Context:

• Seven years after the government tasked the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) with restructuring military commands and establishing theatre commands, India remains caught in inter-service disagreements.
• The Army seeks assured air support, the Air Force fears fragmentation of scarce air assets, while the Navy worries that a predominantly continental outlook may undermine maritime priorities.
• While these concerns deserve consideration, prolonged disagreement is increasingly difficult to justify given the changing nature of warfare and India's complex security environment.

Why the Status Quo is Unsustainable?

• India currently has 17 geographically dispersed, single-service commands, each reporting to its respective Service Headquarters.
• Their areas of responsibility do not necessarily correspond with those of the other services.
• In a modern conflict involving the western or northern borders or the maritime domain, operations could simultaneously cross several command boundaries.
• Lack of coordination among multiple commands can cause delays at a time when AI-enabled, algorithmic and network-centric warfare demands rapid decision-making.
• Theatre commands seek to overcome this fragmentation by placing the forces required for a particular geographical or operational theatre under a single theatre commander, with adequate operational authority.
• Theatreisation is not merely administrative restructuring; it is intended to achieve jointness, integrated planning, faster decision-making and coordinated application of military power.

The Air Power Debate:

• The strongest resistance has centred on the Air Force's doctrine of “centralised control and decentralised execution.”
• Critics argue that assigning aircraft to different theatre commanders could fragment India's already limited air assets.
• However, theatreisation need not require physically distributing squadrons among theatres, and
  • Air assets can remain at their existing bases.
  • Centralised control over air power can be retained.
  • Operational tasking can be decentralised according to theatre requirements.
  • A senior IAF Component Commander can advise the theatre commander on the employment of air power.
• Thus, the real issue is not the doctrine itself but who exercises operational control over air assets.

Lessons from the US - Managing Inter-Service Rivalry:

• The US experience demonstrates that service rivalry cannot simply be wished away; it requires political arbitration and negotiated allocation of roles and missions.
• Key West Agreement, 1948:
  • Following the creation of an independent US Air Force, intense disputes emerged among the Army, Navy and Air Force over operational responsibilities.
  • Then Defence Secretary (James Forrestal) brought the Joint Chiefs together at Key West and compelled them to negotiate their respective roles.
  • The broad settlement was -
    • Air Force: Primary responsibility for strategic air warfare.
    • Navy: Carrier aviation.
    • Marine Corps: Its amphibious and expeditionary role.
    • Army: Land combat.
  • The agreement established an important principle: military roles and missions should be settled through negotiation under civilian political authority.
• 1966 Army-Air Force Agreement:
  • Another dispute arose over fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters during the Vietnam era.
  • The Army and Air Force negotiated a redistribution of responsibilities, with the Army giving up most fixed-wing aircraft in exchange for greater responsibility for combat helicopters.
• Lesson for India: Inter-service disagreements can be resolved through institutionalised negotiation, political oversight and clearly defined responsibilities.

Modern Warfare is Changing:

• India cannot simply copy foreign models, but neither can it ignore contemporary conflicts.
• For example, Ukraine has demonstrated how missiles, drones and other asymmetric capabilities can challenge conventional naval power; Ukrainian attacks severely damaged Russia's Black Sea Fleet.
• Similarly, Iran's use of missiles and drones illustrates how long-range and unmanned systems can compensate, to some extent, for limitations in conventional air power.
• These developments underline the growing importance of multi-domain operations, unmanned systems, precision weapons, networked warfare and integrated command structures.
• The emerging model of warfare increasingly blurs the boundaries between land, sea, air, space and cyber domains, making inter-service integration a strategic necessity rather than merely an organisational preference.

Britain - Innovation in Military Leadership:

• The UK provides another useful lesson in institutional flexibility. For example, Sir Richard Knighton, an aeronautical engineer and the first non-pilot to head the Royal Air Force, later became Chief of the Defence Staff.
• Such appointments demonstrate an institutional willingness to move beyond traditional service conventions when strategic circumstances demand it.
• India's prolonged seven-year debate, by contrast, reflects the difficulty of overcoming entrenched service identities and organisational interests.

Way Forward for India:

• Though the US itself took decades to achieve deeper jointness, India faces a security environment that does not permit indefinite experimentation or delay.
• Therefore, it needs -
  • Bold and reform-oriented Service Chiefs willing to challenge entrenched organisational practices.
  • A strong CDS capable of acting as an honest broker among the three services.
  • Civilian political oversight to resolve disputes over roles, resources and operational control.
  • A clearly articulated National Security Strategy (NSS) to provide strategic direction.
  • Greater emphasis on joint planning, interoperability, integrated logistics and tri-service training.
  • Theatre structures tailored to India's geography, threat perception and force availability, rather than mechanically replicating foreign models.

Conclusion:

• Theatreisation is ultimately a test of India's ability to move from service-centric thinking to jointness.
• Inter-service concerns must be negotiated rather than allowed to become an indefinite veto over reform.
• India's next security crisis will not wait for organisational disagreements to be settled; therefore, a workable theatre-command structure must be established before-not after-the next crisis.