US President's G-2 Grouping: Implications for Global Allies

Nov. 8, 2025

Why in the News?

U.S. President Donald Trump’s reference to a “G-2” with China has revived debates about a potential U.S.-China duopoly, raising concerns among allies.

What’s in Today’s Article?

G-2 Concept (Introduction, Origin, China’s Global Position, Return of Bilateralism, Global Reactions, Implications)

Introduction

When U.S. President Donald Trump announced before meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping that “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”, it reignited debates about the future of U.S.-China relations and the possible sidelining of key allies.
The reference to the G-2, a concept implying a U.S.-China duopoly in global leadership, signals a shift in tone that could unsettle Washington’s partners in Asia and beyond.
At a time when geopolitical fault lines are already deep, this framing challenges the balance built through multilateral institutions and strategic groupings like the Quad.

The Origin of the G-2 Concept

The idea of a “G-2” was first introduced in 2005 by economist C.Fred Bergsten, then Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
He proposed that the United States must prioritise bilateral relationships with key global actors, the European Union, China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, to stabilise global economic systems and energy flows.
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the G-2 idea gained momentum, with Bergsten arguing that effective global economic recovery and climate action would be impossible without U.S.-China cooperation.
The concept was not intended to replace the G-20 or institutions like the IMF or WTO, but to “supplement and strengthen global governance through pre-coordination” between the two biggest economies.
Prominent thinkers also supported the idea, and even the Obama administration explored its feasibility during the early years of U.S.-China engagement under Hu Jintao.

The Changing Nature of China’s Global Posture

Two decades later, the global order has shifted dramatically.
China is no longer the cautious power that once adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “hide your strength and bide your time.”
Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has asserted itself across multiple domains, from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait and global technology infrastructure.
This transformation has redefined China’s interactions with the U.S. and its allies.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded its economic footprint, while its military modernisation has challenged American dominance in the Indo-Pacific.
Consequently, the Trump administration (2017-2021) was pivotal in reframing China from a “strategic partner” to a “strategic competitor.”
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly identified China’s actions as threats to the rules-based international order, leading to trade wars, tariff barriers, and renewed security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Trump’s G-2 Framing: A Return to Bilateralism

Trump’s recent embrace of the G-2 language marks a sharp contrast to his earlier confrontational stance.
While the 2017-2021 phase was characterised by decoupling and trade hostilities, the “G-2 framing” suggests recognition of China’s great-power status and potential equal footing in global decision-making.
For many U.S. partners, this framing raises concerns of strategic ambiguity.
It could signal a transactional pivot, where Washington negotiates directly with Beijing on key issues such as trade, technology, and security, potentially marginalising traditional allies.
Such bilateral prioritisation contradicts the multilateral Indo-Pacific vision promoted through the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, and Australia) and other alliances aimed at countering China’s regional assertiveness.

Global Reactions: Allies’ Concerns and Diplomatic Ripples

India
- India faces a complex diplomatic recalibration.
- The imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods by the Trump administration strained bilateral trade ties, leading to the postponement of the planned Quad Leaders’ Summit.
- Diplomatic discussions even hinted at a potential Quad restructuring where the Philippines could temporarily replace India, a move that reflects both India’s independent stance on global issues and Washington’s evolving calculus.
- However, given India’s growing economic and strategic weight, many observers argue that any sustainable Indo-Pacific architecture cannot exclude India.
Japan and Australia
- Both have expressed unease over the G-2 rhetoric.
- For them, the revival of the Quad in 2017 was a direct response to Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea and its growing military presence.
- A U.S.-China rapprochement could dilute Washington’s commitments and leave allies vulnerable to unilateral shifts in American policy.
ASEAN States
- Southeast Asian countries, particularly those within the ASEAN bloc, view the development cautiously.
- While they welcome reduced tensions between Washington and Beijing, they fear that a bilateral G-2 understanding could come at their expense, potentially undermining their regional autonomy and interests.

Implications for the Global Order

If the U.S. and China move toward a G-2 model, smaller states could face strategic marginalisation.
The rules-based order, which relies on consensus-building through global institutions, may weaken as decision-making becomes concentrated between two superpowers.
Conversely, some analysts argue that even a temporary U.S.-China conciliation could help stabilise trade flows and de-escalate tensions, especially in areas such as semiconductor supply chains, climate negotiations, and global economic governance.