024, no unified system to ensure voting access for migrants has yet been adopted.
• Distinct strategies are required for different categories of migrants.

Proposed Measures for Intra-State Migrants

• Intra-State migrants—who make up around 85% of the migrant population—could potentially return home to vote if supported adequately.
• Enforce statutory holidays on polling days to allow workers to vote without wage loss.
• Arrange special bus services before and on polling days to facilitate travel to home constituencies.

Mechanisms to Enable Voting Rights for Inter-State Migrants

• Need for Tailored Mechanisms
  • Inter-State migrants, especially those in informal, low-paying jobs, face unique challenges in exercising their voting rights.
  • A one-size-fits-all approach is inadequate; multiple mechanisms must be explored and implemented.
• Remote Electronic Voting Machines (RVMs)
  • Pilot Initiative: In 2023, the ECI introduced Remote Electronic Voting Machines (RVMs), each capable of catering to 72 constituencies.
    • RVMs, developed by BEL and ECIL, enable safe, non-networked remote voting for migrants.
    • It used dynamic ballot displays and barcode-based constituency identification for up to 72 constituencies.
  • Challenges: Political parties raised concerns about lack of transparency, identification issues, and the model code of conduct.
  • Administrative Hurdles: The need to pre-register migrants, assess constituency-wise presence, and deploy RVMs across cities makes scaling difficult—especially in Lok Sabha elections.
  • Despite flaws, RVMs represent a significant first step. With improvements and consultations, they could eventually benefit many migrants.
• Postal Ballots
  • Existing Model: Used for armed forces personnel.
  • Extension to Migrants: Would require pre-registration, ballot issuance, and return mechanisms.
  • Feasibility: Easier to implement than RVMs but still requires major logistical coordination by the ECI.
• Changing Voting Constituency
  • Target Group: Long-term migrants with at least six months of residence.
  • Advantages: Empowers migrants to influence local governance and push for inclusive policies.
  • Concerns: May face resistance from local residents but offers long-term democratic integration of migrants.
• Enrolment of Women Migrants
  • Key Demographic: A large number of women migrate post-marriage.
  • Recommendation: Targeted voter registration drives should be launched to include them in electoral rolls at their new residences.
• A combination of RVMs, postal ballots, constituency-switching, and focused enrolment drives—especially for women—can ensure greater electoral inclusion of India’s vast migrant population.

Conclusion

• Given the diversity among migrants, enabling their voting rights is complex.
• A mixed approach combining multiple mechanisms is essential to ensure broader participation of both inter- and intra-State migrants.

Why in the News?

The Central Government has announced that the next Census would take place in 2027 and that it would collect information on castes.

What’s in Today’s Article?

• Upcoming Census (Introduction, Timelines, Process, Significance, Limitations, Suggestions, Way Forward)

Introduction

• India is preparing to conduct its next decennial Census in 2027, with a significant change: the inclusion of caste enumeration.
• This marks the first such effort since 1941 and aims to provide data that could help bring marginalised communities into the policy mainstream.
• However, experts and statisticians argue that to fulfil this ambitious goal, a fundamental restructuring of the current Census design and methodology is essential.

Timeline and Process of the Upcoming Census

• The Census will be conducted in two key phases:

• House-listing Phase (2026): Scheduled between April and September 2026, this phase will record data about dwelling units and household amenities.
• Population Enumeration Phase (2027): This phase will collect demographic, social, and economic data, including caste-related information.

• Caste enumeration will occur during the second phase, which represents a marked departure from earlier Censuses that did not record comprehensive caste data, except for Scheduled Castes (SCs).

Significance of Caste Enumeration

• India last attempted caste enumeration in the 1941 Census, but the data was never processed due to the outbreak of World War II.
• The last usable caste data, therefore, dates back to 1931, making it grossly outdated for modern policy use.
• The Union government, led by PM Modi, has justified this inclusion as a measure to integrate marginalised communities and enhance targeted policymaking.
• However, questions remain whether the current Census framework can deliver on this promise without substantive changes.

