Context:

• The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has faced criticism over its de novo approach, documentary requirements, treatment of EPIC, emphasis on deletions and large-scale exclusion from draft rolls.
• Recent disclosures (by The Indian Express), however, raise a deeper institutional question - whether some major decisions relating to electoral rolls were taken without the knowledge or approval of two of the three Election Commissioners.

From SIR Controversy to Institutional Authority:

• According to the reported disclosures, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections at least 14 times over 10 months regarding decisions concerning -
  • Registration and deletion of voters
  • Restoration of deleted names
  • Form 6
  • Appeals relating to electoral rolls
  • Control over the digital architecture of electoral rolls
• If these reports are accurate, the issue extends beyond whether SIR is administratively sound or fair.
• It raises a fundamental constitutional question: Were these decisions actually taken by the Election Commission as a collective body?

Collective Decision-Making is the Statutory Norm:

• The Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, under Section 18, provides that -
  • Business of the Commission should, as far as possible, be conducted unanimously.
  • Where the Commissioners disagree, the matter is decided by majority opinion.
  • Even the procedure for transaction and allocation of business is to be regulated through a unanimous decision.
• Thus, unilateral decision-making has no statutory basis where a matter falls within the Commission's collective domain.
• Constitutional precedent:
  • In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court emphasised that Article 324 vests electoral authority in the Election Commission, not in an individual Commissioner.
  • The Court cautioned against allowing an individual to eclipse the institution.

Bypassing the Majority:

• The reported situation is unusual because it was allegedly not a case of one Commissioner being outvoted by two others.
• Instead, two Commissioners reportedly stated that certain decisions were taken without their knowledge.
• If substantive decisions legally belonging to the Commission were taken without being placed before it or without a valid allocation of business, their legality could be questioned as ultra vires—beyond the authority granted by law.
• Institutional authority cannot be created merely by issuing an order in the Commission's name.

Form 6 and ECINet - Technology Cannot Override Law:

• The controversy over Form 6, used for inclusion of names in electoral rolls, illustrates the concern.
• Commissioner Vivek Joshi reportedly recorded that the prescribed form could not be altered through an SIR direction without amending the relevant Rules.
• Commissioner Sandhu reportedly concurred, yet an altered version subsequently appeared on ECINet.
• Concerns were also raised about centralisation of access to the electoral-roll database. Commissioners reportedly sought safeguards, including an independent technical audit.
• In Goa, software reportedly prevented restoration of 97 voters whom Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) had found eligible.
• This raises an important governance principle: technology must facilitate statutory authority, not replace or override it.

West Bengal Appeals:

• The West Bengal case further highlights questions of institutional authorisation.
• Of 38.31 lakh appeals reportedly filed before tribunals, 22.21 lakh were deleted voters seeking restoration, and 16.10 lakh were reportedly filed by the Election Commission seeking deletion of voters.
• Questions were raised about who had authorised appeals filed in the name of the Election Commission when two Commissioners reportedly had not been informed.
• This makes accountability, authorisation and institutional transparency central to the controversy.

Need for Institutional Correctives:

• The disclosures suggest that the response should focus on strengthening the institution rather than turning the controversy into a partisan dispute.
• Key measures include -
  • Disclosing which major SIR decisions were taken unanimously or by majority.
  • Reviewing decisions allegedly taken without lawful approval.
  • Ensuring Form 6 conforms to statutory rules.
  • Conducting an independent technical and legal audit of ECINet.
  • Protecting the statutory powers of Electoral Registration Officers.
  • Clarifying the authority under which appeals were filed on behalf of the Commission.
  • Ensuring transparent and documented allocation of business within the Commission.
• These measures reinforce the broader constitutional principles of institutional accountability, rule of law, procedural fairness, transparency and independence of constitutional bodies.

Conclusion:

• The controversy raises a question deeper than the merits of SIR itself: whether the Election Commission is functioning collectively as the constitutional institution envisaged under Article 324.
• A constitutional body entrusted with ensuring the integrity of elections must itself adhere strictly to the constitutional and statutory framework governing its functioning.
• Electoral legitimacy depends not only on accurate voter rolls but also on lawful, transparent and institutionally accountable decision-making.