Context

• The Supreme Court of India is the guardian of the Constitution and is expected to provide authoritative answers to fundamental legal questions.
• However, its expanding workload, fragmented Bench system and delays in constituting Constitution Benches have created significant institutional challenges.
• The September 23 split verdict concerning the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 illustrates these difficulties.
• The disagreement was not initially about the validity of the law but about whether a two-judge Bench was competent to decide the challenge.

The Election Commissioners’ Appointment Framework

• The 2023 Appointment Law
  • The 2023 Act provides that the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners shall be appointed on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.
  • The law replaced the interim arrangement established by the Constitution Bench in Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (2023), under which the Chief Justice of India served as the third member of the selection committee.
• The Article 145(3) Dispute
  • During the proceedings, the Union government argued that the challenge raised a substantial question concerning constitutional interpretation and therefore required a minimum five-judge Bench under Article 145(3).
  • Justice Dipankar Datta rejected this argument, while Justice Satish Chandra Sharma accepted it.
  • The matter was consequently placed before the Chief Justice for consideration of a Constitution Bench.
  • Article 145(3) does not require every important or new case to be heard by five judges. It applies when there is a substantial question of constitutional interpretation.
  • Earlier decisions have distinguished constitutional interpretation from merely applying an already established constitutional principle.

The Constitutional Significance of Anoop Baranwal

• The Interim Nature of the CJI’s Role
  • Both judges agreed that the CJI’s membership of the appointment committee in Anoop Baranwal was an interim arrangement, intended to operate until Parliament enacted legislation.
  • However, the judgment went beyond merely creating that temporary mechanism.
• Protection from Executive Dominance
  • The Constitution Bench had held that Article 324 requires safeguards against exclusive executive control over appointments to the Election Commission.
  • This constitutional principle is binding under Article 141.
  • Justice Datta therefore viewed the central issue as whether the new statutory arrangement complied with an already established constitutional requirement.
  • Justice Sharma adopted a different approach, reasoning that since the constitutional validity of the 2023 Act had not previously been authoritatively decided, the matter required a Constitution Bench.

The Broader Institutional Problem

• Transformation of the Supreme Court
  • The Supreme Court has changed considerably since 1950. It now has a sanctioned strength of 38 judges and functions largely through two-judge Benches.
  • A large part of its workload consists of special leave petitions and ordinary appeals, while Constitution Benches are constituted only when judges can be spared from this daily workload.
• Fragmentation and Judicial Consistency
  • This structure can result in different Benches developing different interpretations of legal principles. Such fragmentation creates challenges for precedent, consistency and constitutional certainty.
  • The problem becomes particularly serious when constitutional questions remain unresolved for years.
  • Anoop Baranwal, for instance, was instituted in 2015, referred to a Constitution Bench in 2018 and decided only in 2023.

The Consequences of Judicial Delay

• By the time the present challenge is finally decided, Election Commissioners appointed under the disputed law may have already overseen multiple State and general elections.
• Thus, delay can create a fait accompli, making a later judicial ruling less capable of reversing the consequences of an earlier decision.
• Constitutional courts must resolve fundamental questions in a reasonable time so that legal uncertainty does not persist indefinitely.

The Way Forward: Institutional Reform

• One possible reform is the creation of a permanent Constitution Bench dedicated primarily to constitutional questions.
• The Law Commission’s 229th Report (2009) had already proposed a similar structural arrangement.
• The Master of the Roster system gives the Chief Justice substantial authority over Bench composition.
• In a Court with 38 judges, this is more than a routine administrative function.
• Bench composition should therefore be governed by transparent, predetermined and objective rules to strengthen institutional confidence and reduce uncertainty.

Conclusion

• The dispute over the Election Commissioners’ appointment law reveals a deeper structural challenge facing the Supreme Court.
• Delayed Constitution Benches, fragmented adjudication, uncertainty over precedent and concentrated roster powers can weaken the Court’s ability to perform its constitutional role effectively.
• Reforms should provide clearer standards under Article 145(3), faster constitution of larger Benches, transparent Bench allocation and stronger adherence to precedent.
• The Supreme Court was conceived not merely as an appellate institution but as the guardian of constitutional governance.
• Its institutional structure must therefore ensure that the most important constitutional questions are answered before delay makes those answers practically ineffective.