Limitations of the Existing Census Framework

• The current format of the Census questionnaire, based on the 2021 draft, only gathers caste data for SCs.
• To make caste enumeration meaningful, experts argue the need to collect data for all castes (excluding Scheduled Tribes), accompanied by adjustments in enumerator training, software tools, and data processing protocols.
• Moreover, key socio-economic indicators like employment, education, age at marriage, and place of birth are currently not cross-tabulated effectively with caste information.
• Existing questions on unemployment, migration, and childbirth suffer from conceptual ambiguity and low data quality, reducing their usefulness for caste-based policy analysis.

Suggested Reforms for Enhanced Data Collection

• Linking Household Data with Demographic Information
  • One major reform proposed is the integration of housing and asset-related questions from the house-listing phase into the population enumeration phase.
  • This change would:

• Reduce data linkage errors arising from a 6-9 month time gap between phases.
• Enable accurate correlation between caste and access to housing, electricity, and sanitation.
• Improve coverage in urban areas, which often suffer from higher omission rates.

• Making the Questionnaire Leaner
  • Several questions have become outdated or redundant due to rapid social and technological change. These include:

• Ownership of mobile phones or computers.
• Household access to bank accounts.
• Streamlining the questionnaire would allow enumerators to focus on collecting accurate responses to more impactful variables.

• Ensuring the Utility of Collected Data
  • Despite the Census providing caste-wise data for socio-economic variables for decades, such data has rarely informed the identification of Most Backward Castes (MBCs) or shaped welfare schemes beyond reservation frameworks.
  • For caste enumeration to be genuinely transformative, the data must be analysed and integrated into broader public policy processes.

Challenges in Collecting Caste Data

• While Census data can be a vital tool, it also faces logistical and methodological hurdles, such as:

• Self-identification inconsistencies across castes and sub-castes.
• Lack of standardised caste lists.
• Enumerator biases and recording errors.

• Nevertheless, in the absence of any other large-scale, uniform data source, the Census remains the most feasible mechanism to gather caste-wise socio-economic data across India.

Way Forward

• To ensure the 2027 Census lives up to its potential, policymakers must:

• Redesign the questionnaire to capture more granular and relevant data.
• Improve enumerator training and digital tools for data collection.
• Integrate caste data with other critical indicators such as literacy, employment, housing, and migration.
• Commit to using the data beyond reservation quotas for broader social and economic reforms.

• If executed thoughtfully, this exercise could provide India with a rich dataset for evidence-based policymaking aimed at inclusive development.

Context

• The recent controversy in Kerala surrounding the placement of a Bharat Mata picture by the Governor at official functions has ignited a significant debate about constitutional propriety, symbolism, and the role of historical imagery in public institutions.
• At the heart of this issue lies a broader question: can unofficial, emotionally charged symbols be given official status in a constitutional democracy?
• This incident, seemingly minor, raises critical concerns about constitutional decorum, the limits of gubernatorial authority, and the dangers of political symbolism being conflated with national identity.

An Overview of the Controversy

• The controversy began when the Governor of Kerala displayed a painting of Bharat Mata, a female figure clads in a saffron sari, holding a spear, and accompanied by a lion, at official events held in Raj Bhavan.
• The room, adorned with this image and a brass lamp placed before it, has become the site of official functions.
• The Governor regularly bows before the picture, offers floral tributes, and lights the lamp, treating it as an integral ceremonial part of the function.
• The Kerala government, however, has raised objections on constitutional grounds, arguing that such a representation of Bharat Mata is not a nationally recognised symbol, unlike the national flag, anthem, or emblem.
• In protest, the Kerala government has opted out of official events held under the visual presence of this picture.

