Context:

• India’s civil justice system suffers from prolonged delays, procedural hurdles and inadequate judicial capacity.
• A striking example is a civil suit filed in the Bombay High Court in 1947 that was settled out of court only in 2026, after 79 years.
• While exceptional, legal practitioners estimate that many civil suits in the Bombay High Court take over two decades to conclude.

Judicial Overload and Shortage of Judges:

• A major reason for judicial delay is too many cases for too few judges.
• For example, Maharashtra had a population of about 112 million according to the 2011 Census, yet has only around 15 judges per million people.
• The Bombay High Court has approximately 1.9 judges per million people, compared with around 157 judges per million in New York State.
• The National Judicial Data Grid shows 648,725 cases pending before the Bombay High Court, including about 9,454 civil suits.
• With only a small number of judges handling original civil jurisdiction, clearing the existing backlog while dealing with fresh filings becomes extremely difficult.

When Civil Disputes Become Criminal Cases:

• Judicial delay can encourage litigants with money and influence to seek alternative ways of enforcing claims.
• A growing concern is the criminalisation of civil disputes, particularly monetary and contractual disagreements.
• A mere failure to honour a contractual obligation does not ordinarily constitute offences such as cheating or criminal breach of trust.
• Yet, some complainants approach the police alleging criminal conduct against debtors or business opponents.
• In certain cases, financial incentives and informal arrangements may encourage police intervention even when the dispute is essentially civil.

The Police as a ‘Parallel’ Justice System:

• Once the police become involved, the process can be much faster and more intimidating than civil litigation.
• The alleged debtor may be summoned to the police station at short notice and subjected to prolonged questioning and pressure to settle.
• The threat of arrest, reputational damage and poor prison conditions can become powerful tools for extracting settlements.
• For example, nearly 50% of such cases may end at the preliminary-inquiry stage, without even an FIR being registered.
• Thus, a litigant who may otherwise have to wait years for a civil decree can obtain a quick settlement through police pressure.

Law on the Books vs Law in Action:

• This phenomenon highlights the distinction between formal law and its actual implementation.
• The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against using criminal proceedings to settle essentially civil disputes and has regarded such criminalisation as an abuse of process.
• Yet, the gap between “law on the books” and “law in action” allows coercive practices to continue.

Structural Problems in Civil Justice:

• The problem cannot be attributed solely to an inadequate number of judges.
• India’s civil justice system also rests on archaic and cumbersome procedural structures that allow defendants considerable scope to delay proceedings.
• The famous observation of the Privy Council in 1872 remains relevant: “The difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a decree.”
• Even after winning a case, execution and enforcement of decrees can remain lengthy and difficult.

Way Forward:

• India needs a comprehensive civil justice reform strategy involving -
  • Increasing judicial capacity and filling vacancies.
  • Simplifying and modernising civil procedures to reduce unnecessary adjournments and delays.
  • Strengthening case management and court administration.
  • Ensuring faster execution of decrees.
  • Preventing the criminalisation of purely civil disputes.
  • Strengthening police accountability and ensuring that criminal law is not used as a tool of coercion.
  • Expanding mediation, arbitration and other Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for suitable disputes.
• Therefore, judicial reform must address not only pendency but also procedural complexity, case management, enforcement of decrees and accountability across institutions.

Conclusion:

• Judicial delay does more than undermine access to justice; it can create incentives for litigants to bypass formal institutions.
• When courts become excessively slow, informal and coercive mechanisms can emerge as a parallel civil justice delivery system.
• Restoring faith in the formal justice system therefore requires not merely more judges, but structural, procedural and institutional reforms that make civil justice timely, accessible and enforceable.