Symbolism, The Freedom Struggle, The Constitutional and Legal Standpoint

• Symbolism and The Freedom Struggle
  • Historically, the slogan ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ was a potent emotional cry during the Indian freedom struggle.
  • Chanted at the height of anti-colonial resistance, it stirred patriotism among freedom fighters.
  • However, this powerful slogan operated largely without a consistent or official visual representation of Bharat Mata.
  • The emotional resonance was tied more to the abstract idea of the nation than to a standardised image.
  • While the personification of India as a mother gained traction in the 19th century, the modern, saffron-clad depiction of Bharat Mata has clear ideological roots.
  • Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay first introduced the idea of a motherland in Anandamath, though his symbol was Banga Mata, not Bharat Mata.
  • Abanindranath Tagore later painted a goddess-like image that Sister Nivedita popularised as Bharat Mata.
  • Yet, even during the peak of the national movement, no particular image of Bharat Mata was ever adopted officially.
• The Constitutional and Legal Standpoint
  • The Indian Constitution provides no legal or symbolic status to any image of Bharat Mata.
  • While emotional and cultural expressions are part of the democratic ethos, they cannot override constitutional principles or official protocol.
  • The picture used by the Governor, although historically grounded, has never been formally adopted by the nation.
  • Furthermore, it has become prominently associated with ideological organisations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
  • This association politicises the symbol, making its presence in official state functions problematic and potentially exclusionary in a secular and pluralistic nation.
  • B.R. Ambedkar’s emphatic declaration in the Constituent Assembly that a Governor has no functions which he can discharge by himself underlines the constitutional limits on the gubernatorial office.
  • The Governor is bound by the advice of the elected government, especially in matters concerning the conduct and setting of official functions.
  • Displaying a symbol that is neither nationally endorsed nor inclusive in its appeal breaches the principles of impartiality and secularism that govern constitutional offices.

The Nehruvian Ideal of Bharat Mata, Nationalism, Imagery, and Modern Governance

• The Nehruvian Ideal of Bharat Mata
  • Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s interpretation of Bharat Mata in The Discovery of India is particularly instructive.
  • For Nehru, Bharat Mata was not a deity or a goddess-like figure but a symbol of the people of India, their hopes, struggles, and collective destiny.
  • When asked to explain the cry ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’, Nehru described Bharat Mata as ‘these millions of people,’ emphasising the humanistic and democratic core of the nation.
  • This view resonates more closely with the secular and inclusive ideals enshrined in the Constitution, as opposed to mythologized or sectarian visual symbols.
• Nationalism, Imagery, and Modern Governance
  • The debate reflects a deeper tension in Indian nationalism: the contrast between inclusive civic nationalism and symbolic ethno-religious nationalism.
  • Gandhi’s nationalism was rooted in moral principles, pluralism, and unity in diversity.
  • In contrast, the use of anthropomorphic images with religious or sectarian connotations tends to exclude rather than unite, reinforcing ideological boundaries rather than dissolving them.
  • The resurgence of such imagery in contemporary political discourse risks regressing to a form of 19^th-century nationalism, which no longer fits the complex social and cultural fabric of 21^st-century India.
  • India's vast diversity cannot be adequately represented by a single image, particularly one that resembles a specific religious archetype.

Governor vs. Government: A Pattern of Conflict

• The Kerala episode is not an isolated incident. Conflicts between Governors and State governments have been a recurring theme in Indian federal politics.
• While the Supreme Court has laid down clear guidelines limiting gubernatorial discretion, tensions persist, often due to political differences between the central and state governments.
• Raj Bhavan, like Rashtrapati Bhavan, is not merely a personal residence; it is an institution that hosts constitutional functions.
• Any symbol used in such a space must carry the legitimacy of national endorsement and the neutrality of state institutions.
• Allowing personal or ideological symbolism to seep into these spaces weakens institutional neutrality and provokes avoidable political confrontations.

Conclusion

• The Raj Bhavan controversy in Kerala is not just about a picture; it is about constitutional fidelity, democratic symbolism, and institutional responsibility.
• The Governor, as a constitutional head, must uphold the values of neutrality, inclusiveness, and legality.
• Symbols matter, especially in a country as diverse and sensitive as India.
• When personal or ideological symbols are given official sanction without legal basis, it challenges the very spirit of democratic governance.

Context:

• The article explores how US President Donald Trump's foreign policy interventions—ranging from military action in Iran to his controversial stance on NATO (questioning its relevance)—are reshaping geopolitical dynamics across Eurasia.
• It underscores the emergence of Germany as a strategic leader in Europe, the shifting power structures in the Middle East, and the reverberations of US disengagement in the Indo-Pacific.
• These transformations signal the birth of a new geopolitical order with major implications for global and regional actors, including India.

NATO in Flux - Trump and Transatlantic Tensions:

• NATO under pressure: The 32-member NATO summit (in The Hague) is marked by growing uncertainty about the alliance’s future.
• Trump’s challenge: His repeated questioning of NATO’s relevance and demands for increased European defence spending are pushing Europe to reassess its security dependencies.
• Shift in leadership focus: With US reliability under question, Germany is emerging as a new strategic anchor within Europe. 

Germany’s Strategic Reorientation - From Reluctance to Leadership:

• Historical backdrop: From a constrained post-WWII role to a reunified “economic giant, geopolitical dwarf.”
• Turning point (2022):
  • Chancellor (former) Olaf Scholz’s declaration of a Zeitenwende — a historic turning point — marked the beginning of Germany’s strategic reorientation.
  • Russia’s Ukraine invasion compelled Germany to allocate €100 billion to modernise the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) and embrace NATO’s 2% GDP defence spending goal.
• Leadership under Merz: Chancellor Friedrich Merz is consolidating this transformation by actively leading NATO’s initiatives and deploying combat-ready troops in Lithuania. 

US Middle East Strategy - Disruption and Normalisation:

• Military and diplomatic shocks: Trump bombed Iranian nuclear sites while facilitating temporary ceasefires and exploring the “Cyrus Accords” to normalise Israel-Iran ties.
• Abraham Accords legacy: His earlier term saw Arab-Israel normalisation; and current strategies aim to deepen these changes, potentially involving Saudi Arabia and Iran.
• Regional implications: The weakening of Iran and shifting alliances are recalibrating the security dynamics of the Middle East.

Indo-Pacific Resonance - Anxiety Amid US Disengagement:

• Absence at NATO summit: No representatives from Japan, South Korea, Australia, or New Zealand were present—signalling drift in Asia-Europe security linkages.
• US commitment in doubt: Trump’s reluctance to label Russia as a threat and his non-affirmation of Article 5 of Washington Treaty (collective defence) has unsettled US allies in Asia.
• Need for strategic autonomy: US allies in Asia may pursue more independent and regional security arrangements.

Rethinking Eurasian Security - A Structural Transformation:

• Security needs political recalibration: More defence spending is not enough; countries must reimagine their regional partnerships.
• Signs of systemic change: From the Ukraine war to strained NATO cohesion and Iran’s internal turmoil, the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia is shifting dramatically.
• Emergence of new regional poles: A more assertive Germany, Middle East realignments, and Indo-Pacific autonomy represent a tripartite reordering of Eurasia.

India’s Strategic Positioning in a Reordered Eurasia:

• Multi-regional engagement: India straddles the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, giving it a unique strategic advantage.
• Policy diversification: New Delhi is deepening ties with Europe, engaging with the Middle East across divides, stabilizing ties with China and strengthening relationships with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and South Korea.
• Balancing act with Trump’s America: Even as India partners with the US, it is building the capacity to navigate an uncertain world order marked by power transitions.

Conclusion:

• The global order is witnessing a tectonic shift as Trump’s disruptive strategies force Eurasia into a structural recalibration.
• With Germany asserting leadership in Europe, the Middle East moving toward regional balancing, and the Indo-Pacific exploring strategic autonomy, the era of US-led security guarantees is being fundamentally questioned.
• For India, this moment offers both challenge and opportunity—requiring nimble diplomacy and robust strategic foresight.